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Stress is a normal part of adolescence, yet young people differ markedly in their vulnerability 
or resilience in the face of everyday stressors (Wright, Masten, & Narayan, 2013). Research 
has begun to investigate whether emotional intelligence (EI), a set of adaptive traits and skills 
involving the perception, understanding, use, and regulation of emotions (Zeidner & 
Matthews, 2018), acts as a ‘stress buffer’, that operates within risk trajectories to safeguard 
mental health and well-being (e.g., Keefer, Saklofske, & Parker, 2018; Mikolajczak, Petrides, 
Coumans, & Luminet, 2009). However, there is a pressing need to conduct more process-
oriented EI research, especially in adolescent populations (Fiori, 2009; Peña-Sarrionandia, 
Mikolajczak, & Gross, 2015).  
This programme of research explores how and when EI, measured as both an ability 
(AEI), and as a trait (TEI), acts as a potential stress buffer, through direct effects on the stress 
response, and indirect effects on emotion regulation (ER) mechanisms. Across three studies 
(total n = 318, age range = 16 - 18 years), the research tests the extent to which EI moderates 
several ER processes under stress, as identified from Gross’ ER framework (1998a; 1998b). 
These include ‘early’ effects (e.g., attentional biases), and ‘later’, more effortful processes 
(e.g., coping style), in addition to direct moderation of the stress response itself (e.g., 
psychological and physiological reactivity). EI’s effects are examined in the context of both an 
active stressor (acute psychosocial stress) and a passive stressor (exposure to distressing 
posts on social media). 
While findings are mixed, they suggest that EI does sometimes bestow protection for 
adolescents when faced with stressors, and moderates several processes within response 
trajectories (notably, attentional deployment and response modulation), beyond the 
influence of higher-order personality traits and general cognitive ability. However, these 
effects are context dependent. Specifically, certain facets of TEI appear most useful when 
adolescents experience acute psychosocial stress, whereas when confronted with highly 
emotive material on social media, AEI seems more pertinent. The work suggests both the trait 
and ability approaches to the study of EI offer valuable insight into adolescent adaptation, 
and represents a positive step forward in our pursuit to understand how EI might lead to 
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AN OVERVIEW OF THE THESIS 
 
1.1 Context of the research 
Emotional intelligence (EI) refers to a set of adaptive traits and skills involving the 
perception, understanding, use, and regulation of emotions (Zeidner & Matthews, 2018). 
EI can be conceptualised as either a trait (TEI; a constellation of emotional self-
perceptions assessed through self-report questionnaires, akin to personality; Petrides, 
Pita, & Kokkinaki, 2007), or an ability, in which EI comprises emotion-related cognitive 
abilities, measured via maximum performance tests, similarly to IQ (AEI: Mayer, Roberts, 
& Barsade, 2008). Since its conception in the 1990s (Salovey & Mayer, 1990), there has 
been an abundance of research identifying associations between EI and a range of 
adaptive life outcomes. For young people, notable outcomes have included better mental 
health (e.g., Fernández-Berrocal, Alcaide, Extremera, & Pizarro, 2006; Schutte, Malouff, 
Thorsteinsson, Bhullar, & Rooke, 2007), improved well-being (e.g., Austin, Saklofske, & 
Egan, 2005; Chamorro-Premuzic, Bennett, & Furnham, 2007), and educational attainment 
(MacCann, Jiang, Brown, Double, Bucich, & Minbashian, 2020). Despite a lack of 
understanding of how and when EI leads to those benefits, there has been a proliferation 
of EI training programmes, underpinned by the expectation that EI is a universally positive 
and adaptive construct to cultivate in young people (e.g., Castillo-Gualda, Cabello, 
Herrero, Rodríguez‐Carvajal, & Fernández‐Berrocal, 2017).  
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Many individual differences, such as personality or IQ, are generally assumed to 
be relatively stable, with the exception of natural changes over the lifespan. For example, 
the personality trait conscientiousness generally increases with age (Debast, van Alphen, 
Rossi, Tummers, Bolwerk, & Derksen, 2014; Wagner, Lüdtke, & Robitzsch, 2019), and IQ 
scores typically decrease with normal ageing (Miller, Myers, Prinzi, & Mittenberg, 2009). 
In contrast, EI (particularly TEI) appears to be more malleable and susceptible to 
environmental influences and training efforts, and thus a target for intervention. 
Academic and public interest in EI has also prospered as a result of the culture-driven 
concern with the positive role of emotions, and the growing discipline of positive 
psychology. The subsequent focus on cultivating ‘soft skills’ or ‘character strengths’ (e.g., 
self-regulation, empathy, optimism, resilience) in young people (Ciarrochi, Atkins, Hayes, 
Sahdra, & Parker, 2016; Shoshani & Steinmetz, 2014; Suldo, 2016) is reflected in an 
upsurge of EI training initiatives in schools, often falling under the general rubric of ‘social 
and emotional learning’ (SEL) or ‘emotional literacy education’ (Zeidner, Matthews, & 
Roberts, 2012a). EI can be trained directly (i.e., designed according to a specific EI model, 
e.g., Castillo-Gualda, et al., 2017), or indirectly (e.g., through mindfulness interventions; 
Jung et al., 2016). 
The aims of EI training and SEL are similar, but distinct. EI training aims to 
“systematically develop critical social and emotional competencies” (Nathanson, Rivers, 
Flynn, & Brackett, 2016, p.1), whereas SEL aims to enable individuals to “acquire and 
effectively apply the knowledge, attitudes and skills necessary to understand and manage 
emotions, set and achieve positive goals, feel and show empathy for others, establish and 
maintain positive relationships, and make responsible decisions” (Collaborative for 
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Academic, Social and Emotional Learning, 2019). While SEL and EI training are not 
interchangeable terms, their respective aims both highlight the zeitgeist of cultivating 
protective factors to produce resilient young people through emotional education. 
However, unlike SEL, which can be somewhat broad and unscientific, EI-based 
programmes have stronger theoretical foundations (Humphrey, Curran, Morris, Farrell, & 
Woods, 2007). Indeed, the British-based Social and Emotional Aspects of Learning 
initiative (Department for Education, 2005) suggests EI should be a guiding concept for 
practice. Both SEL and EI training programs typically include specific activities and 
strategies designed to boost emotional traits and/or abilities (e.g., Weare, 2010). For 
example, students are trained to recognise and label their emotions using a mood-meter 
in the RULER programme, which is firmly grounded in the four-branch ability EI model 
(Nathanson et al., 2016). The INTEMO project involves class discussions on strategies to 
use when difficult emotions in the classroom (i.e., emotion regulation), and the 
acquisition of emotional vocabulary (i.e., emotion knowledge) through playing games 
(Ruiz-Aranda, Castillo, Salguero, Cabello, Fernández-Berrocal, & Balluerka, 2012a). 
Although the amount, nature, and quality of Personal, Social and Health Education (PSHE; 
which covers SEL) varies considerably between schools in England, SEL has remained high 
on the agenda of UK schools, even during periods of significant political and economic flux 
(Allen, 2011; Powell, 2019; Turner, Sutton, Harrison, Hennessey, & Humphrey, 2019).  
Broadly speaking, any intervention designed to promote mental health and well-
being should be informed by a sound theoretical framework (Millar, & Donnelly, 2014), 
and SEL interventions are no exception (Gresham, 2017). However, because many SEL 
programmes (and subsequent evaluations) are not specifically designed to address EI, the 
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level of EI content in them is often insufficient and only relates to EI tangentially 
(Matthews, Zeidner, & Roberts, 2002). This is exemplified by a recent qualitative study 
(Wood, 2020) in which 402 staff members across 38 UK schools were interviewed, to 
explore how they aimed to improve student EI through their school’s own idiosyncratic 
SEL programmes. Findings indicated that schools varied considerably in how they 
conceptualised EI, which consequently impacted the enactment of SEL, and the ways in 
which staff worked with students to develop their social, emotional, and behavioural skills 
(Wood, 2020). Thus, because SEL interventions are often broad, there is a risk that the 
nature and operationalisation of emotional skills could be misinterpreted without the 
supporting foundation of an EI theory-informed framework (Humphrey et al., 2007).  
As a result of the heterogeneity in school ethos, practices, and extent to which 
interventions incorporate EI content explicitly, the evidence base concerning their 
effectiveness is mixed. While meta-analyses often reveal that SEL programmes can 
promote positive social, emotional and behavioural outcomes, when compared to a 
control group (usually a ‘waiting list’ condition) (Durlak, Weissberg, Dymnicki, Taylor, & 
Schellinger, 2011; Sklad, Diekstra, De Ritter, Ben, & Gravesteijn, 2012; Wigelsworth, 
Lendrum, Oldfield, Scott, ten Bokkel, Tate, & Emery, 2015), effects are often small to 
moderate, and dependent on many factors (e.g., programme length, involvement of the 
programme developer in the evaluation). However, the validity of the outcome measures 
of such studies is often questionable, since few actually use EI measures at baseline or 
during post-study evaluations. The majority of interventions opt for outcomes considered 
to be influenced by increased EI to some extent. For example, the ongoing INTEMO 
program for adolescents has demonstrated better psychosocial adjustment (e.g., lower 
5 
 
levels of depression, anxiety, social stress, higher self-esteem) (Ruiz-Aranda, Salguero, 
Cabello, Palomera, & Fernández-Berrocal, 2012), and reductions in physical or verbal 
aggression (Castillo-Gualda et al., 2017). Promoting Alternative Thinking Strategies 
(PATHS; Greenberg, Kusché, & Riggs, 2004) is one of the only SEL interventions designed 
specifically to promote EI and to include EI as part of its framework. However, PATHS 
evaluations still neglect EI as an outcome measure, and instead use teacher-ratings of 
prosocial behaviour, and internalising and externalising problems as proxies (Humphrey, 
Barlow, & Lendrum, 2018). Thus, improvements in EI can only be inferred. Furthermore, 
programmes also rarely distinguish between whether their EI curriculum aims to train 
emotional traits or abilities (Qualter, Gardner, & Whiteley, 2007). This is an important 
distinction, because TEI and AEI have been long-established as separate constructs from 
both theoretical and empirical perspectives (O’Connor & Little, 2003; Petrides & 
Furnham, 2000; Warwick & Nettelbeck, 2004).  
Given the limited public funding available for such programmes, ensuring cost-
effectiveness is critical (Humphrey et al. 2018). However, independent economic 
evaluations of SEL programmes often suggest they are not cost-effective. For example, 
Berry et al. (2016) conducted a thorough examination the PATHS programme, in which 56 
UK schools participated. Cost-consequence analyses of the randomised controlled trial 
revealed that the intervention demonstrated no statistically significant effects on child 
behaviour or emotional well-being, yet the average cost of PATHS was £139 per child. A 
more recent prospective economic evaluation of the same intervention (Turner et al., 
2019) estimated that while the cost effectiveness of the PATHS curriculum was 84%, this 
dropped to 0% once teachers’ salary and time were included with other costs 
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(administration, materials, training), indicating the considerable uncertainty over the 
long-term cost effectiveness of such programmes. Furthermore, in that second trial, 
PATHS led to very small improvements in social and emotional outcomes (p < .10), and 
psychological well-being (p < .05), which dissipated by 12- and 24-month follow-ups. 
Ultimately, there is significant room for improvement with regards to the effectiveness of 
SEL and EI training programmes. Interventions are most effective when informed by a 
solid theoretical framework (Gresham, 2017), rather than on intuitive, idiosyncratic, or 
overinclusive accounts of EI (Zeidner, Matthews, & Roberts, 2012b). The core issue is that, 
while well-meaning, policies and school curricula have been keen to embrace EI training 
interventions before knowledge of the EI is underpinned by rigorous scientific 
investigation (i.e., the “cart before the horse”; Qualter et al., 2007). To move the EI field 
forward, many EI researchers have emphasised the need to examine the mechanisms of 
both TEI and AEI ‘in action’ (i.e., in situational contexts) (Fiori, 2009; Mikolajczak, Petrides, 
Coumans, & Luminet, 2009a; Mikolajczak, Roy, Verstrynge, & Luminet, 2009b). However, 
the processes underlying EI are often overlooked (Fiori, 2009; Mikolajczak & Luminet, 
2008), and SEL (and even EI-based) interventions are unsupported with respect to 
processes (i.e., an understanding of how EI might lead to beneficial outcomes). 
Once touted as an unequivocally ‘bright’ adaptive marker of mental health and 
well-being in young people, EI is now the subject of intense scientific scrutiny. Moreover, 
much of the EI training literature relates to children or young adolescents (i.e., under 16 
years), despite the claims that EI holds a pivotal role in promoting adaptive functioning in 
older adolescents (Davis, 2018a). Before allocating scant public resources to rolling out EI 
training programmes, it is important to increase our understanding of if, how, when, and 
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why, EI promotes adaptive outcomes for adolescents, particularly for those aged 16-18 
years. Doing so will benefit the future design of high quality, effective, and age-
appropriate interventions. Furthermore, if scientific investigations find that EI does not 
confer advantages (or even has detrimental effects; Davis & Nichols, 2016) for young 
people aged 16-18 years, it is ethically problematic that costly EI training programmes are 
being developed, endorsed, and implemented. Ultimately, we need to know more about 
how EI works. 
One school of thought posits that EI may lead to resilience by facilitating adaptive 
stress regulation processes (Davis, 2018a; 2018b), since EI appears an especially useful 
individual-level resource under challenging circumstances (Keefer, Saklofske, & Parker, 
2018; Mikolajczak et al., 2009a). Typically, those studies have employed a cross-sectional 
design to examine correlations between EI and some aspect of stress (e.g., perceived 
occupational stress, or life stress; Extremera, Durán, and Rey, 2007; Mikolajczak, Luminet, 
& Menil, 2006). While such work has been important for demonstrating associations 
between EI and adaptive stress outcomes, a process-oriented approach is needed to 
understand how EI may relate to stress regulation in context (i.e., when the individual is 
acutely stressed) (Davis, 2018b; Fiori, 2009). EI may lessen the effects of stress (and thus 
lead to its documented positive outcomes) through moderation of adaptive stress 
regulation processes. However, there is scant research of that nature. In particular, there 
is a dearth of evidence for adolescence, a developmental stage that involves intense 
emotional development, yet also numerous everyday stressors (Ahmed, Bittencourt-
Hewitt, & Sebastian, 2015; Harper, Dickinson, & Bramwell, 2014). EI could play an 
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important role with respect to buffering the effects of acute stress in adolescence, but 
research has not yet systematically explored that hypothesis. 
The present programme of research endeavours to make several contributions to 
knowledge, by addressing prominent gaps in the evidence base. To reflect 
recommendations that the role of EI needs to be explored in different contexts, stress 
regulation processes are examined in both a lab-based context (i.e., in a stress induction 
paradigm), and an applied context (i.e., on social media). Both approaches utilise 
different stressors (i.e., psychosocial stressor; emotive social media posts), and data 
collection environments (i.e., controlled setting; online). Across these contexts, the 
research examines how EI contributes to several mechanisms of stress regulation. Using 
Gross’ (1998a; 1998b) theory of emotion regulation as a framework, the influence of EI on 
the acute stress response will be considered from multiple perspectives, including 
attentional allocation (e.g., testing whether EI facilitates bias for emotive stimuli), 
cognitive change (e.g., testing whether EI relates to explicit coping), and response 
modulation (e.g., testing whether EI is associated with reactivity to, and recovery from, 
acute stress). Data obtained from the programme of research will therefore indicate 
whether the capacity of EI to buffer acute stress differs as a function of methodological 
and situational factors.  
A further contribution of the research concerns the measurement of EI. Within the 
literature examining the stress-buffering function of EI, most studies focus on TEI, rather 
than AEI, yet understanding the contribution of both constructs is important (Fernández-
Berrocal & Extremera, 2006). Moreover, some suggest that TEI and AEI may work 
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together to achieve positive life outcomes (e.g., Davis & Humphrey, 2012a). Emotional 
skills (AEI) may be insufficient on their own - individuals must also feel confident in those 
skills (TEI) for them to translate into behavior (Keefer et al., 2018). The present research 
explores the role of EI from both trait and ability perspectives. In addition, the 
incremental effects of EI are examined, by controlling for confounding influences that 
form part of EI’s nomological network (e.g., personality; Petrides et al., 2007; cognitive 
ability; Elfenbein & MacCann, 2017). Accounting for such constructs helps to produce as 
‘clean’ an assessment as possible when establishing the roles of TEI and AEI (Davis, 
2018b). All research is conducted with adolescents aged 16-18 years, an empirically 
neglected, but potentially vulnerable, population. Ultimately, the EI field requires 
research that addresses shortcomings in the literature relating to adolescent populations, 
process (i.e., how and when EI operates), and whether effects vary across contexts.  
1.2 Philosophical stance, aims, and objectives 
The research seeks to test the utility of EI as a ‘stress buffer’ in young people, by 
examining how EI moderates a range of stress regulation processes. EI might help protect 
adolescents from the pathogenic effects of stress directly, or, indirectly, through 
deployment of adaptive emotion regulation (ER) strategies and mechanisms, conferring 
resilience (Keefer, Parker, & Saklofske, 2009). The need for us to understand how EI may 
form a protective factor for adolescent stress (i.e., a buffer), and what this is contingent 
on (e.g., ‘type’ of EI; situational factors), calls for experimental approaches that isolate 
and manipulate specific variables under different conditions (Davis, 2018b; Mikolajczak et 
al., 2009a; 2009b). There is also a pressing need to compare how effects might vary 
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between controlled settings, and real-world, applied settings. Thus, the research occupies 
a positivist epistemological position, which assumes that the creation of knowledge is 
based on empirical observation and the testing of specific hypotheses that predict the 
role of EI in relation to stress regulation processes (Haig, 2012). Broadly, the research 
examines whether observed empirical phenomena (i.e., emotional processing in stressful 
situations) fit with expectation (i.e., EI will relate to differences in emotion regulation 
processing to some extent). More specifically, hypotheses test whether EI moderates the 
stress response directly (e.g., by influencing affective or physiological responses to stress), 
or, indirectly, by moderating ER processes known to be integral to stress regulation. For 
the latter, these include ‘early’ effects (e.g., attentional biases), but also ‘later’, more 
effortful processes (e.g., coping style). There is also testing of a potential moderated 
mediation effect (e.g., where coping mediates the relationship between EI and stress 
reactivity, under stressful conditions). In line with recommendations for best practice, 
hypotheses in all three empirical studies were carefully constructed, driven by both 
theory (i.e., determined by what theorical principles suggest EI should do), and/or 
empirically driven (i.e., determined by what evidence suggests EI does), depending on the 
context (Asendorpf et al., 2013).  From an ontological perspective, this assumes the 
existence of an objective reality (the basic paradigm of the scientific method), and 
attempts to quantify this through deductive scientific inquiry (Silverman, 2013), a means 
of theory generation particularly suited to the positivist approach of hypothesis testing 
(Snieder & Larner, 2009).  
However, understanding complex phenomena requires complex methodology, a 
notion urged by the wider literature on mental health and well-being (Cloninger, 2004; 
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Diener, Pressman, Hunter, & Delgadillo-Chase, 2017). Thus, the research uses multiple 
data collection techniques and procedures, to systematically explore the role of EI in 
relation to affective, cognitive, and physiological mechanisms of stress regulation. For 
example, studies use standardised collection of numerical data, derived from both 
objective (e.g., eye-movements; heart rate), and subjective (e.g., self-reported mood; 
coping strategies) sources. Since the focus of the research is on acute stress, research is 
cross-sectional, to capture the workings of EI ‘in action’ (Davis, 2018b). The axiological 
perspective of positivist research is generally aimed at ensuring consistency, reliability, 
and minimising bias, whereby the researcher is independent from the data and maintains 
an objective “value-free” stance (Neuman, 2000). To work towards those values, studies 
the aim to elucidate the precise roles of the variables of interest (TEI; AEI), with 
interference from confounding variables controlled where possible (e.g., including 
potentially confounding influences as covariates in statistical analyses; standardised 
testing protocols). Figure 1 uses Saunder, Lewis, &Thornhill’s (2007) research ‘onion’ to 









Research ‘Onion’ Showing the ‘Layers’ of Methodology for the Current Research 
(Saunders’ et al., 2007)  
 
To investigate the role of EI in relation to stress regulation processes in older adolescents, 
there are three major aims and six objectives. Each objective relates to one or more of 
the three studies, hereby presented.  
Aim 1: To explore how TEI and AEI relate to stress regulation processes in adolescents 
Objective 1: To explore whether the magnitude and duration of physiological 
(heart rate; skin conductance) and subjective (self-rated mood) stress reactivity 
and recovery in response to a situational stressor is directly moderated by TEI/AEI 
(Studies 1 and 2) 
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Objective 2: To test whether attentional processing of emotive material under 
stressful conditions is moderated by TEI/AEI, using an eye-tracking task (Study 2) 
Objective 3: To use moderated mediation to determine whether coping strategies 
mediate the relationship between EI and stress reactivity, and whether this varies 
as a function of experimental condition (Study 1) 
Objective 4: To test whether TEI/AEI moderates responses to highly emotive social 
media posts with respect to affective, attentional, and behavioural processes 
(Study 3) 
Aim 2: To compare how TEI and AEI moderate stress regulation processes in different 
contexts 
Objective 5: To compare findings from Studies 1 and 2 (laboratory studies), and 
Study 3 (online social media study), to assess if TEI/AEI contribute differently to 
stress regulation processes in different contexts (general discussion) 
Aim 3: To examine whether TEI and AEI moderate stress regulation processes beyond 
confounding influences 
Objective 6: To test for incremental effects of TEI/AEI, by controlling for covariates 
of EI (e.g., personality; Petrides et al., 2007; cognitive ability; Elfenbein & 




1.3 Structure of the thesis 
Chapter 2 provides an in-depth explanation of the EI concept (conceptualisations, 
definitions, measurement) and highlights its potential role within the adolescence 
resilience framework. The notion of EI as a stress buffer is then introduced, with a summary 
of the evidence base concerning EI, positive life outcomes, and stress regulation in 
adolescents (Chapter 3). The next three chapters present the three empirical studies 
undertaken. The first study (Chapter 4) tests whether EI predicts stress reactivity and 
recovery in the context of a laboratory social stressor. This forms the foundation for the 
second study, which replicates the first, but also tests whether EI predicts attentional 
processing under stress, using eye-tracking (Chapter 5). The final study (Chapter 6) 
investigates EI and emotion regulation in a more applied context: reacting and responding 
to emotive material on social media. Chapter 7 provides a general discussion of the key 
findings, along with limitations, implications, and directions for future research. Figure 2 
shows the structure of the thesis, and indicates the key questions being addressed by each 










Diagram Presenting the Key Questions Addressed by Each Thesis Chapter 
 
Note. Chapters 1, 2 and 3 answer the questions by reviewing theoretical and empirical literature, 





AN INTRODUCTION TO EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE 
 
2.1 Chapter overview 
This chapter first outlines the brief historical context of EI, and argues that EI may hold a 
pivotal protective role within an adolescence resilience framework. In particular, EI may 
be crucial for healthy emotion regulation in late adolescence, a time of ‘storm and stress’, 
that comprises not only intense emotional development, but also poses substantial 
emotion regulation challenges for some young people (Ahmed et al., 2015). After a 
discussion of EI’s potential as a protective marker during adolescence, the chapter 
provides a detailed review of the current conceptualisations of EI, and coverage of the 
key issues for the trait and ability EI fields. Such challenges include establishing EI’s 
nomological networks and issues surrounding measurement, especially in adolescent 
populations. The chapter concludes by highlighting the need to understand the processes 
through which EI facilitates positive life outcomes in young people. 
2.2 What is EI? 
Emotional intelligence (EI) is defined as a set of adaptive traits and skills that relate to 
perceiving, understanding, using, and regulating emotions effectively (Zeidner & 
Matthews, 2018). The concept of EI can be traced back to the notion of “social 
intelligence” (Thorndike, 1920), which referred to a person’s ability to understand and 
manage others, and to engage in social interactions in an adaptive manner. Consideration 
for the importance and utility of emotions is therefore not new, and has emerged in 
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several areas of psychology, such as psychoanalysis (e.g., Taylor, Parker, & Bagby, 1999), 
intelligence testing (Gardner, 1983), and developmental psychology (e.g., Denham, 1989). 
However, it was not until 1990 that the term EI was formally introduced into the scientific 
literature (Salovey & Mayer, 1990). In their seminal paper, Salovey and Mayer (1990) 
defined EI as “a set of skills hypothesised to contribute to accurate appraisal and 
expression of emotion in oneself and others, the effective regulation of emotion in self 
and others, and the use of feelings to motivate, plan, and achieve in one’s life“ (p.1). In 
2000, the distinction between ‘trait’ and ‘ability’ models of EI was first presented 
(Petrides & Furnham, 2000), and is now standard in the scientific literature. Ability EI (AEI) 
concerns emotion-related cognitive abilities, measured via maximum performance tests, 
similarly to IQ (Mayer et al., 2008), whereas trait EI (TEI) refers to a constellation of 
emotional self-perceptions assessed through self-report questionnaires, akin to 
personality (Petrides et al., 2007). The conceptual differences between the two constructs 
are corroborated by empirical findings, which often demonstrate very low correlations 
between TEI and AEI (e.g., O’Connor & Little, 2003; Warwick & Nettelbeck, 2004). The TEI 
and AEI fields have developed relatively independently, with the TEI field the much larger 
of the two (Siegling, Saklofske, & Petrides, 2015a). Whilst there is consensus over the 
‘dual’ approach, whereby TEI and AEI represent different theoretical frameworks 
underlying emotionally intelligent behaviour (Boyatzis, 2019), few studies examine the 
contribution of both types of EI, instead focussing on TEI or AEI (though usually, TEI). 
Much of the work being conducted to strengthen the theoretical foundations for EI (e.g., 
taxonomies) is conducted separately for TEI and AEI (e.g., AEI: Elfenbein & MacCann, 
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2017; TEI: Petrides, Mikolajczak, Mavroveli, Sanchez-Ruiz, Furnham, & Pérez-González, 
2016).  
In the early years of EI, the popular literature on EI far outpaced scientific 
research. Much of the popularisation of EI can be attributed to the publication of a single 
book, “Emotional intelligence: Why it can matter more than IQ”, which highlighted the 
benefits of having high EI in the workplace, and has sold millions of copies worldwide 
(Goleman, 1995). Although Goleman’s work was heavily criticised for lacking empirical 
support, and failing to suggest reliable and valid measurements of EI (Daus & Ashkanasy, 
2003; Davies, Stankov, & Roberts, 1998; Perloff, 1997), a plethora of pseudoscientific EI 
models and texts followed. Many of those were developed primarily with commercial 
intentions, centred around self-help, or organisation-based applications, for example 
(e.g., Weisinger, 1998). However, the last two decades have also witnessed the 
construction of coherent theoretical EI frameworks (Petrides & Furnham, 2000), and the 
publication of numerous studies supporting EI as a strong predictor of life success 
(Brackett, Rivers, & Salovey, 2011). A considerable quantity of empirical evidence 
suggests that individuals with greater EI scores tend to be happier, healthier, and more 
productive, than those with lower EI scores (for overviews on EI and life success, see 
Brackett et al., 2011; Petrides et al., 2016). In particular, EI is theorised to play an 
important role during adolescence, the developmental period encompassing the 
transition from childhood to adulthood (e.g., Ruiz-Aranda, et al., 2012a). 
19 
 
2.2 Is EI a protective marker during adolescence? 
Adolescence has recently received an expanded and more inclusive definition, with the 
age window now suggested to span the ages of 10 and 24 years (Sawyer, Azzopardi, 
Wickremarathne, & Patton, 2018). As a time of ‘storm and stress’, adolescence involves 
emotional development, but can also produce substantial emotion regulation challenges 
for some young people (Ahmed et al., 2015; Riediger & Klipker, 2014). Late adolescence 
comprises an additional life stage between adolescence and adulthood. Young people 
aged between 16 to 18 years often experience this as an age of ‘feeling in-between’ 
(Arnett, 2004; 2012; Hendry & Kloep, 2012), with others describing older adolescents as a 
‘forgotten group’, caught between child and adult, and between bureaucratic barriers 
(Kennedy, 2010). Older adolescents encounter multiple normative stressors, many for the 
first time (e.g., college exams, learning to drive, relationships, a first job, applying for 
university) (see Figure 3). Compared to when they were children, adolescents also self-
report more daily hassles, more negative emotions, and fewer positive emotions (Larson 
& Ham, 1993), and are required to regulate these more independently (Steinberg, 2008). 
While many of the stressors mentioned are not exclusive to adolescents aged 16-18 years 
(for example, peer pressure is a persistent stressor across adolescent development; 
Byrne, Davenport, & Mazanov, 2007), evidence does appear to suggest that late 
adolescence yields unique and complex emotional challenges, as noted by Zarrett and 
Eccles (2006): “Although early adolescence has received much attention by researchers as 
a period of major distress, late adolescence has become a period of concern among 
developmental researchers and youth advocates” (p. 13). Moreover, interventions 
designed to improve social and emotional skills are often ineffective for older adolescents 
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(Yeager, 2017; Yeager, Dahl, & Dweck, 2017). To help design effective and age-
appropriate interventions, more research is needed to understand the nuances in 
emotion regulation for older adolescents. 
Diagram Depicting the Adolescent Developmental Stages, and the Features Characterising 




While the aforementioned stressors are normative, and not universally harmful 
for adolescents per se, they are problematic for some. Recent statistics suggest that 
approximately 16.9% adolescents in the UK have a mental health problem (Sadler, Vizard, 
Ford, Goodman, Goodman, & McManus, 2018), with social and emotional difficulties 
appearing especially pronounced for young people aged between 16 and 18 years. Young 
people of this age seem vulnerable to developing mental health issues compared with 
either pre-16 adolescents or post-18 adults (Harper et al., 2014; Sadler et al., 2018). For 
example, the number of 16-18 year olds seeking counselling about exam stress has 
increased by 68% since 2015, which is disproportionate to the increase observed for all 




2017). The UK political landscape, which could exacerbate such issues in vulnerable young 
people, is also of note. In the UK, the structure of mental health service provision creates 
problematic ‘gaps’ between child and adolescent mental health services (CAHMS) and 
adult services (AMHS) (Joint Commissioning Panel for Mental Health, 2012; Jones, 
Hassett, & Sclare, 2017). Mental health services are deemed at their weakest, and least 
effective, during that 16-18 transition period (McGorry, Bates, & Birchwood, 2013).  
The vulnerability of some 16-18 year olds to psychological issues is supported by 
neuroscientific research, which highlights this period as a key stage of brain development 
(Giedd et al., 1996; 1999). In particular, normative adolescent development during this 
time dictates functional maturation of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), an 
area associated with a variety of emotional processes, including self-control, and 
decision-making (Heberlein, Padon, Gillihan, Farah, & Fellows, 2008; Wolf, Philippi, 
Motzkin, Baskaya, & Koenigs, 2014). Maturation of those prefrontal regions also 
facilitates new cognitive forms of ER (Casey, Jones, Levita, Libby, Patwell, Ruberry, & 
Somerville, 2010; McRae et al., 2012). It is therefore unsurprising that adolescents 
undergoing this important stage of development can sometimes experience problems 
with the regulation of affect and behaviour (Steinberg, 2005). Compared to adolescents 
aged 18-25 years (early adulthood), some adolescents aged 16-18 years are less skilled at 
understanding actions and consequences (Crone & Molen, 2004), and show more risk 
behaviours (Gardner & Steinberg, 2005). Skill and traits relating to stress regulation in 




However, the ability to navigate those emotional challenges differs markedly 
between individuals; not all adolescents that encounter stressors develop psychological 
difficulties (Luthar, Sawyer, & Brown, 2006; Wright, Masten, & Narayan, 2013). Such 
individuals are often termed ‘resilient’, since they demonstrate positive adaptation 
despite experiencing adversity and threats to development. Investigation of resilience 
processes requires the identification of both risk factors (which make individuals more 
vulnerable to the effects of adversity), and protective markers (which enable resilience 
against the effects of adversity) (Olsson, Bond, Burns, Vella-Brodrick, & Sawyer, 2003; 
Masten, Hubbard, Gest, Tellegen, Garmezy, & Ramirez, 1999). Therefore, if EI helps 
individuals to moderate the impact of stressors (i.e., by acting as a stress buffer), then it 
should be considered a protective marker that facilitates resilience (McMahon, Grant, 
Compas, Thurm, & Ey, 2003). 
There is already a substantial amount of evidence suggesting that individuals with 
high EI tend to achieve positive life outcomes, including good mental health (e.g., 
Fernández-Berrocal et al., 2006; Martins, Ramalho, & Morin, 2010; Resurrección, 
Salguero, & Ruiz-Aranda, 2014; Schutte et al., 2007), well-being (e.g,  Austin et al., 2005; 
Chamorro-Premuzic et al., 2007), and academic achievement (MacCann et al., 2020). 
However, those studies typically only identify simple associations between EI and 
outcomes (e.g., high EI – low anxiety). For example, lower EI generally predicts higher 
levels of trait anxiety and depression in adolescent populations (Fernández-Berrocal et al., 
2006; Schutte et al., 2007). Evidence also supports a relationship between TEI and positive 
psychological indices of well-being, such as life satisfaction and happiness (Austin et al., 
2005; Chamorro-Premuzic et al., 2007; Petrides & Furnham, 2003; Livingstone & Day, 
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2005; Palmer, Donaldson & Stough, 2002). In almost all cases, higher TEI scores predict 
higher scores on aspects of well-being. However, the issue of circularity and 
contamination may be inflating this effect, since both constructs assess how positive a 
person’s self-perceptions are (Keefer et al., 2018). This notion is somewhat supported by 
findings indicating that relationships between AEI, a more objective measure of 
emotional skill, and well-being, are weaker (Martins et al., 2010). Nonetheless, while the 
evidence linking EI with positive outcomes is convincing, it is currently unclear how having 
higher EI leads to those outcomes (i.e., resilience) in adolescents.  
Resilience is not a static quality, trait, skill, or ability, but rather a dynamic 
interaction between risk factors and protective markers that can buffer the effects of 
adversity (Luthar & Cushing, 2002). Thus, identifying simple associations between EI and 
life outcomes does not tell us how EI confers resilience. To rigorously investigate how and 
when EI contributes to stress regulation, we need to conduct EI research that is more 
process-oriented (Peña-Sarrionandia, Mikolajczak, & Gross, 2015). Contextualised within 
a resilience framework, research has begun to investigate EI as a protective marker that 
operates within stress regulation pathways to lead to positive life outcomes in young 
people (e.g., Ciarrochi, Deane, & Anderson, 2002; Davis & Humphrey, 2012a; 2014; 
Mikolajczak, et al., 2006). However, there is still a need for research that assesses how EI 
relates to emotion regulation under adverse or stressful conditions, ‘in action’ (e.g., 
Mikolajczak, Nelis, Hansenne, & Quoidbach, 2008). Doing so will help characterise some 
of the mechanisms that might underpin the advantageous nature of EI. Progression 
towards testing that hypothesis is, however, hindered by other factors. For example, 
pronounced differences in how studies conceptualise EI (i.e., as a trait or an ability), and 
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inconsistent consideration for the incremental effects of EI to predict outcomes over and 
above allied constructs (e.g., personality; Zeidner et al., 2012b; cognitive ability; 
MacCann, Joseph, Newman, & Roberts, 2014), continue to permeate the literature. Issues 
concerning measurement and conceptualisation of EI is provided later in this chapter, and 
a thorough review of the literature examining EI and stress regulation processes is 
provided in Chapter 3. Despite the dearth of knowledge concerning the mechanisms 
underpinning EI, there has been considerable interest in ‘training’ EI in children and 
young people over the last decade (Chapter 1). This is problematic, considering that we 
do not fully understand when and how EI functions with respect to resilience. Before 
highlighting what needs to be done to progress the EI field, it is important that to 
consider how EI is currently conceptualised and measured. 
2.3 Conceptualising and measuring EI 
One of the key challenges in the EI field is understanding its nomological network (i.e., 
deciphering the interrelationships between EI and related constructs). Following its 
introduction into the scientific literature, EI was met with concerns that the construct was 
simply “reinventing the wheel”, “old wine in new bottles”, or even “old wine packaged in 
new and glittering containers” (Zeidner et al., 2012b, p.22). Rapid popularisation of EI in 
the absence of a strong evidence base has led sceptics to describe EI as a poorly defined 
‘bandwagon’ based on unreasoned claims (Murphy & Sideman, 2006). However, much 
work has been done to try and distinguish EI from, and integrate EI with, many other 
related constructs. EI often explains unique variance in life outcomes beyond that 
explained by related constructs, such as personality (for review and meta-analysis, see 
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Andrei, Siegling, Aloe, Baldaro, & Petrides, 2016), and cognitive ability (Karim & Shah, 
2014). The sections below provide an overview of each EI ‘type’, and indicate the key 
challenges currently faced by the AEI and TEI fields, which include establishing a 
nomological network, and issues concerning measurement. Since the research for the 
thesis is conducted with 16-18 year olds, attention then turns to the issue of reliably and 
accurately measuring EI in older adolescents. 
2.3.1 AEI: Challenges and controversies 
The AEI approach conceives EI as a form of intelligence, where the content domain is 
emotions, similar to how numbers or words represent the content domains of numerical 
and verbal abilities (Mayer, Caruso, & Salovey, 2016). The most commonly utilised and 
accepted model of AEI is that proposed by Mayer and Salovey (1997). Their model 
proposes four abilities: emotion perception, emotion understanding, using emotion, and 
emotion management (see Figure 4 for examples). The first branch, emotion perception 
involves the ability to identify discrete emotions in others and oneself, requiring the 
individual to accurately attend, detect, and decipher emotional signals (Papadogiannis, 
Logan, & Sitarenios, 2009), and show self-awareness of one’s own physiological and 
psychological state (Mayer, Caruso, & Salovey, 1999). The second branch refers to using 
emotion to facilitate thought. In contrast to earlier research that viewed emotion and 
cognition as opposing forces (e.g., Lloyd, 1979), current thinking posits that cognition and 
emotional processes can interact to enhance thinking, and lead to adaptive behaviour 
(Fiori & Veseley-Maillefer, 2018). This branch captures the integration of emotions with 








information to perform cognitive activities such as problem-solving and decision-making 
(Mayer & Salovey, 1997). Understanding emotions (the third branch) comprises the ability 
to comprehend the antecedents and consequences of emotions in the self and others, and 
an understanding of how emotions vary as a function of time and context (Rivers, Brackett, 
Salovey, & Mayer, 2007). This requires proficiency in being able to predict which emotions 
will arise from a specific scenario, how someone’s emotional state will affect their 
behaviour, and an understanding of the way that emotions blend together to form complex 
emotional experiences. The fourth branch (emotion management) involves the ability to 
regulate one’s own, and others’ emotions effectively and as required/intended for the 
specific situation. Emotion management is thought to be the most sophisticated and 
cognitively complex of the four branches, and includes both up-regulation and down-
regulation.   
Efforts to develop performance-based measurement of EI culminated in the Mayer-
Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT; Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2002), in 
which EI is perceived as a general factor organised into the four emotional abilities 
described above (Mayer & Salovey, 1997). While these abilities converge with each other as 
distinct yet related skills (Elfenbein & MacCann, 2017), the branches are theorised to 
possess a hierarchical arrangement (see Figure 4). The ‘bottom’ branches (emotion 
perception, and using emotions to facilitate thought) are considered a necessary foundation 
(‘experiential’ processing) for the ‘top’ two (emotion understanding and management), 
which are considered more sophisticated, higher-level (‘strategic’) cognitive processes 
(Mayer & Salovey, 1997). The MSCEIT comprises 141 items across eight tasks (two tasks for 
each branch), for which ‘correct’ answers can be identified, using either ‘expert’ scoring 
(where the answers are agreed by emotion experts) or ‘consensus’ scoring (based on the 
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proportion of sample that endorsed that same answer), with generally high agreement 
found between the two methods (.93-.99; Mayer, Salovey, Caruso, & Sitarenios, 2003). The 
MSCEIT remains the most commonly used AEI measure in empirical research to date (as 
reported in systematic reviews, e.g., Gutiérrez-Cobo, Cabello, & Fernández-Berrocal, 2016; 
Laborde, Dosseville, & Allen, 2016; Lea, Davis, Mahoney, & Qualter, 2019). 
Historically, EI critics have claimed that AEI does not meet the standards for an 
intelligence (Roberts, Zeidner, & Matthews, 2001), arguing that there is a general absence of 
a clear conceptual model of intelligence within which to place EI. However, there have now 
been several efforts to locate AEI within the structure of intelligence, with factor-analytic 
studies suggesting that AEI occupies a position in the intelligence hierarchy at the level 
below g (the general factor of intelligence) (MacCann, 2010; MacCann et al., 2014). From a 
theoretical perspective, AEI should correlate with cognitive ability, but not too highly such 
that AEI would be rendered redundant (Elfenbein & MacCann, 2017). Furthermore, some 
argue that we should use a more nuanced approach to conceptualising AEI and intelligence, 
whereby the magnitude of relations should differ depending on whether the EI branches are 
related to fluid or crystallized intelligence (e.g., Roberts, Schulze, & MacCann, 2008). 
Whereas general intelligence (or, ‘general cognitive ability’) refers to an individual’s overall 
capacity for adaptation through effective information processing (Brody, 2004), 
contemporary frameworks suggest intelligence has crystallised and fluid components. 
According to the highly regarded Cattell-Horn-Carroll theory (Cattell, 1963; Stankov, Boyle, 
& Cattell, 1995; Sternberg & Kaufman, 1998), fluid intelligence (Gf) comprises ‘raw’ abilities, 
including abstract reasoning, concept formation, and novel problem solving, independently 
of acquired knowledge. In contrast, crystallised intelligence (Gc) includes higher level 
cognitive skills that rely on acquisition and application of explicit, culturally-based, 
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declarative knowledge. Findings often demonstrate positive but relatively weak associations 
between AEI and crystallised intelligence (i.e., using acquired knowledge to solve problems) 
(MacCann, Matthews, Zeidner, & Roberts, 2003; Mayer, Salovey & Caruso, 1999; Roberts et 
al., 2001). This has particularly been the case for the emotion management and emotion 
understanding branches of AEI (Farrelly & Austin, 2007; MacCann, 2010; MacCann, Fogarty, 
Zeidner, & Roberts, 2011). However, a recent meta-analysis (352 effect sizes from 80 
studies) examined the relations between the four AEI branches, fluid intelligence (Gf), and 
crystallised intelligence (Gc) (Olderbak, Semmler, & Doebler, 2018). Findings indicated that, 
for all branches, the strength of the relationship with Gf and Gc was equivalent (i.e., the 
magnitude of relationship between AEI and intelligence was not dependent on the 
intelligence ‘subtype’ examined). However, understanding emotions most strongly 
correlated with Gf/Gc combined, relative to using emotion to facilitate thought, managing 
emotions, and perceiving emotion (Olderbak et al., 2018). Taken together, the above 
findings suggest that while AEI (especially the strategic branches) generally relates to 
cognitive ability, the four branches of ability EI do not appear differentially related to Gf or 
Gc. It would appear that AEI relates to intelligence broadly, rather than specifically.  
Nevertheless, the structure of AEI itself is continuously being reviewed and refined. 
For example, emotion information processing (EIP) – how individuals (both consciously and 
automatically) acquire, perceive, encode, pay attention to, retain, and retrieve, emotional 
information - has been proposed as an important component of both EI and emotion 
regulation (Fiori & Veseley-Maillefer, 2018). In other words, emotionally intelligent 
behaviour could be in part be underpinned by differences in EIP, such as the speed of 
processing emotional information (see Figure 4, also Austin, 2005; Matthews et al., 2002). 
Emotions are an important source of information in our environment (Schwartz, 2012), and, 
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in theory, EI could promote adaptation by enabling more efficient processing of that 
information. The information-processing approach to EI is small, but growing (Gutiérrez-
Cobo et al., 2016; Veseley-Maillefer et al., 2018). Overall, findings indicate that AEI predicts 
efficient emotion processing more strongly than TEI, alluding to AEI’s links with cognitive 
abilities (Gutiérrez-Cobo et al., 2016; Gutiérrez-Cobo, Cabello, Fernández-Berrocal, 2017). In 
an attempt to integrate the EI and EIP perspectives, Veseley-Maillefer and colleagues (2018) 
recently introduced the ‘PAT’ theoretical framework (EIP, AEI, and TEI) to explain how TEI, 
AEI, and EIP may interact to predict emotionally intelligent behaviour, and downstream EI-
related outcomes.  
Specifically, Fiori and colleagues have recently suggested the notion of a fluid, 
experiential component of AEI, to capture the automatic EIP that occurs independently of 
acquired knowledge (Fiori & Veseley-Maillefer, 2018). The key issue is that contemporary 
AEI measurements are less than ideal, and do not provide valid and sufficient coverage of 
the AEI construct (Olderbak et al., 2018). In theory, scoring highly on AEI measures is 
supposed to represent proficiency in emotion-related cognitive abilities, encompassing 
superior EIP, and coverage of AEI’s fluid and crystallised components (Fiori & Veseley-
Maillefer, 2018; Veseley-Maillefer, Udayar, & Fiori, 2018). This is not the case. For example, 
the MSCEIT structure has been disputed and contradicted on several occasions (e.g., Fiori & 
Antonakis, 2011), with some suggesting the addition of two new abilities (emotion 
expression ability and emotion attention regulation), and the splitting of emotion 
management into ‘regulating own’ and ‘regulating others’ emotions (Elfenbein, Jang, 
Sharma, & Sanchez-Burks, 2017; Elfenbein & MacCann, 2017). Furthermore, researchers 
often suggest that the branch concerning using emotion to facilitate thought is problematic, 
and that models without this branch show improved construct validity and fit MSCEIT data 
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better (e.g., Gardner & Qualter, 2011). Thus, the facilitation branch is often flagged as 
conceptually redundant (Palmer, Gignac, Manocha, & Stough 2005; Rossen, Kranzler, & 
Algina, 2008). Some EI researchers argue that facilitating emotion could instead be 
considered as part of the emotion management branch, since using emotions to accomplish 
goals can be a form of emotion regulation (Joseph & Newman, 2010; Maul, 2011; Maul, 
2012). As a consequence, studies sometimes omit the facilitation branch a priori when 
measuring AEI (e.g., Joseph & Newman, 2010).  
The MSCEIT is costly to purchase, and the scoring process lacks transparency, since it 
is scored off-site by the publisher, Multi-Health Systems Inc. (Keefer, Parker, & Saklofske, 
2018). The unorthodox use of consensus scoring or expert scoring is also problematic due to 
the subjectivity of the emotional experience (Siegling et al., 2015a), and the lack of 
consideration for context (Fiori, Antonietti, Mikolajczak, Luminet, Hansenne, & Rossier, 
2014). Furthermore, the majority of the items of the MSCEIT (and indeed, most AEI 
instruments) assess performance in hypothetical scenarios, which relies on emotion 
knowledge, rather than the ability to execute adaptive behaviour. Individuals could be adept 
at thinking and describing how they or a generic person should behave in a hypothetical 
situation, but lack the procedural skill to execute these behaviours themselves in everyday 
life (Fiori, 2009). The construct validity of the MSCEIT is therefore questionable, since scores 
might reflect vocabulary size, conformity to social norms, emotional knowledge, 
stereotypical judgements, or a combination (Petrides, 2011; Siegling et al., 2015a). There is 
a pressing need for improved AEI assessment tools. 
Newer, non-commercial alternative AEI instruments have since been developed, to 
address the MSCEIT construct validity issues (Fiori & Veseley-Maillefer, 2018). For this, a 
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piecemeal approach is generally taken. Unlike the MSCEIT, some of the more contemporary 
measures do not often represent all four branches of the four-branch AEI model within the 
same instrument. This seems a logical approach, as summarised by Fiori and Veseley-
Maillefer (2018): 
Knowing that EI is a complex construct, it seems unlikely that “one perfect” measure 
that would capture all the different components of EI is in the near future. It may be 
more realistic to aim for “several good” measures of EI, each of them capturing key 
aspects of this construct with satisfactory reliability and validity (p.41). 
Among the new assessments are the Situational Test of Emotion Management 
(STEM), and the Situational Test of Emotion Understanding (STEU) (MacCann & Roberts, 
2008), both of which are freely available. Unlike the MSCEIT, which was empirically keyed, 
the STEU uses a theoretical scoring system, using Roseman’s (2001) appraisal theory of 
emotions. To tackle the issue of construct validity, for which the MSCEIT is commonly 
criticised, the STEM characteristics have been experimentally manipulated to distinguish 
test effects from construct effects (MacCann & Roberts, 2008). In the STEM, participants 
select the optimum emotional management strategy to deal with either sadness, anger, or 
fear, across a diverse range of 44 scenarios. In contrast, the STEU instructs the participant to 
identify which emotion (e.g., sadness, pride, regret, contempt, frustration, anger, fear) is 
most likely to be felt in a range of given situations. Despite their relatively recent 
development, psychometric properties of the STEU and STEM appear convincing so far, with 
adequate reliabilities of .71 (STEU) and .68 (STEM) (MacCann & Roberts, 2008). As the thesis 
utilises those newer AEI measures, more information about the STEM and STEU is provided 
in Chapter 4. Some of the newer measures, particularly those assessing the emotion 
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perception branch, are more dynamic (e.g., Multimodal Emotion Recognition Test [MERT]; 
Bänziger, Grandjean, & Scherer; 2009; Geneva Emotion Recognition Test [GERT]; Schlegel & 
Scherer, 2015), whereby participants select the emotion being expressed in video clips. 
Fortunately, the future regarding AEI assessment is promising, and the field appears to be 
progressing towards more reliable and valid forms of assessment (Fiori & Veseley-Maillefer, 
2018; Keefer et al., 2018).  
2.3.2 TEI: Challenges and controversies 
Following Goleman’s influential book (Goleman, 1995), several attempts were made to 
develop self-report EI measures (i.e., TEI) alongside the skill-based (i.e., AEI) measures 
outlined in the above section. In contrast to AEI, which approaches EI as a set of emotional 
competencies, TEI is an umbrella term for emotional traits and dispositions that underlie 
emotionally intelligent behaviour (Petrides et al., 2007). TEI is often labelled as ‘self-
reported’ EI, or emotional self-efficacy, since it represents people’s beliefs about their 
emotions (Petrides et al., 2016). Unlike the case for AEI, the TEI field is not dominated by a 
single instrument, and data is derived from multiple tests. While TEI instruments vary widely 
in their content and, by extension, coverage of the TEI sampling domain, TEI measures share 
the same measurement method of self-report questionnaires, with responses typically 
modulated on a Likert scales (e.g., the Trait Emotional Intelligence Questionnaire [TEIQue]; 
Petrides, 2009; Emotional Quotient Inventory [EQ-i]; Bar-On, 1997; Schutte Emotional 
Intelligence Scale [SEIS]; Schutte & Malouff, 1998).  
One key issue is that TEI measures are sometimes criticized for having an unclear 
structure. For example, the EQ-i is often considered somewhat vague, having been 
converted from a well-being inventory to an EI questionnaire (Pérez, Petrides, & Furnham, 
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2005). In addition, some TEI instruments (e.g., EQ-i Bar-On, 1997; SEIS; Schutte & Malouff, 
1998) are restricted in their range and depth of coverage of the TEI domain, and do not 
sufficiently capture some important aspects of emotional functioning, such as emotion 
regulation, emotion expression, and self-motivation (Parker, Keefer, & Wood, 2011; Pérez et 
al., 2005; Petrides, 2009; Schutte & Malouff, 1998). The sampling domain of TEI most 
commonly used in contemporary studies was derived by Petrides and Furnham (2001), via a 
content analysis of early models of EI and related constructs, with the aim of providing a 
general platform to interpret subjective emotional self-efficacy (Table 1). The TEIQue family 
of measures (e.g., TEIQue, TEIQue-Short Form [TEIQue-SF], TEIQue-Adolescent Full Form 
[AFF]) (Petrides, 2009) are some of the few TEI tools that have been developed according to 
a clear theoretical framework (Siegling et al., 2015a; Siegling, Veseley, Petrides, & Saklofske, 
2015b). The TEIQue is not only the most commonly used measure when assessing TEI (e.g., 
Lea et al., 2019), but, compared to other TEI instruments, has been found to be the best 
predictor of multiple psychological criteria in adults (Gardner & Qualter, 2010). TEIQue 
measures generally show excellent reliability which usually exceeds .80 (e.g., Cooper & 
Petrides, 2010; Petrides, 2009), a robust factor structure that retains its validity even in the 
brief versions (Cooper & Petrides, 2010), and good predictive validity (Petrides, 2011). Thus, 
the programme of research will use the TEIQue to measure TEI in all three empirical studies, 
and the remainder of the theoretical and empirical discussions of TEI in this chapter will 







The Sampling Domain of Trait Emotional Intelligence (Petrides & Furnham, 2001) 
 
Facets High scorers perceive themselves as… 
Adaptability …flexible and willing to adapt to new conditions 
Assertiveness …forthright, frank, and willing to stand up for their rights 
Emotion perception (self and others) …clear about their own and other people’s feelings 
Emotion expression …capable of communicating their feelings to others 
Emotion management (others) …capable of influencing other people’s feelings 
Emotion regulation …capable of controlling their emotions 
Impulsiveness (low) …reflective and less likely to give in to their urges 
Relationships …capable of having fulfilling personal relationships  
Self-esteem …successful and self-confident 
Self-motivation …driven and unlikely to give up in the face of adversity 
Social awareness …accomplished networkers with excellent social skills 
Stress management …capable of withstanding pressure and regulating stress 
Trait empathy …capable of taking someone else’s perspective 
Trait happiness …cheerful and satisfied with their lives 
Trait optimism …confident and likely to ‘look on the bright side of life’ 
 
But what exactly is TEI? There has been a crucial need to establish TEI beyond “a 
grab-bag of desirable personal characteristics” such as agreeableness, optimism, empathy, 
and assertiveness (Zeidner, Matthews, & Roberts, 2006, p.102). Figure 5 illustrates the TEI 
sampling domain, and its nomological network. Expectedly, TEI shows little or no 
relationship with cognitive ability in empirical studies (Newsome, Day & Cantano, 2000; 
Derksen, Kramer, & Katzko, 2002). However, TEI scales tend to correlate substantially with 
several of the Big Five personality traits, such as those of the Five Factor Model (FFM; 
McCrae & Costa, 2008). Specifically, global TEI typically shows a strong positive relationship 




Diagram of the Nomological Network of Trait Emotional Intelligence (TEI), Based on the Trait Emotional Intelligence Questionnaire 





small positive correlations with openness, agreeableness, and conscientiousness, as 
demonstrated by meta-analytic investigations (e.g., van der Linden, Pekaar, Bakker, 
Schermer, Vernon, Dunkel, & Petrides, 2017; van Rooy & Viswesvaran, 2004). As such, 
throughout EI’s history, there have been concerns that the associations between EI and 
adaptive outcomes simply reflect the overlap between EI and personality traits (Zeidner et 
al., 2012b).  
To help establish the discriminant validity of TEI, there have been several attempts 
to locate TEI in personality space. Such endeavours have indicated that TEI is both distinct 
(i.e., it can be isolated in personality space), and compound (i.e., it correlates with several 
higher-order personality dimensions), concluding that TEI is located at the lower levels of 
personality hierarchies (De Raad, 2005; Petrides & Furnham, 2001; Petrides et al., 2016). 
Further factor analyses have demonstrated that TEI facets define a distinct oblique factor in 
the spaces of the Giant Three and Big Five (Petrides et al., 2007). Importantly, the literature 
now suggests that TEI typically shows incremental validity over personality traits in criteria 
pertaining to many different areas of functioning, including physical and mental health, 
academic achievement, and behavioural criteria (Andrei et al., 2016; Siegling et al., 2015b; 
Siegling, Veseley, Saklofske, Frederickson, & Petrides, 2017). However, controlling for 
personality helps produce a ‘clean’ assessment as possible when establishing the role of TEI 
(Davis, 2018b). It is wise to still test for the incremental effects of TEI in situations where the 
role of TEI is still relatively unknown (e.g., attentional selection; Davis, 2018b; stress 
reactivity; Mikolajczak, Roy, Luminet, Fillee, & Timary, 2007). In other words, while TEI may 
show incremental validity beyond personality in predicting adaptive criteria in adults in 




stronger predictor of those criteria in different samples (e.g., adolescents), or in different 
contexts (e.g., in times of acute stress). 
It is currently unclear which aspects of TEI lead to positive effects (i.e., which facets), 
and in which circumstances (i.e., under stressful conditions). A major problem occurs when 
TEI overlaps theoretically with the constructs being measured (e.g., subjective well-being 
[SWB]). Psychological well-being comprises a component of TEI (e.g., happiness is part of 
the TEI sampling domain, and well-being is a subscale of the TEIQue, see Figure 5), so it 
would be illogical if TEI did not relate to well-being. Indeed, “well-being may correlate with 
questionnaire measures of EI [TEI] precisely because both types of measure reflect how 
positive the person’s self-opinions are”, and self-esteem correlates with both (Zeidner, 
Matthews, & Roberts, 2012, p.20). Empirically, TEI scores often correlate very highly with 
SWB, with r  values often exceeding .70 (e.g., r = .70 with happiness; Petrides & Furnham, 
2003), and even stronger correlations for the TEI well-being subscale in isolation (e.g., r = .76 
with life satisfaction; Freudenthaler, Neubauer, Gabler, Scherl, & Rindermann, 2008). 
Though rarely carried out, subscale analyses (i.e., repeating analyses with TEI subscale 
scores) may provide more meaningful interpretations than working with composite TEI 
scores alone, by elucidating which elements of emotional self-efficacy are most useful in 
different contexts (Downey, Johnston, Hansen, Birney, & Stough, 2010; Zeidner et al., 
2012b). The present research conducts exploratory subscale analyses to address that issue. 
2.3.3 The need for a dual approach to EI, with age-appropriate measures 
Generally, most EI researchers agree that TEI and AEI represent different constructs, and 
explain different aspects of emotionally intelligent behaviour (Fernández-Berrocal & 




performance (i.e., what an individual could do given optimal circumstances) but does not 
necessarily represent what we tend to do on an everyday basis, which is captured by TEI 
(e.g., Gohm, Corser, & Dalsky, 2005). However, few studies examine the contribution of 
both ‘types’ of EI to life outcomes. Compared to TEI, a lack of AEI studies has been indicated 
by systematic reviews of EI and stress reactivity (Lea et al., 2019), performance on cognitive 
tasks (Gutiérrez-Cobo et al., 2016), and psychological maladjustment in adolescence 
(Resurrección et al., 2014). However, despite the availability and ‘acceptance’ of valid TEI 
measures, they are especially susceptible to the more general issues associated with non-
cognitive self-report measures, namely the tendency of individuals to respond in a socially 
desirable manner (i.e., to over-report positive behaviour and under-report negative 
behaviour) (e.g., Grubb & McDaniel, 2007; Tett, Freund, Christiansen, Fox, & Coaster, 2012). 
In one experimental study by Day and Carroll (2007), participants completed a TEI measure 
(EQ-i) and an AEI measure (MSCEIT) measures in two conditions (a job application condition 
versus a control condition). The EQ-i was much more susceptible to faking than the MSCEIT 
(i.e., scores between the job and control conditions were significantly more disparate for 
EQ-i than for the MSCEIT). The issue of socially desirable responding becomes especially 
pertinent when one considers that the majority of TEI studies examine the relationship 
between TEI (i.e., self-reported EI) and some other self-reported outcome (e.g., life stress; 
Extremera et al., 2007). When both predictors and criterion measures are self-reported, 
there is the risk of “contamination”, where findings may have arisen from shared 
measurement error (i.e., positive self-evaluations), rather than true associations (Keefer et 
al., 2018). Thus, focussing on TEI may not provide us with the full picture of EI’s mechanisms 
of action. To an extent, AEI helps to circumvent those self-report issues through maximum 




AEI. Rather than viewing AEI and TEI as competing, mutually exclusive conceptualisations 
(Mayer et al., 2008), this work adopts the perspective that they represent complementary 
approaches to the study of EI, and both have the potential to offer valuable insight into 
adaptational behaviours.  
The issues regarding the conceptualisation and measurement of EI is confounded 
further by the distinct lack of age-appropriate EI measures. Few EI measures are designed 
for populations of specific ages, and even fewer for the later years of adolescence (16-18 
years). Older adolescents are sometimes described as a ‘forgotten group’, often caught in 
the gap between adolescence and adulthood with respect to research, measurement, and 
clinical practice (Kennedy, 2010). To ensure construct validity, the developmental literature 
suggests that, ideally, different instruments are needed to assess emotion-related 
constructs (such as EI) at different ages (Denham, Wyatt, Bassett, Echeverria, & Knox, 2009). 
According to social constructionist and functionalist perspectives, subjective emotional 
experience is highly dependent upon the social context (e.g., relationships with family and 
peers), and social experience (e.g., experience at solving emotion-related problems), both of 
which change drastically throughout development (Saarni, 1999). Broadly speaking, 
emotional skills should increase progressively with greater maturity and further life 
experience (Saarni, 1999).  
In terms of EI specifically, relatively little is known about its development (especially 
AEI) with respect to age and experience. However, personality research has found evidence 
of “maturity” during the years of emerging adulthood, indexed via increases in 
conscientiousness and emotional stability (Roberts, Walton, & Viechtbauer, 2006). Between 




dramatic changes were a decrease in constructs related to negative emotionality (e.g., 
aggression), and an increase in scores for traits related to constraint (e.g., self-control) 
(Donnellan, Conger, & Burzette, 2007). A gradual maturational process is also often 
assumed for TEI, with Petrides et al. (2007, p. 158) noting, “people become less emotional 
and better socialised”. While there are relatively few studies that have carried out 
comprehensive longitudinal testing, the limited evidence available suggests that TEI is 
relatively malleable during adolescence, but that it becomes more stable with age (Keefer, 
Holden, & Parker, 2013; Keefer, Parker, Saklofske, Wood, Eastabrook, & Taylor, 2005). 
However, TEI development may be non-linear (Esnaola et al., 2017). In the most 
comprehensive longitudinal study to date, Keefer et al. (2013) monitored TEI changes (using 
the Emotional Quotient Inventory: Young Version Short form; Bar-On & Parker, 2000) in a 
sample of 10-18-year-olds over a six-year period, and found varying decreasing, increasing, 
and stable patterns depending on age and the different specific facets (i.e., development 
was often non-linear). For example, for the intrapersonal scale, there was an initial decrease 
between the 10-11 and 12-13 age ranges, followed by relatively little change until the age of 
17, whereas adaptability scores tended to decrease until ages 14-15, and then increase at 
ages 16-17 (Keefer et al., 2013). Later work has also emphasised that over the course of 
adolescence, certain trait EI-related competences, notably those relating to interpersonal 
traits and adaptability, are especially malleable and sensitive to improvement (Dave, Keefer, 
Snetsinger, Holden, & Parker, 2019).  
In general, we do not know how and when AEI changes as a function of age and 
experience, other than that overall AEI scores tend to increase with age (Davis & Humphrey, 
2012a; Peters, Kranzler, & Rossen, 2009), with a significant increase between adolescents 




2016). However, longer term patterns of change in the construct are relatively unexplored. 
Considering that EI not only demonstrates gradual maturation, but that non-linear 
development appears to occur over adolescence (e.g., Keefer et al., 2013), accounting for 
developmental stage would appear critical when considering how to assess EI (or indeed, 
any emotion-related construct) in children and adolescents (Zeman, Klimes-Dougan, 
Cassano, & Adrian, 2007).  
Whilst adolescent versions of EI measures do exist, they are not perfect. By far the 
most commonly utilised TEI measures for adolescents include the EQ-i:YV (Bar-On & Parker, 
2000) and the adolescent versions of the TEIQue (Petrides, 2009). In the case of the TEIQue, 
adolescents in the ages of 16-18 years can be administered either the adult version of scales 
(TEIQue; Petrides, 2009) or the adolescent version, designed for ages 13-17 years (e.g., 
TEIQue-AFF; Petrides, 2009; TEIQue-Adolescent Short Form [TEIQue-ASF; Petrides, 
Sangareau, Furnham, & Frederickson, 2006). While the TEIQue-Children Form (TEIQue-CF; 
Mavroveli, Petrides, Shove, & Whitehead, 2008) is based on a sampling domain specifically 
developed for children, the sampling domain for the adolescent forms of the TEIQue is 
analogous to that designed for adults (Petrides, 2009). Differences between adult and 
adolescent TEI measures are generally only related to readability. Adolescent forms of TEI 
measures are typically generated by simplifying the wording and/or the syntactic complexity 
of adult measures, and are rarely generated specifically for the adolescent population. For 
example, the TEIQue item “I often find it difficult to stand up for my rights” is changed to “I 
find it hard to stand up for my rights” in the adolescent version of the scale (Petrides, 2009). 
Although most validation work has been conducted with the adult TEIQue, psychometric 




Humphrey, 2014; Siegling et al., 2015b), and the TEIQue-ASF has been widely used (e.g., 
Ferrando et al. 2010; Mavroveli, Petrides, Rieffe, & Bakker, 2007).  
With respect to AEI, few youth versions are available, but the internal consistencies 
are reasonable for the few that have been developed, such as the MSCEIT-Youth Version 
(MSCEIT-YV; Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2014), and the Situational Test of Emotional 
Management-Youth Version for young adolescents (STEM-Y; MacCann, Wang, Matthews, & 
Roberts, 2010). As with the TEI measures, the adolescent and adult versions differ in terms 
of readability, but in some cases the item content is changed. For example, the scenarios 
utilised in the STEM-Y also included emotional situations related to school life, unlike the 
adult version of the STEM (MacCann & Roberts, 2008). While these often show 
psychometric shortcomings compared to the adult versions of the scales (Davis & 
Wigelsworth, 2017), they often still meet the minimum levels of reliability and validity 
required for research use.   
Some developmental psychologists suggest that levels of self-awareness and self-
insight of adolescents older than 16 years is on par with that of adults, meaning that their 
answers should be more accurate and reliable than those of children (Denham et al., 2009; 
Wigelsworth, Humphrey, Kalambouka, & Lendrum, 2010). While this may be true, evidence 
indicates older adolescents often disengage with materials when the language, examples, 
and values used, are deemed inappropriate for their developmental stage (Yeager et al., 
2017). While adolescent forms of both TEI and AEI instruments are designed for use with a 
wide age range (e.g., MSCEIT-YV for 10-18 years; Mayer et al., 2014; STEM-Y for 11-15 years; 
MacCann et al., 2010; EQ-i:YV: 7-18 years), they appear inclined towards, and to be 




Salovey, 2012). For example, Pfeiffer (2001) estimates the EQ-i:YV is geared to a reading 
level of 9-10 years, and the STEM-Y item 6 asks adolescents to imagine they are the 
secretary for their school chess club. There is a potential risk that the content of EI measures 
may not be age-appropriate for participants aged 16-18, risking them feeling patronised, 
and subsequently, resulting in disengagement (Denham et al., 2009).  
Overall, there seems to be a disparity between the developmental literature – which 
suggests age-appropriate measures of EI may be needed (Denham et al., 2009) – and EI 
research, which uses either the adult form, a syntactically simplified version of the adult 
form, or a child form. The field would benefit greatly from the further development of EI 
measures (particularly AEI) specifically for older adolescents (i.e., between the ages of 16 
and 18 years), with developmentally appropriate wording, relevant 
scenarios/situations/context, and sampling domains (e.g., Zeman et al., 2007). However, in 
the meantime, further testing of existing AEI measures is required to establish their 
psychometric properties with adolescent samples. Although not a primary aim, and beyond 
the scope of the research, studies will also serve to validate several EI measures within the 
16-18 year old population. Taken together, the evidence discussed above, alongside 
recommendations made by critical reviews (e.g., O’Connor, Hill, Kaya, & Martin, 2019), 
suggests the TEIQue, STEM, and STEU families of measures as the most appropriate tools for 
use in the programme of research. 
2.4 Towards a process-oriented approach to EI and stress 
Earlier discussion emphasised that, despite issues concerning measurement and 
operationalisation, EI appears an especially useful individual-level resource for young people 




(Austin, Saklofske, & Mastoras, 2010; Davis & Humphrey, 2012a; 2012b; Extremera et al., 
2007; Keefer et al., 2018). Within a resilience framework, there is a body of work examining 
the utility of EI as a protective marker that operates within stress regulation pathways, 
leading to positive life outcomes for young people (e.g., Ciarrochi et al., 2002; Davis & 
Humphrey, 2012a; 2012b; 2014; Mikolajczak et al., 2006). However, most studies historically 
have employed a cross-sectional design, whereby participants’ standing on two or more 
self-reported variables (e.g., TEI; perceived life stress) are measured, and correlational 
analyses are subsequently used to test for a significant relationship. As Martins et al. (2010, 
p.562) noted a decade ago, cross-sectional research on EI and health “has already reached 
sufficiency and stability”. Furthermore, such work does not inform us of the processes 
through which EI influences stress responding in context (i.e., when the individual is acutely 
stressed).  
By using an approach designed to investigate the processes involved (i.e., the 
processes underlying EI), we can begin to understand how and when EI could buffer the 
effects of stress. Our understanding of how EI works in specific situations (i.e., its 
mechanisms of action) is still very limited, since studies do not often acknowledge 
contextual factors (e.g., emotional state of the participant) (Veseley-Maillefer et al., 2018). 
To test the hypothesis that EI acts as a stress buffer for young people, research needs to 
examine which mechanisms relate to EI under conditions of acute stress. As will be covered 
by Chapter 3, there is progress to be made in this area by acknowledging the links between 
EI and emotion regulation (ER) strategies - processes through which individuals can dampen, 




The present programme of research takes a process-oriented approach in the sense 
that, rather than focussing exclusively on whether EI leads to positive life outcomes per se 
(i.e., ‘what’ EI does), its studies examine some of the mechanisms (in the form of ER 
processes) that may underlie the relationships between EI and those positive outcomes, and 
under which conditions (e.g., ‘how’ and ‘when’ EI works). Broadly, this could be 
conceptualised as moderated mediation, whereby EI (i.e., the predictor) could dampen the 
stress response (i.e., the outcome), via adaptive ER processes (i.e., mediating variables), 
with these effects contingent on the level of stress (i.e., the moderator, such as 
experimental condition). However, EI may benefit adolescent stress regulation in several 
ways, and potentially operate through several different processes and pathways. For 
example, EI may buffer (i.e., moderate) the stress response directly (i.e., higher levels of EI 
correspond with less stress, as indicated by biomarkers and/or psychological markers). EI 
may also moderate the effects of stress indirectly (i.e., by promoting effective ER during 
stressful situations, which subsequently reduces the impact of the stress). Moreover, the 
relationships between EI and outcomes in stressful situations (e.g., stress reactivity) may be 
mediated by specific ER processes, and furthermore, may depend on whether EI is 
conceptualised as a trait or an ability, and/or differ according to the nature of the stress 
encountered. These perspectives will be explored in the three empirical studies that 
comprise this programme of research (Chapters 4-6). Chapter 3 critically evaluates the 
current status of the evidence base regarding EI and acute stress, highlighting the potential 






EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE: A POTENTIAL STRESS BUFFER? 
 
3.1 Chapter overview 
This chapter critically evaluates the notion that EI may act as a ‘stress buffer’. The chapter 
begins by reviewing the key literature linking EI to stress-related life outcomes, with 
particular attention paid to findings relevant to adolescents. Understanding the processes 
through which EI operates is important, but currently under-researched. To organise the 
evidence concerning EI and various conscious and automatic ER processes, a focussed 
integration of the EI and emotion regulation (ER) literature, follows. Culmination of work to 
date indicates a need to study EI and stress regulation ‘in action’, in both controlled 
(experimental) and applied contexts (social media), within older adolescent populations.  
3.2 EI and stress outcomes 
According to the Transactional Model of Stress, stress occurs when the demands required to 
respond appropriately to a situation/stimulus are perceived by an individual as exceeding 
their capabilities (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). These events are referred to as ‘stressors’, and 
are typically appraised as negative, unpredictable, and threatening, by the individual (Liu & 
Vickers, 2015). A variety of everyday stressors can affect young people, including socially 
evaluative situations, were one feels negatively judged by others (e.g., peer pressure, 
interviews/presentations; Rudolph & Conley, 2005; Sumter, Bokhurst, Miers, Pelt, & 
Westenberg, 2010), family stressors, such as interparental conflict (Chappel, Suldo, & Ogg, 




Bögels, 2014). More recently, evidence suggests that social media poses a new but powerful 
stressor for young people (Beyens, Frison, & Eggermont,, 2016; O’Reilly, Dogra, Whiteman, 
Hughes, Eruyar, & Reilly, 2018; van der Schuur, Baumgartner, & Sumter, 2019; Weinstein & 
Selman, 2016). However, the above stressors are generally considered ‘normative’ and 
clearly do not always have negative effects on mental health or well-being (Luthar et al., 
2006; Wright et al., 2013). As alluded to in Chapter 2, testing for EI as a protective factor 
(i.e., a moderator) within a resilience framework offers the opportunity to investigate 
whether EI buffers the effects of those acute stressors for young people (e.g., McMahon et 
al., 2003).  
Unsurprisingly, stress management is central to most models of trait (TEI) and ability 
EI (AEI), and features in their measurement. For example, stress management is a facet of 
the Trait Emotional Intelligence Questionnaire (TEIQue; Petrides, 2009), and many scenarios 
of the Situational Test of Management (STEM) assess one’s ability to cope with stress 
(MacCann & Roberts, 2008). Indeed, the stress management dimension of TEI in particular 
undergoes significant development during adolescence (Esnaola et al., 2017). A 
hypothesised role for EI as a ‘stress buffer’ is therefore emerging from the literature: EI 
could potentially operate within risk trajectories to protect the individual from the effects of 
stress (Mikolajczak et al., 2009a Mérida-López & Extremera, 2017), and, thus, lead to 
benefits in a number of life domains. Furthermore, by taking a process-oriented approach, 
we can investigate not only ‘if’, but ‘how’ and ‘when’ EI contributes to stress regulation 
(Peña-Sarrionandia et al., 2015). 
A substantial amount of cross-sectional research has already linked EI with adaptive 




levels of general perceived life stress (i.e., how an individual feels about the general 
stressfulness of their life; Extremera et al., 2007), and less occupational stress and burnout 
(i.e., the perceived stressfulness of an individual’s job and one’s ability to cope at work; 
Mérida-López & Extremera, 2017). Furthermore, both TEI and AEI appear to help students 
cope with stress in educational settings. For example, students with higher EI feel less 
stressed during examination periods (i.e., an acutely stressful situation; Austin et al., 2010). 
EI also seems to provide a protective function in educational settings over the long term, for 
example by reducing the risk of developing mental health issues throughout academic study 
(Perera & DiGiacomo, 2013). Periods of change can be particularly stressful for young 
people, such as the transition from primary to secondary school (Anderson, Jacobs, 
Schramm, & Splittberger, 2000), and it is thought that EI may enable young people to cope 
more effectively with those stressful transitions (Jordan, McRorie, & Ewing, 2010; Qualter et 
al., 2007). While those studies demonstrate that EI is associated with positive post-
transition effects for academic achievement, feelings of self-worth, school attendance, and 
behaviour – rather than stress specifically – results still suggest that high or moderate levels 
of EI generally bodes well for young people undergoing stressful transition periods (Qualter 
et al., 2007; Jordan et al., 2010). As alluded to earlier, late adolescence is an important 
transition period in which many stressors are encountered, though EI evidence is more 
limited in this regard. In general, there is a strong evidence base suggesting EI is linked to 
less stress (or more positive outcomes in stressful situations), but there is a clear lack of 
research elucidating the precise role EI plays.  
One way that EI could lead to adaptation is via a compensation effect in the 
presence of other risk factors. EI may indirectly moderate positive outcomes by 




situation outweigh an individual’s other resources (Andrei, Mancini, Baldaro, Trombini, & 
Agnoli, 2014). That finding is especially prominent within the education literature. While 
cognitive ability and personality may explain more variance in academic success than EI 
alone (MacCann et al., 2020), TEI may be a key predictor of academic achievement in 
specific groups, such as students with low IQ (see Mavroveli & Sanchez-Ruiz, 2011). For 
instance, whilst low cognitive ability could negatively impact the grade achieved for an 
assignment, the positive components/facets that constitute TEI might play a role in 
improving that outcome. Low impulsiveness may help the individual focus on completion of 
the task, or perceived social competence may empower them to seek help with the 
assignment. Evidence reflects this: TEI acts as an important moderator of the cognitive 
ability-achievement relationship, enabling students to attain higher grades by drawing upon 
emotion-related resources (Ferrando et al., 2010; Fiori, 2015; Perera & DiGiacombo, 2013). 
In contrast, evidence for the effect of AEI on academic performance is mixed. While AEI 
often shows no links with academic performance (O’Connor & Little, 2003; Rode, Mooney 
Arthaud-Day, Near, Baldwin, Rubin, & Bommer, 2007), a 5-year longitudinal study revealed 
that adolescents’ AEI scores at the start of high school (M age = 11 years 2 months) 
moderated the effect of cognitive ability on their performance at the end of high school (M 
age = 15 years 10 months) (Qualter, Gardner, Pope, Hutchinson, & Whitely, 2012) 
supporting the notion of AEI as a compensator for low IQ (Fiori, 2015).  
Evidence from the social and emotional learning (SEL) and EI training literature echo 
the idea that EI may be beneficial for certain individuals. For example, one study 
demonstrated that the Promoting Alternative Thinking Strategies (PATHS; Greenberg, 
Kusché, & Riggs, 2004) programme (which aims to ‘train’ EI) is only effective in reducing 




issues at baseline) (Malti, Ribeaud, & Eisner, 2011). In addition, further evidence indicates 
that EI may be most effective for individuals with low intellectual ability (Fiori, 2015; 
Mavroveli & Sanchez-Ruiz, 2011), or for vulnerable individuals with deficits in aspects in 
emotional functioning (e.g., autism spectrum disorder; Pope & Dacre Pool, 2018). 
Furthermore, for neurotypical, well-adjusted individuals that already possess levels of high 
EI, additional training does not always appear useful (Davis & Nichols, 2016; Qualter et al., 
2007). This poses a serious issue with the “one size fits all” approach typically employed in 
training interventions. Indeed, there are also growing concerns among a number of EI 
researchers that high EI may not always be advantageous, and that the relationship 
between EI and positive life outcomes may not be as linear and direct as implied previously. 
As discussed by both Davis and Nichols (2016), and Qualter, Whiteley, Hutchinson, and Pope 
(2007), there could be an optimum level of EI before effects plateau (or even become 
negative). An optimal ‘window’ of positive skill is seen for similar constructs: very high levels 
of self-esteem can result in over-confidence, dejection, and even negative behaviours, such 
as aggression (Baumeister, Campbell, Krueger, & Vohs, 2003), feeding into a wider paradigm 
shift known colloquially as the ‘too-much-of-a-good-thing’ movement (Pierce & Aguinis, 
2013). Future research must pay more attention to the processes involved. It is only by 
understanding how, and in which contexts, EI may buffer stress that we can start to address 
the important questions regarding the adaptive value of EI.  
The evidence outlined in this chapter thus far suggests that EI is often perceived as a 
protective, helpful, individual-level resource for navigating the stressors that permeate 




underlying the relationship between acute stress (i.e., an adverse experience) and adaptive 
outcomes (e.g., mental health, well-being, academic success). 
3.3 EI and stress regulation processes 
There is a growing and diverse body of research examining EI as a moderator of the 
relationship between adversity and outcomes from multiple life domains. For example, TEI 
moderates the relationship between childhood abuse and suicidal ideation and attempts 
(Cha & Nock, 2009), and the relationship between depression and somatic complaints in 
girls (Mavroveli et al., 2007). Other studies have identified that TEI and AEI moderate effects 
differently. In a large study (n = 748 adolescents) by Davis and Humphrey (2012), TEI 
lessened the effect of family dysfunction on externalising symptomology, whereas very high 
AEI strengthened the effect of socioeconomic status on depression. Furthermore, Ciarrochi 
et al. (2002) demonstrated that adolescents scoring higher on TEI experienced less stress 
(indexed by daily hassles and suicidal ideation), whereas high AEI was associated with more 
daily stress. Whilst not often examining stress ‘in action’ (i.e., situational stress), such work 
represents the start of process-oriented investigations into the processes of EI.  As alluded 
to in Chapter 3, rather than exclusively examining whether EI leads to positive life outcomes 
using questionnaire-based studies, an examination of the mechanisms (e.g., ER processes) 
that may help EI directly and indirectly buffer acute stress, and under which conditions, 
needs to be conducted to progress the field.   
When individuals are faced with a stressor (or even begin to anticipate one), the 
‘fight or flight’ response needs to be activated, catalysing a cascade of endocrine (e.g., 
cortisol), autonomic nervous system (ANS) (e.g., increased heart rate), psychological (e.g., 




2006). It is important that an individual’s fight or flight response is proportionate to the level 
of threat encountered, and is sufficiently regulated (i.e., controlled). Indeed, dysregulated 
stress responding is associated with a diverse range of adverse somatic and psychological 
outcomes, such as hypertension (Matthews et al., 2004), and depression (Burke, Davis, Otte, 
& Mohr, 2005). In order for an individual to successfully operate the ‘fight or flight’ 
response, they need to regulate their emotions, which can involve a number of strategies. 
Such ER strategies range from “explicit, conscious, effortful, and controlled regulation (e.g., 
explicit coping strategies), to implicit, unconscious, effortless, and automatic regulation” 
(p.2, Gross, 2013). Here, automatic processing refers to fast, involuntary cognitive 
processing that does not require much effort, and occurs outside conscious awareness (e.g., 
eye movements towards/away from stimuli), whereas conscious processes are effortful, 
more controlled, and explicit (e.g., coping strategies) (Fiori, 2009). In simple terms, EI 
attempts to understand who shows adaptive emotional functioning (i.e., outcome-
oriented), and ER attempts to understand how individuals do so (i.e., process-oriented) 
(Peña-Sarrionandia et al., 2015). As suggested by Peña-Sarrionandia et al. (2015), 
conducting EI research that is more process-oriented (e.g., assessing how EI relates to ER 
processes under stressful conditions; Mikolajczak, et al., 2008), will help characterise some 
of the mechanisms that might underpin the advantageous nature of EI. Evidence suggests 
that, when stressed, adolescents are likely to invoke multiple strategies to manage their 
emotions, in the hope that one will be successful (Lennarz, Hollenstein, Lichtwarck-Aschoff, 
Kuntsche, & Granic, 2018). Success of ER strategies is context-dependent; for example, 
cognitive reappraisal is often an ineffective ER strategy when experiencing emotions of very 
high intensity (Sheppes, Scheibe, Suri, & Gross, 2011). EI may help adolescents to 




Going forward, exploring the underlying processes of EI, and its stress-buffering 
effects, could benefit substantially from acknowledging the vast body of ER literature (Peña-
Sarrionandia, et al., 2015). Although the EI and ER research traditions have developed in 
parallel, ER was a focus for research long before the EI term was coined (e.g., Campos, 
Campos, & Barrett, 1989). ER - an important component of the nomological network of both 
TEI and AEI - refers to the heterogeneous set of processes through which an individual can 
dampen, intensify, or maintain their emotion(s) (Gross & Thompson, 2007). Successful ER is 
central to healthy psychosocial functioning (Gross & Thomson, 2007). In contrast to EI 
research, which focusses on individual differences in emotional functioning, ER research 
aims to understand “the processes by which individuals modify the trajectory of one of 
more component(s) of an emotional response”, via alterations in their duration, intensity or 
quality (Peña-Sarrionandia et al., 2015, p.1).  
In 1998, James Gross put forward a general process model of ER which largely 
shaped the ER field (Gross, 1998a; Gross & Thompson, 1998b), and is still highly regarded 
two decades later (e.g., Chapman, 2015). Gross’ pioneering ER framework has been 
subsequently applied by emotion researchers across a number of disciplines including 
occupational (e.g., Grandey, 2000), developmental (e.g., John & Gross, 2004), and clinical 
psychology (e.g., Werner & Gross, 2010). ER handles “demands that are appraised taxing or 
exceeding the resources of the person’’ (Lazarus & Folkman 1984, p. 141). However, 
because ER and stress regulation considerably overlap developmentally, conceptually, and 
physiologically (Wang & Saudino, 2011), Gross’ ER framework is often employed to explore 
how individuals cope with stressful experiences (e.g., Moriya & Takahasji, 2013; Scheibe & 
Zacher, 2013; Troy & Mauss, 2011). The model depicts ER as multi-staged, comprising of five 




the emotion generation trajectory (Gross, 1989a; Gross & Thompson, 1998b) (see Table 2 
for description and examples). Gross also described higher order distinctions between the 
ER process ‘families’. The first four ER families (situation selection, situation modification, 
attentional deployment, cognitive change) refer to antecedent-focussed processes, which  
occur before a ‘full-blown’ emotional response has been generated, whereas, in contrast, 
the last ER family (response modulation) is response focussed, occurring after an emotion 
has been elicited (Gross, 1998a). Gross has since noted that the four-stage model of ER is 
likely an oversimplification, since ER is more dynamic (i.e., a cyclic or spiral structure is 
possible, where the emotional response elicited can influence subsequent situation 
selection), and multiple emotions can be regulated at any one time (Gross, 2015). Thus, 
while Gross’ model may seem to oversimplify the complex process of ER, it nevertheless 
provides a useful lens through which to consider how EI might influence the stress response.  
EI might reduce vulnerability to the pathogenic effects of stress through deployment 
of adaptive ER strategies and mechanisms (Keefer et al., 2009). However, the role of EI and 
ER processes can be investigated from multiple perspectives, and at multiple points along 
the stress response trajectory. It is also useful to conceptualise ER in terms of conscious or 
automatic processes in the context of EI (Fiori, 2009). While the traditional EI model 
assumed and measured an entirely conscious emotional experience (i.e., declarative 
knowledge), more recent thinking (see Fiori, 2009) recognises that emotionally intelligent 
behaviour has an automatic component (Winkielman & Berridge, 2004; Zeidner, Matthews, 
Roberts, & MacCann, 2003). Research to date has focussed much more on the conscious 
forms of ER, rather than the automatic forms, especially in relation to EI (e.g., Veseley-





An Overview of the Process Model of Emotion Regulation (ER) 
Stage of ER 
process 
ER family Definition Examples of specific ER 
processes 
Real life example 
1. Situation Situation 
selection 
Approaching or avoiding certain 




Deciding not to attend 
a dreaded social event 
 Situation 
modification 
Taking external actions that directly 
alter a situation in order to influence its 
emotional impact 
Problem solving 
Seeking social support 
Conflict resolution 
 
Filing away a rejection 
letter rather than 
leaving it on the 
desktop 
2. Attention Attentional 
deployment 
Directing one’s attention with the goal 
of altering one’s emotional response 




Thinking about holiday 
plans while in a 
depressing meeting 
3. Appraisal Cognitive change Modifying one’s appraisal of a situation 





Reminding self that 
characters in a 
distressing film are 
actors 
4. Response Response 
modulation 
Directly influencing experiential, 
behavioural, or physiological 






Drinking alcohol to 
decrease feelings of 
anxiety 




overviews of those key conscious and automatic mechanisms theoretically and/or 
empirically pertinent to EI and acute stress. It is important to acknowledge that these 
mechanisms do not occur independently of each other. For example, stress reactivity can be 
influenced by coping strategy selection (e.g., O’Connor, Nguyen, & Anglim, 2017), and 
rumination can predict increased attention to emotional information (e.g., Hilt, Leitzke, & 
Pollak, 2017). 
3.3.1 Attentional deployment. 
Attentional deployment, the controlled process of selectively concentrating on some 
stimulus in the internal or external environment, is a one of the first ER processes to appear 
in development (Johnson, 2009). Consciously (e.g., ruminating) or automatically regulating 
attention (e.g., shifting gaze) has been highlighted as one such cognitive pathway through 
which EI could buffer the effects of stress, and ultimately, promote well-being (e.g., Davis, 
2018b).  
3.3.1.1 Conscious attentional processing 
Gross (1989a) suggests that under stress, cognitive strategies that direct one’s attention, 
such as distraction, rumination, and mindfulness, can be deployed to manipulate one’s 
emotional state. Those ER strategies have been explored in the context of EI, to differing 
extents, but mostly through the use of cross-sectional designs, and analysis of dispositional 
traits (i.e., trait rumination, trait mindfulness). For example, the mood repair scale of the 
Trait Meta Mood Scale (TMMS) predicted a smaller tendency to ruminate in one study 
(Salovey, Stroud, Woolery, & Epel, 2002). In another, high global TEI indirectly predicted less 
problematic social media use and problematic gaming via trait mindfulness and trait 




and Mendoza (2018) showed that that TEI predicts a tendency to ruminate over positive 
emotions, and to distract oneself from negative emotions, for the TMMS subscales of 
attention to emotion, and emotion repair subscales, respectively. 
Mindfulness is particularly effortful ER strategy of the Gross’ model’s attentional 
deployment family (1989a), and a construct for which there has been modest interest within 
the field of EI. Mindfulness involves receptive attention to one’s psychological and 
physiological state (Brown & Ryan, 2003). Trait mindfulness (i.e., the tendency to be 
mindful) has been investigated extensively within the context of both TEI and AEI, as 
predictor (e.g., through mindfulness training; Ajilchi, Amini, Ardakani, Zadeh, & Kisely, 2019; 
Jung et al., 2016), as a predicted outcome (Miao, Humphrey, & Qian, 2018), as a trait 
moderator/mediator between EI and life outcomes (e.g., problematic online behaviour; 
Kircaburun, et al., 2019), and even as a component of EI (Ciarrochi & Godsell, 2006). 
However, the majority of studies that assess mindfulness and EI in stress contexts are 
intervention-based, where stress susceptibility is measured after individuals have 
undergone mindfulness interventions (e.g., Creswell, Pacilio, Lindsay, & Warren Brown, 
2014; Nyklícek, Mommersteeg, van Beugen, & Ramakers, 2013). Few studies assess 
individual differences in the use of state mindfulness as an ER strategy under stressful 
conditions. While some state mindfulness scales have been developed (e.g., State 
Mindfulness Scale; Tanay & Bernstein, 2013), items are not always applicable to acute 
laboratory stressors which take place over a very short period of time, and require cognitive 
effort (e.g., “I noticed various sensations caused by my surroundings, e.g., heat, coolness”; “I 
found some of my experiences interesting”). Thus, EI and mindfulness will not be a focus for 
the present thesis. A more promising and feasible area relevant to acute stress regulation 




3.3.1.2 Automatic attentional processing 
With regard to EI and attention, the number of studies examining automatic ER processes is 
small, but interest is increasing (for review, see Gutiérrez-Cobo et al., 2016). Recently, 
studies have begun to employ eye-tracking technology, which offers a rigorous paradigm 
whereby attention can be directly and continuously measured (Waechter, Nelson, Wright, 
Hyatt, & Oakman, 2014). Data from one such recent study suggests that when viewing 
images passively, TEI directs attention towards positive emotional stimuli (happy faces, 
positive social scenes), and away from socially threatening and neutral stimuli (angry faces, 
negative social scenes; Lea, Qualter, Davis, Pérez-González, & Bangee, 2018).  
The above research, however, was conducted under non-stressful conditions; 
investigating attentional processing under stress is necessary to draw conclusions about the 
usefulness of EI ‘in action’. Maladaptive attentional processing is a characteristic feature of 
anxiety disorders (for review, see Weierich, Treat, & Hollingworth, 2008), whereby anxious 
individuals show bias for negative emotional information, even at low threat levels. In 
contrast, adaptive processing embodies vigilance for threatening stimuli in stressful 
situations, but threat avoidance in non-stressful conditions (Davis, 2018b; Mogg & Bradley, 
1998). Theoretically, attentional biases towards emotional information should constitute a 
core feature of EI (Fiori, 2009). Furthermore, if EI is truly adaptive in this sense, the pattern 
of visual processing of high EI scorers should align more closely with the adaptive profile 
(i.e., bias for threat in stressful condition only) than that of low scorers (generalised bias for 
threat).  
Only three studies have examined the relationship between EI and attention under 




Funke, Emo, and Zeidner (2015), participants completed a visual search activity (to assess 
attention to emotion) following a cognitive stressor. Whilst TEI predicted less post-task 
distress, there were no associations between TEI and attentional processing. The other two 
studies used a dot-probe task, which assesses attentional bias for emotional stimuli over 
neutral stimuli. In the standard paradigm (MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986), two stimuli 
(cues) that differ in their emotional content (e.g., threatening versus neutral) are presented 
simultaneously, followed by the presentation of a probe (normally a triangle or other 
symbol). Participants then indicate the location of the probe as quickly and accurately as 
possible through keypress. Response to the ‘attended’ location is usually faster. Using a 
word-based dot-probe task, high TEI (self-control) individuals showed a bias for emotional 
words under stressful conditions, and a bias for neutral words under neutral conditions, 
with the opposite pattern observed for individuals with low TEI (Mikolajczak et al., 2009b). 
Findings therefore indicated that TEI may moderate the impact of stress by facilitating 
‘healthy’ attentional processing. However, a complex myriad of findings was identified in a 
dot-probe study that employed eye-tracking (Davis, 2018b). In that study, high AEI 
management predicted bias away from angry faces, whereas TEI sociability and emotionality 
scales predicted bias towards angry and sad faces, respectively. However, those effects 
were consistent across stressful and non-stressful conditions, suggesting EI may not underlie 
adaptive emotional processing under stress. Given the small number of studies, and mixed 
findings, more testing is needed, especially with adolescent populations. This is addressed in 




3.3.2 Cognitive change 
The family of ER strategies in Stage 3 of Gross’ model refer to cognitive change; modifying 
one’s evaluation of a situation to regulate its emotional impact (Gross, 1998a), or, more 
simply, “changing the way we think in order to change the way we feel” (p.4, Peña-
Sarrionandia et al., 2015). Whilst the literature concerning EI and ER strategies, including 
cognitive change, has been extensively reviewed elsewhere (see Peña-Sarrionandia et al., 
2015), the section below will review only the areas relevant to EI and cognitive change when 
experiencing acute stress (i.e., not those relating to EI and emotional regulation of long term 
problems): cognitive appraisal, and coping, the latter for which many studies have been 
published. 
3.3.2.1 Cognitive appraisal 
Some studies have explored the possibility that high EI individuals are more resistant to 
stress because they evaluate stressful situations more positively. How stressful a situation is 
perceived to be (and the subsequent emotional response) depends on the individual’s 
cognitive appraisal – their subjective interpretation of the situation (Lazarus & Folkman, 
1984). Cognitive appraisals are often divided into ‘challenge’ versus ‘threat’, whereby 
threatened individuals focus on the possibility for loss, while challenged individuals 
concentrate also on the potential gains (Tomaka, Blascovich, Kibler, & Ernst, 1997). 
Appraising stressors as threatening, rather than challenging, can hinder outcomes in stress-
rich contexts such as examination performance (Giacobbi, Tuccitto, & Frye, 2007). Findings 
are mostly in support for EI as a predictor of more positive cognitive appraisals. Across 
multiple studies, individuals with high TEI scores appraised a stressful task as less 




Findings from Schneider, Lyons, and Khazon (2013) also indicated that high AEI (emotion 
management scale) was predictive of feeling more challenged and less threatened, but only 
in men. 
3.3.2.2 Coping 
Coping plays a crucial role in an individual’s adaptation to stressful situations. Over time, 
researchers have moved away from the traditional view of coping as an unconscious 
defence mechanism (e.g., Vaillant, 1977), and towards the notion of coping as a conscious, 
deliberate response to stressful events (e.g., Folkman & Lazarus, 1985). When faced with a 
stressor, individuals can deploy a variety of coping strategies to manage their response 
(Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). One of the most common coping strategy categorisations is that 
comprising problem-focussed coping vs. emotion-focussed coping vs. avoidance coping 
(Skinner, Edge, Altman, & Sherwood, 2003), upon which many self-report coping inventories 
have been devised (e.g., the Coping Inventory for Stressful Situations; CISS; Endler & Parker, 
1999). Problem-focussed coping strategies focus on tackling the source of stress directly, by 
taking constructive steps to remove or minimise the stress itself (i.e., problem-solving). In 
contrast, emotion-focussed coping does not tackle the root of the stress, but instead 
attempts to influence the emotions evoked by the stressor (e.g., breathing exercises, self-
blame, catastrophizing). Alternatively, individuals may use avoidance coping strategies, 
motivated by wanting to ‘escape’ the stressor or its associated negative emotionality (e.g., 
deliberately distancing or detaching oneself from the situation). Identifying ‘adaptive’ 
strategies that can be universally applied across all contexts and individuals is not feasible 
(Carver & Connor-Smith, 2010), as the efficacy of any one strategy is context-dependent 




way of coping in a stressful situation, sufficient attention needs to be paid towards the 
individual’s coping resources, and specifics of the situation, such as the desired outcome - is 
it more important for the individual to perform well, to keep calm, or both? (Folkman & 
Moskowitz, 2004). The ER literature also emphasises the importance of context when 
determining ‘adaptive’ ways of responding to stress (Gross & Thompson, 2007). 
Generally, the aims of EI research on coping falls into one of two categories: first, to 
test whether EI scores correlate with scores from established dispositional or situational 
coping scales, or second, to examine whether coping mediates the associations between EI 
and some adaptive outcome (Zeidner et al., 2012b). There is a considerable quantity of 
research supporting the former, since links are often established between both TEI and AEI, 
and ‘adaptive’ coping (Bastian, Burns, & Nettlebeck, 2005; MacCann et al., 2011; 
Mikolajczak et al., 2008; Saklofske, Austin, Galloway, & Davidson, 2007). Evidence also 
supports the second assertion. Effective coping often mediates the relationship between EI 
and adaptive outcomes in student samples (e.g., exam-related stress; Austin et al., 2010). In 
adolescents specifically, emotional-focussed and avoidant coping (which typically represent 
maladaptive strategies in most cases) mediate low EI and psychological distress (Chan, 
2005), self-harming behaviours (Mikolajczak, Petrides, & Hurry, 2009c), and externalising 
and internalising symptoms (Downey et al., 2010). Furthermore, TEI and AEI might work in 
tandem with respect to coping with stress, where AEI promotes initial strategy selection, 
and TEI promotes coping effectiveness (Davis & Humphrey, 2012a; 2014).  
However, there are a very limited number of investigations that examine EI and state 
coping in task-oriented contexts (i.e., when actually confronted with an acute stressor). To 




stressful conditions (two with TEI, one with AEI). Salovey et al. (2002, Study 2) identified that 
participants with greater scores on the mood repair scale of the TMMS were less likely to 
engage with avoidant coping under psychosocial stress. Similarly, high AEI scorers used less 
avoidant coping strategies when exposed to cognitive stressors (e.g., impossible anagrams) 
(Matthews, Emo, Funke, Zeidner, Roberts, Costa, & Schulze, 2006). In another cognitive task 
(timed tower of Hanoi), TEI was related to less maladaptive emotion-focussed coping (e.g., 
self-blame) (O’Connor et al., 2017). Whilst all suggest an adaptive role for EI, all three 
studies utilised undergraduate psychology student samples. In general, coping repertoires 
increase with age (Compas, Malcarne, & Banez, 1992), with adolescence forming a key 
developmental period in this regard. An integrative review of coping across childhood and 
adolescence by Zimmer-Gembeck and Skinner (2011) used the findings of 58 studies to 
hypothesise a developmental trajectory for coping, whereby adolescence witnesses 
development of more adaptive problem-focussed coping, as instrumental action becomes 
supplemented by planful problem-solving in challenging situations. However, the 
developing ability to attend and reflect on internal emotional states in adolescence can also 
lead to the use of more emotion-focussed coping strategies. Based on this, we might expect 
that the role of EI in coping in stressful conditions could differ between adolescents and 
adults (see Study 1, Chapter 4).  
3.3.3 Emotional response modulation 
The fourth family of ER in Gross’ model concerns the modulation of the stress response 
once an emotion has been elicited (Gross, 1998a). Stress reactivity and recovery could be 
said to represent outcomes/consequences of ER processes, rather than constituting ER 




individuals present their stress response, and how they recover, have important 
consequences for adaptation (e.g., Geurts & Sonnentag, 2006; Henze, Zankert, Urschler, 
Hiltl, Kudielka, Pruessner, & Wust, 2017). When confronted with a stressor, individuals need 
to initiate a “fight or flight” response, and then shut off the response once the stressor 
ceases (McEwen, 2006). When confronted with a stressor (real, anticipated, or imagined), 
the ‘fight or flight’ response needs to be activated, which typically initiates two physiological 
pathways: the sympathetic-adrenal-medullary (SAM) pathway of the autonomic nervous 
system (ANS), and the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenocortical (HPA) axis (McEwen, 2006). 
Upon first detection of the stressor, the SAM axis initiates a rapid response, in which 
sympathetic neurons stimulate the release of catecholamines (e.g., adrenaline, 
noradrenaline) from the adrenal glands (Cohen, Kessler, & Gordon, 1995). Circulating 
catecholamines then catalyse a cascade of physiological changes relating to metabolism 
(e.g., gluconeogenesis, respiration (e.g., increased respiratory rate), and circulation (e.g., 
increased heart rate), and adaptive behavioural changes (e.g., increased alertness) (Cohen, 
et al., 1995). The hypothalamus also activates the HPA axis response, stimulating the 
production of stress hormones (notably, adrenocorticotropin hormone; ACTH) from the 
paraventricular nucleus, which consequently (via the pituitary gland) promotes secretion of 
glucocorticoids such cortisol from the adrenal cortex; the final effectors of the HPA axis 
(Tarullo & Gunnar, 2006). Ultimately, the purpose of these mechanisms is to lead to the 
individual’s preparedness and readiness to respond to the stressor (see Russell & Shipston 
[2015] for a comprehensive description of the physiological and endocrinal aspects of the 
stress response, and the implicated neuroanatomical regions). 
There are important differences to note between acute and chronic stress. Whereas 




respond to a sudden, unexpected event (i.e., acute stress), chronic stress describes 
prolonged elevation of the stress markers (McEwen, 2017). For example, an individual with 
persistent elevation of heart rate or cortisol can be described as experiencing chronic stress, 
sometimes termed “allostatic overload” (McEwen, 2003). It follows that dysregulated acute 
stress responding could, over time, lead to chronic stress, since physiological and 
psychological equilibrium is not sufficiently restored between acutely stressful experiences 
(Compas, 2006).  
3.3.3.1 Stress reactivity 
Stress reactivity represents describes the extent or capacity to which an individual responds 
to an acute stressor (Schlotz, 2013). Whilst still debated (see Hu, Lamers, de Geus, & 
Penninx, 2016; Phillips, Ginty, & Hughes, 2013), hyperreactivity to acute stress is generally 
deemed to be harmful to the individual and their performance (e.g., Arora, Ashrafian, Davis, 
Athanasiou, Darzi, & Sevdalis, 2010; Rano, Fridén, & Eek, 2018). To correspond with that 
pattern of adaptive stress responding, high EI individuals should display less emotional and 
physiological reactivity in stressful situations, and recover more quickly, than their low EI 
peers (Lea et al., 2019; Mikolajczak, Petrides, & Hurry, 2009c; Peña-Sarrionandia et al., 
2015). To study that hypothesis, experimental studies typically induce stress in participants, 
and then test whether their level of EI relates to the magnitude of their response, and/or 
how fast they recover from the stressor, using either objective or self-reported index of the 
stress response (Lea et al., 2019).  
There is growing empirical interest in exploring whether EI relates to stress reactivity 
(for systematic review, see Lea et al., 2019), with research crossing disciplines as diverse as 




2011), sport (e.g., marathon running; Lane & Wilson, 2011), and education (e.g., academic 
examinations; Lane, Thelwell, & Devonport, 2009). However, the vast majority of studies to 
date have used an adult sample, typically comprising undergraduate students (Lea et al., 
2019). Only three studies have explored EI and stress reactivity in younger populations: one 
with adolescents ages 13–15 years (Ciarrochi, Chan, & Bajgar, 2001), and two with children 
ages 7–12 years (Aminabadi, Erfanparast, Adhami, Maljaii., Ranjbar, & Jamali, 2011; 
Aminabadi, Adhami, Oskouei, Najafpour  & Jamali, 2013). Crucially, no studies have 
examined EI and stress reactivity in adolescents between the ages of 16 and 18 years. 
Furthermore, there is considerable methodological heterogeneity in this area. Studies span 
both EI conceptualisations (i.e., TEI; AEI), induce stress differently (e.g., a speech; Ling, 
Raine, Gao, & Schug, 2018; recalling a negative life decision; Sevdalis, Petrides, & Harvey, 
2007), use a range of EI measures (e.g., TMMS, TEIQue), and operationalise stress using a 
variety of psychological and physiological indices (e.g., heart rate [HR]; Laborde, Brüll, 
Weber, & Anders, 2011; change in negative affect [NA]; Davis, 2018b).  
Findings are unsurprisingly inconsistent, producing a complex pattern of findings 
overall (Lea et al., 2019). Depending on the context, EI has been shown to increase 
reactivity, decrease reactivity, or have no significant effects. Evidence generally suggests 
that whether EI is useful under acute stress is highly dependent on the stress context, and 
how EI is measured. Overall, TEI significantly predicts adaptive stress reactivity in the 
context of sports-based stressors (e.g., a sports competition), and cognitive stressors (e.g., a 
memory task), but not others (psychosocial stress). For example, high TEI individuals 
typically secrete less cortisol (the main stress hormone) in response to a challenging 
cognitive task (e.g., Mikolajczak et al., 2007), but increased cortisol during public speaking 




less clear for AEI, since there is a dearth of AEI research. While AEI buffered subjective stress 
in one study (Ruiz-Aranda, Salguero, & Fernández-Berrocal, 2011), it had no significant 
effect in two others (Limonero, Fernández-Castro, Soler-Oritja, & Álvarez-Moleiro, 2015; 
Matthews et al., 2006). AEI appears to intensify physiological stress (Bechtoldt & Schneider, 
2016; Rash & Prkachin, 2013). Ultimately, it is not clear whether EI is an adaptive resource 
with respect to stress reactivity. 
There are several methodological issues apparent in the research exploring EI and 
stress modulation (Lea et al., 2019). First, an overreliance on TEI over AEI tools is evident, 
introducing the risk of socially desirable responding, and (when stress is also measured 
using self-report) common method bias, where the tendency to self-rate positively can mask 
test effects (Keefer, et al., 2018; Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). Only a 
minority of studies measure emotional competencies (i.e., AEI), and very few measure both 
TEI and AEI. Sole focus on either construct misses the opportunity to examine the respective 
roles of perceived and actual emotional skills; measurement of both EI conceptualisations is 
preferred. Second, few studies control for confounding variables. Many studies fail to 
control for potential confounding influences, such as personality and cognitive ability. 
Considering TEI is widely acknowledged as a lower order personality trait (Petrides et al., 
2007), it is concerning that so few TEI studies account for personality to some extent. 
Similarly, very few studies control for cognitive ability, a closely linked construct to AEI 
(Mayer et al., 2008). Another issue relates to the robustness of the stress induction 
paradigms within the EI field: less than half of conducted studies include a control group 
(Lea et al., 2019). Furthermore, a common issue is that the majority of studies in the stress 
literature only examine subjective (self-reported) stress reactivity, which is problematic, 




the time (e.g., Andrews, Ali, & Pruessner, 2013; Oldehinkel, Ormel, Bosch, Bouma, van Roon, 
Rosmalen, & Riese, 2011).  In other words, how stressed an individual feels does not always 
relate to physiological stress markers, and we therefore cannot assume one stress variable 
will predict another. All studies in the programme of research explore EI and physiological 
and/or psychological reactivity to some extent, while addressing the above methodological 
issues (see Chapters 4-6).  
3.3.3.2 Stress recovery 
The health advantage of EI may also lie in the ability to mentally and physically return to 
baseline following a stressful experience. Stress reactivity and stress recovery (“conceptual 
siblings separated at birth”; Linden, Earle, Gerin, & Christenfeld, 1997, p.1) are both 
revealing aspects of the stress response. Several studies have examined whether EI predicts 
how quickly individuals recover, or ‘bounce back’ from acute stress, by continuing to 
monitor indices of stress after the stressor has ceased. Recovering faster from stressful 
experiences is advantageous in most contexts (Burke et al., 2005; Geurts & Sonnentag, 
2006), as this restricts exposure to the harmful ‘fight or flight’ cascade to only that which is 
necessary (e.g., increased cortisol levels and cardiac activity; McEwen, 2017).  
EI appears beneficial in this regard, for both the short and long term. For example, in 
the laboratory setting, individuals with high TEI show faster recovery following the viewing 
of distressing video footage (Fernández-Berrocal & Extremera, 2006), and in medical 
students, after performing a new surgical task (Arora et al., 2011). TEI has also predicted 
more adaptive cardiac recovery after archers participated in a challenging shooting session 
(Dal & Doğan, 2019). AEI also promoted recovery after exposure to emotional imagery, and 




promote recovery over longer periods of time (e.g., recovering from personal failures, Boss 
& Sims, 2008; emotional adjustment following an ultra-endurance event; Nicolas, Martinet, 
Millet, Bagneux, & Gaudino, 2019). Perhaps EI might lead to more efficient (e.g., faster) 
emotion information processing (EIP) in stressful contexts, aiding recovery (Fernández-
Berrocal & Extremera, 2006; Matthews et al., 2002). Ultimately, EI may be useful in the case 
of reactivity and recovery from acute stress, but this is potentially dependent on the context 
(e.g., stressor type), EI measurement (i.e., TEI, AEI), and sample (no studies have been 
conducted with adolescents) (see Study 1, Chapter 4).  
An alternative line of enquiry concerns EI as a moderator of cognitive processes 
immediately following the stressor. Rumination, which describes the process of focussing 
and brooding on negative emotions (e.g., worrying about an exam that did not go as well as 
anticipated), is often identified as a robust risk factor for psychopathology in adolescence 
(Rood, Roelofs, Bogels, Nolen-Hoeksema, & Schouten, 2009). Evidence indicates that 
individuals who ruminate more after a psychosocial stressor (i.e., those who dwell on the 
negative experience of the stressor, even when there is little one can do about it) not only 
exhibit impaired emotional recovery (LeMoult, Arditte, D’Avanzato & Joorman, 2013) but 
also heightened cardiovascular activity (Key, Campbell, Bacon & Gerin, 2008). Furthermore, 
post-stressor rumination can also strengthen an attentional bias for emotional material (Hilt 
et al., 2017; LeMoult et al., 2013). Thus, EI could enhance mental health outcomes by 
reducing the extent to which an individual dwells on past stressors. To the best of the 
author’s knowledge, only two studies have directly tested that hypothesis. The first 
identified that the clarity subscale of the TMMS was associated with less ruminative thought 
following an experimental stressor (Salovey, Mayer, Goldman, Turvey, & Palfai, 1995), 




after an emotional event was shown by the second study (Lanciano, Curci & Zatton, 2010). 
Furthermore, work by Szczygieł and Mikolajczak (2017) showed that individuals with high 
TEI are more likely to savour positive emotions, complementing the notion that high EI 
individuals may be less inclined to dwell on negative experiences. However, it is not yet 
known how EI relates to post-event rumination in adolescents, or how those variables relate 
to other indices of acute stress responding (see Study 2, Chapter 5). EI may exert a 
protective effect by speeding up psychological and physiological recovery, and limiting the 
extent to which young people ruminate about the stressful event.  
3.4 EI and acute stress: What needs to be done 
Understanding the ways in which EI may be helpful (or not) for older adolescents is 
imperative. Effective stress regulation would greatly benefit 16-18 year olds, a group that is 
especially susceptible to experiencing stress and mental health issues (e.g., Sadler et al., 
2018; National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children [NSPCC], 2017). Although 
there have been several initiatives that attempt to train EI in schools, awareness of the 
mechanisms underpinning EI and stress responding would enable these to be theoretically 
grounded, and empirically supported. The majority of research to date concerning EI and 
stress has been cross-sectional, which does not indicate how, why, or when, EI may buffer 
the effects of stress for young people. A process-oriented approach is needed to understand 
how EI contributes to more adaptive stress regulation, by assessing how EI moderates ER 
processes under stressful conditions (Peña-Sarrionandia et al., 2015). This requires an acute 
stress approach: examining EI ‘in action’, using situational stressors.  
It is also important to acknowledge stress regulation in more applied contexts, in 




highly relevant to adolescents (Fox & Moreland, 2015), on which 91% of 16-24 year olds are 
active (Royal Society for Public Health [RSPH], 2017). In particular, there are emerging 
concerns that the heightened emotional sensitivity and protracted development of 
cognitive control in adolescents may make them especially reactive to emotion-arousing 
material accessed on social media (Crone & Konijn, 2018). However, evidence around well-
being and social media is very mixed, whereby social media use can be either beneficial or 
detrimental (Marino, Gini, Vieno, & Spada, 2018; Orben & Przybylski, 2019; Verduyn, Ybarra, 
Resibois, Jonides, & Kross, 2017; Zhan, Sun, Wang, & Zhang, 2016). A new school of thought 
considers that the relationship is dependent on how social media is utilised (i.e., which 
material is engaged with) (Seabrook, Kern, & Rickard, 2016), and individual differences in 
social media use (Vannuci & Ohannessian, 2019). EI could protect mental health via 
‘healthier’ online behaviour, and proficient ER in relation to online material, although that 
hypothesis has not yet been tested (see Study 3, Chapter 6). 
The programme of research outlined in this thesis rigorously tests several 
hypotheses related to the stress-buffering function of EI, with reference to multiple 
conscious and automatic ER processes, outlined in Figure 6. These are: psychological 
(Studies 1, 2 and 3) and physiological stress reactivity (Studies 1 and 2), coping under stress 
(Study 1), attentional processing under stress (Studies 2 and 3), psychological and 
physiological recovery from stress (Study 1), post-stress rumination (Study 2), and situation 
selection (Study 3). Figure 6 provides an overview of the mechanisms that are focussed 
upon within the programme of research, and indicates the studies in which they can be 
located. These are presented under the original ER families theorised by Gross (1998a), and 












Note. ‘C’ denotes a conscious process, and ‘A’ denotes an automatic process. Stages match those in 













EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND ACUTE STRESS REACTIVITY AND RECOVERY 
IN ADOLESCENTS 
 
4.1 Chapter overview 
No research has yet examined whether EI relates to the direct modulation of the acute 
stress response in later adolescence. To correspond with the pattern of adaptive stress 
responding, high EI individuals should display less emotional and physiological reactivity in 
stressful situations, and recover more quickly, than their low EI peers (Lea et al., 2019; 
Mikolajczak et al., 2009a; Peña-Sarrionandia et al., 2015). This chapter presents the 
methods and findings of Study 1, an experimental study. The extent to which EI moderated 
stress reactivity and recovery was assessed in 58 adolescents aged 16-18 years, following 
exposure to an acute psychosocial stressor. Findings indicated that trait EI (TEI) predicted 
physiological stress reactivity: higher levels of global TEI (and the sociability subscale) 
predicted a less extreme increase in HR in response to the stressful situation. By placing the 
findings of the present study in context, it would seem that within TEI’s nomological 
network, agreeableness, assertiveness, and self-efficacy, are the key TEI factors involved in 
facilitating adaptive ER in psychosocially stressful situations. Moreover, given that ability EI 
(AEI) did not relate to stress outcomes, findings suggest that how confident adolescents feel 
about their emotional abilities matters more for stress regulation than their actual emotion-





One mechanism through which EI may lead to positive effects is by acting as a ‘stress buffer’ 
(Mikolajczak et al., 2009a; 2009b). Specifically, EI may help to directly modulate the stress 
response, by minimising the (acute) stress experienced in demanding situations, or 
situations perceived as demanding (Lea et al., 2019). Of particular interest to researchers is 
stress reactivity – a disposition that describes the extent or capacity to which an individual 
responds to an acute stressor (Schlotz, 2013). Psychological and biological processes of 
reactivity are central to understanding the physical and emotional consequences that can 
result from overexposure to stress (Compas, 2006). 
While abnormal stress reactivity has been repeatedly investigated as a vulnerability 
marker for various somatic and psychological issues, the nature of what constitutes 
‘adaptive’ reactivity remains a strongly debated topic. Specifically, there is disagreement on 
whether heightened (i.e., hyperarousal) or blunted reactivity (i.e., hypoarousal) poses more 
of an issue for adaptation (see Hu et al., 2016; Phillips et al., 2013). Traditionally, heightened 
stress reactivity has been associated with the worsening of long-term health risks, notably 
cardiovascular disease (e.g., Chida & Steptoe, 2010; Lovallo, 2011), due to allostatic 
overload resulting in “chronic wear and tear” on the stress systems of the body (McEwen, 
2003; McEwen, 2004; McEwen, 2008). However, harmful effects can also be short-term. For 
example, high levels of acute stress can impair decision-making (LeBlanc, 2009; Arora et al., 
2010), sport performance (van der Does, Brink, Otter, Visscher, & Lemmink, 2017; Rano et 
al., 2018), and short-term memory capacity (e.g., Kuhlmann, Piel, & Wolf, 2005; Shields, 
Sazma, McCullough, & Yonelinas, 2017). However, other (limited) evidence has suggested 




groups (see Carroll, Lovallo, & Phillips, 2009). A recent systematic review of stress reactivity 
and health (n = 48 papers) attempted to resolve the conflict in the literature, with findings 
indicating that both hyperarousal and hypoarousal to acutely stressful stimuli were 
detrimental to health outcomes (Turner et al., 2020). Findings were somewhat nuanced, 
however, whereby each type of dysregulation predicted different long-term negative health 
outcomes (e.g., hyperarousal: increased blood pressure; hypoarousal: increased BMI). Thus, 
both perspectives on dysregulated stress reactivity warrant investigation. Furthermore, 
because the stress pathway is complex, involving arousal of both the ANS and the 
hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenocortical (HPA) axis (e.g., McEwen, 2003; 2004; 2008), acute 
stress can be measured in a multitude of different ways. Commonly used physiological 
indices of stress reactivity include cardiac measures (including heart rate [HR], heart rate 
variability [HRV], blood pressure), cortisol secretion, electro-dermal activity (EDA), 
electroencephalography (EEG), and pupil dilation (Lea et al., 2019). While those biomarkers 
are free from self-report biases, biomarkers are often not a reliable indicator of stress on 
their own, and are usually applied together with self-report questionnaires to contextualize 
the measurements. Both subjective and objective stress reactivity have adaptive value: they 
show independent predictive validity, yet are often only weakly correlated with each other 
(e.g., Campbell & Ehlert, 2012; Christensen, Dich, Flensborg-Madsen, Garde, Hansen, & 
Mortensen, 2019). 
When deciding which perspective to take on the issue (i.e., how much reactivity is 
adaptive), it is important to note that the majority of the literature concerning stress 
reactivity is focussed on adults, yet the magnitude and duration of the stress response 
varies across the lifespan. In particular, stress response pathways undergo significant 




Flynn, 2012; Spear, 2000). Brain regions associated with emotionality and stress reactivity, 
such as the hippocampus, amygdala, hypothalamus, and prefrontal cortex, continue to 
mature well into young adulthood (Gogtay et al., 2004; Spear, 2000). Evidence suggests 
that, compared to adults and children, adolescents tend to show heightened reactivity to 
acute stressors, both physiologically and behaviourally (Romeo, 2013; Stroud, Foster, 
Papandonatos, Handwerger, Granger, Kivlighan, & Niaura, 2009). Moreover, as a sensitive 
developmental period, overexposure to acute stress, or a disposition for exhibiting 
heightened reactivity, can be particularly problematic in adolescence (Roberts & Lopez-
Duran, 2019; Romeo, 2013). For example, the aforementioned emotion-related brain 
regions are extremely sensitive to stress hormones at this time (Gogtay et al., 2004; Spear, 
2000). When the protracted maturation of emotional neuroanatomy is combined with 
heightened stress reactivity during adolescence, this can present a “perfect storm” in the 
context of psychological adaptation (Romeo, 2013). Indeed, the limited evidence available 
for older adolescents suggests that heightened physiological and emotional reactivity to 
stress predicts an increased risk for internalising and externalising problems (Ortiz & Raine, 
2004; Owens, Helms, Rudolph, Hastings, Nock, & Prinstein, 2018). There is little controversy 
over the adaptive pattern concerning stress recovery – how individuals ‘bounce back’ from 
acute stress (Linden et al., 1997). Theoretical, empirical, and clinical perspectives posit that 
the faster an individual recovers from a stressor, the better (Geurts & Sonnentag, 2006). It is 
imperative that once the stressor no longer poses a danger to the individual, the “fight or 
flight” cascade stops, to prevent allostatic overload, and subsequent “wear and tear” on the 
body’s stress systems (McEwen, 2017). Thus, adolescents that show an adaptive stress 




4.2.1 Acute stress responding: A role for EI? 
Researchers are increasingly turning to emotion-related dispositions in the search for 
individual differences that might modify stress responding in young people. Increasingly, 
investigations into the processes of EI, and its stress-buffering effect, are acknowledging the 
vast body of ER literature (Peña-Sarrionandia et al., 2015). Gross’ ER framework is often 
used for this purpose (e.g., Moriya & Takahasji, 2013; Scheibe & Zacher, 2013; Troy & 
Mauss, 2011). As discussed in Chapter 3, the emotional response modulation family of ER 
processes (Gross, 1998a) – directly influencing physiological, behavioural, and psychological 
components of the emotional response – has important consequences for adaptation. 
Modifying one’s psychological and/or physiological stress reactivity (i.e., the extent to which 
someone ‘reacts’ to a stressful situation) could reflect an important mechanism through 
which EI may help offset potentially deleterious stress-induced alterations in physiology and 
behaviour, and lead to positive life outcomes (Keefer et al., 2018). However, as highlighted 
by Chapter 3 (and the associated publication: Lea et al., 2019), there is no published 
research examining whether EI buffers stress reactivity in adolescents. The role of EI in 
stress response modulation processes in adolescents could be investigated from multiple 
perspectives. However, considering both ‘types of EI (i.e., TEI; AEI), both psychological and 
physiological aspects of stress reactivity, and stress recovery, would thoroughly test the 
hypothesis that EI buffers the effects of acute stress. 
The majority of research into EI and stress thus far is correlational and/or cross-
sectional, often limited to questionnaire-based studies that test for associations between EI 
and an aspect of self-reported dispositional or chronic stress. However, to substantiate 




controlled, experimental stress paradigms (Mikolajczak et al., 2009a; 2009b). While 
responses to laboratory-induced stress are not of clinical importance per se, they do 
represent the way that individuals ordinarily respond to everyday challenges (Henze et al., 
2017), and dysregulated responses to those acute stressors can present both short-term 
(e.g., LeBlanc, 2009; Arora et al., 2010), and long-term consequences for adaptation (e.g., 
Chida & Steptoe, 2010; Lovallo, 2011).  In adults, experimental studies that have examined 
EI and stress reactivity and recovery have produced mixed findings (Lea et al., 2019; Chapter 
3, Section 3.3.3). Evidence generally suggests that whether EI is useful under acute stress is 
highly dependent on the stress context, and how EI is measured. Overall, TEI significantly 
predicts adaptive stress reactivity in the context of sports-based stressors (e.g., a sports 
competition), and cognitive stressors (e.g., a memory task), but not others (psychosocial 
stress; emotive stimuli). For example, high TEI individuals typically secrete less cortisol (the 
main stress hormone) in response to a challenging cognitive task (e.g., Mikolajczak et al., 
2007), but increased cortisol during public speaking (Thomas et al., 2018), than their low TEI 
counterparts. However, the picture is less clear for AEI, since there is a dearth of AEI 
research. While AEI buffered subjective stress in one study (Ruiz-Aranda et al., 2011), it had 
no significant effect in two others (Limonero et al., 2015; Matthews et al., 2006). AEI 
appears to intensify physiological stress (Bechtoldt & Schneider, 2016; Rash & Prkachin, 
2013). Ultimately, it is not clear whether EI is an adaptive resource with respect to stress 
reactivity, especially in adolescents. However, the experimental literature suggests that EI 
appears useful for stress recovery in adults, in both the short and long term (Chapter 3, 
Section 3.3.3.2). 
It is also unclear how EI might influence stress reactivity and recovery. One school of 




address the absence of research that examines the relationship between situational coping 
and EI in adolescent samples, the present study also assessed coping as an ER strategy 
(Chapter 3, Section 3.3.2.2; Gross, 1998a). While evidence suggests that EI promotes more 
adaptive coping in adults for both TEI and AEI (e.g., Matthews et al., 2006; et al., 2002, Study 
2; O’Connor et al., 2017), we might expect that the role of EI in coping in stressful conditions 
could differ between adolescents and adults (Compas et al., 1992). In addition, evidence 
suggests that coping with a stressor effectively might have a beneficial influence on stress 
reactivity (i.e., adaptive coping relates to less reactivity, e.g., Dunkley, Mandel, & Ma, 2014). 
Together, the literature hints at a potential mechanism through which EI may buffer acute 
stress (i.e., through a reduction in psychological and physiological stress reactivity, via 
selection of more adaptive coping strategies). Studies typically employ (moderated) 
mediation analyses to investigate whether coping mediates the relationship between EI and 
stress outcomes (e.g., Matthews et al., 2006; Mikolajczak et al., 2008), an approach also 
taken by the present study.  
There are additional issues with the body of literature described thus far. Two thirds 
of studies examining EI and stress responding do not control for any additional variables 
that may have confounded with EI to influence reactivity or recovery variables, such as 
personality, cognitive ability, or mental health (Lea et al., 2019). As discussed in Chapter 2, 
EI can theoretically and empirically overlap with several constructs. TEI is widely 
acknowledged as a lower order personality trait (Petrides et al., 2007), and AEI is closely 
linked with cognitive ability (Mayer et al., 2008). Therefore, studies measuring TEI and AEI 
should routinely account for those confounding influences, to clearly define EI’s relationship 
with stress regulation. Furthermore, acute stress responding can be affected by clinical 




Schene, Phillips, & Roseboom, 2010) can show blunted stress reactivity, and impaired stress 
recovery, compared to controls. Critical evaluation of empirical literature in the area also 
reveals serious quality issues, namely a lack of experimental control; only 22% of studies 
used an explicit control group for their stress induction paradigm (Lea et al., 2019). The 
present study aims to overcome those limitations by using a clearly defined control group, 
and including personality, cognitive ability, and mental health, as covariates. Furthermore, 
the participant sample comprises a ‘forgotten’ group in empirical research: 16-18 year olds 
(Kennedy, 2010). EI could be especially helpful for older adolescents, considering that 
neuroscientific, statistical, and behavioural evidence suggests that older adolescents 
experience significant daily stress (Figure 3), and are undergoing significant stress regulation 
development (e.g., Chapter 2 Section 2.2; Esnaola et al., 2017; Gardner & Steinberg, 2005; 
Giedd et al., 1996; 1999; Zarrett & Eccles, 2006). While not all older adolescents go on to 
develop adverse outcomes as a result of exposure to normative stressors, the number of 
those that do go on to develop mental health issues is rising (e.g., Sadler et al., 2018). It is 
therefore important that we understand whether EI could act as a useful individual-level 
resource with respect to stress reactivity and recovery. 
4.2.2 Aims and hypotheses 
The present study employs comprehensive (measuring TEI and AEI, physiological and 
subjective stress) and robust (i.e., control group, controlling for confounders) methodology 
in an empirically neglected population (older adolescents). Specifically, the present study 
aimed to test whether EI moderates acute stress reactivity and recovery in adolescents aged 
16-18, and if so, whether that relationship is mediated by coping strategy selection. To 




from adult data (Lea et al., 2019). First, it is predicted that TEI will predict less psychological 
reactivity and HR reactivity in the stress condition (H1). Second, H2 predicts TEI will predict 
faster recovery from stress. Due to the aforementioned inconsistency of the evidence 
regarding AEI and stress reactivity and recovery, directional hypotheses for AEI cannot be 
generated. Third, H3 predicts that TEI and AEI will predict greater use of adaptive coping 
strategies (i.e., more task-focussed coping, less emotion-focussed coping, and less avoidant 
coping). However, to test whether coping explains the relationship between EI and stress 
reactivity, further analyses are needed. For this, studies typically use mediation analyses to 
establish whether EI acted on stress responses through coping, similar to the approach 
taken by Mikolajczak et al. (2008), and Matthews et al. (2006). Thus, finally, it is 
hypothesised that the relationship between EI and reactivity will be mediated by emotion-
focussed coping strategies and/or avoidant coping strategies (H4). In all cases, exploratory 
analyses were also conducted using TEI factor scores. Since TEI is an umbrella term for 
emotional traits and dispositions, not a unidimensional construct (Petrides et al., 2007), 
drawing conclusions about ‘whole’ TEI alone does not make conceptual sense without an 
appreciation for its component parts. Analysis at the subscale level provides more 
meaningful interpretations than working with composite TEI scores, and helps elucidate 
which elements of TEI are most useful in different contexts (Downey et al., 2010; Zeidner et 
al., 2012a). Such analyses are exploratory, however, as there is insufficient evidence to 
suggest directional hypotheses with respect to specific TEI subscale – few studies provide 






To clarify whether EI is adaptive in terms of responding to acute stress, the present study 
used an experimental approach, comparing the relationship between EI and stress reactivity 
under acutely stressful versus neutral (i.e., control) conditions. An experimental, between-
groups design was selected, with the study comprised of two parts: an online questionnaire 
battery, and an in-person experimental session. There were two independent variables: 
experimental condition (randomly assigned; stressful vs. control) and EI (TEI; AEI: emotion 
management [AEI(EM)] and emotion understanding [AEI(EP)]; all continuous variables), and 
three dependent variables: subjective stress reactivity (i.e., mood), physiological stress 
reactivity (i.e., HR), and coping (task-based; emotion-based; avoidance). Participants were 
assigned to one of the two conditions using an online random number generator 
(https://www.randomizer.org). Sex, the Big Five personality traits, cognitive ability, and 
mental health, were included as covariates in analyses. Ethical approval was granted by the 
Humanities and Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee (HASSREC) at the University of 
Worcester in June 2017 (HASSREC code: HCA16170033). Appendix A provides an extended 
discussion on the choice of design, stressor, and analysis for the present study. 
4.3.2 Participants 
A-priori power analyses conducted using G*Power (Erdfelder, Faul & Buchner, 1996) 
suggested a minimum of 128 participants to achieve .80 probability of detecting a true 
medium-sized effect using hierarchical regression (Field, 2017), and this was used as the 
recruitment target for the study. However, recruiting participants within a narrow age band 




in making direct contact with head-teachers). Thus, a convenience sample of 74 adolescents 
was consequently recruited from a state Sixth Form college in the West Midlands with 
which the researcher had professional contacts. A review of empirical studies examining EI 
and stress reactivity (Lea et al., 2019) indicated that, in practice, approximately 50-100 
participants was the ‘norm’, suggesting that n = 74 is not anomalous for the field. Initially, 
an email containing brief information about the study (Appendix B) was sent to the head-
teacher of the college. The email stated that the researcher would follow up with a phone-
call 7 days later. The headteacher expressed interest during the phone-call, and so a 
meeting was arranged to discuss the study particulars, attended by the researcher, head-
teacher, and a member of the student safe-guarding team. Following consent to take part at 
the institution-level, arrangements were made to recruit students to take part in the study 
(details provided in ‘Procedure’ section).  
In the most recent available report by Ofsted (the UK government office responsible 
for inspecting and regulating schools and colleges), the participating Sixth Form college was 
rated ‘Good’. Ofsted also suggests that the West Midlands performs broadly in line with 
England as a whole at with respect to secondary and further education (Ofsted, 2014). In 
addition, the ethnicity data obtained for the city within which the college was situated 
revealed a comparable, though slightly lower, proportion of people with a Black and Ethnic 
Minority origin (BME) (12.6%), than for the general population of England (20.2%) (UK 
Census, 2011). Furthermore, during 2017/2018, when data collection took place, the mean 
percentage of students eligible for and claiming free school meals in state funded secondary 
schools and colleges for Worcestershire (9%) was slightly less than for England as a whole 




reliable proxy measure of disadvantage of an area (Kounali, Robinson, Goldstein, & Lauder, 
2008). In sum, statistics suggests that the sample was broadly representative of the UK 
population as a whole in terms of socioeconomic factors.  
Of the 74 participants whom provided consent, 58 completed the entire study. 
Those that completed both parts and those that did not did not statistically vary in 
composition of either sex or age (ps > .05). The final sample comprised 48 females and 8 
males (2 participants selected ‘Other’); 42 were 16 years, 11 were 17 years and 5 were 18 
years old.  
4.3.4 Measures 
To minimise disruption to teaching time, the battery of questionnaire measures was 
completed online in participants’ free time. However, as drop-out rate for completing an 
online questionnaire battery is concerning (Hoerger, 2010) maximising completion rates was 
imperative. Hoerger (2010) calculated that for psychological studies, 10% of participants 
drop out almost instantaneously, with at least an additional 2% dropping out per 100 survey 
items. Thus, to reduce respondent fatigue (Lavrakas, 2008), short forms of measures were 
selected over longer forms. Online delivery also provided the participant with the flexibility 
to complete measures at any time, on any device. The completion rate for the questionnaire 
battery was high: 96% of students that started the questionnaires went on to complete all 
questions. Choice of instrumentation for the battery of tests was given careful 
consideration. For each construct of interest, relevant reviews, meta-analyses, and empirical 
studies that had measured that construct alongside EI and stress reactivity, were consulted 




validated for use with adolescents. The following sections provide details of the instruments 
selected, with full copies available in Appendix C.  
4.3.4.1 Emotional intelligence: trait 
The Trait Emotional Intelligence Questionnaire - Adolescent Short Form (TEIQue-ASF) is an 
age-appropriate, short measure of TEI from the TEIQue family of measures (e.g., TEIQue, 
TEIQue-Short Form [TEIQue-SF], TEIQue-Adolescent Full Form [TEIQue-AFF]) (Petrides, 
2009). Those measures are some of the few TEI measures that align with a clear theoretical 
framework (Siegling et al., 2015a; 2015b). Other instruments (e.g., Emotional Quotient 
Inventory [EQ-I]; Bar-On, 1997; SEIS; Schutte & Malouff, 1998) are restricted in their range 
and depth of coverage of the TEI domain (Parker et al., 2011; Pérez et al., 2005; Petrides, 
2009). Further factors influencing the selection of the TEIQue-ASF for the present study 
include its widespread use, availability, and excellent psychometric properties of the TEIQue 
(Cooper & Petrides, 2010). Its popularity was also alluded to in a systematic review on EI in 
stress reactivity contexts (Lea et al., 2019). In the TEIQue-ASF, individuals indicate their level 
of agreement with a set of 30 brief statements using a 7-point Likert scale, with scale points 
ranging from ‘Completely disagree’ (1) to ‘Completely agree’ (7). From this, global scores 
and scores on four emotional self-perception factors; emotionality, self-control, sociability, 
and well-being, are derived (Petrides, 2009), where higher scores denote higher levels of 
TEI.  
Table 3 displays descriptions of the factors and example items from the TEIQue-ASF. 
The TEIQue family of measures possesses excellent reliability which usually exceeds .80, and 
is generally considered superior to other common TEI measures, such as the Schutte 





Descriptions of Factors and Example Items from the Trait Emotional Intelligence Questionnaire - Adolescent Short Form (TEIQue-ASF) 
Factor Factor description Example items High scorers perceive themselves as… 
Emotionality 
 
Perceived abilities relating to 
recognition and expression of 
emotion in the self and others, 
necessary for development and 
maintenance of close personal 
relationships 
I often find it hard to see 
things from someone else’s 
point of view. (R) 
I pay a lot of attention to my 
feelings. 
…clear about their own and other people’s feelings 
…capable of communicating their feelings to others 
…capable of taking someone else’s perspective 
Self-control Perceived ability to control impulses 
and cope under pressure 
Sometimes, I get involved in 
things I later wish I could get 
out of. (R) 
I find it hard to control my 
feelings. (R) 
…capable of controlling their emotions 
…reflective and less likely to give in to their urges 
…capable of withstanding pressure and regulating 
stress 
Sociability Perceived competencies relating to 
communication and influence within 
social contexts (e.g., negotiation, 
networking) 
I’m good at getting along 
with my classmates. 
I can make other people feel 
better if I want to. 
…capable of influencing other people’s feelings 





 …accomplished networkers with excellent social 
skills 
Well-being Perceived optimism, happiness, and 
life satisfaction 
I’m happy with the way I 
look. 
Sometimes, I think my whole 
life is going to be miserable. 
(R) 
…confident and likely to look on the “bright side of 
life” 
…cheerful and satisfied with their lives 
…successful and self-confident 
Auxiliary 
factors 
Items relating to self-motivation 
and adaptability which are not 
connected to the four above factors 
I find it hard to keep myself 
motivated. (R) 
I’m able to cope well in new 
environments. 
…driven and unlikely to give up in the face of 
adversity 
…flexible and willing to adapt to new conditions 




structure that retains its validity even in the brief versions (Cooper & Petrides, 2010), and 
has excellent reliability, indicated by Cronbach’s alphas of .88-.92 and good item 
discrimination (Cooper & Petrides, 2010; Petrides, 2009). Although most validation work has 
been conducted with the adult TEIQue, psychometric properties of the TEIQue-ASF also 
appear convincing so far (Davis & Humphrey, 2014; Siegling et al., 2015b). Reliability scores 
were largely acceptable in the present study: .91 (global score), .91 (well-being), .70 (self-
control), .70 (emotionality), and .61 (sociability).   
4.3.4.2 Emotional intelligence: ability 
The prevailing model of AEI proposes two areas of emotional cognition; experiential 
(perception of emotion; using emotion to facilitate thought) and strategic (understanding 
emotion; managing emotion) (Mayer et al., 2002). The present study focusses on the 
strategic branch due to its consistent link with mental health (e.g., suicidal behaviour; Cha & 
Nock, 2009) and stress-related variables (e.g., perceived life stress; Ruiz-Aranda, Extremera 
& Pineda-Galán, 2014; cardiac reactivity; Schneider et al., 2013). In terms of measurement, 
AEI is predominantly estimated using the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test 
(MSCEIT; Mayer et al., 2002). However, commentators argue that implementation of 
alternatives is required to fully differentiate test effects from construct effects in such a 
complex construct (MacCann & Roberts, 2008). Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 2, the 
MSCEIT is costly, and lacks transparency due to its unorthodox scoring methods (Fiori et al., 
2014). Newer, freely available assessments of EI: the vignette-based Situational Test of 
Emotional Understanding (STEU), and Situational Test of Emotional Management (STEM), 
were selected for the present study, both of which are freely available (MacCann & Roberts, 




The STEM was constructed using the situational judgement test method (McDaniel, 
Morgeson, Finnegan, Campion & Braverman, 2001). In the STEM, participants select the 
optimum emotional management strategy to deal with either sadness, anger, or fear, across 
a diverse range of 44 scenarios. Item responses are assigned different weightings to 
represent degree of agreement with expert consensus opinion. In contrast, the STEU was 
developed according to Roseman’s (2001) appraisal theory of emotions, which predicts the 
most plausible emotion to be felt in a situation based on specific combinations of seven 
appraisal dimensions, such as causal agency (other- vs. self- vs. circumstance-caused) and 
control potential (high vs. low). Participants identify which emotion (e.g., sadness, pride, 
regret, contempt, frustration, anger, fear) is most likely to be felt in 43 given situations, with 
the correct emotion scored according to Roseman’s theoretical model. Vignette topics in 
both scales span the workplace, relationships, and personal life. Higher scores on the STEU 
and STEM represent greater capacities to understand and manage emotions, respectively. 
For more details of the STEU/STEM development, see the test authors’ original paper 
(MacCann & Roberts, 2008), and Table 4 for example items.  
Despite their relatively recent development, psychometric properties of the STEU 
and STEM appear promising, with adequate reliabilities of .71 (STEU) and .68 (STEM) 
(MacCann & Roberts, 2008). For brevity, the current study employed the shorter versions of 
these measures; the STEU-Brief (STEU-B; 19 items) (Allen, Weissman, Hellwig, MacCann, & 
Roberts, 2014), and the STEM-Brief (STEM-B; 18 items) (Allen, Rahman, Weissman, 
MacCann, Lewis, & Roberts, 2015), reliabilities for which are mostly acceptable; .63 (STEU-B) 
and .84 (STEM-B) (Allen et al., 2014; 2015). With the exception of the MSCEIT-Youth version 
(only available commercially), no AEI measures have been validated with an adolescent 





Example Items from the Situational Test of Emotional Management- Brief (STEM-B) and Situational Test of Emotional Understanding- Brief 
(STEU-B) 
Strategic AEI branch Tool Example items Answers 
Emotional 
Management 





Julie hasn’t seen Ka for ages and looks forward to 
their weekend trip away. However, Ka has changed 
a lot and Julie finds that she is no longer an 
interesting companion. What action would be the 
most effective for Julie? 
(a) Cancel the trip and go home. [.00] 
(b) Realise that it is time to give up the friendship 
and move on. [.00] 
(c) Understand that people change, so move on, 
but remember the good times. [.92] 









Xavier completes a difficult task on time and under 
budget. Xavier is most likely to feel? 
(a) Surprise   
(b) Pride   
(c) Relief   
(d) Hope   
(e) Joy 
Note: STEM: answer ratings shown in parentheses (determined by expert opinion); STEU: correct answer in bold (determined according to Roseman’s 




18 year olds. Cronbach alphas supported the suitability of the STEM-B (.67), but not the 
STEU-B (.38), for the population in question. 
4.3.4.3 Personality 
The Big Five Factor model (FFM), in which personality is conceptualised as five components 
(extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism, and openness), is generally 
considered the ‘gold standard’ personality model in psychology (McCrae & Costa, 2013). 
Personality was assessed using the mini International Personality Item Pool (mini-IPIP; 
Donnellan, Oswald, Baird, & Lucas, 2006), a freely available measure of the FFM, selected 
due to its efficiency in assessing broadband personality with relatively few (20) items. In the 
scale, participants indicate to what extent they agree with 20 brief statements prefaced 
with “I…” using a five-point scale from ‘very inaccurate’ (1) to ‘very accurate’ (5). Each trait 
is assessed through four items. Internal consistencies have been acceptable-good (.65 - .91) 
across multiple studies (e.g., Cooper, Smillie, & Corr, 2010), and, importantly, in a large 
nationally representative sample of 15,701 adolescents (Baldasaro, Shanahan, & Bauer, 
2013). Those studies also demonstrated robust factor structure via confirmatory factor 
analyses. The mini IPIP has excellent convergent validity with longer FFM measures, such as 
the Big Five Inventory (BFI; John & Srivistava, 1999), and the full version of the IPIP 
(Donnellan et al., 2006). Descriptions of the five factors, along with example items from the 
IPIP, and Cronbach’s α values for the present data, can be located in Table 5. 
4.3.4.4 Cognitive ability 
According to the traditional model of intelligence developed by Catell (1963), cognitive 
ability (‘intelligence’; g) can be conceptualised as two broad factors: fluid intelligence (Gf; 





Descriptions of Factors, Alpha Reliabilities and Example Items from the Mini International Personality Item Pool (mini-IPIP) 
Factor Description High scorers typically… Example items (“I…”) 
Extraversion  
(α = .77) 
Inclination to seek stimulation from 
the company of others (as opposed 
to solitude) 
• Have lots of energy 
• Are likely to assert themselves 
• Are action-oriented 
…am the life of the party. 
…don’t talk a lot. (R) 
Agreeableness 
(α = .80) 
Disposition to show a pro-social 
approach (as opposed to 
antisocial); tendency to get on well 
with others 
• Are well-liked 
• Show compromise and altruism 
…am not really interested in others. (R) 
…sympathise with others’ feelings. 
Conscientiousness 
(α = .70) 
Tendency to control impulses and 
display socially acceptable 
behaviour 
• Are very organised and goal-
oriented 
• Delay gratification 
…like order. 
…get chores done right away. 
Neuroticism 
(α = .82) 
Propensity to experience negative 
feelings (e.g., anxiousness, 
sadness); emotional instability 
• Are emotionally reactive 
• Show low levels of confidence 
and self-esteem 
…have frequent mood swings. 
…am relaxed most of the time. (R) 
Openness 
(α = .74) 
Willingness to try new things; depth 
and complexity of experiences 
• Think outside the box 
• Prefer variety 
• Are creative and innovative 
…have a vivid imagination. 
…am not interested in abstract ideas. (R) 




acquired knowledge) and crystallised intelligence (Gc; the ability to use acquired skills, 
knowledge, and experience, to solve problems). Although other types of intellectual 
functioning (e.g., visual perception; auditory perception) have been explored, Gf and Gc still 
remain the central components of contemporary models. Since evidence generally suggests 
that EI is more closely related to Gc than Gf (e.g., Farrelly & Austin, 2007), a measure of Gc 
was employed in the present study. In addition, controlling for word knowledge ensures 
that higher scores on the adult AEI measures do not simply reflect superior comprehension. 
Objective, standardised measures of g are preferred over commonly utilised proxy 
measures of intelligence (e.g., academic achievement), which can be the consequence of 
multiple factors (Rossen & Kranzler, 2009). Thus, Gc was indexed in the current study using 
an 18-item Vocabulary tests from the Kit of Factor-Referenced Cognitive Tests (Ekstrom, 
French, Harman, & Dermen, 1976). Participants read the list of words (e.g., implicate, feline, 
airtight) and choose alternatives that are closest in meaning. The test battery has been well-
validated (for example: Salthouse, 2014), and is quick to administer. In the present study, 
participants scored an average of 61.11% (SD = 16.36), with an internal consistency of .64.  
As discussed in Chapter 2, few freely available tasks and measures are specifically designed 
for older adolescents. Despite being designed for participants aged over 18 years, several 
tests in the Kit of Factor-Referenced Cognitive Tests (Ekstrom et al., 1976) have been 
successfully used with adolescents (e.g., 16-25 years; Berger, van Spaendonck, Horstink, 
Buytenhuijs, Lammers, & Cools, 1993), including the vocabulary test used in the present 





4.3.4.5 Mental health 
Adolescents’ mental health was assessed using the Hospital Anxiety Depression Scale 
(HADS; Zigmond & Snaith, 1983), which focusses on two scales: anxiety and depression (7 
items each). In the HADS, participants read statements and choose the response that most 
closely resembles how they have been feeling over the past week. For example, 'Worrying 
thoughts go through my mind' (response options: 'A great deal of the time', 'a lot of the 
time', 'from time to time but not too often', 'only occasionally'). The HADS is an established 
tool in both research and practice, and is recommended by the National Institute for Health 
and Care Excellence (NICE; 2020). Although clinical diagnoses were not required for the 
present research, the measure provides an indication of levels of trait anxiety and 
depression that could influence the variables of interest. Compared with healthy individuals, 
those experiencing high levels of anxiety and depression often show dysregulated stress 
reactivity and recovery (Burke et al., 2005; de Rooij et al., 2010). Importantly, the HADS has 
been validated for use with older adolescents (Chan, Leung, Fong, Leung, & Lee, 2010; 
Jörngården, Wettergen, & Essen, 2006) and has typically good psychometric properties with 
Cronbach alphas exceeding .70 in most cases. The present study yielded Cronbach alpha 
coefficients of .88 overall, .84 for the Anxiety scale and .81 for the Depression scale.  
4.3.5 Stress manipulation procedure 
To induce stress, the experiment employed a variant of the Sing-a-Song Stress Test (SSST), a 
relatively novel, but effective, means of inducing acute stress (Brouwer & Högervorst, 2014). 
The SSST significantly induces both physiological and perceived stress (Brouwer & 
Högervorst, 2014), and presents practical utility, and a greater suitability for the target 




Hellhammer, 1993). Appendix A provides detailed justifications for selection of the SSST as a 
stress inducer, and indices of stress, for the present study.  
The SSST was presented as a PowerPoint slideshow (Appendix D), with the 
researcher observing the participant and offering verbal clarifications when necessary. To 
establish baseline physiology, the first screen instructs the participant to relax and take 
deep breaths for two minutes. The participant then engages with four simple, nonverbal, 
non-emotive cognitive tasks (e.g., “Think of as many animals as you can beginning with the 
letter ‘p’”), interchanged by a counter counting down from 30 seconds to zero.  Next, the 
(stress-inducing) screen informs participants that they are required to sing a song of their 
choice at the end of the countdown (60 seconds to 0), and that the performance will be 
recorded. When the counter reaches zero, participants sing their song for 60 seconds (see 
Figure 7). It is during that last 60 seconds (i.e., while the participants are singing) for which 
stress reactivity is derived (see ‘Stress operationalisation’ section). In the control conditions, 
participants completed the same breathing exercise before reading a non-emotive magazine 
article and completing a readability questionnaire, for which participants were assured 
there were no right or wrong answers (see Appendix E). The control task had a similar 
cognitive load, but to attenuate the social-evaluative threat, the researcher was supportive 
and there was no pretence of audio-visual recording. The reading task was shown to be an 











Note. HR = heart rate; HR1 represents HR at time-point 1 (baseline), HR2 = HR at time point-2 (reactivity); HR3 = HR at time-point 3 (recovery); CITS-S = 
Coping Inventory for Task-Based Stressors – Situational version; PANAS = Positive Negative Affect Schedule; SSST = Sing-a-Song Stress Test.
Figure 7 




4.3.6 Stress responses 
4.3.6.1 Psychological reactivity 
Physiological changes following a stressful stimulus are accompanied by changes in 
subjective experience (Levenson, 2014). Subjective mood was estimated using the Positive 
and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988; see Appendix C), 
the most commonly used mood tool identified in the systematic review of the EI and stress 
reactivity literature. The scale assesses two broad and independent dimensions: positive 
affect (PA), and negative affect (NA). In the ‘present moment’ PANAS, participants rate to 
what extent they are experiencing 20 adjectives (e.g., ‘nervous’, ‘determined’, ‘upset’) on a 
five-point Likert scale from ‘Very slightly or not at all’ (1) to ‘Extremely’ (5). Each scale 
contains ten items, with the summed scores for the items on each scale indicating the 
participant’s current level of PA and NA. The PANAS possesses excellent psychometric 
properties (Crawford & Henry, 2004; Tuccitto, Giacobbi, & Leite, 2010), reliably capturing 
transient, state-dependent variations in stress, and converging with similar measures such 
as the Profile of Mood States (POMS) and State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) (Rossi & 
Pourtois, 2012). Although some literature challenges its cross-cultural applicability (Villodas, 
Villodas, & Roesch, 2011), the PANAS has been validated with the age range in question, 
returning acceptable internal consistency scores of .80-86 in English-speaking populations 
(Crocker, 1997; Huebner & Dew, 1995). In the present study, alpha reliabilities were 
excellent for both NA (.80-.92) and PA (.80-.87) scales.  
4.3.6.2 Physiological reactivity 
Previous studies exploring the relationship between EI and physiological stress reactivity 




(ANS) activity (Lea et al., 2019). Therefore, throughout the experimental session, 
participants wore a Fitbit Charge 2, a wrist-worn optical blood sensor (Fitbit, US) that 
employs PurePulse© optical HR technology to automatically measure HR once every 
second. Whereas some evidence suggests that Fitbit technology may not adequately 
capture HR during free-living conditions, when compared to ‘gold standard’ chest straps 
(Lee, An, Kang, & Kim, 2016), preliminary evidence indicates that reliability is very good in an 
experimental setting when participants are seated (i.e., the conditions of the present study) 
(Shcherbina et al., 2017). In addition, the age of the participants (under 18 years) and the 
nature of the experiment (stress induction) also supported the equipment selection; the 
device is unlikely to cause any additional stress to participants due to its familiarity with 
young people, and its non-invasiveness, when compared to other laboratory equipment 
(e.g., chest straps).  
4.3.6.3 Stress operationalisation 
Stress was operationalised via both objective (physiological; HR) and subjective 
(psychological; mood) means (see above sections). The approach to operationalisation of 
stress reactivity and recovery variables, and selected time-points, was akin to similar studies 
examining the role of EI and cardiac reactivity (e.g., Ling et al., 2018; Liu, Vickers, Reed, & 
Hadad, 2017; Pittarello, Conte, Caserotti, Scrimin, & Rubaltelli, 2018). Level of stress was 
captured across the experiment at three time-points: at baseline (PA1, NA1, HR1), during 
the stressor (PA2, NA2, HR2), and during recovery (PA3, NA3, HR3) (see Table 6 for 







Descriptions of Stress Variables Captured Across the Experiment  
Stress variable  Description/source  
Baseline HR [HR1]  Mean HR during 120s breathing exercise  
HR during stress task [HR2]   Average HR across 60s of singing  
HR following positive video [HR3]  Mean HR across 60s following positive video viewing  
Baseline mood [PA1/NA1]  PANAS1 completed at baseline  
Mood during stressor [PA2/NA2]  PANAS2 completed retrospectively  
Mood after positive video [PA3/NA3]  PANAS3 completed following positive video viewing 
Note: HR = heart rate; PA = positive affect; NA = negative affect. Time-points for capturing stress 
indices were matched in the control group.  
  
 
Operationalisations of stress reactivity and recovery were subsequently calculated 
from these indices. Psychological stress reactivity was calculated by subtracting mood at 
baseline (PA1/NA1) from mood during stressful task (PA2/NA2) (i.e., stress reactivity = PA2 – 
PA1; NA2 – NA1). Physiological stress recovery was operationalised as the change in mood 
from during the stressor (PA2/NA2), to following the positive video (PA3/NA3) (i.e., PA3 – 
PA2; NA3 – NA2), with baseline PA/NA included as covariates. Calculations for physiological 
variables was similar, but used % changes instead of raw values (PA/NA scores are 
standardised, whereas HR is not). Physiological stress reactivity was operationalised as the 
% change from the average HR during the 2-minute relaxation exercise (baseline; HR1) to 
the average HR during the singing task (HR2) (i.e., stress reactivity = HR2 – HR1). Recovery 
was operationalised as the % change from the average HR during the singing (HR2) to the 
average HR during the minute following the presentation of a positive video (HR3) (i.e., 




individual’s resting HR). The experimental context for which these variables were applied is 
described in the ‘Procedure’ section. 
4.3.6.4 Coping. 
In addition to investigating EI in relation to response modulation (i.e., psychological and 
physiological stress reactivity), the present study also endeavoured to investigate EI’s role in 
relation to situational coping (H3; H4), part of the ‘cognitive change’ family of ER strategies 
(Gross, 1998a). Whilst there is little consensus on how best to conceptualise and measure 
coping (especially in childhood and adolescence; Compas, Connor-Smith, Saltzman, 
Thomsen, & Wadsworth, 2001), it is generally agreed that coping is a complex, 
multidimensional construct. Many coping measures have been developed that attempt to 
converge different theoretical approaches, such as task-focussed coping vs. emotion 
focussed coping, and approach vs. avoidance distinctions, resulting in a plethora of 
taxonomies and inventories of coping strategies (for review, see Kato, 2013). For example, 
Skinner et al. (2003) analysed the structure of coping category systems and identified 15 
different higher order distinctions from 100 coping measures. One of the most common 
coping strategy categorisations is that comprising task-focussed coping vs. emotion-
focussed coping vs. avoidance coping, upon which many self-report coping inventories have 
been devised (e.g., Endler & Parker, 1999). 
The Coping Inventory for Task Stressors (CITS; Matthews & Campbell, 1998) is a self-
report, multidimensional measure of explicit coping styles used to complete a stressful task. 
The CITS-S (CITS - situational version) consists of 21 items that form three scales: task-
focussed coping, emotion-focussed coping, and avoidance coping. Participants indicate the 




performed, using a 5-point scale from ‘not at all’ (0) to ‘extremely’ (4). Table 7 provides a 
description and example items for each of the three dimensions. The CITS-S is particularly 
well-suited for the present study as it is specifically designed for a task-based stressor, in 
contrast to more generic coping instruments (such as the widely used COPE; Carver, Scheier, 
& Weintraub, 1989), which contain items irrelevant to laboratory-based situational stressors 
(e.g., ‘I discuss my feelings with someone’). The CIT-S has demonstrated good internal 
reliability of between .79 and .91 with adolescent populations (Matthews & Campbell, 1998; 
Matthews et al., 2006; O’Connor et al., 2017), and, furthermore, the CITS has been recently 
employed alongside the present study’s measure of TEI, the TEIQue-SF (O’Connor et al., 
2017). The CITS-S was also shown to be reliable in the present study: task-focussed coping: 




Descriptions and Example Items for the Coping Inventory for Task-Based Stressors 
(Situational Version) (CITS-S) 
Coping dimension Description Example item “I…” 
Task-focussed Practical strategies that focus 
on performance and tackle the 
stressor directly 
…Was careful to avoid mistakes. 
…Did my best to follow instructions 
for the task. 
 
Emotion-focussed Maladaptive strategies that 
utilise negative emotions (e.g., 
…Wished that I could change what 




worry, self-blame) to cope with 
stress 
…Blamed myself for becoming too 
emotional. 
Avoidance-focussed Strategies characterised by 
efforts to avoid or “escape” the 
stressor 
…Stayed detached or distanced 
from the situation. 
…Didn’t take the task too seriously. 
 
4.3.7 Procedure 
In the participating college, the researcher visited eight AS and A level1 Psychology classes to 
give talks that lasted approximately 15 minutes. During this time, the researcher introduced 
herself to the students, gave a brief PowerPoint presentation that highlighted the benefits 
and risks of participating in research, and provided a brief outline of the study. Information 
packs containing an information sheet, letter to parents, and consent form, were then 
handed out (see Appendix F). These talks were arranged by liaising directly with Psychology 
teachers, and usually took place at the end of timetabled lessons. Individual student 
involvement was contingent upon the return of the opt-in consent form (co-signed by both 
the student and their parent/guardian). Participants indicated their email address on their 
consent form; the information sheet reassured them that they would only be contacted for 
the purposes of recruitment and arranging timeslots. Email addresses were stored in a 
spreadsheet on the researcher’s password-protected laptop and were not included in 
datasets containing responses, to preserve anonymity. The study was composed of two 
parts: an online questionnaire battery, and an in-person experimental session. Within one 
week after written consent was obtained, participants received an email containing an 
individual link to the online portion of the study, where the TEIQue-ASF, STEM-B, STEU-B, 
 





mini IPIP, HADS, and the vocabulary test, were completed (all hosted on 
esurveycreator.co.uk). Biological sex and age data were also collected. Order effects were 
controlled for by counterbalancing the order of measures across the sample (Lavrakas, 
2008). Participants could stop and resume the online portion of the study at any point over 
10 days. Throughout this time, two email reminders were sent out to participants who had 
not completed all questions. The battery took approximately 25 minutes to complete.  
Approximately two weeks after completion of the online questionnaires, participants 
were sent an email with a link to a Doodle Poll web page to select a convenient time slot 
(outside teaching blocks) for the in-person experimental session. Of the 74 students that 
completed the questionnaires, 58 also completed an in-person experimental session (in 
terms of the drop-outs, 15 participants did not book a time-slot for the experiment, and 1 
participant withdrew due to illness). Data collection for the experiment took place in unused 
classrooms within the college. Prior to meeting, participants were randomly assigned to 
either the stressful or control condition. Participants were aware they may have to perform 
a task as part of the experiment, but the nature of the task was unknown to them. Upon 
arrival, participants were verbally assured regarding confidentiality and their right to 
withdraw. After putting on the Fitbit Charge 2 wristband (Fitbit, US), those in the stress 
condition underwent the SSST, whereas the control group read the neutral magazine article. 
Subjective mood (and time-matched HR index) was captured at three time points: at the 
start of the experiment (baseline), immediately after the stressful task or control task 
(reactivity), and approximately five minutes after the task (recovery) (Figure 7). Time-points 
were based on those used in similar studies (e.g., Ling et al., 2018; Liu et al., 2017; Pittarello 




always had a first point of contact within the college with whom to consult in case of 
student well-being issues. After the intermediate mood assessment, participants completed 
the coping measure and watched a short comedic video of puppies to reduce remaining 
stress and repair mood, a similar technique akin to that used by Verheyen and Göritz (2009), 
before completing the third and final mood measure. Afterwards, a verbal debrief was 
provided, which included signposting to sources of emotional support. To maintain study 
integrity, it was requested that participants not share the details of the experiment with 
other participants. Participants also had the option of completing an anonymous evaluation 
of the study, all of whom obliged (Appendix G). Results from the evaluation were informally 
used to assist with the design of participant recruitment strategies for subsequent studies. 
Finally, participants were thanked for their participation and reminded to contact the 
researcher should they have questions or wish to withdraw their data. The experimental 
session lasted approximately 20 minutes. See Figure 7 for a visual representation of the 
experiment timeline. Data collection was conducted between October and December 2017. 
4.4 Results  
4.4.1 Analysis plan 
To check the stress induction procedure was successful, two 2 (condition: stressful vs. 
control) x 2 (time: before and during task) repeated measures ANOVAs were performed for 
NA and HR (Mikolajczak et al., 2009a) (see Table 6 for calculations of stress variables used in 
analyses). The analytic strategy for the reactivity analyses (i.e., H1, H2, and H3) was based 
upon that described by Matthews et al. (2006). Separate hierarchical regressions were 




successive steps entered were baseline state (e.g., NA1), and the dummy vectors for task 
condition. The third step entered the Big Five personality traits, cognitive ability, trait  
anxiety, and trait depression2, along with their product vectors representing conditional 
effects (e.g., neuroticism x task condition). EI (e.g., TEI; AEI) was entered for the fourth step. 
For the fifth and final step, the product vectors representing EI x task condition were 
entered. All predictors were centred around their mean, as per Hayes’ (2018, p. 524) 
suggestion for analyses where the main effects and interaction effects are of interest (i.e., EI 
and EI x experimental condition). Separate models were constructed for TEI and AEI, to 
avoid masking their individual incremental contributions towards the study outcomes. 
 To test H4, moderated mediation analyses were used to test coping strategies as 
mediators in the EI-reactivity relationship, and whether this was moderated by experiment 
condition, akin to MacCann et al. (2011) and Matthews et al. (2006). These were 
constructed and tested using the freely available PROCESS macro for SPSS (Model 8; Hayes, 
2018). Although structural equation modelling (SEM) would have allowed for a 
parsimonious approach to the testing of a network of relationships between variables, SEM 
guidance typically recommends a minimum of 200-300 participants (e.g., Kline, 2011; 
Kyriazos, 2018; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2014). Conducting SEM analyses with the achieved 
sample size (n = 58 completed all aspects of the study) would risk producing an 
unreliable/improper solution (Kyriazos, 2018), and the inappropriate use of SEM in 
 
2 It is important to note that indices of mental health (i.e., anxiety and depression) were included as covariates 
in the study, rather than used as outcomes. Compared with healthy individuals, individuals with high levels of 
anxiety and depression often show dysregulated stress reactivity and recovery (Burke et al., 2005; de Rooij et 
al., 2010). Thus, there was a risk that individual differences in stress responses could be attributed to mental 
health conditions, rather than EI. Thus, while EI scores often correlate with better mental health and well-
being (e.g., Fernández-Berrocal et al., 2007), the purpose of controlling for anxiety and depression was to 




psychological studies is a growing problem (e.g., Karimi & Meyer, 2014). For all analyses, a 
decision was also made to not adjust p values, despite analyses being repeated for each TEI 
subfactor. While the Bonferroni correction (and other correction solutions) reduce the risk 
of Type I errors when running multiple analyses with the same dependent variable (Field, 
2017), that approach was deemed inappropriate in the present study for a number of 
reasons. First, subfactor analyses were exploratory and, secondly, were not explicitly linked 
to the study hypotheses, and, third, employing p value adjustments may instead mask 
effects (increasing Type II errors) by drastically reducing statistical power (Cabin & Mitchell, 
2000; Gelman, Hill & Yajima, 2012; Nakagawa, 2004; Streiner & Norman, 2011).  
4.4.2 Data screening and preparation 
Of the 83 students that consented to take part in the study, 71 students finished the battery 
of questionnaires, 58 of whom also completed an experimental session. The 13 participants 
that completed the online questionnaire battery and 58 participants that completed the 
entire study did not differ systematically in terms of TEI, AEI, personality, cognitive ability, or 
mental health (independent samples t-tests for completions vs. non-completions all showed 
ps > .05). There were also no discernible differences in age or biological sex composition (ps 
> .05). The dataset for those 58 participants was complete with the exception of HR 
responses for three participants (the small wrist size of those three participants meant that 
the device was not close enough to the skin to capture HR, even on the tightest setting), 
data for whom was subsequently used on a pairwise basis. Preliminary analysis of the 
dependent variables highlighted three univariate outliers (but no multivariate outliers) that 
were detached from the distribution with z-scores ± 3.29 SD from the mean. To prevent 




replaced with the next highest value in the dataset (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2014), the 
approach recommended for biomarker data (Looney & Hagan, 2015).  
4.4.3 Preliminary analyses 
In line with guidance for experimental studies, normality analyses were conducted for each 
experimental group separately (Field, 2017). Data showed no evidence of non-normality, 
indicated by 1) skewness and kurtosis statistics (scores divided by their SE were smaller than 
± 1.96), 2) significant Shapiro-Wilk tests (ps > .05), and 3) visual inspection of histograms. All 
other assumptions for hierarchical regression (e.g., independence of errors, equal error 
variances, homogeneity of variance) were met (Field, 2017). Multicolinearity was minimised 
through the use of mean-centred variables. Whole-sample statistics (including means, 
standard deviation, range, reliability indices, skew, and kurtosis) for the online measures are 
provided in Table 8. Reliability analyses highlighted the STEU-B as a highly unreliable 
measure of emotional understanding for the participant group, demonstrated by an 
unacceptable level of internal consistency (α = .38) that was not attributable to any single 
item (Field, 2017). Others have encountered similar issues regarding the low internal 
reliability of the STEU, though with values still considerably higher than in the present study 
(α = .48; Austin et al., 2010). Thus, main analyses using the STEU-B are not reported or 
interpreted as the measure does not adequately capture the construct of interest (i.e., 
emotional understanding) in young people.  
For the purposes of experimental control, it was necessary to identify any pre-
existing differences between experimental groups in terms of demographics (age, sex) and 
the study variables of interest. Randomly allocated mood groups did not differ in: age (χ(2) = 





Correlations and Whole-Sample Descriptive Statistics for EI, Personality, Mental Health and Cognitive Ability (N = 71) 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1. TEI: total - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
2. TEI: EM .78*** - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
3. TEI: SC .81*** .46*** - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
4. TEI: SO .72*** .51*** .48*** - - - - - - - - - - - - 
5. TEI: WB .89*** .57*** .70*** .53*** - - - - - - - - - - - 
6. AEI: EU .23 .40** .12 .07 .14 - - - - - - - - - - 
7. AEI: EM .33** .43*** .28* .07 .23* .51*** - - - - - - - - - 
8. O -.12 -.19 -.03 .06 -.15 .00 -.13 - - - - - - - - 
9. C .52*** .49*** .36** .35** .42*** .09 .09 -.16 - - - - - - - 
10. E .43*** .29* .23 .43*** .39** -.12 .08 -.16 .21 - - - - - - 
11. A .31** .53*** .10 .25* .11 .31** .31** -.09 .32** .04 - - - - - 
12. N -.71*** -3.67** -.73*** -.51*** -.67*** -.03 -.17 -.00 -.19 -.29* .01 - - - - 
13. ANX -.68*** -.42*** -.60*** -.59*** -.57*** -.17 -.24* .06 -.28* -.31** -.10 .77*** - - - 
14. DEP -.69*** -.48*** -.57*** -.44*** -.71*** -.21 -.22 .24* -.33** -.34** -.18 .55*** .58*** - - 
15. GC .11 .04 .23 .02 .07 .26* .18 .21 .04 -.25* .06 -.20 -.18 -.03 - 
M 4.42 4.74 3.90 4.92 4.33 11.70 10.14 14.56 12.73 12.14 16.55 13.72 10.03 4.56 10.88 
(SD) (0.90) (0.91) (1.07) (0.86) (1.53) (2.14) (2.29) (2.83) (3.34) (3.48) (2.83) (3.84) (4.77) (3.96) (16.71) 
Range   2.27 – 
6.67 
  2.63 – 
6.75 
  1.67 – 
6.33 
  2.17 – 
7.00 
  1.00 – 
7.00 
  7.00 – 
16.00 
  3.33 – 
14.42 
  7.00 – 
20.00 
  5.00 – 
20.00 
  4.00 – 
19.00 
  8.00 – 
20.00 
  4.00 – 
20.00 
  0.00 – 
20.00 
  0.00 – 
18.00 
  5.00 – 
18.00 
Skew -.27 -.08 .088 -1.03 -.40 .07 -.70 -.36 .21 -.27 -.88 -.45 -.03 1.41 .35 
Kurtosis -.02 -.44 -.45 1.71 -.76 -.30 .30 .60 -.34 -.43 .42 -.44 -.60 2.08 -.46 
α 0.91 0.70 0.70 0.61 0.91 0.38 0.67 0.74 0.70 0.77 0.80 0.82 0.84 0.81 0.64 
 Notes. TEI = Trait emotional intelligence; EM = Emotionality; SC = Self-control; SO = Sociability; WB = Wellbeing; AEI = Ability emotional intelligence; AEI: EU = Emotional 
understanding; AEI: EM = Emotional management; O = Openness; C = Conscientiousness; E = Extraversion; A = Agreeableness; N = Neuroticism; ANX = Trait anxiety; DEP 





Management (t(56) = .12, p = .912), Big Five factor scores (ts < , .28, ps <.05), cognitive 
ability (t(56) = -.27, p = .795), or trait depression (t(56) = -1.47, p = .154). For reasons that 
are unclear, trait anxiety (t(56) = -2.10, p = .043) did differ. Participants later assigned to the 
control group reported higher levels of trait anxiety in the questionnaire battery (M = 11.89, 
SD = 4.74) than those assigned to the experimental group (M = 9.40, SD = 4.29). However, 
since preliminary analyses indicated that trait anxiety had no direct influence on any of the 
dependent variables (ps >.05), this anomaly is unlikely to have distorted the study findings. 
Descriptive statistics for coping styles across experimental groups is shown in Table 
9. The use of coping strategies differed between the experimental conditions. T-tests 
indicated that task-focussed and emotion-focussed coping strategies were used more for 
the control task (compared to the more stressful task), whereas the reverse pattern was 
shown for avoidant coping strategies (Table 9). In general, participants reported using task-
focussed and emotion-focussed to a similar extent, and avoidant strategies the least. 
Preliminary exploratory analyses were conducted to investigate relationships between 
coping indices and stress outcomes (data not shown). The only significant findings were: (1) 
maladaptive emotion-focussed coping predicted greater NA deterioration, for the stress 
group only, and (2) avoidant coping predicted impaired NA recovery across both groups.  
Table 9 
Means and Standard Deviations of Coping Styles as a Function of Experimental Condition 
  Stress  Control   
  M SD  M SD  t-test 
Task-focussed  13.80 3.65  17.96 4.59  -3.84*** 
Emotion-focussed  13.60 7.27  17.43 6.98  -.204* 
Avoidant  11.53 4.69  8.54 4.69  2.12* 





4.4.4 Relationships between study variables 
Table 8 displays whole-sample descriptive statistics and bivariate intercorrelations for the 
questionnaire battery variables (TEI, AEI, personality dimensions, cognitive ability, 
depression, anxiety). As expected, all were related to at least one TEI or AEI scale (or 
subscale). With respect to mental health, TEI and all component subscales were associated 
with lower levels of anxiety and depression (rs = -.41 to -71, ps < .01), and AEI (EM) also 
correlated with lower anxiety levels (r = -.24, p = .042), and depression (r = 0.22, p = .062), 
consistent with the large body of literature linking EI to psychological adaptation. Scores for 
any of the questionnaire variables did not significantly differ between males and females (ps 
>.05), with the exception of trait neuroticism (t(67) = -3.02, p = .004), whereby females 
showed higher levels (M = 14.26, SD = 3.71) than males (M = 10.75, SD = 3.39), a prevalent 
finding in the literature (Schmitt, Realo, Voracek & Allik, 2008). Main analyses (i.e., for 
reactivity and recovery) were not conducted separately for males and females due to the 
relatively small number of male participants (n = 8; 13.8% of sample), in light of literature 
suggesting that unequally sized groups can lead to unequal variances, general loss of power, 
and Type I error rates (Rusticus & Lovato, 2014).  
Global TEI, and its emotionality and self-control subfactors, were positively 
associated with Emotional Management (Table 8). In response to the above analyses, 
subsequent main analyses controlled for the effects of sex, personality, cognitive ability, and 
mental health, as a precautionary measure. Baseline mood and physiology (i.e., PA1, NA1, 
HR1) were also controlled for when performing reactivity analyses. Correlations and whole-
sample descriptive statistics for EI and all stress outcomes (for stressful and control 




As anticipated, subjective (NA) and objective (HR) measures of stress did not 
significantly correlate (Campbell & Ehlert, 2012). Moderator analyses were conducted to 
test whether EI moderated the relationship between NA and HR during the task. For this, 
hierarchical multiple regressions were run to assess the increase in variation explained by 
the addition of an interaction term between NA and EI to a main effects model. Neither TEI 
(F(1, 51) = 2.25, p = .144) nor AEI (F(1, 51) = .14, p = .712) moderated the relationship 
between self-reported NA and HR during the task. In other words, the disparity between 
participants’ emotional and physiological responses was not dependent on EI, consistent 
with findings elsewhere (Mikolajczak et al., 2007). 
4.4.5 Stress manipulation check 
In line with similar work, 2 (condition: stressful vs. control) X 2 (time: before and during 
task) repeated measures ANOVAs were performed on NA and HR to examine the success of 
the stress induction procedure (e.g., Mikolajczak et al., 2009a; 2009b) (Figure 8). Turning 
first to NA, results indicated a main effect of time, whereby NA2 was higher than NA1 (F(1, 
56) = 43.48, p < .001, n2partial = .44) and a main effect of condition (F(1, 56) = 36.75, p < .001, 
n2partial = .40), where the mean level of NA was globally higher in the stress condition (M = 
19.97, SD = .82) than the neutral condition (M = 12.80, SD = .85). There was also a significant 
time X condition interaction (F(1,56) = 74.56, p < .001, n2partial = .58). Post-hoc paired t tests 
confirmed that participants in the stress condition underwent a large increase in NA (M = 
24.67, SD = 7.77) from baseline (M = 15.27, SD = 5.09) (t(1, 29) = -8.90, p < .001). In contrast, 
NA decreased over the course of the experiment for control group participants (MT1 = 13.46, 
SD = 2.25; MT2= 12.14, SD = .55) (t(1, 27) = 2.32, p = .033), perhaps indicating that they felt 




In terms of HR, results indicated a main effect of time (F(1, 53) = 47.66, p < .001, 
n2partial = .47), demonstrated by an increase from HR1 (M = 77.78 bpm, SD = 14.98) to HR2 
(M = 86.49 bpm, SD = 15.67), but no main effect of condition. A significant time x condition 
interaction emerged, however (F(1,53) = 47.66, p < .001). Post-hoc tests revealed that HR 
increased significantly for participants in both the stress condition (MT1 = 72.52 bpm, SD = 
10.10; MT2 = 88.49 bpm, SD = 14.95; t(1,26) = -6.25, p < .001) and for the control condition 
(MT1 = 82.86 bpm, SD = 17.21; MT2 = 84.56 bpm, SD = 16.37; t(1, 27) = -3.35, p = .002). HR 
increases for the stress condition were comparable to the increase observed in the  
 
 
Notes. The figure illustrates the mean change in NA (absolute values) and HR (as % change) between 
T1 (baseline) and T2 (task) for each experimental condition. Error bars represent 2 ± standard errors. 
NA = negative affect; HR = heart rate. 
Figure 8 




TSST (17 bpm; Kirschbaum et al., 1993). However, the magnitude of the increase differed 
significantly between the conditions (F(1,53) = 39.88, p < .001): the increase was almost 10 
times greater for the stress group (M = 15.97 bpm; SD = 13.27; 22.03% change) than the 
control group (M = 1.70 bpm; SD = 2.69; 2.39% change). Taken alongside the NA analyses, 
the marginal mean HR increase (less than 2 bpm) in the control group could be attributed to 
factors unrelated to stress (i.e., engagement, excitement, concentration) that can occur 
during the completion of any cognitive task (Wood, Maraj, Lee, & Reyes, 2002).  
In essence, the stressor was highly effective, evidenced by substantial increases in 
both physiological and perceived stress in the stress group, compared to the control group. 
It is also noteworthy that the positive video shown after the stressor was successful in 
promoting mood repair: watching the video produced (1) significant increases in PA for both 
the experimental (M = 5.90, SD = 6.46; t(1,29) = 5.01, p < .001) and control groups (M = 2.71; 
SD = 5.45; t(1,27) = 2.64, p = .014), and (2) significant decreases in NA for both the 
experimental (M = -12.23, SD = 7.04; t(1,29) = 9.54, p = .001) and control groups (M = -1.64; 
SD = 2.31; t(1,27) = 3.76, p < .001). 
H1: TEI will predict reduced psychological and physiological reactivity under stressful 
conditions 
4.4.6 Effects of EI on stress reactivity  
4.4.6.1 TEI and stress reactivity 
Separate hierarchical regressions were conducted to determine if TEI improved the 
prediction of NA, PA, or HR reactivity, after controlling for confounding variables. For all 
three models, baseline variables (step 1), and experimental condition (step 2) predicted all 




relating to these initial two steps are not reported for the remainder of the results section. 
For the prediction of NA, the addition of the covariates did not significantly improve the 
model at step 3 (ΔR2 = .08, p = .522). The addition of global TEI (ΔR2 = .002, p = .511) and TEI 
x condition (Model 5: ΔR2 = .001, p = .672) also failed to significantly increase R2. Similarly, at 
step 3 of the PA model, the addition of covariates did not significantly improve the model 
(ΔR2 = .21, p = .215). Furthermore, adding in TEI at step 4 (ΔR2 = .003, p = .626), and the TEI 
product vector at step 5 also produced no significant effects (ΔR2 = .008, p = .447).  
A different picture emerged for physiological stress (HR reactivity). Entering the 
covariates at step 3 significantly improved the model fit (ΔR2 = .008, F(12, 40) = 9.98, p = 
.008, adjusted R2 = .67). While the addition of TEI at step 4 did not have a significant effect 
(ΔR2 = .006, p = .31), the TEI x condition at step 5 significantly increased R2 (ΔR2 = .026, F(1, 
38) = 8.98, p = .036, adjusted R2 = .71). At that fifth and final step, several factors remained 
significant predictors, including TEI (β = -1.168, p = .021), which predicted smaller HR 
responses overall. There were also significant conditional predictors, with directional effects 
identified through post-hoc testing. TEI (β = .855, p = .036) predicted smaller HR responses 
in the stress condition, but had no effect in the control condition. Findings for the reactivity 
analyses are summarised in Table 10.  
All analyses were repeated with TEI factor scores to allow for a detailed analysis of 
the role of TEI’s constituent factors (e.g., Matthews et al., 2015; see Appendix A). None of 
the four subscales significantly predicted either NA or PA change. However, the sociability 
and self-control subscales predicted HR reactivity under stress (Table 11). The inclusion of 
the subscales at step 4 (ΔR2 = .07, F(4, 37) = 9.28, p = .018, adjusted R2 = .72), and 





Summary Statistics for Regressions of Stress Reactivity onto Pretask State, Condition, Personality, Cognitive Ability, Mental Health, and Global 
TEI Predictors 
Notes. NA = negative affect; HR = heart rate; FFM = Five Factor Model personality traits; TEI = trait emotional intelligence; Gc = cognitive ability; O = 







 Step 1: 
Pretask state 
 Step 2: 
Condition 
 Step 3: 
FFM, cognitive ability, 
mental health 
 Step 4: 
TEI 
 Step 5: 





Significant EI and covariate 
predictors (at Step 5) 
Criterion R2 F(1,56)  R2 ΔR2 ΔF(1,55)  R2 ΔR2 ΔF(9,46)  R2 ΔR2 ΔF(1,45)  R2 ΔR2 ΔF(1,44)  
NA .33 28.09***  .72 .38 73.38***  .78 .06 1.43  .78 .00 .74  .78 .00 .02  None 
HR .40 35.08***  .56 .16 19.20***  .75 .19 2.88**  .77 .02 2.37  .80 .03 7.40*  TEI (β = -.94**) 
TEI x Condition (β = .69*) 
Sex (β = .37***) 
Gc (β = 1.46***) 
Gc x Condition (β = -.1.27***) 
O (β = -.1.09***) 
O x Condition (β = .67**) 





Summary Statistics for Regressions of Stress Reactivity onto Pretask State, Condition, Personality, Cognitive Ability, Mental Health, and Global 
TEI Subfactor Predictors 
Note. NA = negative affect; HR = heart rate; FFM = Five Factor Model personality traits; TEI = trait emotional intelligence; SEL = TEI (self- control factor); SOC 
= TEI (sociability factor); Gc = cognitive ability; O = openness; A = agreeableness). * = p < .05, ** = p < .01, *** = p < .001.
 Step 1: 
Pretask state 
 Step 2: 
Condition 
 Step 3: 
FFM, cognitive ability, 
mental health 
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Significant EI and covariate 
predictors (at Step 5) 
Criterion R2 F(1,56)  R2 ΔR2 ΔF(1,55)  R2 ΔR2 ΔF(9,46)  R2 ΔR2 ΔF(1,45)  R2 ΔR2 ΔF(1,44)  
NA .33 28.09***  .72 .38 73.38***  .78 .06 1.43  .78 .00 .16  .80 .02 1.00  None 
HR .40 35.08***  .56 .16 19.20***  .75 .19 2.88**  .83 .08 4.46  .91 .08 7.53***  SEL (β = .78**) 
SEL x Condition (β = -.54*) 
SOC (β = -1.27***) 
SOC x Condition (β = 1.05***) 
Sex (β = .37***) 
Gc (β = 1.46***) 
Gc x Condition (β = -.1.27***) 
O (β = -.1.09***) 
O x Condition (β = .67**) 













significantly improved the model. However, sociability and self-control exerted opposite 
effects. While the significant effects of both factors were restricted to the stress group, 
sociability predicted smaller HR responses in the stress group, whereas self-control 
predicted larger HR increases (Figure 9).  
In sum, TEI did not predict mood reactivity in response to stress. However, global TEI 
(and the sociability subscale) predicted smaller HR responses in the stressful task, indicating 
a buffering effect. In contrast, the TEI self-control subscale predicted a larger change in HR 
in the stressful condition. 
4.4.6.2 AEI and stress reactivity 
Akin to the TEI analyses, separate hierarchical regressions were conducted to determine 
whether AEI predicted NA, PA, or HR change, after controlling for confounding variables. 
Findings regarding covariates are identical to those reported for the TEI analyses above, and 
are thus not repeated here. For NA, the insertion of AEI into the model (ΔR2= .079, p = .651) 
and subsequent conditional effects (ΔR2= .001, p = .738) did not result in a significant R2 
increase. Results were the same for PA (AEI: ΔR2 = .04, p = .124; conditional effects ΔR2 = 
.00, p  = .995), and HR (AEI: ΔR2 = .01, p  = .183; conditional effects ΔR2 = .001, p  = .652). 
Thus, AEI did not predict any aspect of the acute stress response. 
H2: TEI will predict faster psychological and physiological recovery from a stressful task 
4.4.7 Effects of EI on stress recovery 
Hierarchical regression analyses were also conducted to assess whether EI influenced stress 
responding once the stressor had ceased, after controlling for confounding influences. 




second (condition), third (covariates), fourth (EI), and fifth steps (EI x condition interaction) 
of the regressions were the same. 
4.4.7.1 TEI and stress recovery 
For the prediction of NA recovery, the addition of the covariates significantly improved the 
model (ΔR2 = .21, F(9, 45) = 8.02, p = .004, adjusted R2 = .60), but the subsequent 
incorporation of TEI (ΔR2 = .001, p = .68), and the TEI x condition variable (ΔR2 = .009, p = 
.27), had no significant effect. At the final stage of the model, the only significant predictor 
of NA recovery was agreeableness (β = -1.22, p < .001), and its interaction term (β = .83, p = 
.012), indicating that individuals scoring higher in agreeableness showed enhanced recovery 
from stress (i.e., a bigger decrease in NA between T2 and T3). With respect to PA recovery, 
the entering of covariates (ΔR2 = .06, p = .57), TEI (ΔR2 = .02, p  = .16), and the TEI x 
interaction term (ΔR2 = .003, p = .57) all failed to significantly improve the model. Trait 
anxiety (β = -.36, p = .046) was the only significant predictor of PA recovery at the final step. 
The same was identified for HR recovery, whereby covariates (ΔR2 = .06, p = .57), TEI (ΔR2 = 
.06, p = .57), and TEI x condition (ΔR2 = .06, p = .57) were not significant predictors. Analyses 
were repeated with TEI factor scores, and findings were no different from global TEI scores. 
Overall, TEI did not enhance mood or physiological recovery from stress. 
4.4.7.2 AEI and stress recovery 
The addition of AEI (R2 change = .009, p = .269) or the AEI x condition interaction term (ΔR2 = 
.001, p = .076) did not improve the model for predicting NA recovery. Similarly, AEI also did 
not significantly increase R2 for the PA recovery model (AEI: ΔR2 = .00, p = .937; AEI x 




condition: ΔR2 = .005, p = .261). AEI was therefore not significantly related to stress 
recovery. 
H3: TEI and AEI will predict greater use of adaptive coping strategies 
4.4.8 Effects of EI on coping 
The CITS-S coping measure assessed the use of three families of coping strategies 
throughout the task: task-focussed (e.g., “I did my best to follow instructions for the task”), 
maladaptive emotion-focussed (e.g., “I worried about what I would do next”), and avoidant 
coping (e.g., “I stayed detached or distanced from the situation”). To explore relationships 
between EI and coping, the analytic approach mirrored the ones taken for the reactivity and 
recovery analyses. Separate hierarchical regressions were conducted to determine if EI (or 
EI x condition effects) improved the prediction of how much participants used a particular 
family of coping strategies (i.e., task-focussed, emotion-focussed, avoidant), after 
controlling for confounding variables.  
4.4.8.1 TEI and coping 
For all models, experimental condition (step 1) predicted all outcomes, as described above. 
For the case of task-focussed coping, entering the covariates for step 2 significantly 
improved the model (ΔR2 = .28, F(8, 48) = 4.99, p = .005, adjusted R2 = .39), whereas the 
inclusion of TEI (ΔR2 = .012, p = .290) and its interaction terms (ΔR2 = .003, p = .616) at steps 
3 and 4 did not. At the final step, only trait anxiety significantly predicted less task-focussed 
coping, regardless of condition (β = -.46, p = .028). Similarly, TEI (ΔR2 = .004; p = .56) and the 
TEI x condition vector (ΔR2 = .035, p = .10) also failed to predictive emotion-focussed coping. 
While entering the covariates at step 2 induced a significant R2 change (ΔR2 = .33, F(9, 47) = 




neither the covariates (ΔR2 = .16, p = .41), TEI (ΔR2 = .008, p = .499), or TEI x condition (ΔR2 = 
.008, p = .502) predicted the use of avoidant coping strategies. The non-significant findings 
regarding task-focussed and avoidant coping also applied to all four TEI subscales.  
4.4.8.2 AEI and coping 
Once confounding variables were controlled, the addition of AEI improved the predictive 
model for task-focussed coping (ΔR2 = .07, F(1, 45) = 5.12, p = .010, adjusted R2 = .45), 
where higher AEI scores predicted less task-focussed coping (β = -.32, p = .010). This was not 
dependent on experimental condition (ΔR2 = .00, p = .912). However, the R2 change 
produced through the addition of AEI was not significant for the emotion-focussed coping 
model (ΔR2 = .033, p = .012), akin to the addition of the AEI x condition predictor (ΔR2 = .00, 
p = .99). Furthermore, AEI (ΔR2 = .014, p = .378) nor its interaction term (ΔR2 = .008, p = 
.491) predicted avoidant coping. In sum, AEI was only predictive of task-focussed coping.  
H4: The relationship between EI and stress reactivity will be mediated by adaptive emotion-
focussed coping strategies 
4.4.8.3 Coping as a mediator between EI and reactivity 
Although the above section tested whether EI related to the usage of different coping 
strategies, further analyses are necessary to establish whether EI acted on stress responses 
through coping (Hayes, 2018). Specifically, moderated mediation was necessary to test 
whether the indirect effect of EI on stress responding through coping was moderated by 
experiment condition (Hayes, 2018), using the PROCESS macro for SPSS (Model 8; Hayes, 
2018). This approach mirrors that of similar studies (e.g., Matthews et al., 2006). While 
contemporary guidance suggests that a significant direct relationship between X and Y is not 




to explain how EI might influence stress reactivity. Thus, based on the reactivity findings 
from the present study, and the small sample size of the study, mediation models were only 
tested for the cases where EI significantly predicted a stress outcome. In the models, EI was 
entered as the predictor (X), stress reactivity was entered as the outcome (Y), the three 
coping strategies were entered as mediators: task-focussed coping (M1), emotion-focussed 
coping (M2), and avoidance coping (M3). Condition was entered as the moderator (W), and, 
as before, personality traits, cognitive ability, and mental health were included as 
covariates. The model assessed the effect of the condition on the ‘a’ paths (i.e., relationship 
between EI and coping), rather than the ‘b’ paths (i.e., the relationship between coping and 
stress reactivity), since the analyses aimed to test for stress-dependent patterns of coping 
selection, facilitated by EI. Figure 10 shows a conceptual diagram of the moderated 
mediation model being tested. The significance of indirect paths was assessed using 95% 
Figure 10 
A Conceptual Diagram of the Moderated Mediation Model with Coping Strategies as the 





percentile bootstrap confidence intervals (CIs) with 10 000 bootstrap samples (Hayes, 2018), 
in line with recommendations for mediation analyses with small sample sizes (Creedon & 
Hayes, 2015). 
Regression analyses indicated that the a path (regressing sociability onto coping 
strategies) was significant for avoidant coping (a3: b = -6.44, SE = 2.74, p = .024), but not 
task-focussed or emotion-focussed coping (a1 and a2: ps > .05). None of the three strategies 
were significantly predictive of HR (b1-3: ps > .05). The direct effect of sociability on HR 
reactivity was significant (c’: b = -20.55, SE = 6.05, p = .0016), and moderated by condition (b 
= 11.38, SE = 18.30, p = .0031), such that sociability only predicted HR reactivity under stress 
(stress: b = -.9.17, SE = 3.34, 95% CI [-15.92, -2.42]; control: b = 2.20, SE = 3.40, 95% CI [-
4.68, 9.09]). However, there were no indirect effects. Sociability was not indirectly linked to 
HR reactivity through task-focussed, emotion-focussed, or avoidant coping (see Appendix I 
for full moderated mediation output). The moderated mediation model produced for the 
self-control factor resulted in a very similar output, and no indirect effects were identified. 
To avoid repetition, this information is included in Appendix I rather than the main text.  
In sum, coping did not explain the relationship between sociability and reactivity, 
signalling the presence of other potential underlying mechanisms that were not explored in 
the present study.  
4.5 Discussion of key findings 
Findings did not support a clear-cut role for either TEI or AEI as a moderator of stress 
reactivity or recovery. In terms of specific hypotheses, H1 (which predicted that TEI would 




neither TEI (nor any TEI subscales) nor AEI predicted psychological reactivity, TEI predicted 
smaller HR increases in the stress condition, compared to the control condition (supporting 
H1). This finding appeared to be solely attributable to the sociability subscale. However, the 
TEI self-control subscale predicted larger increases in HR in the stress condition, which did 
not support H1. H2 – which predicted that TEI would promote recovery from stress – was 
not supported. AEI was also unrelated to recovery. With respect to coping, AEI (EM) 
predicted less (adaptive) task-focussed coping across both conditions (not supporting H3). 
H4, which proposed coping would mediate the relationship between EI and stress reactivity 
– was also not supported.  
4.5.1 EI and reactivity to acute psychosocial stress 
When under stress, individuals with higher global TEI scores showed a smaller increase in 
HR. However, while few studies perform TEI analyses at the subscale level, doing so can 
yield more meaningful interpretations than working exclusively with composite TEI scores 
(Downey et al., 2010; Zeidner et al., 2012a). This is crucial, given that TEI’s nomological 
network includes many adaptive personal characteristics (Figure 5); exploratory analyses of 
EI subscales permits a nuanced insight into which aspects of EI may be useful in which 
contexts (Matthews et al., 2015). The exploratory analyses in the present study revealed a 
specific role for trait sociability with regards to stress reactivity. Individuals with high scores 
on the sociability subscale of the TEIQue-ASF (Petrides, 2009) showed a significantly smaller 
increase in HR in the stress condition. Put simply, in a socially stressful situation, individuals 
that perceived themselves as socially competent became less stressed, compared to 
individuals that did not perceive themselves as socially competent. While significant findings 




since values for self-reported and physiological measures of stress only correspond 
approximately 25% of the time (Campbell & Ehlert, 2012). Thus, findings suggest a 
potentially protective role of TEI (specifically, the sociability subscale).  
The findings of the present study echo those by Mikolajczak and colleagues, one of 
the only EI researchers to perform facet-level analyses in relation to stress reactivity. Across 
several studies, their research indicates that higher global TEI scores are associated with 
significantly lower reactivity to stress at both psychological (i.e., mood deterioration) and 
biological (i.e., salivary cortisol) levels (Mikolajczak et al., 2007; 2009). Furthermore, trait 
sociability had the strongest effect out of all four subscales (emotionality, sociability, well-
being, self-control) in all cases. Akin to the present study, the stress induction paradigm in 
those studies was psychosocial in nature (i.e., Trier Social Stress Test; Kirschbaum et al., 
1993). Both paradigms have a strong social evaluation component, whereby participants are 
exposed to a potentially negative judgment by others (Campbell & Ehlert, 2012). In the 
present study, this was achieved by having the participant sing in front of an experimenter, 
further enhanced by the belief that the performance was being video-recorded (purportedly 
for the purposes of further analysis). Trait sociability appears helpful in that respect. 
According to the TEIQue sampling domain (Petrides, 2009; Table 1), individuals with high 
scores on the sociability factor perceive themselves to be capable of influencing other 
people’s feelings, forthright, frank, and willing to stand up for their rights, and as 
accomplished networkers with excellent social skills (Petrides, 2009). At face value, it 
therefore seems unsurprising that individuals who think of themselves as more assertive, 
and confident in their abilities to influence others’ emotions (i.e., trait sociability), become 




decipher what precisely might make sociability useful in helping to modulate the stress 
response, it is necessary to examine the specific items in the TEIQue-ASF that make up the 
sociability subscale. For each item, the participant rates the extent to which that statement 
applies to them: 
• I’m good at getting along with my classmates (Item 6) 
• I find it hard to stand up for my rights (Item 10, reverse-scored) 
• I can make other people feel better when I want to (Item 11) 
• I would describe myself as a good negotiator (Item 21) 
• I tend to “back down” even if I know I’m right (Item 25, reverse-scored) 
• I’m unable to change the way other people feel (Item 26, reverse-scored) 
The factorial structure of the TEIQue proposes that the above sociability items tap three 
TEI facets: social competence (Items 6, 21), emotion management (others) (Items 11, 26), 
and assertiveness (Items 10, 25) (Petrides & Furnham, 2003). Several of these items overlap 
conceptually with the agreeableness items of the mini-IPIP, for which high scores represent 
a general pro-social orientation towards others (i.e., being agreeable) (Donnellan et al., 
2006; Appendix C). In addition, agreeableness was the only personality trait that 
significantly predicted stress reactivity. In the stress condition only, adolescents scoring 
more highly on agreeableness showed a smaller increase in HR to sociability (Tables 10 and 
11). Plausibly, there could be a common aspect of trait sociability and agreeableness that 
helps facilitate stress response modulation. The personality literature describes 
agreeableness as a willingness to be helpful and trusting, and to possess a pro-social 
orientation towards others (Tobin & Gadke, 2015). Higher levels do tend to predict positive 




satisfaction (e.g., Jovanović, 2019), and acting as a marker for pro‐social behaviours (Jenson-
Campbell & Granziano, 2001; Gleason, Jenson-Campbell, & Richardson, 2004).  
The general picture for associations between agreeableness and stress reactivity is one 
of inconsistency, where null findings are often reported (e.g., Oswald, Zandi, Nestadt, 
Potash, Kalaydjian, & Wand, 2006, Williams, Rau, Cribbet, & Gunn, 2009). However, some 
evidence suggests that agreeableness predicts adaptive ER in contexts in which there are 
strong social consequences. In particular, individuals who score higher on the trait show 
greater efforts to regulate stress (e.g., when presented with distressing vignettes, or viewing 
distressing emotional stimuli), especially in the presence of another person (Studies 1 and 2; 
Tobin, Graziano, Vanman, & Tassinary, 2000). Those findings are corroborated with 
psychophysiological evidence (electromyography of the cheeks and brows; Study 3; Tobin et 
al., 2000). The need to please others has been suggested as on way that agreeableness 
could aid psychosocial stress regulation (Dunkley, Blankstein, Zuroff, & Hui, 2006). 
Experimental evidence suggests that compared to disagreeable individuals, agreeable 
individuals might possess an ability to diffuse negative social cues in social environment, by 
“turning the other cheek” and focussing on prosocial thoughts (Meier, Robinson, & 
Wilkowski, 2006). Perhaps in times of psychosocial stress (i.e., situations with a strong 
element of social evaluation), individuals with higher levels of the agreeableness trait are 
able to ‘activate’ prosocial thoughts, and thus moderate stressful sensations and feelings. In 
the case of the present study, perhaps agreeable participants (either consciously or 
unconsciously) modified their stress response due to the presence of the experimenter. 
That notion is supported by evidence demonstrates that agreeable individuals tend to have 
more prosocial goals of ER (i.e., to maintain or promote positive social interactions and 




English, 2018; Roberts & Robins, 2000). While the above points discuss how agreeableness 
may have contributed to adaptive stress reactivity, the same principles may apply to 
sociability, since the two traits correlated, and each predicted the same outcome. Despite 
their similarities, however, they are not identical constructs. In addition, crucially, Big Five 
personality traits (including agreeableness) were controlled for in all hierarchical regressions 
of the present study, and yet, sociability still demonstrated incremental validity in predicting 
physiological responses to acute stress, suggesting it contributes something unique to stress 
regulation.  
Upon comparing the items between the mini-IPIP (Donnellan et al., 2006; Appendix 
C) and the TEIQue-ASF (Petrides, 2009), assertiveness appears to be the key distinguishing 
difference between agreeableness and sociability. Perhaps adolescents that score highly on 
trait sociability handle psychosocial stressors better due to their assertiveness and 
confidence in social contexts. Assertive individuals are self-efficacious, and confident in their 
abilities, traits thought to promote resilience in adolescence (Murphey, Barry, & Vaughn, 
2013). While general self-efficacy - an individual’s perception of their ability to successfully 
execute a specific task, in order to achieve a desired result (Bandura, 1997) - was not 
measured directly in the present study, TEI is typically conceptualised as “emotional self-
efficacy” (Petrides, 2009), with sociability specifically relating to emotional self-efficacy in 
situations involving other people. The stress paradigm in the present study required that 
participants simultaneously completed a task (i.e., chose and sang a song), regulated their 
emotional response, whilst dealing with social evaluation pressure. Historically, self-efficacy 
has been viewed as critical in ER, especially in adverse circumstances (Saarni, 1999), 
enabling individuals to face stressful demands with confidence, and as a result, flourish in 




has shown that higher levels of self-efficacy can show beneficial effects for stress reactivity 
(e.g., Mikolajczak et al., 2008; Wiedenfield, O’Leary, Bandura, Brown, Levine, & Raska, 
1990). Thus, it follows that individuals with high self-efficacy would inherently find the task 
less stressful.  
Placing the findings of the present study in context suggests that within TEI’s 
nomological network, agreeableness, assertiveness, and self-efficacy, are the key factors 
involved in facilitating ER in psychosocially stressful situations. The precise mechanism of 
action that connects those constructs to dampened stress reactivity is not clear, but there a 
likely a number of interconnecting processes involved (e.g., cognitive appraisal; locus of 
control). Across multiple studies, evidence suggests that individuals with high TEI scores 
appraise a stressful tasks as less threatening (Mikolajczak et al., 2006; Mikolajczak & 
Luminet, 2008; Salovey et al., 2002). Since cognitive appraisal is a common means of 
modifying one’s appraisal of a situation to regulate its emotional impact (Gross, 2015), 
perhaps high sociability individuals perceive socially charged acute stressors as less 
threatening, and their prosocial nature and self-efficacy enables them to instead focus on 
managing their emotional response (Meier et al., 2006; Mikolajczak et al., 2008). 
Alternatively, perhaps they felt more in control of the situation (locus of control - an 
individual’s sense of control over events - is a known protective factor in stressful situations) 
(Jerusalem & Schwarzer, 1992; Roddenberry & Renk, 2010). Testing the involvement of 
those potential processes could form the basis of future TEI investigations. 
Although not entirely unexpected, AEI did not predict any aspect of the stress 
response process. As signalled in the introduction, there is generally a dearth of research 




paints an unclear picture. While AEI buffered subjective stress in one study (Ruiz-Aranda et 
al., 2011), it had no significant effect in two others (Limonero et al., 2015; Matthews et al., 
2006), yet intensified physiological stress in another case (Bechtoldt & Schneider, 2016; 
Rash & Prkachin, 2013). The findings of the present study suggest that, for adolescents at 
least, perceived emotional skills (i.e., TEI) appear more useful in psychosocially stressful 
contexts. As TEI was predictive of objective, physiological reactivity (HR), and not self-report, 
there was little risk that findings arose from “contamination”, where findings can arise from 
shared measurement error (i.e., positive self-evaluations) (Keefer et al., 2018). Put simply, it 
may be that how confident adolescents feel about their emotional abilities matters more for 
stress regulation than their actual emotion-cognitive skill. While the role of TEI (and the 
sociability subscale) in the stress response appears to make theoretical sense, there were 
other findings that did not fit expectations. 
4.5.2 EI and reactivity to acute psychosocial stress: Unexpected findings 
The first puzzling finding is that the TEI self-control subscale also incrementally predicted 
physiological reactivity. However, effects were in the opposite (maladaptive) direction to 
sociability; in the stress condition, individuals with higher scores on the self-control subscale 
showed larger increases in HR. As the TEIQue self-control scale taps into the TEI facets of 
emotion regulation, impulsiveness (low), and stress management (Petrides, 2009), it is not 
entirely clear why this trait would be unhelpful when regulating one’s response to an 
acutely stressful situation. However, for perspective, the standardised coefficient for the 
sociability scale x condition interaction coefficient was larger (β = 1.27, p < .001) than the 
self-control x condition interaction coefficient (β  = -.54, p < .05). There is a possibility that 




significance of the self-control finding, the study needs to be replicated. The study described 
in Chapter 5 involves a direct replication of the current study with a naïve sample. 
Furthermore, a pooled sample analysis of the two studies should shed more light on 
whether the finding prevails in a larger sample, where the analyses will hold more statistical 
power.  
Secondly, in contrast to predictions (H2), TEI nor AEI predicted recovery from stress. 
Considering that EI should represent more efficient (e.g., faster) emotion information 
processing (EIP) in stressful contexts, speeding up recovery (Fernández-Berrocal & 
Extremera, 2006; Matthews et al., 2002), this finding is surprising. While the experimental 
literature suggests that EI appears useful for stress recovery, in both the short and long 
term, it is important to note that issues regarding methodology may have inflated the 
findings of other studies (Lea et al., 2019). Perhaps when EI is rigorously tested as a 
moderator of stress recovery (i.e., by using a control group, and accounting for confounding 
variables), EI no longer explains unique variance in stress recovery. It may instead be that EI 
relates to cognitive aspects of the recovery process (e.g., post-event rumination), as 
assessed in Study 2 (Chapter 5).  
The third unexpected finding relates to effortful, explicit coping processes. The 
present study assessed task-focussed, emotion-focussed coping, and avoidance coping 
(Endler & Parker, 1999; Table 7), using the Coping Inventory for Task Stressors (CITS; 
Matthews & Campbell, 1998). Generally, evidence to date suggests that EI promotes more 
adaptive coping in adults (Matthews et al, 2002; 2006; O’Connor et al., 2017), though none 
examined state-based coping in adolescents. In the present study, whilst neither TEI nor AEI 




based coping across both stressful and non-stressful conditions (though the effect was 
stronger in the former). Because task-focussed coping is often highlighted as an adaptive 
means of coping with stressful situations (e.g., Davey, 1993), it might not seem clear why an 
ability to manage emotions (i.e., AEI) would relate to less task-focussed coping. However, a 
closer inspection of the scale and the stressor itself suggests a potential explanation. Task-
focussed coping strategies focus on tackling the source of stress directly, with items 
including; “I was careful to avoid mistakes”, and “I did my best to follow instructions for the 
task”. Although identifying universal ‘adaptive’ strategies is not feasible, since the efficacy of 
any one strategy is context-dependent (Baker & Berenbaum, 2007; Carver & Connor-Smith, 
2010), Folkman & Moskowitz, 2004), active coping (i.e., task-focussed) is more effective in 
controllable situations (e.g., Bowman & Stern, 1995). However, in the SSST paradigm, the 
stress is instead largely uncontrollable (e.g., participants had a fixed amount of time to 
prepare and sing the song, reinforced with visible countdowns), and the emphasis was on 
social evaluation, rather than evaluation of performance per se (i.e., the quality of the 
singing was not assessed). Thus, in such situations is probably more advantageous to keep 
calm (e.g., by engaging with emotion-focussed coping strategies), than to strive for 
performance-based outcomes (Folkman & Moskowitz, 2004). Findings could suggest that 
adolescents with high emotion management abilities reduce the likelihood of using 
unhelpful strategies under psychosocial stress. However, since AEI did not predict stress 
reactivity or recovery, we cannot be certain about the adaptive value that phenomenon 




4.5.3 Implications for EI as a protective marker in adolescence 
As discussed in Chapters 1-3, one school of thought proposes that EI may buffer the effects 
of adversity (acute stress) on life outcomes in adolescents by exerting effects on ER 
processes. The present study examined how EI relates to certain ER processes relating to the 
families of emotion response modulation (where the individual directly modulates the stress 
response once an emotion has been elicited: i.e., stress reactivity and recovery), and 
cognitive change (modifying one’s appraisal of a situation to regulate its emotional impact, 
using explicit coping strategies; Gross, 1998a). The key finding was that, when measured as 
a trait (a constellation of emotional self-perceptions; Petrides et al., 2007), EI predicted 
more favourable stress response modulation under psychosocial stress. Sociability appeared 
to be the key element of TEI responsible for that phenomenon, where higher levels were 
associated with lower HR reactivity in the stress condition. The present study’s findings have 
potential implications for EI as part of a resilience framework. 
Whilst causation cannot be inferred from the current set of findings, there are some 
tentative suggestions that can be made with respect to resilience. In particular, how 
confident adolescents feel about their emotional competence seems to be an important 
protective factor for adolescents facing stressful situations. When confronted with a 
stressor, individuals need to avoid hyperreactivity (i.e., a heightened response) to prevent 
placing an unnecessary burden (‘allostatic overload’) on stress response systems of the body 
(e.g., Arora et al., 2010; Rano et al., 2018). Since TEI predicted a more adaptive stress 
response, this could help explain why TEI is often associated with more positive stress-
related outcomes in young people, such as good mental health (e.g., Fernandez-Berrocal et 




Premuzic et al., 2007), and educational attainment (MacCann et al., 2020). In addition, AEI 
was associated with a reduced likelihood of using unhelpful strategies under psychosocial 
stress (i.e., less task-focussed coping). However, it is not clear to what extent this tendency 
is protective, since it was not restricted to the stress condition, and AEI nor task-focussed 
coping predicted stress reactivity or recovery.  
Specifically, findings suggest that TEI may be especially useful in interpersonal 
contexts. Psychosocial stress is particularly potent in adolescent daily life, since adolescents 
are particularly sensitive to the effects of social evaluation (Gunnar, Talge, & Herrera, 2009; 
Somerville, 2013). The psychosocial task selected for the present study aimed to somewhat 
mimic everyday sources of social stress for young people (e.g., presentations; peer pressure; 
uncomfortable interactions with others; e.g., Rüppel, Sebastian, & Walter, 2015; Zeidner & 
Matthews, 2005), through fear of failure, social evaluative threat, and a lack of control 
(Buck, 2016). However, while the study has yielded a potentially protective role for EI in 
social settings, it is important to note that the current finding may not extend to other types 
of stressor. The specific emotions and physiological outcomes that emerge in a challenging 
situation are highly idiosyncratic, and depend on many stressor characteristics (i.e., levels of 
social evaluative threat, cognitive effort required; Denson, Spanovic, & Miller, 2009). It 
seems unlikely that sociability would be as useful in non-social contexts (e.g., cognitive 
stressors). 
4.5.4 Limitations 
The present study had several limitations that warrant consideration. The first issue relates 
to its sample size (final n = 58). While recruiting participants within a narrow age band (i.e., 




empirically ‘forgotten’ group (Kennedy, 2010), this presented a challenge in terms of 
participant recruitment. Though not dissimilar to the sample size achieved in many similar EI 
experimental studies (e.g., n = 30; Laborde et al., 2011; n = 30 ; Petrides & Furnham, 2003; n 
= 48; Salovey et al., 2002; n = 60; Sevdalis et al., 2007), the sample size of 58 is still relatively 
small. Consequently, effect sizes were small; the largest achieved in the study was = .08 
(change in R2 achieved by adding TEI subscales to the HR reactivity predictor model). 
Furthermore, a post-hoc power analysis using G*Power (Erdfelder et al., 1996) indicated 
that the study was underpowered (.349), suggesting that a larger sample size is needed to 
rule findings out as false positives. Thus, to test that, data from Study 1 will be pooled from 
the reactivity data from Study 2 (Chapter 5), which uses the same stress induction 
procedure (i.e., SSST), and methods of stress measurement (i.e., HR; PANAS). Since the 
pooled analysis will have a larger participant sample, statistical power should be higher, and 
reduce the margin of error, meaning conclusions regarding the role of EI will be more 
justified (Kühberger, Fritz, & Scherndl, 2014). 
The very low internal reliability of the STEU-B (.38) was also a concern. Whilst as a 
precaution, STEU scores were not interpreted or included in analyses, it is important to note 
that the STEU-B may not be appropriate for older adolescents. Though others have also 
identified issues with STEU reliability (e.g., Austin, 2010), it is not clear why the measure was 
so unreliable in this case, since the unreliability could not be attributed to any particular 
item(s). Perhaps, the vignettes were not age-appropriate (e.g., those relating to the 
workplace), which, due to the unfamiliarity of the situation (i.e., some adolescents may not 
have yet been in employment), could have hindered the adolescents’ ability to understand 
the contextual nature of the emotions being felt. As alluded to in Chapter 2, there is a risk 




values used, are perceived as irrelevant (Yeager et al., 2017). In contrast, whilst still less than 
desirable, the reliability of the STEM-B (.67) was better, and more comparable with other 
studies (e.g., .73; Austin, 2010; .84; Allen et al. 2015; .63: de Motta, Carvalho, Castilho, & 
Pato, 2018). Furthermore, the present study only examined the role of TEI and the 
‘strategic’ branch of the AEI, which represents higher-level cognitive processes (Mayer et al., 
2002). However, understanding the role of the ‘experiential’ branch, namely emotion 
perception, is also important to consider when attempting to untangle the precise 
mechanisms through which EI could buffer the effects of acute stress. In theory, being able 
to recognise how one is feeling (i.e., higher emotion perception scores) could help 
implement appropriate ER strategies in acutely stressful situations. Study 2 (Chapter 5) 
considers this perspective by investigating TEI and AEI (emotion perception and emotion 
management) with respect to attentional processing under stress. 
A further limitation is that the present study only included a single marker of 
physiological stress reactivity (HR). However, using a combination of physiological 
parameters (alongside a subjective measure) is considered the most valid way of measuring 
stress reactivity (Campbell & Ehlert, 2012), and allows for a more fine-grained analysis of 
stress response patterns that could be facilitated by EI. Empirical evidence suggests that 
electrodermal activity (EDA), as measured via skin conductance, is a valid and reliable 
marker of acute stress, that provides different information about sympathetic activity that is 
not captured by cardiac autonomic indices alone (e.g., Fernandes, Helawar, Lokesh, Tari, 
Shahapurkar, 2014; Mestanik, Visnovcova, & Tonhajzerova, 2014). To address the limitation 
of a single physiological stress marker, the study described in Chapter 5 uses both HR and 




In conclusion, findings regarding EI and stress reactivity and recovery were mixed. 
While TEI (particularly the sociability domain) appeared to have a physiologically protective 
function for adolescents in socially threatening situations, the self-control factor seemed to 
exacerbate the physiological response. In contrast, AEI did not significantly influence any of 
the study variables, suggesting that perceived emotional skills may be more pertinent than 
actual emotional skills. Comparing the present findings alongside those concerning EI and 
attentional processing under stress (Study 2), and EI and ER on social media (Study 3) will 
help identify any emerging themes, and better understand the role of context. For example, 
whether sociability plays an important role in multiple aspects of ER, or just response 
modulation (i.e., the present study). To explore additional mechanisms through which EI 
might influence stress responding, Study 2 will test whether EI moderates early attentional 
processing under stress in adolescents. In addition, reactivity data from the present study 
will be pooled with reactivity data from Study 2, to re-assess relationships between EI and 
reactivity in a larger sample. Study 2 will also investigate the role of another aspect of AEI: 













EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND ATTENTIONAL PROCESSING OF EMOTION 
UNDER STRESS 
 
5.1 Chapter overview 
This chapter presents the findings of Study 2, an experimental study that aimed to 
investigate how EI influences early attentional selection under acute psychosocial stress, 
and post-event rumination. Theoretically, if adaptive, EI should embody avoidance of threat 
(i.e., attentional bias away from threat) in non-stressful conditions, but hypervigilance for 
threat (i.e., attentional bias towards threat) in acutely stressful conditions (Yiend, 2009), and 
less post-stressor rumination (LeMoult, et al., 2013). While that has been tested in adults 
(Davis, 2018b), no research has explored EI and attentional processing with adolescents. 
Using a dot-probe task, participants’ bias for different emotions (happy, sad, angry) was 
ascertained in either stressful or control conditions. Findings indicated that while ability EI 
(AEI) did not moderate any aspect of stress regulation, the trait EI (TEI) self-control subscale 
corresponded with avoidance of sad emotion, and less post-task rumination. However, 
because those effects were not contingent on experimental condition (i.e., stressful, 
control), it is not clear whether self-control underscores adaptive processing. Study 2 also 
served as a replication for Study 1. Pooled data from both studies indicated that TEI 
sociability subscale buffered both psychological and physiological reactivity, suggesting an 
important role for perceived social competence in the context of acute social evaluative 
stress. However, the questionable ecological validity of the above findings calls for an 





The programme of research began by exploring whether EI directly moderated stress 
reactivity and recovery (Chapter 4). An experimental approach was used, whereby analyses 
tested whether different conceptualisations of trait EI (TEI) and ability EI (AEI; emotion 
understanding; emotion management) predicted psychological (self-reported change in 
mood) and physiological (HR) outcomes, in both stressful and control conditions. The 
present study was designed to extend Study 1 in several ways, with amendments made to 
address limitations and broaden the scope of the research. First, Study 2 omits the use of 
the Situational Test of Emotion Understanding - Brief (STEU-B; Allen et al., 2014), since 
Study 1 highlighted the STEU-B as an unreliable measure of emotional understanding for the 
participant group (α = .38). However, in addition to assessing emotion management using 
the Situational Test of Emotion Management - Brief (STEM-B; Allen et al., 2015), Study 2 also 
captures the experiential branch of AEI through measurement of emotion perception, to 
maximise the explanatory power of the findings. Second, while Study 2 uses the same stress 
paradigm as Study 1 (the Sing-a-Song Stress Test; Brouwer & Högervorst, 2014), it also 
includes a second marker of autonomic nervous system (ANS) activity: electrodermal 
activity (EDA). Third, in addition to measuring how EI relates to the response modulation 
processes, Study 2 also investigates how EI might contribute to early orienting processes, 
and post-stressor rumination. 
5.2.1 Extending the investigation of EI and physiological stress reactivity 
To briefly recap the stress response: when an individual is exposed to an acute stressor, the 
‘fight or flight’ response activates the sympathetic-adrenal-medullary (SAM) pathway of the 




These pathways catalyse a cascade of emotional, physiological and behavioural changes that 
ultimately lead to the individual’s preparedness and readiness to respond to the stressor. 
Many of those changes can be measured in the laboratory. Study 1 measured stress 
reactivity using HR an index for ANS reactivity, due to its capacity to represent general ANS 
reactivity to acute psychosocial stress (Cohen, et al., 1995), and its rapid response to stress 
in comparison to other indices (e.g., cortisol) (Tarullo & Gunnar, 2006). However, using a 
combination of physiological parameters (alongside a subjective measure) is recommended 
(Campbell & Ehlert, 2012). EDA is another biomarker commonly used to estimate stress 
reactivity, referring to electrical changes that arise as a result of changes in sweat gland 
permeability, measured at the surface of the skin (Critchley & Nagai, 2013). When an 
individual becomes stressed, one of the downstream effects of the sympathetic-adrenal-
medullary (SAM) pathway is to enable increased sweating, by increasing the permeability of 
the apocrine and apoeccrine sweat glands (Dawson, Schell, & Filion, 2017). A common way 
to capture EDA in laboratory conditions is to measure electrical conductance across the skin, 
which can be achieved by passing a very small amount of current between two electrodes in 
contact with the skin, measured in microSiemens (μS). Empirical evidence suggests that 
EDA, as measured via skin conductance, is a valid and reliable marker of acute stress, that 
provides different information about sympathetic activity that is not captured by cardiac 
autonomic indices alone (e.g., Fernandes et al., 2014; Mestanik et al., 2014). The two indices 
typically show different temporal patterns in response to acute stress (where changes in 
EDA tend to occur slightly after changes in HR, e.g., Nikolic-Popovic, & Goubran, 2011). 
Measuring stress reactivity in the form of both HR and EDA should allow for a more fine-




As described in the most empirically supported model of ER (Gross, 1998a), ER 
processes do not occur in isolation. In particular, both theory and evidence suggest that 
stress reactivity and attentional processes are intrinsically linked (e.g., Appelhans & 
Luecken, 2007; Jiang, Buchanan, Yao, Zhang, Wu, & Zhang, 2017). For example, when 
McHugh, Behar, Gutner, Geem, and Otto (2010) examined the impact of acute cortisol 
reactivity on attentional bias to threat-related words in a dot probe paradigm, heightened 
cortisol reactivity to a psychological stressor was associated with decreased attentional bias 
for verbal threatening stimuli (i.e., avoidance). Put simply, how an individual reacts to a 
stimulus may be influenced by how they have attended to it, and vice versa. Thus, in 
addition to re-examining the role of EI in stress response modulation, the present study also 
considered how EI might contribute to the ER process of automatic attentional deployment 
under stress. 
5.2.2 EI and attention 
Attentional deployment, the process of selectively concentrating on some stimulus in the 
internal or external environment, is an important ER process (Gross, 1998a). Affect-biased 
attention refers to selective attention processes by which an individual becomes ‘tuned’ to 
favour certain categories of affectively salient stimuli before they are encountered, an ER 
strategy that has the potential to buffer acute stress (Todd, Cunningham, Anderson, & 
Thompson, 2012). Attentional processes are critical for ER, since rapid and efficient 
selection of emotionally salient stimuli is critical for flexible and adaptive behaviour (Gross & 
Thompson, 2007; Yamaguchi & Onoda, 2012). Consciously (e.g., mindfulness; rumination) or 




through which EI could buffer the effects of stress, and ultimately, promote well-being (e.g., 
Davis, 2018b). 
To date, affect-biased attentional processing under stress has been primarily 
investigated in clinical and sub-clinical samples. In those populations, maladaptive 
attentional processing is common (for review, see Weierich et al., 2008). Empirical research 
consistently identifies that those with anxiety disorders (Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, 
Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van Ijzendoorn, 2007; Mobini & Grant, 2007), or high trait 
anxiety (Koster, Crombes, Verschuere, Damme, & Wiersema, 2006), show an attentional 
bias for threatening stimuli. This phenomena could contribute to a ‘vicious cycle’, where 
high anxiety propagates a bias for negative emotion, leading to heightened stress reactivity, 
which in turn then acts to further maintain high anxiety levels (Williams, Mathews, & 
MacLeod, 1996). Clearly, focussing on threatening stimuli is maladaptive when threat levels 
(derived from internal state, or external stimuli) are low. However, when threat levels are 
high (i.e., when the individual is experiencing acute stress), selectively focussing on 
threatening stimuli is adaptive, as it allows the individual to react and respond to the source 
of threat appropriately (Mogg & Bradley, 1998). Thus, the prevailing theoretical model 
proposes that whether an individual should allocate more attention to negative or positive 
emotional material is dependent on the level of threat present. ‘Healthy’ processing is 
flexible, and theoretically embodies avoidance of threat (i.e., attentional bias away from 
threat) in non-stressful conditions, but hypervigilance for threat (i.e., attentional bias 
towards threat) in acutely stressful conditions (Yiend, 2009). According to the notion of EI as 
a driver of efficient emotion processing, EI may moderate early attentional biases for 
emotional information (Fiori & Veseley-Maillefer, 2018; Veseley-Maillefer et al., 2018). If EI 




more closely with the adaptive profile than low scorers, a hypothesis put forward by Davis 
(2018b).  
Few experimental studies have examined automatic attentional processes with respect 
to EI (Gutiérrez-Cobo et al., 2016). Furthermore, studies have used varying attention 
paradigms and measures of attention, and findings are subsequently contradictory 
(Gutiérrez-Cobo et al., 2016). While high TEI predicted attentional bias towards emotional 
(vs. neutral words) in one study (Coffey et al., 2003), attention towards emotional vs. 
neutral words did not vary according to TEI in another study (Fisher, Sass, Heller, Silton, 
Edgar, Stewart, & Miller, 2010). In addition, some studies that have focussed on AEI have 
not suggested a clear role for AEI in attentional processes. For example, Fiori and Antonakis 
(2012) found that none of the AEI branches predicted performance on a selective attention 
task (where participants were required to ignore distracting emotional information). 
However, others have identified that AEI predicts faster discrimination of negative emotion 
(vs. neutral; Farrelly & Austin, 2007). While another study indicated that AEI predicted faster 
reaction times in the emotional Stroop task (Martin & Thomas, 2011), a composite score 
(from the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test [MSCEIT]) was used as the 
predictor; an approach that does not provide insight into which EI components might be 
pertinent to attentional processing.  
EI studies that have employed eye-tracking technology, a rigorous paradigm whereby 
attention can be directly and continuously measured (Waechter et al., 2014), are scarce. 
However, eye-tracking is necessary to capture the automatic processing of emotional 
information that occurs independently of acquired knowledge (Fiori & Veseley-Maillefer, 




to direct visual attention towards positive stimuli (e.g., happy faces), and away from 
threatening stimuli (Lea et al., 2018). However, to truly test the hypothesis that EI facilitates 
healthy attentional processing to buffer the effects of acute stress, research needs to 
examine how EI relates to attentional processes ‘in action’ (i.e., when experiencing 
situational stress under controlled conditions). 
 Only three studies to date have explicitly examined the relationship between EI and 
affect-biased attention under stress (see Chapter 3, Section 3.3.1.2). While a visual search 
activity showed no association between TEI and performance on a visual search task 
(Matthews et al., 2015), the other two studies used a dot-probe task that measured 
attentional bias for emotional stimuli over neutral stimuli (MacLeod et al., 1986). To recap, a 
standard dot-probe paradigm involves the simultaneous presentation of two stimuli (cues) 
that differ in their emotional content (e.g., threatening vs. neutral), followed by the 
presentation of a probe (normally a triangle or other symbol). Participants then indicate the 
location of the probe as quickly and accurately as possible through key press; the response 
to the ‘attended’ location is usually faster. Using a dot-probe paradigm, Mikolajczak et al. 
(2009) found that high TEI (self-control) individuals showed a bias for emotional words 
under stressful conditions, and a bias for neutral words under neutral conditions, with the 
opposite found for low TEI individuals. That study was the first to indicate that EI may 
moderate the impact of stress by facilitating ‘healthy’ visual processing of stimuli. Davis 
(2018b) built on that study, using a more robust methodology. Biologically salient material 
(i.e., human faces) were used instead of words, and the study design distinguished between 
stimuli valence, by including negative, positive, and neutral faces (rather than using simple 
emotional vs. neutral distinctions made by previous studies). AEI (emotion understanding 




to capture first fixations to emotional stimuli, prior to behavioural response (i.e., keypress). 
Findings were less clear-cut than those found by Mikolajczak et al. (2009). While high AEI 
management and TEI well-being predicted bias away from negative emotion (angry and sad 
faces, respectively), TEI (sociability and emotionality subscales) predicted bias towards 
negative emotion (angry and sad faces, respectively). Furthermore, most effects operated 
across both stressful and control conditions. Ultimately, the findings led to a confusing 
picture that suggested that EI may not underlie adaptive attentional processing under stress 
(Davis, 2018b).  
There is a pressing need to replicate the above preliminary work. Thus, the present 
study serves to replicate the attentional bias paradigm employed by Davis (2018b), to test 
whether the pattern of findings regarding EI and attentional bias under stress generalise to 
an adolescent sample. EI may moderate attentional processes differently in adolescence, a 
developmental stage that involves emotional development, yet also substantial emotion 
regulation (ER) challenges (Ahmed et al., 2015; Riediger & Klipker, 2014). The role of 
emotion perception ability in attentional processes also warrants consideration, yet is 
missing from previous work (e.g., Davis, 2018b). This ability forms the first branch of Mayer 
and Salovey’s (1997) AEI model, and describes the ability to identify discrete emotions in 
others and oneself, requiring the individual to accurately attend, detect, and decipher 
emotional signals (Mayer et al., 1999). In addition, Gross (1989a) suggests that under stress, 
ER strategies that direct one’s attention require the rapid and efficient selection of 
emotionally salient stimuli (Gross & Thompson, 2007; Yamaguchi & Onoda, 2012). It 
therefore seems plausible that for an individual to form an attentional bias for an emotion 
type, they need to be able to distinguish between different emotions. Thus, emotion 




attentional processing relate to ER during the stressor, there are other forms of ER which 
occur after the stressor has ceased (i.e., post-event mental processes, such as rumination).  
5.2.3 EI and post-event rumination 
In Study 1, EI showed limited utility with respect to affective or physiological recovery, in the 
first five minutes following the stressful event (i.e., the Sing-a-Song Stress Test). It could be 
that a longer period of time is necessary to capture the effects of EI on those forms of post-
stressor ER, and EI may instead relate to the deliberative cognitive processes of stress 
regulation that occur during that initial recovery period. Individuals draw on a variety of 
cognitive strategies as a way of coping with stress (Marroquín, Fontes, Scilleta, & Miranda, 
2010). One such explicit, controlled ER strategy is rumination, which describes the process 
of focussing and brooding on negative emotions (e.g., thinking excessively about something 
upsetting a friend said), characterised by intrusive, repetitive, unwanted thoughts that 
interrupt ongoing activities and are difficult to control (Rachman, 1981). Unlike emotion-
focussed coping, rumination is an ER strategy that more specifically relates to negative 
cognitions, whereby the negative thoughts involved are characterised as being persistent 
and intrusive (Smith & Alloy, 2009).  
In contrast to mood repair and physiological recovery (which can take time), 
individuals tend to ruminate about a stressful event immediately after it has concluded 
(Kocovski, MacKenzie, & Rector, 2011; Morgan & Banerjee, 2008). Thus, the effects of EI on 
post-stressor rumination may be more likely to be detected in a time-restricted 
experimental paradigm than other forms of post-event processes (e.g., changes in negative 
affect [NA]). Put simply, those with superior emotional traits and skills may engage with 




The research concerning the implications of rumination for adaptation is extremely 
consistent. Compared to those who do not tend to ruminate (i.e., when rumination is 
conceptualised as a trait), individuals who ruminate more have a greater likelihood of 
developing internalising disorders, especially in adolescence (for meta-analysis, see Rood et 
al., 2009; Young & Dietrich, 2015). The extent to which people ruminate after a stressful 
event has important consequences for adaptation. As described in Chapter 3 (Section 
3.3.3.2), evidence suggests that individuals who show high post-event rumination (i.e., 
those who ruminate more following a laboratory stressors) show not only exhibit impaired 
emotional and cortisol recovery (LeMoult et al., 2013; Stewart, Mazurka, Bond, Wynne-
Edwards, & Harkness, 2013), but also heightened cardiovascular activity (Key et al., 2008). 
Ruminating about an event generally impairs one’s ability to repair their mood following 
that event (Odou & Brinker, 2013; Odou & Brinker, 2014). Furthermore, some suggest that 
rumination may inhibit the individual’s ability to shift attentional focus away from negative 
environmental stimuli, even after the threat has passed (Hilt et al., 2017; LeMoult et al., 
2013; Stewart et al., 2013). In sum, ruminating is rarely a helpful stress regulation strategy. 
Importantly, individuals differ markedly on the extent to which they ruminate after a 
stressful situation, leading to an important question: “why is it that following an emotional 
event, there are people who have more (or less) ruminative thoughts than others?” 
(Lanciano et al., 2010, p.67). Such differences in mental rumination could theoretically be 
related to differences in EI: if rumination is characterised by fixation on negative emotion, it 
would make sense that EI could be helpful in this regard. A wealth of evidence documents a 
relationship between TEI and positive emotionality, which is unsurprising given the positive 
constructs present in its nomological network (e.g., optimism, happiness, self-esteem) (see 




general tendency to ‘savour’ positive emotions, and to distract oneself from negative 
emotions (Gómez-Baya & Mendoza, 2018; Salovey et al., 2002; Szczygieł & Mikolajczak, 
2017). Studies using the Trait Meta Mood Scale (TMMS) have also identified TEI can predict 
fewer intrusive thoughts following an experimental stressor, helping to repair mood 
(Ramos, Fernandez-Berrocal, & Extremera, 2007; Salovey et al., 1995). There is also nascent 
support for a link between high AEI and reduced rumination. Specifically, adaptive 
processing of intrusive and ruminative thoughts could be facilitated by emotion 
management skill (Lanciano et al., 2010). By engaging with higher level emotion-related 
cognitive processes, high AEI (EM) individuals could effectively buffer the effects of acute 
stress, and subsequently have more positive life outcomes than low AEI (EM) individuals. 
However, as is usually the case for EI studies that examine ER processes, research examining 
EI and post-event rumination has been conducted exclusively with adult samples.  
Thus, there are clear research ‘gaps’: little research has been published on 
experimentally examined state rumination (i.e., rumination ‘in action’), even less on EI and 
state rumination, and none on EI and state rumination in adolescents. EI could enhance 
mental health outcomes for young people by employing adaptive cognitive strategies that 
combat rumination (i.e., by reducing the extent to which they dwell on everyday stressors). 
Furthermore, EI may exert that protective effect through interactions with other ER 
processes, such as speeding up psychological and physiological recovery, and supporting the 
‘healthy’ attentional processing patterns outlined in the earlier “EI and Attention” section.  
5.2.4 Aims and hypotheses 
The present study contributes to knowledge in several ways. It is the first to examine the 




Furthermore, because the study shares common methodology with Study 1, findings can be 
used to ascertain whether the findings from Study 1 replicate. Third, it tests whether EI 
moderates post-stressor rumination, a hypothesis that has not yet been tested with 
adolescents. The study endeavours to be robust in all aspects of its methodology. Study 1 
controlled for variables that had theoretically or empirically been found to influence stress 
reactivity (personality, cognitive ability, and mental health). As the present study was 
measuring both stress reactivity and attentional bias, those confounding influences were 
again measured and included as covariates in analyses.  
The present study had three aims: to explore (1) the role of EI in the attentional 
processing of emotion under conditions of acute stress in adolescents, (2) the relationship 
between EI and post-stressor rumination, and (3) to replicate Study 1 regarding EI and 
reactivity. Predictions did not distinguish between TEI and AEI, due to the very limited 
evidence available EI and attentional processing under stress. First, TEI should predict less 
psychological (NA) and physiological (HR; EDA) reactivity under stressful conditions (H1). 
That first hypothesis will be tested twofold, using the sample from the present study, and in 
a larger sample (pooled reactivity data from Study 1 and Study 2). Second, EI should predict 
attentional bias towards threat (angry faces; sad faces; fearful faces) and away from happy 
faces under stressful conditions, and towards happy faces and away from threatening faces 
under control conditions (H2). Third, EI should predict lower levels of post-stressor 
rumination after the stressful task (H3). Akin to Study 1, exploratory analyses were also 






As with Study 1, Study 2 took an experimental, between-groups design (design choice is 
discussed in Appendix A), which comprised an online questionnaire battery, and an in-
person experimental session. There were two independent variables in the experimental 
session: condition (randomly assigned; stressful vs. control) and EI (TEI, AEI [EM], AEI [EP]): 
continuous variables). Random assignment to conditions was carried out using an online 
random number generator (https://www.randomizer.org). There were 9 dependent 
variables. Eight dependent variables contained measures of attentional biases to emotion 
(i.e., happiness, sadness, anger), for both manual reaction time (RT) data, and eye 
movements. Three variables were measures of stress reactivity, indexed in the form of 
changes in mood (NA), HR, and EDA. Akin to Study 1, personality, cognitive ability, and 
mental health, were included as covariates in all analyses. Ethical approval was granted by 
the Humanities and Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee (HASSREC) at the University 
of Worcester in June 2018 (HASSREC code: HCA17180065). 
5.3.2 Participants 
An a-priori power analysis conducted using G*Power (Erdfelder et al., 1996) recommended 
that a minimum of 128 participants were required to achieve an 80% probability of 
detecting true effects using a hierarchical regression (Field, 2017), and this was used as the 
recruitment target for the study. However, as with Study 1, recruiting participants within a 
narrow age band (i.e., between the ages of 16 and 18 years) presented a challenge (largely 
due to difficulties in making direct contact with gate-keepers), and despite best efforts, a 




trials (n = 192) per participant), and VanVoorhis and Morgan’s (2007) suggestion of a 
minimum of 50 participants, this sample size was deemed sufficient for the purposes of the 
study. The participant recruitment process is hereby described. First, an email containing 
brief information about the study (Appendix B) were sent to head-teachers of 22 state and 
private Sixth Form colleges and secondary school Sixth Forms within a 20-mile radius of a 
major city in the West Midlands. Emails stated that the researcher would follow up with a 
phone-call 7 days later. If, during that phone-call, the head-teacher expressed an interest, a 
meeting was arranged to discuss the study particulars, attended by the researcher, head-
teacher, and a member of the student support/safe-guarding team. Following consent to 
take part at institution-level, arrangements were made to recruit students to take part in 
the study (details provided in ‘Procedure’ section). Following consent to take part on a 
school-level, arrangements were made to recruit students for the study (details provided in 
‘Procedure’ section).  
Of the 22 schools and colleges that were initially contacted, two agreed to take part 
in the research. One of those sites was the same Sixth Form college from Study 1. However, 
it is important to note that the present study used a different cohort of students (i.e., each 
study used an independent participant group). The second site was a sixth form situated 
within a state high school. In most recent reports by Ofsted (the UK government office 
responsible for inspecting and regulating schools and colleges), both sixth forms were rated 
‘Good’. Ofsted also suggests that the West Midlands performs broadly in line with England 
as a whole at with respect to secondary and further education (Ofsted, 2014). As with Study 
1, the ethnicity data obtained for the city within which the recruitment sites were situated 




Minority origin (BME) (12.6%), than for the general population of England (20.2%) (UK 
Census, 2011).  
Following the 22 initial emails, a further 11 emails were sent to colleges and schools 
within a 30-mile radius. However, due to difficulties recruiting sixth forms (in particular, 
non-responses to emails, and difficulties in making direct contact with head-teachers), a 
convenience sample of students (aged 16-18 years) from a local University was also 
recruited. Potential differences in maturity between sixth form students and University 
students were controlled for (see ‘Subjective age’ measure). The final sample consisted of 
students from a large state sixth form college (n = 44), a sixth form that formed part of a 
state secondary school (n = 6), and a University in the West Midlands (n = 10). To estimate 
general socioeconomic status (Ofsted is not relevant to higher education providers), the 
postcodes of the respective educational establishments were used to obtain 
‘neighbourhood level’ Education, Skills and Training Deprivation (ESTD) indices. The ESTD is 
a domain of the English Indices of Deprivation, calculated using a number of objective 
indicators, including school attainment, school absence, staying in education, and entry to 
higher education (Smith, Noble, Noble, Wright, McLennan, & Plunkett, 2015). ESTD indices 
for the three sites were similar: most recent calculations (2015) placed the participating 
establishments in the 6th (n = 2) and 8th (n = 1) deciles, where decile 1 represents the 10% 
most deprived areas, and decile 10 represents the 10% least deprived areas (Office for 
National Statistics, 2015). Furthermore, during 2017/2018, when data collection took place, 
the mean percentage of students eligible for and claiming free school meals in state funded 
secondary schools and colleges for Worcestershire (9%) was only slightly less than for 




meal eligibility is a reliable proxy measure of disadvantage of an area (Kounali et al., 2008). 
Generally, statistics suggests that the sample was broadly representative of the UK 
population as a whole in terms of socioeconomic factors. 
Of the 70 participants who provided consent, 60 completed both the online 
questionnaire battery and the experimental session. Those that completed both parts and 
those that did not did not vary significantly in either sex or age composition (ps > .05). The 
final study sample comprised 50 females and 8 males (2 participants selected ‘Other’). 29, 
19 and 12 students were 16, 17 and 18 years old respectively. None of the participants had 
taken part in Study 1.  
5.3.3 Materials: Online questionnaire battery 
To allow comparisons to be made with Study 1, six of the measures used for Study 1 were 
retained for Study 2 (Table 12). The following sections provide details of the Study 2 
instruments not described in Study 1, with full copies available in Appendix C.  
Table 12 
Measures Used across Studies 1 and 2 
 
Construct 
Study 1  
(Chapter 4) 
Study 2  
(Chapter 5) 
TEI TEIQue-ASF TEIQue-ASF 
AEI (understanding) STEU-B - 
AEI (management) STEM-B STEM-B 
AEI (perception) - Emotion recognition test 
Personality Mini-IPIP Mini-IPIP 
Cognitive ability Vocabulary Test Vocabulary Test 
Mental health HADS HADS 
Mood PANAS PANAS 
Physiological stress HR HR; EDA 
State coping CITS-S - 




Note. TEI = trait emotional intelligence; TEIQue-ASF = Trait Emotional Intelligence Questionnaire – 
Adolescent Short Form (Petrides, 2009); AEI = ability emotional intelligence; STEU-B = Situational 
Test of Emotion Understanding- Brief (Allen et al., 2014); mini IPIP = mini International Personality 
Item Pool (Donnellan et al., 2006); HADS = Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (Zigmond & Snaith, 
1983); PANAS = Positive and Negative Affect Schedule; HR = heart rate; EDA = electrodermal activity; 
CITS-S = Coping Inventory for Task-Based Stressors (Situational Version) (Matthews & Campbell, 
1998). 
 
5.3.3.1 Subjective age 
There was a risk that, despite being in the same 16-18 age bracket, Sixth Form students 
could have differed from those who have recently started university, in terms of their 
emotional mind-sets and maturity (e.g., Fang & Galambos, 2014). To account for potential 
differences attributable to that phenomenon, participants were asked to indicate their 
subjective age (i.e., perceived maturity). Subjective age identity (SAE) was estimated from a 
single item: “Compared to most people my age, most of the time I feel…”, with answers 
rated on a 7-point scale from 1 (‘a lot younger’) to 7 (‘a lot older’). The item is frequently 
used on its own to examine adolescent subjective age (Arbeau, Galambos, & Jansson, 2007; 
Fang & Galambos, 2014; Hubley & Hultsch, 1994), and  has shown consistently high item-
total correlations (.61–.67) when used in multi-item SEA scales in adolescent samples (e.g., 
Galambos & Tilton-Weaver, 2000; Galambos, Barker, & Tilton-Weaver, 2003). 
5.3.3.2 Emotional intelligence: ability 
Study 2 builds on Study 1 by incorporating measurement of the experiential AEI branch. 
Proficiency in emotion perception (the ability to recognise and distinguish between 
emotions) could facilitate the adaptive attentional pathway assessed via the dot probe task. 
With the omission of the STEU-B (due to reliability issues), the strategic branch of AEI was 




emotion perception is by measuring how accurately participants identify which emotion is 
present in emotional stimuli, an emotion recognition test (ERT) was sought for the present 
study (Elfenbein & MacCann, 2017). A test that fulfilled three criteria was sought: 1) 
featured predominantly audiovisual stimuli (i.e., stimuli with both sound and visual 
components), 2) had the capacity to implemented online, and 3) was 10-15 minutes in 
length.  
To achieve an ecologically valid representation of emotion, the first criterion was 
that the emotional stimuli be audiovisual. Although most emotion stimulus sets contain only 
static facial images (e.g., JACFEE; Matsumoto & Ekman, 1988; KDEF; Lundqvist, Flykt, & 
Ohman, 1998), static facial expressions are rarely observed in real life, and the assessment 
of facial movements often facilitates the process of deciphering emotion (e.g., Bould, 
Morris, & Wink, 2008, Pollick, Hill, Calder, & Paterson, 2003). Moreover, recent evidence 
suggests MSCEIT scores (which also uses static images) do not predict the ability of 
adolescents to recognise emotion from vocal tone (Davis, Morningstar, Dirks, & Qualter, 
2020). Furthermore, while MSCEIT scores may predict recognition of dynamic facial emotion 
in adults, the effect does not extend beyond the effects of crystallized cognitive ability 
(Davis, Morningstar, & Qualter, 2020). These issues help highlight the importance of 
multisensory integration (i.e., sight and sound) during emotion perception (de Gelder & 
Bertelson, 2003; Kreifelts, Ethofer, & Wildgruber, 2007; Massaro & Egan, 1996).  
Second, it was important for the ERT to have the capacity to be implemented 
effectively online, a necessity for its incorporation into the online portion of the study. 
Lastly, the test was required to be of suitable length (< 15 minutes total completion time) to 




others. For example, the MSCEIT-Youth Research Version emotion perception scale uses 
static images (MSCEIT YRV; Mayer et al., 2014). The Geneva Emotion Recognition Test – 
Short (GERT-S; Schlegel & Scherer, 2015) appeared promising (audio-visual stimuli, 10 
minutes long), but unfortunately posed many technical issues when embedded into the 
online questionnaire battery. Because a suitable test that satisfied all criteria could not be 
identified, a new ERT was developed for the purposes of the present study. It is common for 
EI researchers to develop bespoke scales and tasks to fit the purposes of the study (e.g., see 
Zysberg, Levy, & Zisberg, 2010). Appendix J provides details of how the ERT was developed, 
using stimuli from the Ryerson Audio-Visual Database of Emotional Speech and Song 
(RAVDESS; Livingstone & Russo, 2018). 
In the final ERT, participants viewed each of the 36 videos video in a random order, 
and chose the emotion they thought is being expressed from a choice of six. Responses were 
scored as either correct (1) or incorrect (0). Total scores (% correct) are computed for each 
participant by dividing the number of correct responses by the total number of responses 
provided, and then multiplying by 100. Results from a small pilot version of the ERT (n = 10) 
indicated its potential for use in the present study (data not shown). In the present study, 
participants achieved an average score of 76.60% (SD = 7.06).  
5.3.4 Experimental session tasks and measures 
5.3.4.1 Stress induction 
The second part of the study entailed a face-to-face experimental session, with an identical 
stress induction procedure to that described in Study 1 (i.e., the Sing-a-Song Stress Test; 
SSST [stress condition] or reading task [control condition]; Chapter 4, Section 4.3.5). Stress 




operationalised as the change in stress variables (i.e., NA, HR, EDA) from baseline to 
immediately after the stressor (Table 6). However, unlike Study 1 (which measured both PA 
and NA), only the NA subscale of the PANAS was used, to keep the in-person part of the 
study a reasonable length. Using change in NA as a single index for psychological stress 
reactivity is very common in the literature (see Davis, 2018b; Mikolajczak et al., 2009a , or 
for review, Lea et al., 2019), and also lowers the risk of Type I errors, via a reduction in the 
number of analyses performed. However, Study 2 measured physiological stress differently 
to Study 1: an Empatica E4 wristband (Empatica, US) was used to track physiological 
changes over the course of the experiment. The E4 is a portable, photoplethysmographic 
device that provides high quality physiological recordings that include EDA, HR, Blood 
Volume Pulse (BVP), acceleration (motion-based activity), and temperature. The E4 HR and 
EDA signals show good stress discrimination power under laboratory conditions (e.g., Simon, 
Godin, Campagne, & Charbonnier, 2016), and also show promising application potential in 
several clinical areas, including the detection of migraines and epileptic seizures (Onorati et 
al., 2017; Siirtola, Koskimäki, Mönttinen, & Röning, 2018). Qualitative data has also 
indicated that participants view the device as non-obtrusive (Lo, Sehic, & Meijer, 2017), 
further supporting its use with adolescents in the present study.  
5.3.4.2 Attentional bias 
Attentional bias was measured using a dot-probe paradigm developed by Davis (2018b), the 
only other study to measure the relationship between EI and attentional bias under stress 
using eye-tracking. Immediately after the SSST, participants took part in a visual dot-probe 
task to assess their attentional bias for emotional stimuli over neutral stimuli. In the 




their emotional content (e.g., threatening versus neutral) are presented simultaneously, 
followed by the presentation of a probe (normally a triangle or other symbol). Participants 
then indicate the location of the probe as quickly and accurately as possible through 
keypress. Response to the ‘attended’ location (i.e., the location the participant is focussing 
on) is usually faster. Thus, it is presumed that the difference in reaction time (RT) between 
congruent (when the probe appears at the same location as the emotional stimulus), and 
incongruent trials (probe and emotional stimuli at different locations) reflects attentional 
allocation (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). If an individual shows a shorter average RT to congruent 
stimuli, this indicates an attentional bias towards emotional stimuli. In contrast, shorter RTs 
in response to incongruent stimuli indicate avoidance of emotional stimuli. 
Dot-probe paradigms offer advantages over other tasks used to assess selective 
attention. In the emotional Stroop task, participants name the ink colour of words, 
presented one at a time, as quickly as possible (Stroop, 1935). Normally, words are from two 
categories of different valence (e.g., threatening versus neutral). The result of longer 
naming latencies to ink colours of one group of words over another indicates an attentional 
bias. However, attention researchers have emphasised that the Stroop task may engage 
mechanisms other than attention, with effects instead reflecting differences in language and 
colour processing speeds, for example (for discussion, see Starzomska, 2017). In contrast, 
dot-probe paradigms offer a more direct, and methodologically robust, test of attentional 
bias, with less potential for interference from other information processing systems (Mogg 
& Bradley, 1998). To capture continuous attentional deployment prior to the onset of the 
probe, manual RTs can be coupled with eye movement data to provide a multi-dimensional, 




measure which stimuli type participants tend to fixate on first (i.e., emotional, or neutral), 
whereby more first fixations on emotional stimuli (e.g., happy, sad, angry) than neutral 
indicate greater attentional allocation to that emotion type. The present study used a dot-
probe paradigm where attentional bias was indexed by 1) manual RTs (captured through 
key press responses), and 2) first fixations (captured through eye-tracking). Dwell time was 
not measured in the present study due to equipment limitations, but is noted as a potential 
future direction in the Chapter discussion. 
5.3.4.2.1 Dot-probe task 
In experimental contexts, ‘threat’ is usually operationalised as stimuli with negative valence 
(e.g., angry or fearful faces; Davis, 2018b). The dot-probe paradigm for the present study 
was constructed and presented in OpenSesame, an open-source experiment builder 
(Mathôt, Schreij, & Theeuwes, 2012), using facial emotion stimuli from the NimStim Set of 
Facial Expressions (Tottenham et al., 2009). The NimStim repository contains 672 images of 
43 ethnically diverse professional actors, each modelling eight different facial emotions: 
happy, sad, angry, fearful, surprised, disgusted, neutral, and calm (see Figure 11).  
Figure 11 






Notes. Emotions: neutral (top left), happy (top right), sad (bottom left), angry (bottom right). Source: 
Tottenham et al., 2009).  
 
NimStim images have good levels of reliability (αs are around .84) and validity 
(Tottenham et al., 2009), and have been used for emotional stimuli in numerous eye-
tracking studies (e.g., Davis, 2018b; Hilt et al., 2017; Wieckowski, Capriola-Hall, Elias, 
Ollendick, & White, 2018). 112 pairs of images were constructed, consisting of 32 angry-
neutral pairs, 32 happy-neutral pairs, 32 sad-neutral pairs, and 16 neutral-neutral pairs (for 
practice trials). Each pairing used expressions from the same actor (e.g., for an angry-neutral 
pair, an image of an actor showing an angry expression, would be presented alongside 
another image of the same actor, but with a neutral expression). Images measured 90mm 
(width) x 110mm (height) and were spaced 215mm apart from the image centres, set 
against a white background (Figure 12). Following the practice session, stimuli were 
presented twice, across two blocks, producing 192 experimental trials in total.  
The dot-probe method, NimStim images, and timings were identical those described 
in Davis (2018b), the only other study to measure the influence of EI on attentional bias 




Figure 12  
Procedure and Dimensions Used for the Dot-Probe Task 
Note. An incongruent trial is shown (i.e., emotional face and probe locations are different). 
  
(500ms), followed by a face pair (500ms) (Figure 12). With the offset of the image pair, a 
probe stimulus (triangle) immediately appeared in the location previously occupied by one 
of the faces (neutral or emotional face) for 1100ms, or until a key press response was 
detected. The emotional face, and the probe, each appeared on the left/right hand side of 
the screen with equal frequency. Thus, half of the trials were congruent (i.e., the emotional 
face appeared on the same side as the probe), and half were incongruent (i.e., the 
emotional face appeared on the opposite side to the probe). Image pairings were presented 
in a random order. Participants were instructed first focus on the fixation cross, and then to 
identify the location of the probe as quickly as possible by pressing either A (left) or L (right). 
RT was recorded for the interval between the onset of the probe and the key press 
response. The inter-trial interval had a randomised duration of between 750 and 1250ms 




5.3.4.2.2 Eye-tracking technology 
A mobile Eye Tribe eye-tracker (Eye Tribe, Denmark) recorded participants’ eye movements 
continuously for each trial at a temporal resolution of 30Hz, and an accuracy of between .5 
and 1º visual angle, corresponding to on-screen average error of 0.5 to 1 cm. The EyeTribe 
eye-tracker is capable of running at two frame rates: 30Hz and 60Hz. Whilst recording at 
60Hz enables faster processing of eye movements, recording at high resolution reduces the 
trackable screen area and allows for less head movements. Since data was collected in non-
laboratory environments (i.e., classrooms, where head movements were not restricted), the 
30Hz frame rate was selected to mitigate data loss (EyeTribe, 2014). Evidence generally 
indicates that given the equipment is set up correctly, the accuracy and precision of Eye 
Tribe data is comparable to that of more established models, despite being classed as a 
‘budget’ eye-tracker (Ooms, Lapon, Dupont, & Popelka, 2015). Whilst using the Eye Tribe for 
testing high-accuracy saccade metrics is cautioned against, it is well-suited for fixation 
investigations, even at 30Hz (Dalmaijer, 2014). Thus, the device was deemed fit for the 
purpose of the present study: to capture the direction of the first fixation (i.e., emotional or 
neutral face) following the offset of the central fixation cross. For each participant, the seat 
and screen height were adjusted such that the participant’s eye height met the centre of the 
screen. The distance between the participants’ eyes and the screen was approximately 60 
cm. The eye-tracker was calibrated for each participant using a 9-point visual display at the 
start of the task. In total, the dot-probe task took approximately 12 minutes to complete. 
5.3.4.3 Post-event rumination 
The extent to which participants ruminated about their stressful task performance was 




(Edwards, Rapee & Franklin, 2003) (Appendix C). In contrast to the majority of rumination 
instruments, which measure trait rumination (i.e., the tendency of an individual to ruminate 
in general; e.g., the Rumination Responses Scale; Nolen-Hoeksema, Larson, & Grayson, 
1999), the Thoughts Questionnaire measures state rumination (i.e., short-term rumination 
in response to an acute stressor). The scale lists 15 negative thoughts relating to the task. 
Participants rated each statement according to how often they thought about certain 
aspects of the task since its end, using a 5-point scale ranging from “Not at all” (0) to “Very 
often” (4). Example items included “I must have looked stupid” and “How awkward I felt”. 
Items are summed to produce a post-event rumination score. This questionnaire was highly 
reliable (.93) when used to assess ruminating thoughts following participation in the Trier 
Social Stress Test, another psychosocial stressor (Zoccola, Quas & Yim, 2010). Although 
participants in both experimental conditions completed the measure, minor changes were 
made to the wording of 2 items to ensure applicability to each task (e.g., for item 5: “How 
bad my singing was” [experimental group] versus “how bad my understanding of the article 
was” [control group]). Whilst the questionnaire has not been tested with adolescents aged 
16-18 years, a small pilot sample (n = 7) confirmed measure readability. In the present 
study, the measure was proved to be highly reliable in both the experimental (.94), and the 
control conditions (.91). 
5.3.5 Procedure 
As with Study 2, the researcher visited seven AS and A2 level3 Psychology classes across the 
two participating sixth form colleges, giving talks that lasted for approximately 15 minutes 
to introduce the study to students and hand out information packs (see Appendix F for 
 





information sheet and consent form). During this time, the researcher introduced herself to 
the students, gave a brief PowerPoint presentation that highlighted the benefits and risks of 
participating in research, and provided a brief outline of the study. Information packs 
containing an information sheet, letter to parents, and consent form, were then handed 
out. These talks were arranged by liaising directly with Psychology teachers directly, and 
usually took place at the end of timetabled lessons. Individual student involvement was 
contingent upon the return of the opt-in consent form (co-signed by both the student and 
their parent/guardian). Participants indicated their email address on their consent form; the 
information sheet reassured them that they would only be contacted for the purposes of 
recruitment and arranging time-slots. Email addresses were stored in a spreadsheet on the 
researcher’s password-protected laptop and were not included in datasets containing 
responses, to preserve anonymity. Within one week after written consent was obtained 
from sixth form students, participants received an email containing an individual link to the 
online portion of the study. The researcher also delivered the same study information talk 
to first year Psychology undergraduates during start-of-semester introductory lectures. 
However, because parental consent was not required for those students (all were over the 
age of 18), they were instead instructed to contact the researcher by email if they were 
interested in taking part. A link to the study was then sent via email.   
The first step of the online survey, after reading the Information Sheet and consent 
form (Appendix B), asked participants to generate a six-digit ID, using the last two letters of 
their surname, month of birth, and the last two digits of their phone number (e.g., if the 
participant’s name was John Smith, they were born in June, and their phone number ended 




battery, containing the ERT, TEIQue-ASF, STEM, IPIP, HADS, and the vocabulary test (all 
hosted on Qualtrics.com). Participants also indicated their age, subjective age, and sex. 
Measures were presented in a random order to counteract order effects (Lavrakas, 2008). 
Participants could stop and resume the questionnaires at any point over 10 days. 
Throughout this time, two email reminders were sent out to participants who had not 
completed all questions. The battery took approximately 25 minutes to complete.  
Approximately one week after completion of completion of the questionnaire 
battery, participants were sent an email with a link to a Doodle Poll web page to choose a 
convenient time slot for the in-person experimental session. Data collection took place in 
unused classrooms within the college (sixth form students), or the university 
(undergraduate students). The stress induction procedure was identical to that described 
for Study 1 (i.e., stress group: SSST; control group: neutral magazine article: see Appendix 
E). Immediately afterwards, participants started the dot-probe task. Subjective mood was 
captured at three time points: at the start of the experiment (baseline), immediately after 
the stressful task or control task (reactivity), and halfway through the eye-tracking task 
(recovery; approximately six minutes after the SSST). Time-points were the same as those 
used in Study 1, and in similar studies (e.g., Ling et al., 2018; Liu et al., 2017; Pittarello et al., 
2018; see Table 6). Physiological responses were captured at time-matched points. At the 
end of the experiment, participants watched the same comedic video from Study 1 - which 
had been shown to significantly decrease levels of NA - to reduce remaining stress. 
Participants were then debriefed, thanked for their participation, and asked not to disclose 




experiment lasted approximately 45 minutes. Data collection for the present study took 
place between October 2018 and February 2019. 
5.4 Results 
5.4.1 Analysis plan 
To check the stress induction procedure was successful, three 2 (condition: stressful vs. 
control) x 2 (time: before vs. during task) repeated measures ANOVAs were performed for 
NA, EDA, and HR. For the reactivity analyses, the analytic strategy mirrored that of Study 1 
(based on the strategy of Matthews et al., 2006), whereby separate hierarchical regressions 
were performed, with either NA, HR, or EDA as criterion. The same covariates as Study 1 
(Big Five personality traits, cognitive ability, trait anxiety, and trait depression, along with 
their product vectors representing conditional effects), were also entered into the models. 
For the attentional bias analyses, hierarchical regressions were run to test whether EI 
predicted attentional bias to different emotions, with either a) manual reaction times, or b) 
eye movements (first fixations) as criterion. Task condition was entered in step 1. The 
covariates outlined above, along with their product vectors, were also included in the 
models at steps 2 and 3 respectively, followed by EI (step 4) and EI x condition (step 5). 
Rumination regressions used same components as the above models, but with post-event 
rumination as criterion. EI was operationalised as a continuous variable in all analyses, 
Bonferroni adjustments were not made, and exploratory analyses were carried out for TEI 
subscales, akin to Study 1. As alluded to in the Analysis Plan for Study 1, the achieved 
sample size was not sufficient to conduct SEM analyses, which typically require a minimum 




5.4.2 Data screening and preparation 
Of the 70 students that consented to take part in the study, 67 students completed the 
online questionnaire battery, and 60 of those also completed the experiment. The 7 
participants that completed the online questionnaire battery and 60 participants that 
completed the entire study did not differ systematically in terms of TEI, AEI, personality, 
cognitive ability, or mental health (independent samples t-tests for completions vs. non-
completions all showed ps > .05). There were also no significant differences in age or sex 
composition (ps > .05). The dataset for those 60 participants was complete with the 
exception of eye-tracking responses for 3 participants, because the eye-tracker could not 
calibrate to their eye movements, even after ruling out technical issues. A failure to 
calibrate can be caused by numerous naturally occurring individual factors, including droopy 
eyelids, downward lashes, ocular dominance, or if eyes are particularly dry or wet 
(Holmqvist & Andersson, 2017). Data for those participants was subsequently used on a 
pairwise basis. 
5.4.2.1 Preparation of manual reaction time (RT) data 
In line with previous research (Davis, 2018b), the complete data set of 11,520 experimental 
trials (60 participants x 192 trials) was screened for incorrect responses (i.e., keypress did 
not correctly identify the location of the probe) and outliers (+/- 2 SD from the mean RT of 
423.67 ms). For each participant, emotion bias scores for each emotion type (happy, angry, 
sad), were computed according to established methodology (Bradley, Mogg, Falla, & 
Hamilton, 1998), whereby the mean RT to congruent stimuli (where the emotional face 
appears in the same position as the probe) is subtracted from the mean RT to incongruent 




the bias score for sad faces = mean RT to congruent stimuli (sad face on the same side as the 
probe) – mean RT to incongruent stimuli (sad face on different side to the probe). Scores 
with a positive value represent a bias towards that emotion type, whereas a negative value 
represents a bias away from that emotion type (zero = no bias). Mean RTs for incongruent 
and congruent stimuli, by emotion type and condition, are given in Table 13.  
Table 13 
Manual Reaction Times to Face Stimuli as a Function of Experimental Condition and Emotion  
  Experimental condition 
Stimuli type Emotion type Stress M (SD)  Control M (SD) 
Congruent  Angry 429.79 (75.97)  414.48 (127.41) 
 Sad 416.99 (64.13)  419.40 (121.35) 
 Happy 418.14 (70.93)  423.57 (132.87) 
Incongruent Angry 422.95 (68.75)  418.50 (125.10) 
 Sad 423.77 (72.11)  414.50 (125.71) 
 Happy 424.31 (72.07)  423.65 (132.18) 
Note. M = mean; SD = standard deviation; N = 31 (stress), N = 29 (control); congruent stimuli = probe 
and emotional face in same position; incongruent stimuli = probe and emotional face in different 
positions. 
 
Mean bias scores for each emotion type, across experimental conditions are provided in 
Appendix K. Only bias for sad faces differed according to experimental group, whereby 
participants in the stress group showed a bias for sad faces (> .5), whereas those in the 




5.4.2.2 Preparation of eye movement data 
For each trial, the EyeTribe used an algorithm to record whether a fixation occurred for each 
of 15 equally spaced time-points throughout the 500ms presentation of the face pair, and 
the screen coordinates for which gaze was directed at that time-point (x,y). Thus, the 
experiment returned an eye-tracking file for all 192 trials, for each participant 
(approximately 40,000 rows). The file was imported into RStudio version 1.2.1335. First, eye 
movements that occurred < 100 ms after the onset of the face pair were filtered out, as 
these ‘anticipatory’ fixations typically occur independently of emotional stimuli (Mogg et al., 
2004). Second, code was developed to record the coordinates of the first fixation for each 
trial. Remaining analyses were conducted in Microsoft Excel (2016) and SPSS v26. The first 
fixation coordinates were cross-referenced with the locations of the on-screen images (left 
image: x = 110.25 to 489.75, y = 150 to 618; right image: x = 534.25 to 913.75, y = 150 to 
618, where the origin, 0,0 is the top left of the screen) to determine whether the first 
fixation was on the left image, right image, or neither of the images (i.e., on the white space 
surrounding the images, or off-screen). The emotion of first fixation (i.e., happy, sad, angry) 
and gaze direction (i.e., towards/away) could then be deduced by corresponding the ‘left’ 
and ‘right’ fixations for each trial with the order of image presentation information provided 
in OpenSesame RT output file. The mean number of first fixations to each type of emotion 
stimulus, across experimental conditions, is shown in Table 14. 
To establish attentional bias scores for each emotion type, the number of first 
fixations to that emotion type was divided by the total number of trials where a fixation was 
made during emotion-neutral pairings of that emotion type (Davis, 2018b). For example, 





Mean Number of First Fixations to Face Stimuli as a Function of Experimental Condition 
  Experimental condition 
Gaze direction Emotion type Stress M (SD)  Control M (SD) 
Towards Angry 15.97 (5.83)  16.71 (6.40) 
 Sad 16.55 (6.36)  15.82 (5.59) 
 Happy 14.97 (6.32)  16.07 (6.20) 
Away Angry 17.10 (6.60)  16.11 (6.45) 
 Sad 16.69 (5.65)  16.75 (6.19) 
 Happy 17.55 (6.69)  17.18 (5.99) 
Note. M = mean; SD = standard deviation; N = 31 (stress), N = 29 (control). 
 
fixations made in trials with happy-neutral face pairings. Scores of more than .50 represent 
a bias towards that emotion type, whereas scores of less than .50 represent a bias away 
from that emotion type. Bias towards emotion types did not differ according to 
experimental condition (Appendix K).  
5.4.3 Preliminary analyses 
Key assumptions for running hierarchical regressions were not violated in any of the 
analyses (Field, 2017). The assumption of normality was met, as assessed by a Q-Q Plots, 




Linear relationships were shown between the dependent and independent variables 
collectively (as assessed by visual inspection of scatterplots of studentized residuals versus 
unstandardized predicted values), and between the dependent variable and each of the 
independent variables (as assessed by visual inspection of partial regression plots). There 
were no notable multivariate or univariate outliers with z-scores ± 3.29 SD from the mean, 
and multicollinearity was minimised through the use of mean-centred variables. Whole-
sample statistics (including means, standard deviation, range, reliability indices, skew, and 
kurtosis) for the online measures are provided in Table 15. 
The data was probed for any pre-existing differences between experimental groups 
in terms of age, sex, and independent variable scores. Randomly allocated experimental 
groups did not differ according to: age (χ(2) = 1.56, p = .466), sex (χ(2) = 2.26, p = .328), TEI 
(t(58) = -1.02, p = .312), emotional management (t(58) = -.66, p = .510), emotion perception 
(t(58) = -.49, p = .625), Big Five factor scores (ts < 1.30, ps <.05), cognitive ability (t(58) = -
.12, p = .234), trait anxiety (t(58) = .08, p = .941), or trait depression (t(58) = 1.76, p = .092).  
5.4.4 Relationships between study variables 
Table 15 displays whole-sample descriptive statistics and bivariate intercorrelations for the 
questionnaire battery variables (TEI, AEI, personality dimensions, cognitive ability, 
depression, anxiety). Expectedly, findings broadly mirrored those of Study 1, whereby all 
constructs were related to at least one TEI or AEI scale (or subfactor), with the exception of 
cognitive ability (p > .05). Trait neuroticism was the only questionnaire variable that differed 
between sexes (t(63) = 2.70, p = .007), where females scored more highly (M = 14.52, SD = 
3.38) than males (M = 11.11, SD = 3.69). Subsequent main analyses controlled for the effects 





Correlations and Whole-Sample Descriptive statistics for EI, Personality, Cognitive Ability and Mental Health (N = 65) 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1. TEI: total - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
2. TEI: EM .76*** - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
3. TEI: SC .67*** .40** - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
4. TEI: SO .52*** .34** -.01 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
5. TEI: WB .89*** .53*** .50*** .43*** - - - - - - - - - - - 
6. AEI: EM .14 .27* .12 .03 .03 - - - - - - - - - - 
7. AEI: EP -.17 -.06 -.13 -.26* -.16 .04 - - - - - - - - - 
8. O -.05 .12 -.03 -.13 -.12 .09 .05 - - - - - - - - 
9. C .32** .22 .34** .01 .28* .06 .04 -.05 - - - - - - - 
10. E .13 -.02 -.16 .51*** .09 -.12 .11 .11 -.11 - - - - - - 
11. A .31* .54*** .54*** .17 .09 .18 -.07 .21 .06 .10 - - - - - 
12. N -.55*** -.19 -.60*** -.14 -.56*** .15 .09 .24 -.20 -.01 .13 - - - - 
13. GC -.04 .01 .09 .11 -.05 .10 .12 .24 .02 .03 .10 -.08 - - - 
14. ANX -.67*** -.34** -.57*** -.22 -.68*** .17 .10 .17 -.22 -.10 -.08 .64*** -.02 - - 
15. DEP -.63*** -.43*** -.46*** -.24 -.64*** -.02 .00 -.11 -.29* .03 -.33** .34** -.14 .55*** - 
M 4.37 4.56 3.80 5.01 4.23 10.57 76.52 14.62 13.05 12.11 15.62 14.05 61.11 17.02 12.25 
(SD) (0.77) (.94) (.96) (0.72) (1.49) (2.11) (7.04) (2.91) (3.13) (4.09) (3.63) (3.60) (19.00) (4.36) (3.08) 
Range   2.43 – 
5.97 
  2.13 – 
6.63 




  1.00 – 
7.00 




  8.00 – 
20.00 
  6.00 – 
19.00 
  5.00 – 
20.00 
  4.00 – 
20.00 
  4.00 – 
20.00 
  11.11 – 
100 
  9.00 – 
27.00 
  7.00 – 
23.00 
Skew -.13 -.19 .13 -.46 -.19 -.83 -.86 -.35 .13 -.10 -1.11 -.44 -.05 .50 .95 
Kurtosis -.34 -.10 -.04 .03 -.93 .74 2.08 .05 -.47 -1.07 1.10 .04 -.38 -.44 1.20 
α .88 .68 .53 .51 .76 .64 NA .65 .56 .84 .80 .73 .74 .84 .73 
Notes. TEI = Trait emotional intelligence; EM = Emotionality; SC = Self-control; SO = Sociability; WB = Wellbeing; AEI = Ability emotional intelligence; AEI (EM) = Emotional management; AEI (EP) = 
Emotion perception; O = Openness; C = Conscientiousness; E = Extraversion; A = Agreeableness; N = Neuroticism; GC = Crystallised intelligence; ANX = Trait anxiety; DEP = Trait depression; M = 
mean, SD = standard deviation, α = Cronbach’s alpha coefficient.  





Baseline mood and physiology (i.e., NA1, HR1) were also controlled for when performing 
reactivity analyses. Sex differences were not assessed due to the considerable imbalance in 
numbers (females: 50; males: 8; other: 2). Correlations and whole-sample descriptive 
statistics for EI and all stress outcomes (for stressful and control conditions) are located in 
Appendix L. 
5.4.5 Stress manipulation check 
As with Study 1, the stress manipulation procedure was highly successful. The stress 
manipulation was analysed in an identical manner to Study 1 (Chapter 4). Participants in the 
stress condition experienced a significant increase in NA (Mchange = 8.07, SD = 4.89, t(1, 30) = 
9.19, p < .001), whereas those in the control group underwent a slight NA decrease (Mchange 
= -1.14, SD = 2.72, t(1, 28) = -2.25, p = .032). The stressful task, but not the control task (p > 
.05), also induced a significant HR increase of 18.68% (Mchange = 14.57 bpm, SD = 17.09, t(1, 
30) = 4.77, p < .001). As changes in EDA can emerge after HR changes (e.g., Posada-Quintero 
et al., 2018), the effect of group (experiment vs. control) on % EDA change from baseline 
was assessed at 3 time-points (during singing task, 1 minute post-singing, and 2 minute 
post-singing) via separate ANOVA analyses. Significant differences in EDA change were only 
observed after 1 minute post-singing (F(1,56 = 5.62, p = .021): participants in the stress 
condition experienced an average EDA increase of 249.12%, compared to only a 56.86% 
change in the control group. Thus, the SSST was effective in inducing psychological (NA) and 





H1: EI will predict reduced psychological and physiological reactivity under stressful 
conditions 
5.4.6 Effects of EI on stress reactivity 
5.4.6.1 TEI and stress reactivity 
Separate hierarchical regressions were conducted to test whether TEI improved the 
prediction of NA, HR, or EDA change, when the values of confounding influences were held 
constant. In the same manner as for Study 1, baseline stress variables (step 1), and 
experimental condition (step 2) predicted all outcomes. To avoid repetition of the mood 
manipulation analysis, only findings relating step 3 onwards are reported.  
For the prediction of NA, results broadly replicated those of Study 1. Entering the 
covariates did not significantly improve the model at step 3 (ΔR2 = .02, p = .965). The 
subsequent addition of global TEI (ΔR2 = .001, p = .644) and TEI x condition (ΔR2 = .01, p = 
.154) also failed to significantly increase of R2. However, in contrast to Study 1, global TEI did 
not predict HR reactivity (ΔR2 = .203, p = .060). Similarly, TEI (ΔR2 = .003, p = .570), nor the 
TEI x condition, significantly increased R2 (ΔR2 = .015, p = .212). At the final step, only scores 
on the depression subscale of the HADS predicted HR reactivity (β = -1.32, p < .01). 
However, the relationship between depression and HR change was dependent on the 
experimental condition, since the depression x condition predictor was also significant (β = 
.1.26, p < .01). Depression predicted larger HR responses in the stress condition, but had no 
effect in the control condition. Global TEI also failed to predict EDA reactivity, either as a 




Exploratory analyses were run with TEI factor scores. While their addition did not 
improve model fit for NA reactivity (ΔR2 = .02, p = .962), trait sociability score (β = -.91, p = 
.010), and the interaction between sociability and condition (β = .88, p = .030) remained 
significant predictors in the final model. To probe this finding further, the model was re-run 
without the other subfactors and their interaction terms (Field, 2017). Simple slopes analysis 
revealed that there was a statistically significant negative relationship (b = -2.19, SE = .93) 
between trait sociability and NA reactivity in the stress condition (p = .020). In contrast, the 
relationship (b = .86, SE = .96) between trait sociability and NA reactivity in the control 
condition was not significant (p = .375); none of the four TEI factor scores (ΔR2 = .01, p > .05) 
or their conditional effects (ΔR2 = .57, p > .05) predicted HR reactivity.  
Similarly, EDA reactivity could not be predicted using any of the TEI subfactors (R2 
change = .01, p > .05) or product scores (ΔR2 = .01, p > .05). Overall, TEI did not predict 
either mood or physiological reactivity. Only the sociability factor played a significant role: 
higher scores predicted less mood deterioration in the stress condition. Reactivity analyses 
for TEI are summarised in Tables 16 and 17. 
5.4.6.2 AEI and stress reactivity 
Findings regarding covariates are identical to those reported for the TEI analyses above, and 
are thus omitted. Akin to the TEI analyses, separate hierarchical regressions were conducted 
to determine whether AEI (EM) or AEI (EP) predicted NA or HR change. AEI did not predict 
either NA or HR reactivity (consistent with findings from Study 1 and Study 2). Reactivity 





Summary Statistics for Regressions of Stress Reactivity onto Pretask state, Condition, Personality, Cognitive ability, Mental Health, and Global 
TEI Predictors 
Note. NA = negative affect; HR = heart rate; 2; EDA = electrodermal activity; FFM = Five Factor Model personality traits; TEI = trait emotional intelligence; 






 Step 1: 
Pretask state 
 Step 2: 
Condition 
 Step 3: 
FFM, cognitive ability, 
mental health 
 Step 4: 
TEI 
 Step 5: 





Significant EI and covariate 
predictors (at Step 5) 
Criterion R2 F(1,58)  R2 ΔR2 ΔF(1,57)  R2 ΔR2 ΔF(10,47)  R2 ΔR2 ΔF(1,46)  R2 ΔR2 ΔF(1,45)  
NA .21 15.80***  .67 .46 79.33***  .69 .02 .35  .70 .01 .23  .71 .01 2.15  None 
HR .22 16.67***  .37 .15 12.76***  .57 .20 1.97  .57 .00 .33  .59 .02 1.64  DEP (β = -1.32**) 
DEP x Condition (β = 1.26**) 





Summary Statistics for Regressions of Stress Reactivity onto Pretask state, Condition, Personality, Cognitive Ability, Mental health, and TEI 
Subfactor Predictors 
Note. NA = negative affect; HR = heart rate; EDA = electrodermal activity; FFM = Five Factor Model personality traits; TEI = trait emotional intelligence; SOC 
= TEI (sociability factor); DEP = trait depression. * = p < .01; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. 
 Step 1: 
Pretask state 
 Step 2: 
Condition 
 Step 3: 
FFM, cognitive ability, 
mental health 




 Step 5: 





Significant EI and covariate 
predictors (at Step 5) 
Criterion R2 F(1,56)  R2 ΔR2 ΔF(1,57)  R2 ΔR2 ΔF(10,47)  R2 ΔR2 ΔF(4,43)  R2 ΔR2 ΔF(4,39)  
NA .21 15.80***  .67 .46 79.33***  .69 .02 .35  .72 .03 .90  .76 .04 1.62  SOC (β = -.91*) 
SOC x Condition (β = .88*) 
HR .22 16.67***  .37 .15 12.76***  .57 .20 1.97  .57 .00 .13  .62 .05 1.14  DEP (β = -1.55**) 
DEP x Condition (β = 1.51**) 




5.4.6.3 EI and stress reactivity: Pooled sample 
The full set of findings from the pooled sample from Studies 1 and 2 is provided in Appendix 
M.  In general, those findings were a combination of those obtained from the separate 
Study 1 and 2 samples. In the stress group, global TEI predicted less NA reactivity (it did not 
in Study 1 or 2 separately). A more detailed investigation into TEI’s component factors 
revealed that, under stress, the TEI sociability subfactor predicted less NA reactivity 
(supporting Study 2) and less HR reactivity (supporting Study 1) (Figure 13). AEI did not 
predict either NA or HR reactivity (consistent with findings from Study 1 and Study 2). 
H2: EI will predict attentional bias to threat under stressful conditions, and away from threat 
under control conditions 
5.4.7 EI and attentional bias: Reaction time data 
5.4.7.1 TEI and attentional bias: Reaction times 
Hierarchical regressions were run to test whether TEI (either global or factor scores) would 
predict attentional bias (as determined through RT data) for different emotion types. 
Personality traits, cognitive ability, mental health were controlled for in the 2nd step, after 
experimental condition (step 1). The addition of global TEI, and TEI x condition terms did not 
significantly increase R2 for the models predicting bias for sad faces, angry faces, or happy 
faces (sig(ΔFs)  > .05) (Table 18). Furthermore, no predictors remained significant at the final 
steps. However, a different pattern of findings emerged when exploratory analyses were 
run with TEI subfactors (Table 19). For sad faces, entering the TEI subfactors significantly 
improved the model, ΔR2 = .36, F(4, 44) = 2.02, p = .021, adjusted R2 = .21. The addition of 





TEI Sociability as a Predictor of Psychological and Physiological 








control was the only significant predictor of sadness bias, whereby higher scores predicted a 
bias away from sad faces across both conditions (β = -.56, p = .003). Entering factor scores 
and their interaction terms failed to predict bias for angry faces (sig(ΔFs) > .05). For happy 
faces, subfactors and their conditional effects failed to significantly predict bias (sig(ΔFs) > 
.05). Nevertheless, the emotionality, (β = 1.21, p = .07) and emotionality x condition terms 
(β = - 1.32 p = .057) approached significance for predicting bias for happy faces in the final 
model. However, even after removing the other subfactors from the model, the 
emotionality terms still did not significantly increase R2 (sig(ΔFs) > .05). Furthermore, simple 
slopes analysis suggested that the relationship between trait emotionality and bias for 
happy faces was not significant for either condition (ps > .50). In sum, while global TEI did 
not predict bias for any emotion type, the self-control factor predicted a general bias away 
from sad faces. 
5.4.7.3 AEI and attentional bias: Reaction times 
After controlling for experimental condition (step 1) and covariates (step 2), AEI (EM) and 
AEI (EM) x condition terms failed to predict bias for sad faces, angry faces, or happy faces 
(sig(ΔFs) > .05). Similarly, AEI (EP) and AEI (EP) x condition did not predict bias for any 





















Notes. ANG = bias for angry faces; SAD = bias for sad faces; HAP = bias for happy faces; FFM = Five Factor Model personality traits; TEI = trait emotional 
intelligence; SEL = Trait emotional intelligence (self-control factor); N = neuroticism. * = p < .05, ** = p < .01. 
 Step 1: 
Condition 
 Step 2: 
FFM, cognitive ability, 
mental health 
 Step 3: 
TEI 
 Step 4: 




Significant EI and covariate 
predictors (at Step 4) 
Criterion R2 F(1,58)  R2 ΔR2 ΔF(9,49)  R2 ΔR2 ΔF(1,48)  R2 ΔR2 ΔF(1,47)   
ANG .00 .13  .21 .21 1.31  .22 .01 1.22  .22 .00 1.11   None 
SAD .07 4.05*  .18 .11 1.07  .22 .04 1.25  .22 .00 1.13   None 
HAP .02 1.13  .17 .15 .97  .17 .00 .86  .18 .01 .84   None 
 Step 1: 
Condition 
 Step 2: 
FFM, cognitive ability, 
mental health 
 Step 3: 
Emotionality, Self-Control, 
Sociability, Well-being 
 Step 4: 





Significant EI and covariate 
predictors (at Step 4) 
Criterion R2 F(1,58)  R2 ΔR2 ΔF(10,48)  R2 ΔR2 ΔF(4,44)  R2 ΔR2 ΔF(4,40)   
ANG .00 .13  .21 .21 1.31  .27 .06 1.20  .36 .09 1.26   A (β = 1.52*) 
 
SAD .07 4.05*  .18 .11 1.07  .36 .18 1.77*  .37 .01 1.36*   SEL (β =- .56**) 




5.4.8 EI and attentional bias: Eye movement data  
5.4.8.1 TEI and attentional bias: Eye movements 
Hierarchical regressions were run to test whether TEI (either global or factor scores) would 
predict attentional bias (as determined through first fixations) for different emotion types. 
Personality traits, cognitive ability, mental health were controlled for in the 2nd step, after 
experimental condition (step 1). For models predicting bias for happy, sad, or angry faces, 
neither global TEI, nor TEI x condition terms significantly increase the models’ R2 (sig(ΔFs) > 
.05) (see Appendix N for regression tables). Furthermore, no predictors remained significant 
at the final steps, with the exception of predicting bias for sad faces, where 
conscientiousness (β = .38, p = .007), and subjective age (β = .46, p = .001), predicted bias 
towards sad faces, and anxiety predicted bias away from sad faces (β = -.12 p = .044), across 
both conditions. However, a potential role for the sociability TEI subfactor became apparent 
from exploratory analyses with TEIQue-ASF subscales. While the addition of the four 
subfactors did not explain any additional variance with respect to happy faces, sad faces, or 
angry faces (sig(ΔFs)  > .05), sociability (β = 1.27, p = .021), and the sociability x condition 
term (β = -1.39, p = .012) remained significant predictors at the final step of the sad face 
predictor model. To probe further, the regression was rerun without the other three non-
significant subfactors. Whereas the addition of sociability still did not significantly improve 
the model (sig(ΔF) = 32), the subsequent addition of the sociability x condition term 
significantly increased R2 (ΔR2 = .11, F(1, 42) = 3.24, p = .003, adjusted R2 = .52). However, 
further analyses of the regression slopes revealed that the relationship between trait 
emotionality and bias for sad faces was not significant for either the stress or control 




hierarchical regression indicated that the sociability TEI subfactor predicted a general bias 
towards sad faces, significance of the finding did not withstand follow-up testing.  
5.4.8.2 AEI and attentional bias: Eye movements 
AEI (EM) and its subsequent conditional effects did not improve prediction of bias for happy 
sad, or angry faces (see Appendix N for regression tables). Likewise, entering AEI (EP) and its 
product vectors did not indicate a bias for sad or angry faces. However, while the addition 
AEI (EP) also did not improve the model for happy faces (ΔR2 = .04, p = .149), the interaction 
between AEI (EP) and condition did (ΔR2 = .09, p = .017). Follow-up testing suggested that in 
stressful conditions, higher AEI (EP) predicted bias for happy faces, with effects non-
significant in the control group. However, despite that finding demonstrating that AEI (EP) 
presents an incremental contribution towards attentional processing of happy faces (i.e., it 
statistically improved the model), the final model was not statistically significant, F(1, 46) = 
1.49, p = .143, adjusted R2 = .16). Overall, while findings hinted at a potential role of AEI (EP) 
in facilitating first fixations happy faces in stressful conditions, neither EM nor EP robustly 
predicted first fixations, for any emotion type.  
H3: EI will predict less post-event rumination after a stressful task 
5.4.9 EI and post-event rumination 
In general, participants ruminated more after the stressful task (singing: M = 23.81, SD = 
15.18) than the control task (reading: M = 8.03, SD = 9.87), t(1,58) = 4.80, p < .001). In the 
stress condition, negative relationships were identified between rumination and global TEI (r 
= -.48, p = .006), a finding which also applied to the self-control (r = -.44, p = .013) and well-




rumination after the control (i.e., non-stressful) task, in the case of global scores (r = -.48, p = 
.009), and the emotionality and well-being subfactors (r = -.43, p = .019; r = -.50, p = .006). 
AEI (EM) was also negatively related to rumination in the control condition (r = -.50, p = 
.006). Whilst the above significant correlations were present, hierarchical regressions were 
run to test whether EI (or EI x condition effects) improved the prediction of post-stressor 
rumination after covariates had been accounted for. 
5.4.9.1 TEI and post-event rumination 
For all models, experimental condition (step 1) predicted rumination, as described above. 
Entering the covariates for step 2 significantly improved the rumination model (ΔR2 = .24, 
F(10, 48) = 4.70, p = .022 adjusted R2 = .41), but the inclusion of TEI (ΔR2 = .01, p = .332) and 
its interaction terms (ΔR2 = .00, p = .530) at steps 3 and 4 did not. No predictors were 
significant at the final step (ps >.05). Similarly, when all four TEI factors (ΔR2 = .01, p = .861) 
and their interaction terms (ΔR2 = .05 p = .301) were added to the model, the R2 did not 
significantly increase. However, at the final step of that model, self-control (β = -1.14, p = 
.049) remained a significant predictor of rumination. To test the possibility that self-control 
effects were being masked by the presence of other non-significant predictors, the 
regression was re-run without the non-significant predictors. Indeed, the addition of self-
control to the model then improved R2 (ΔR2 = .09, F(1, 57) = 16.69, p = .006, adjusted R2 = 
.35), whereas the addition of self-control x condition still did not (p > .05). Thus, scoring 
more highly on the self-control factor predicted less state rumination, regardless of whether 






Self-Control as a Predictor of Post-Event Rumination (Absolute Values) 
 
5.4.9.2 AEI and post-event rumination 
AEI (EM) and its subsequent conditional effects did not improve prediction of rumination 
(ΔR2 = .03, p = .129, conditional effects ΔR2 = .01, p = .300). AEI (EP) also failed to produce a 
significant increase in R2 (ΔR2 = .02, p = .231; conditional effects ΔR2 = .00, p = .583).  
5.5 Discussion of key findings 
The present study explored whether EI moderated early attentional processing of emotion 
under conditions of psychosocial stress, and is the first to do so with an adolescent 
population. In addition, the study served to replicate Study 1, by testing whether EI related 
to stress reactivity (where the individual directly modulates the stress response once an 




terms of response modulation, analyses of the pooled sample revealed that TEI predicted 
both psychological and physiological stress reactivity, with sociability playing an important 
role. As with Study 1, AEI was not a significant predictor of stress reactivity. A confusing 
picture emerged with respect to attentional processing, which did not provide support for 
H2. Significant findings only present for the TEI self-control subscale. Higher scores 
predicted a tendency to orient away from sad faces (for RT data only), a pattern which 
operated irrespective of the context (i.e., this bias was found in both stress and control 
conditions). That same subscale also predicted less post-event rumination, likewise across 
both experimental conditions (partially supporting H3). Importantly, EI predicted all of the 
outcomes described above beyond the effects of broadband personality dimensions, 
cognitive ability, and mental health, suggesting EI may offer unique contributions to both 
automatic and conscious ER processes in adolescents.  
5.5.1 EI and reactivity to acute psychosocial stress 
Amidst the concerns of a potential replication ‘crisis’ in psychology, it is important to ensure 
findings replicate, using the same methods but a different set of participants (Makel, 
Plucker, & Hegarty, 2012; Nelson, Simmons, & Simonsohn, 2017). The present study 
replicated the stress induction paradigm from Study 1, yielding similar results. Because the 
TEIQue sociability subscale predicted stress reactivity in two independent samples, we can 
be more confident about the importance of perceived social competence in the context of 
psychosocial stress for young people, and the generalisability of the finding. Interestingly, 
when analyses were conducted with the larger, pooled sample (n = 118), sociability 
predicted both psychological reactivity and physiological reactivity, indicating that sociability 




that strongly recommends the inclusion of both subjective and objective stress measures in 
reactivity studies (Andrews et al., 2013; Campbell & Ehlert, 2012) is rarely adhered to in the 
EI field (Lea et al., 2019). However, because our finding applies to both objective (i.e., HR) 
and subjective (i.e., mood) measures, there is little risk of shared measurement error 
(methodological “contamination”) between TEI (i.e., self-reported EI) and psychological 
reactivity (i.e., self-reported stress) (Keefer et al., 2018). It is still noteworthy that EI did not 
relate to EDA reactivity, but this is likely due to the different temporal trajectory observed 
with EDA, relative to HR (Nikolic-Popovic & Goubran, 2011).  
Clues for the mechanisms that underlie sociability’s buffering effect can be gained by 
scrutinising its nomological network. Discussion in Chapter 4 indicated that TEI sociability is 
a conglomerate of several constructs, including assertiveness, social competence, 
agreeableness, and self-efficacy (Petrides, 2009). Evidence that has examined the role of 
those constructs in relation to ER could therefore help explain why sociability conferred 
adaptative stress responding in a social context. For example, experimental evidence 
suggests that agreeable individuals might possess an ability to diffuse negative social cues 
(e.g., judgement from others) in stressful social environments, by focussing on prosocial 
thoughts (Meier et al., 2006). Crucially, however, Big Five personality traits (including 
agreeableness) were controlled for. Assertiveness in social settings could be the key 
distinguishing aspect of sociability that explains stress reactivity beyond agreeableness 
(p.128). Assertive individuals are self-efficacious, and have high self-esteem, meaning they 
can face stressful demands with confidence (Murphey et al., 2013). Evidence suggests that 
not only do assertiveness, self-esteem, and self-efficacy, help buffer the effects of stress 
reactivity (Hughes, 2007; Krieger, Hermann, Zimmermann, & Holtforth, 2015), but that 




Trotman, Williams, Quinton, & van Zanten, 2018). Perhaps, high sociability individuals 
perceive socially charged acute stressors as less threatening, and their prosocial nature and 
self-efficacy enables them to instead focus on managing their emotional response (Meier et 
al., 2006; Mikolajczak et al., 2008). Self-efficacious individuals also tend to show an internal 
locus of control (a known protective factor in stressful situations) meaning that they 
attribute situation outcomes to their own efforts and abilities (Roddenberry & Renk, 2010). 
Taken together, perhaps in times of psychosocial stress, individuals with higher levels of 
sociability draw on several adaptive traits (e.g., the agreeableness aspect ‘activates’ 
prosocial thoughts; self-efficacy ‘activates’ appraisals which label the threat as a challenge, 
and within the individual’s control) to ultimately, act on the autonomic nervous system 
(ANS) to present a less extreme response. However, such mechanisms are speculative and 
were not tested directly in the present study.  
As with Study 1, AEI did not contribute significantly to stress reactivity, corroborating 
the notion that how confident adolescents feel about their emotional abilities matters more 
for stress response modulation than their actual emotion-cognitive skill. In addition, the 
failure of the present study sample (and the pooled sample) to identify a significant role of 
self-control with relation to stress reactivity, suggests that the initial self-control finding was 
potentially a false positive. 
5.5.2 EI and attentional deployment 
To recap, attentional allocation, the process of selectively concentrating on some stimulus, 
is an important ER process that has the potential to buffer acute stress (Gross, 1998a; Todd 
et al., 2012). There are certain ways of processing emotional material in our environment 




prevailing theoretical model proposes that whether an individual should allocate more 
attention to negative or positive emotional material in our external environment is 
dependent on the level of threat present (Mogg & Bradley, 1998). Ultimately, adaptive 
processing entails avoidance of threat (i.e., attentional bias away from threat) in non-
stressful conditions, but hypervigilance for threat (i.e., attentional bias towards threat) in 
acutely stressful conditions (Yiend, 2009). Theoretically, patterns of visual processing of high 
EI scorers should align more closely with the adaptive profile than low scorers (Davis, 
2018b), and this formed the basis of H2. To test this, attentional bias for happy, sad, and 
angry faces was operationalised using RT and eye movement data obtained from a dot 
probe task, following a stress induction.   
There were no significant effects of global TEI, AEI (emotion management; emotion 
perception), on attentional selection. However, performing exploratory TEI subscale 
analyses provided more meaningful interpretations (Downey et al., 2010; Zeidner, 
Matthews, & Roberts, 2012). The exploratory analyses in the present study revealed that 
the self-control TEI subscale predicted a bias away from sad faces, a finding consistent 
across both stressful and control conditions. Because of its specific role in the present study, 
the rest of the discussion will focus on the TEI self-control factor. According to TEIQue 
developers, the self-control factor represents a perceived ability to control impulses and 
cope under pressure (Petrides, 2009), with high scorers perceived themselves as “capable of 
controlling their emotions”, “reflective and less likely to give in to their urges”, and “capable 
of withstanding pressure and regulating stress”. For context, these traits are derived from 





• I find it hard to control my feelings (Item 4, reverse-scored) 
• I change my mind often (Item 7, reverse-scored) 
• I’m able to deal with stress (Item 15) 
• I can control my anger when I want to (Item 19) 
• Sometimes, I get involved in things I later wish I could get out of (Item 22, 
reverse-scored) 
• I try to control my thoughts and not worry too much about things (Item 30) 
Thus, self-control is the part of TEI that specifically targets perceived abilities 
regarding emotion regulation and stress management. Previous research has demonstrated 
that perceived emotion regulation abilities are associated with the implementation of more 
efficient ER strategies in times of stress, such as more adaptative coping styles, and more 
‘challenge’ versus ‘threat’ cognitive appraisals of stressors (Mikolajczak et al., 2006; Salovey 
et al., 2002). It would therefore make sense for people scoring highly in perceived self-
control to show higher resistance to stress, by preferentially attending to threat under 
stress (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Yiend, 2009). One study also found a 
role for self-control in attentional processing, where self-control produced context-sensitive 
effects on attentional bias in adults (Mikolajczak et al., 2009b). Higher scores predicted an 
attentional bias for emotional material (regardless of valence) in stressful conditions, and 
attentional bias for neutral material in neutral conditions. However, several of the 
methodological shortcomings in that study were addressed in the current study, potentially 
accounting for the differences in the findings. For example, Mikolajczak et al. (2009) 
measured responses to arbitrary symbols rather than biological salient stimuli (i.e., 




distinguishing between discrete emotions. However, Davis (2018b), upon which the 
methodology of the present study was based, only identified roles for emotionality, well-
being, and sociability TEI subscales in the initial orienting of adults’ attention. Perhaps the 
self-control subscale plays a unique role in the attentional processing of stimuli with 
adolescents, specifically with relation to sadness-inducing stimuli. 
Emotionally negative stimuli may warn of dangers to be avoided. However, while 
angry faces were the primary focus (as anger is the most threatening emotion used in the 
study), it is surprising that a significant outcome was only detected for sad faces, since 
sadness-inducing stimuli do not represent threat per se. Attentional biases towards sadness 
are typically seen in young people with either clinical depression, or depression 
symptomology (for meta-analysis see Peckham, McHugh, & Otto, 2010), though there are 
exceptions (e.g., Sylvester, Hudziak, Gaffrey, Barch, & Luby, 2016). In fact, a tendency to 
preferentially attend to and process sad stimuli appears to be a depression-state marker in 
adolescents (Maalouf, Clark, Tavitian, Sahakian, Brent, & Phillips, 2012). Although such 
research usually uncovers depression-sensitive patterns relate to a failure to disengage from 
sad stimuli, rather than an orienting (i.e., avoiding) preference (Teachman, Joorman, 
Steinman, & Gotlib, 2012), evidence generally suggests that avoiding sadness-evoking 
stimuli is adaptive in everyday circumstances (Mennen, Norman, & Turk-Browne, 2019), 
suggesting that self-control helped facilitate adaptive attentional processing in our study. It 
is important to note that mental ill health was included as a covariate in the present study 
(using the HADS). In other words, biases for and away from sad stimuli in the present study 
could not be attributed to depressive symptomology, meaning that TEI self-control 




Findings suggest that a perceived ability to regulate one’s impulses and emotions 
(i.e., self-control) could be protective in relation to depressive symptomology, rather than 
buffering stress. Indeed, in the present study, self-control correlated negatively with the 
depression scale of the HADS (r = .41, p < .001) (Table 15). Since not all studies perform 
subscale-level analyses, it becomes necessary to draw upon the broader EI literature to try 
and explain the finding that self-control corresponded with sadness avoidance. A wealth of 
cross-sectional, questionnaire-based studies have identified an association between higher 
TEI and lower risk of depression in adolescents (e.g., Balluerka, Aritzeta, Gorostiaga, Gartzia, 
& Soroa, 2013; Fernández-Berrocal et al., 2006; Foster, Lomas, Downey, & Stough, 2018). 
Although such studies did not always use the TEIQue, significant findings often specifically 
related to subscales relating to emotion management, akin to the self-control subscale of 
the TEIQue (e.g., the repair scale of the TMMS; Balluerka et al., 2013; the emotion 
management and control subscale of the adolescent SUIT; Foster et al., 2018). Those 
findings suggest that self-control associated with a lower risk of depression, supported by 
the current study, which suggests this may be due to a tendency to avoid sad stimuli. 
Because clinical symptoms were controlled for in the present study, the result could 
perhaps indicate a way in which EI could safeguard against depression in the future.  
 As with Study 1, no significant findings were yielded with respect to AEI, again 
emphasising the distinctiveness of the TEI and AEI constructs (Petrides, 2011). How well 
adolescents feel they can control their emotions and impulses appears a more important 
facilitator of attentional processing than their actual emotion-cognitive skill. However, it is 
important to note that effects found for EI and early attentional processing of sadness were 




a puzzling finding. Given the highly successful stress manipulation check in both Study 1 and 
the present study (effect sizes of n2partial were large in every case [Cohen, 1988]), it seems 
unlikely that stress-dependent effects were not achieved due to issues of stressor 
effectiveness. Participants in the stress condition showed a significantly larger increase in 
psychological and physiological stress indices than those in the control condition. An 
alternative explanation could be that while the stressor was powerful in inducing short-term 
stress, the effects subsided over the course of the 12-minute dot probe task (i.e., the 
participants became less stressed as time went on). To test that possibility, additional 
analyses were conducted separately for the first half of the dot-probe task (i.e., the first 6 
minutes) and the second half (i.e., the latter 6 minutes) (data not shown). For example, the 
RT bias for sad faces in the 1st half was calculated by subtracting the average RT for 
congruent anger trials from the average RT for incongruent anger trials, for the first 16 
anger-neutral trials only. These values were then regressed onto EI using the same analyses 
outlined in the results section. If stressor potency influenced the outcomes, we would 
expect that findings would differ between the two halves. However, the findings achieved 
for the first and second halves were identical to those reported in the results: TEI self-
control predicted a bias away from sad faces (as indicated by RT data), but tests for global 
TEI, other TEI subscales, and AEI (management and perception), failed to produce significant 
findings.  
A potential explanation for the seemingly generalised effect of self-control could be 
that attentional selection was not adequately captured by the dot-probe paradigm used in 
the present study. Indeed, the fact that significance was only identified for the RT measure 




data may not have sufficiently captured early vigilance. The present study captured early 
attentional selection by identifying the emotion of first fixation (between 100ms and 500ms 
after stimulus presentation), in line with similar work (Davis, 2018b), However, early 
attentional selection is thought to involve a combination of processes (vigilance, 
disengagement, avoidance) (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Cisler & Koster, 2010), with the latter 
two components typically underrepresented in attention research (Cisler & Koster, 2010), 
and which relate to other theories of anxiety and attentional processing. One hypothesis: 
the theory of attentional maintenance (AM; Fox, Russo, Bowles, & Dutton, 2001) suggests 
that that anxious individuals are not more vigilant for threatening stimuli, but that once 
attended, they find it difficult to disengage from it. As the present study focussed only on 
first fixations (i.e., vigilance for threat), it is not possible to test whether EI facilitates 
adaptive responding with respect to other attentional patterns. Nonetheless, the present 
study takes an important step by replicating work exploring EI and threat vigilance in adults 
(Davis, 2018b) with an adolescent sample, using a similarly robust methodology (i.e., by 
using RTs and eye-tracking, both ‘types’ of EI, and controlling for confounding influences). 
Future researchers should investigate EI and the more elaborative attentional processes 
(i.e., disengagement, avoidance) by measuring dwell time on stimuli, or fixations after 
500ms (Georgiou, Bleakley, Hayward, Russo, Dutton, Eltiti, & Fox, 2005; Schofield, Johnson, 
Inhoff, & Coles, 2011). To address these concerns, future research could investigate EI and 
attentional bias using alternative paradigms, such as visual search tasks (van Bockstaele, 




5.5.3 EI and post-event rumination 
As a maladaptive ER strategy, ruminating (which features intrusive, repetitive, unwanted 
thoughts that interrupt ongoing activities; Rachman, 1981) can lead to internalising 
disorders in adolescents (for meta-analysis, see Rood et al., 2009; Young & Dietrich, 2015). 
The present study is the first to assess the relationship between EI and post-stressor 
rumination in adolescents. While others have explored whether EI relates to trait 
rumination (i.e., a general tendency to ruminate), there is a dearth of evidence concerning 
state rumination (i.e., rumination in direct relation to a recent, specific stressful experience), 
which has important consequences for adaptation. The third hypothesis of the present 
study predicted that both TEI and AEI should predict less rumination after the stressful 
(singing) task. However, while global TEI and AEI failed to predict rumination, only the self-
control TEI subscale predicted less post-event rumination across both stressful and control 
conditions. In other words, when individuals had greater self-perceived tendency to control 
their emotions and impulses (Petrides, 2009) they had fewer negative thoughts after 
completing a task (whether the task was stressful or not).  
The finding that self-control scores corresponded with less post-event rumination is 
corroborated by the literature for adult samples. For example, global TEI predicts fewer 
intrusive thoughts following an experimental stressors (Ramos et al., 2007; Salovey et al., 
1995). The finding of the present study could be explained by evidence suggesting that 
higher TEI predicts a general tendency to ‘savour’ positive emotions, and to distract oneself 
from negative emotions (Gómez-Baya & Mendoza, 2018; Salovey et al., 2002; Szczygieł & 
Mikolajczak, 2017). Adolescents who felt that they could control their emotions may have 




focus to more positive thoughts. It is unclear why the moderation effect on rumination was 
generalised (i.e., to both the stressful and control task), but the finding nevertheless 
indicates an adaptive role for self-control subscale. Even though reading a magazine article 
is less stressful than singing a song, both tasks were performed in the presence of a 
stranger. By ruminating less about performances in socially evaluative situations, a 
perceived ability to manage emotion could have a protective effect for young people (i.e., 
by reducing the extent to which they dwell on everyday stressors).  
5.5.4 Implications for EI as a protective marker in adolescence 
Significant findings were restricted to aspects of perceived emotional competence (i.e., TEI), 
and not actual emotional competence (i.e., AEI). First and foremost, findings replicated 
those of Study 1, supporting the tentative conclusions made in the discussion of Chapter 4: 
how confident adolescents feel about their emotional competence (captured via the TEI 
sociability subscale) appears to confer adaptivity, by dampening the fight or flight response 
in the context of acute stress. Study 2 extended that investigation into the workings of EI by 
measuring both automatic (i.e., bias for emotion) and controlled (e.g., post-event 
rumination) attentional selection processes under stress (Gross, 1998a). With respect to 
automatic attentional processing, a perceived ability to control impulsivities and emotions, 
as captured via the self-control subscale of the TEIQue, corresponded with a generalised 
avoidance of sad faces. Because evidence suggests that adolescent depression is often 
characterised by an attentional bias for sad emotion (Peckham et al., 2010), avoidance of 
sad emotion is generally thought to confer adaptation in neutral conditions. Similarly, self-
control predicted a lesser tendency to ruminate in relation to a recently completed task (i.e., 




demonstrates that adolescents who ruminate less tend to fare better in terms of anxiety 
and depression outcomes (Rood et al., 2009; Young & Dietrich, 2015). Thus, these findings 
would seem that perceived self-control could facilitate resilience in young people. However, 
it is challenging to determine whether the findings relating to attentional processing were 
adaptive, because effects applied across both stressful and non-stressful contexts. 
Conclusions should remain tentative until similar findings are demonstrated with other 
studies using adolescent samples. Furthermore, as with Study 1, the same caveat applies: 
findings may only be applicable to the specific paradigm used (i.e., psychosocial stresss), 
since the specific emotions and physiological outcomes that emerge in a challenging 
situation are highly idiosyncratic (Denson et al., 2009). Even though effects were not 
contingent on the stressor condition, this does not mean that a different pattern of findings 
would not apply to different types of stressors.  
5.5. 5 Limitations 
The findings of the present study should only be considered in light of its limitations, the 
first of which refers to measurement issues. While most measures proved reliable in the 
present study (e.g., crystallised intelligence [vocabulary test], Big Five traits [mini-IPIP], AEI 
[STEM-B], mental health [HADS], mood [PANAS]), yielding similar Cronbach’s α values to 
Study 1, some of the TEIQue-ASF subscale scores were questionable. Reliability scores were 
comparable to those in Study 1 for the TEIQue global score (.88), well-being (.76), and 
emotionality (.68), but were lower for the self-control (.53) and sociability scales (.51). It is 
concerning that it is those latter two subscales for which significant findings emerged in the 
present study. However, these scales do sometimes generate relatively low estimates of 




2018b). The low reliability of the subscales could be attributable, at least in part, to the use 
of the short form of the TEIQue measure (30 items), rather than the longer form (153 
items), a decision made for pragmatic purposes. Thus, drawing firm conclusions regarding 
the role of the component subscales of TEI should be reserved until similar findings are 
observed when the full-length version of the scale is used (TEIQue-AFF; Petrides, 2009). This 
issue is discussed further in the general discussion (Chapter 7). 
The second limitation relates to the study sample. Due to difficulties recruiting 
participants within the specified age group, a convenience sample of students (aged 16-18 
years) from a local university was also recruited. Consequently, the final sample consisted of 
a small number of first-year undergraduate students (n =10) in addition to Sixth Form 
students (n = 51). Despite participants being in the same 16-18 age bracket, there was a risk 
that Sixth Form students could have differed in terms of their emotional mind-sets and 
maturity from those who have recently started university (e.g., Fang & Galambos, 2014). 
Participants’ subjective age (i.e., perceived maturity) was requested, to try to account for 
potential differences attributable to that phenomenon. Subjective age, EI, or scores on any 
of the covariates (e.g., Big Five personality traits) did not differ between Sixth Form students 
and university students (p > .05) (data not shown). However, while the risk of major 
psychological differences between the two participant subsets seems small, it still remains 
possible, that other differences in those 10 students that were not captured could have 
influenced study findings.  
Third, there are drawbacks with the attention paradigm selected. As described in the 
introduction, ‘adaptive’ processing theoretically embodies avoidance of threat (i.e., 




(i.e., attentional bias towards threat) in acutely stressful conditions (Yiend, 2009). That 
attentional selection pattern reflects the evidence that individuals with high anxiety show a 
generalised vigilance for threat (Mogg & Bradley, 1998). Early attentional selection was 
operationalised in the present study as the emotion of first fixation (Davis, 2018b). 
However, as noted earlier in the discussion, attentional selection is thought to involve a 
combination of processes (vigilance, disengagement, avoidance) (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; 
Cisler & Koster, 2010). For example, the AM theory (Fox et al., Dutton, 2001) suggests that 
that anxious individuals are not hypervigilant for threat, but that they struggle with 
disengagement. In addition, the dot probe itself is sometimes criticised for yielding 
potentially unreliable estimates of individual differences in attentional bias (Chapman, 
Devue, & Grimshaw, 2019; Schmukle, 2005). Future research should investigate EI and other 
aspects of attentional selection (i.e., disengagement, avoidance) by measuring dwell time on 
stimuli, or fixations after 500ms (Georgiou et al., 2005; Schofield et al., 2011), using 
alternative paradigms, such as visual search tasks (van Bockstaele et al., 2020).  
Finally, the ecological validity of the present study (and indeed, Study 1) needs to be 
acknowledged. While the experimental paradigm offers the several advantages (e.g., an 
opportunity to control confounding influences), participants may behave quite differently 
when exposed to more naturalistic stressors, or in response to more salient emotive stimuli. 
For example, studies have found that the Trier Social Stress Test does not have as 
pronounced an effect as a real-life stressor (e.g., examination; Henze et al., 2017). It is 
essential to verify if and how EI contributes to stress regulation processes in more applied 





In conclusion, findings indicated key roles for the sociability and self-control domains 
of TEI, but not AEI, for adolescents experiencing acute psychosocial stress. Akin to Study 1, 
sociability buffered the effects of both psychological and physiological stress. A dot-probe 
task was then used to determine whether EI influenced the emotion that adolescents first 
fixated to following stimuli presentation. The only significant predictor of attentional 
selection was the self-control subscale, which corresponded with avoidance of sad emotion. 
However, because the effect was not contingent on experimental condition (i.e., neutral; 
stressful), we cannot infer whether self-control underscores ‘adaptive’ attentional 
processing. In all analyses, neither strategic nor experiential AEI predicted any aspect of 
stress regulation, suggesting that for adolescents, how confident they feel in their emotional 
abilities seems more predictive of stress outcomes in social settings than their actual 
emotional skill. However, it could be that TEI and AEI buffer stress differently depending on 
the situation, and methodology used. While Studies 1 and 2 have demonstrated a potential 
role for TEI in a controlled stress paradigm, it is essential that EI and stress regulation 
processes are also explored using more salient, naturalistic stimuli. Study 3 will assess how 
adolescents respond when exposed to ecologically valid material stimuli, using material that 







EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND EMOTION REGULATION IN RESPONSE TO 
EMOTIVE SOCIAL MEDIA POSTS 
6.1 Chapter overview 
Whereas Studies 1 and 2 used an experimental approach to explore how EI moderates 
stress regulation processes, it is not clear whether findings generalise to everyday 
situations. This chapter presents the findings of Study 3, a novel study that investigates how 
EI may moderate emotion regulation (ER) in a more applied context: social media. Social 
media presents a pertinent new stressor in adolescence (O’Reilly et al., 2018), with which 
there are particular concerns that the heightened emotional sensitivity and protracted 
development of cognitive control in adolescents make them specifically reactive to emotion-
arousing material online (Crone & Konijn, 2018). EI could help safeguard adolescent well-
being by facilitating ‘healthy’ ER on social media upon exposure to emotive posts. Upon 
viewing an ecologically valid artificial newsfeed, 189 participants reported how each post 
made them feel (affective response), how drawn they were to that particular post 
(attentional preference), and their likelihood of engaging with that post (situation selection). 
Findings indicated that only ability EI (AEI) appeared important in amplifying affective 
responses towards stimuli. Furthermore, mediation analyses demonstrated one way 
through which AEI could lead to positive well-being outcomes in young people is via a 
tendency to present stronger affective reactions to material on social media. It would 
appear that in applied settings, actual emotional skill (i.e., AEI) is more pertinent to ER than 





Several EI researchers have emphasised the importance of stress context when trying to 
understand the mechanisms underlying EI (e.g., Davis, 2018b; Fiori, 2015; Mikolajczak et al., 
2008). The previous two studies used an experimental paradigm, conducted in controlled 
settings. Findings from those studies suggested that TEI may influence the ER processes of 
response modulation and attentional allocation (Gross, 1998b), at least in the context of 
acute psychosocial stress. Specifically, findings highlighted contributions of sociability (i.e., 
perceived assertiveness, social competence), and self-control (i.e., perceived ability to 
control emotions and impulses) subscales. The studies used validated, robust methodology 
(e.g., an established stress induction procedure [Sing-a-Song Stress Test, SSST; Brouwer & 
Högervorst, 2014]; a validated dot-probe paradigm [Davis, 2018]), while addressing notable 
limitations identified from previous studies. For example, research was conducted with a 
neglected sample (i.e., 16-18-year olds), controlled for confounding influences, and 
measured multiple aspects of EI to maximise explanatory power (i.e., TEI, emotion 
management, emotion perception, emotion understanding [though the latter measure was 
deemed unreliable]). However, the experimental paradigms only assessed the contribution 
of EI to ER processes under controlled conditions. EI may operate quite differently when 
stimuli are more ecologically valid, and salient to the developmental stage. For example, 
responses to static emotional faces on a plain background (i.e., the material used in the dot-
probe task; Tottenham et al., 2009) may not reflect how adolescents would respond to the 





6.2.1 Social media as a stressor in adolescence 
The proliferation of social media use over the last decade is widely acknowledged, with the 
amount of time young people spend online having doubled in the past decade (Ofcom, 
2017). In Great Britain, 96% of 16-24 year olds now use social media (Office for National 
Statistics, 2017). Social media refers to interactive websites or online applications (“apps”) 
that allow users to generate and share content with others, create personalized profiles, 
and develop online social networks (Obar & Wildman 2015).  
There is an ongoing, heated debate as to whether social media negatively impacts 
the social and emotional well-being of children and adolescents (Bell, Bishop, & Przybylski, 
2015). The debate spans research, policy, and practice, relating to young people, and 
features a strong tendency to focus on screen-time (the amount of time spent using a 
device with a screen, such as a smartphone, computer, television, or video game console). 
Whilst there is a general consensus and empirical evidence to suggest that problematic use 
(i.e., excessive use) or addiction to social media is detrimental to an individual’s well-being 
(Kuss & Griffiths, 2017), there is intense scrutiny on whether everyday use (i.e., screen-time 
use that does not reach the psychopathological threshold) is still harmful. For example, 
many governmental organizations in the UK have called for more research into digital 
screen time (UK Science and Technology Committee [Commons], 2017). However, the many 
cross-sectional studies that have tested for associations between screen-time and 
adolescent well-being have produced conflicting findings. Evidence has suggested that 
adolescents who spend more time on social media show greater levels of anxiety and 
depression (Woods & Scott, 2016; Vannucci, Flannery, & Ohannessian, 2017), less life 




Martin, & Campbell, 2018). Yet, a high-quality pre-registered analysis of UK adolescents 
found that moderate digital engagement did not predict well-being, but very high levels of 
usage could be problematic (Fernandes, 2017; Przybylski & Weinstein, 2017). Furthermore, 
a recent rigorous large-scale analysis using three datasets (n = 355,358) examined 
correlational evidence for digital technology (including social media) and adolescent well-
being (Orben & Przybylski, 2019). The association between digital technology use and 
adolescent well-being was negative, but very small, explaining a maximum of 0.4% of the 
variation in adolescent well-being. However, negative associations between social media 
use and well-being often receive a disproportionate amount of attention, in both the 
academic and public domains, even when correlations are small (Orben & Przybylski, 2019). 
As a result, social media is often blamed for the increase in adolescent mental health 
problems. 
To make sense of the abundance of individual studies that have investigated social 
media and adolescent well-being, a multitude of meta-analyses and systematic have been 
conducted (e.g., Best, Manktelow, & Taylor, 2014; Marino et al., 2018; Orben & Przybylski, 
2019; Uhls, Ellison, & Subrahmanyam, 2017; Verduyn et al., 2017; Zhan et al., 2016). 
However, findings are very mixed. Often, such reviews simply conclude that using social 
media has both benefits and risks. For example, social media can assist with identify 
formation (Eleuteri, Saladino, & Verrastro, 2017), and combatting loneliness, by providing 
social support (Matook, Cummings, & Bala, 2015), yet it is also associated with an increased 
levels of body dissatisfaction (Kleemans, Daalmans, Carbaat, & Anschutz, 2016), 
cyberbullying (Reid & Weigle, 2014), and somatic symptoms (e.g., sleep problems; Woods & 




psychosocial adjustment outcomes (Vannucci & Ohannessian, 2019). Whether or not the 
‘net’ effect of social media is positive or negative, the fact remains that in late adolescence 
in particular, social media can present a pertinent, yet poorly understood, form of everyday 
stress that warrants further investigation (O’Reilly et al., 2018).  
6.2.2 Individual differences on social media: The “rich-get-richer” hypothesis 
The relationship between social media use (i.e., screen-time) and adolescent well-being is 
fundamentally complex, and likely to be dependent on the presence of a multitude of 
protective factors and risk factors. Ultimately, while attempting to explore the mechanisms 
through which social media impacts adolescents, researchers may be asking the ‘wrong’ 
questions. Instead of focussing on the effects of screen-time alone, it may be more 
pertinent to ask: “which factors mediate and moderate relations between social media and 
mental health outcomes?” (Uhls et al., 2017, p. 3). A new school of thought considers that 
the relationship between social media use and well-being may be dependent on how social 
media is utilised (i.e., which material is engaged with) (Seabrook et al., 2016), and individual 
differences (Vannuci & Ohannessian, 2019). Adolescent social media use may not be 
intrinsically harmful for adolescent well-being per se, but rather the specific ways in which 
some individuals use it could be (Weinstein, 2018).  
The rich-get-richer hypothesis (or, social enhancement hypothesis), initially 
suggested by Kraut, Kiesler, Boneva, Cummings, Helgeson, and Crawford (2002), proposes 
that those who already have strong social skills and resources benefit the most from social 
media. There has generally been more support for that hypothesis over the competing poor-
get-richer hypothesis (e.g., Abbas & Mesch, 2016; Liu & Brown, 2014; Wilson, Fornasier, & 




the least vulnerable, and harm those that are the most vulnerable (Seabrook et al., 2016). 
As with most forms of psychological maladjustment, there are individual factors that 
exacerbate or protect young people from the potentially negative effects of social media. 
Research into the identity of those factors, and how and when they contribute to the social 
media use-well-being trajectory, is dwarfed by the wealth of cross-sectional research on 
screen-time and life outcomes. Yet, preliminary evidence has highlighted some individual-
level protective factors that may safeguard adolescent mental health and well-being on 
social media.  
Whereas there is scant research on EI as a protective factor for the effects of social 
media, emotion-related constructs that appear in EI’s nomological network have shown 
promise in this regard. Indeed, positive self-related constructs related to TEI are often 
identified as protective factors in the context of social media. For example, evidence often 
suggests a protective function of extraversion online. Consistent with the “rich get richer” 
model, social media use often predicts better subjective well-being (SWB) outcomes for 
more extraverted individuals, compared to more introverted individuals (Cheng, Wang, 
Sigerson, & Chau, 2019; Kraut et al., 2002; Zywica & Danowski, 2008). In contrast, higher 
levels of neuroticism, another Big Five personality trait, can magnify the detrimental 
association between Facebook addiction and well-being (e.g., Chow & Wan, 2017; Turel, 
Poppa, & Gil-Or, 2018). TEI often correlates strongly with those traits; positively with 
extraversion, but negatively with neuroticism (Petrides et al., 2007; Petrides, Vernon, 
Schermer, Ligthart, Boomsma, & Veselka, 2010). Evidence also suggests that individual 
dispositions, such as personality, can also predict individuals’ motivations for using social 
media, which can consequently influence well-being outcomes (Seidman, 2013). Another 




Rosenberg, 1965) also benefits well-being via a reduced tendency to make social 
comparisons on social media (Bergagna & Tartaglia, 2018; Zywica & Danowski, 2008). Thus, 
if the above TEI-related factors provide protective benefits in the context of social media, it 
suggests that TEI could also have a buffering role. It is unclear whether AEI could also be 
involved, due to a dearth of evidence simultaneously examining emotion-related skills, well-
being, and use of social media. Regardless of the (limited) questionnaire-based studies 
examining EI and social media outcomes, a more process-based approach could reveal 
greater insight into how EI may safeguard well-being. One way that EI could contribute to 
adolescent well-being could involve facilitating ‘healthy’ ER on social media upon exposure 
to emotive material. 
6.2.3 EI as a facilitator of emotion regulation on social media 
There are emerging concerns that the heightened emotional sensitivity and protracted 
development of cognitive control in adolescents make them especially sensitive to the 
effects of emotion-arousing material on social media (Crone & Konijn, 2018). Qualitative 
research supports this; adolescents feel that social media can cause emotional distress 
through exposure to distressing, irritating, and/or upsetting emotive material (Weinstein, 
2018). By increasing an individual’s exposure to negatively valanced material, social media 
could therefore negatively impact adolescent well-being (Best et al., 2014). Net Aware, a 
guide created by the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children (NSPCC) have 
emphasised that this is a prominent issue in the context of adolescent mental health (2017). 
For example, they report that 30% of young people often encounter violent or graphic 
content on social media (NSPCC, 2017). Furthermore, experimental evidence suggests that 




(Kramer, Guillory, & Hancock, 2014). When individuals were exposed to more positively-
valenced statuses, they were more likely to express positive content themselves (with the 
reverse pattern shown for individuals exposed to negatively-valenced statuses). Whilst 
highly criticised for ethical shortcomings (Shaw, 2016), Kramer et al.’s (2014) study alluded 
to the large-scale risks of (even passively) consuming negatively-valenced content on social 
media. To safeguard well-being, adolescents need to engage with effective ER strategies to 
be able to react and respond to that encountered material appropriately. 
While historically used to describe “offline” emotional responding, the notion of 
context-sensitive emotional responding could also apply online, and could suggest a way in 
which EI could help buffer the stressful effects of social media (i.e., by promoting ER 
strategies relevant to the context). A context-sensitive emotional response aligns with 
contextual demands (Flink, Boersma, Klein-Strandberg, & Linton, 2019), and is considered 
an important form of ER (Coiffman & Bonanno, 2010). When faced with positive (i.e., non-
threatening stimuli), or negative (i.e., threatening stimuli), we need to present an 
appropriate response. Empirical evidence suggests that this type of regulatory flexibility is 
crucial for psychological adaptation (Bonanno & Burton, 2013).  
A relevant body of literature here concerns the work examining EI and passive mood 
induction. Generally, TEI predicts increased PA in response to positive mood inductions, and 
increased negative affect (NA) in response to negative mood inductions (Lea et al., 2019), 
indicating an affective ‘amplification’ effect. For example, those with higher levels of TEI 
reported more negative emotions when watching a holocaust documentary (Petrides and 
Furnham, 2003), and an apartheid clip (Fernández-Berrocal and Extremera, 2006), 




when participants were asked to recall a regrettable life decision, high TEI individuals 
presented a stronger negative affective reaction. However, there are some exceptions to 
the trend for increased negative affectivity. Ramos et al. (2007), Zysberg (2012), and Schutte 
et al. (2002, study 3) demonstrated that high TEI scorers were less reactive to emotive 
video, images, and negative written statements, respectively. The only study to use an 
adolescent sample in the review (Ciarrochi et al., 2001) found no association between TEI 
and mood changes while watching a negative film. Findings are also more complicated when 
studies consider TEI “profiles” - differing levels of multiple subscales, rather than global TEI 
or single subscales (Gohm, 2003; Papousek, Freudenthaler, & Schulter, 2008). For example, 
Papousek et al. (2008, sample 1) found that individuals scoring low on emotion perception, 
but high on emotion regulation, showed reduced less mood deterioration after viewing a 
sad emotional video clip. The reverse pattern was found for high perception but low on 
regulation. In essence, individuals who could perceive their emotions accurately, but not 
regulate them, were negatively affected by the sad film to a greater extent.  
Similar conclusions cannot be drawn with respect to AEI due to the dearth of 
literature; only three studies have examined links between AEI and psychological reactivity. 
When shown either positive or negatively valenced emotional images, AEI had no effect on 
responses (Zysberg, 2012; Limonero et al., 2015). In the case of emotional videos, only one 
study thus far has examined AEI and reactivity via mood induction, and found that reactivity 
did not differ according to level of AEI in the case of negative mood induction (a video about 
dying from cancer), but that high AEI individuals felt more positive following a positive mood 
induction (a comedy clip) (Ciarrochi, Chan, & Caputi, 2000). However, all of the 
aforementioned studies took place in experimental settings, preventing generalisability. 




sensitive responding (i.e., amplified affective reactions) in passive mood induction tasks, it is 
unclear whether this extends to AEI, adolescent samples, and applied settings (i.e., on social 
media). The above points discuss EI and affective responses, but there are other relevant ER 
processes that could apply to exposure to emotive material online, including those involving 
attention and situation selection (Gross & Thompson, 2007).  
Turning next to attentional processes, theoretical principles posit that ‘healthy’ 
attentional processing embodies avoidance of threat in non-stressful conditions, but 
vigilance for threat under stressful conditions (Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Yiend, 2009). One 
might expect that, under non-stressful circumstances, when exposed to negatively-valenced 
content on social media (i.e., material that evokes anger, fear or some other negative 
emotion), a psychologically ‘healthy’ adolescent may be more likely to show avoidance 
behaviour (e.g., less likely to notice and engage with the content), yet be drawn towards the 
positively valenced content (i.e., material that evokes joy, pride, or amusement). In line with 
context-sensitive responding theory, EI should promote that pattern, thus safeguarding 
well-being. Indeed, during an ‘offline’ passive viewing task, high TEI individuals were drawn 
more towards positive faces and scenes than negative or neutral ones (Lea et al., 2018), 
further suggesting a potential role for TEI in directing attention towards positive content 
online under neutral conditions.  
With respect to Gross’ ER framework, the decision of whether to engage or not 
engage with online material could be viewed as situation selection ‘in action’. Situation 
selection is a powerful ER strategy, that involves consciously choosing whether to approach 
or avoid emotionally relevant situations (Gross & Thompson, 2007). On social media, posts 




(often captioned), which the user can click on to view the video in full. Thus, the user can 
decide whether to approach the situation (i.e., watch the video), or avoid it (i.e., scroll past 
it). Cognitive control – the ability to exert conscious control over cognitive processes - 
undergoes significant development in adolescence, and has the potential to influence the 
decision of whether to engage with different types of emotion-arousing media (Crone & 
Konijn, 2018). Adolescents with high levels of impulse control may be more proficient in 
consciously deciding whether to engage with certain types of material on social media 
(Luna, Paulsen, Padmanabhan, & Geier, 2013). Thus, AEI (especially the strategic branch), 
given its links with cognitive control, may be helpful in terms of inhibiting engagement with 
‘unhealthy’ material (e.g., not watching a violent video shared on social media), as a way of 
regulating emotional response and avoiding the ‘threat’ (Checa & Fernández-Berrocal, 
2019). Evidence suggests that high AEI (EM) individuals exhibit greater affective forecasting 
accuracy (i.e., have greater abilities to predict how a particular situation will make them 
feel) (Dunn, Brackett, Ashton-James, Schneidermann, & Salovey, 2007). On social media, 
those individuals could therefore make more informed choices on what to engage with, 
based on their ability to predict how engaging with material would make them feel. The 
experiential branch of AEI could also be important; adolescents with emotion perception 
ability could be more proficient in distinguishing between positive and negative social media 
posts (which could also inform stimuli selection).  
Taken together, there is a need to explore whether EI relates to affective, 
attentional, and behavioural, responses to emotional material in adolescents, using 




6.2.4 The present study 
To date, empirical studies have shown that high TEI can be an important protective factor 
against the problematic use of smartphones, smartphone addiction, online gaming, and 
internet use more generally (Beranuy et al., 2009; Che, Hu, Zhen, Yu, Li, Chang, & Zhang, 
2017; Kircaburun et al., 2019; Van Deursen, Bolle, Hegner, & Kommers, 2015). However, 
there is a dearth of research examining whether EI facilitates healthy ER on social media 
when adolescents are faced with highly emotive material. Given the need for a process-
oriented approach to EI and stress (e.g., assessing how EI relates to ER in specific situations), 
exploring how EI might moderate ER on social media will explore a novel but promising 
mechanism through which EI could lead to psychological adaptation in young people. The 
present study aims to investigate whether EI moderates emotion processing upon exposure 
to emotive content on social media. Previous work into protective factors has 
predominantly focused on correlating scores on the individual difference with self-reported, 
retroactive social media use, without examining social media use ‘in action’, in real time 
(Seabrook et al., 2016). The present study examines whether EI predicts how adolescents 
self-report their affective response, attentional preference, and decisions to engage with, 
positive and negative posts on social media, using a naturalistic newsfeed designed 
specifically for the study. As with the other studies in the programme of research, the roles 
of both TEI and AEI are examined. Furthermore, to ensure a rigorous approach, other 
factors that could influence those variables are identified and controlled for. These included 
personality, and cognitive ability, akin to Studies 1 and 2. Participants’ current mood is also 
controlled for, given that people preferentially process emotional stimuli that are congruent 




collection environment (i.e., online) (Rusting, 1998; Yiend, 2009). Differences in impulse 
control - the inability to withhold a reactive or reflexive response in favour of more 
deliberative actions (Ainslie, 1975) – are also controlled for, given that they can contribute 
to social media behaviours (e.g., Wilmer & Chein, 2016). General indices of social media use 
are also accounted for, due to their links with well-being, including average frequency of 
use, and the type of use – the extent to which individuals use social media actively (i.e., to 
interact with other users) or passively (i.e., passively scanning content and profiles), (e.g., 
Frison & Eggermont, 2016). Finally, socially desirable responding is an important factor to 
consider for the present study. Whereas the previous two studies used a combination of 
subjective (e.g., self-reported mood; coping strategies) and objective outcome measures 
(e.g., HR; EDA; eye movements; reaction times), all outcome measures were self-reported in 
the present study. While this provides the participants with an opportunity to provide their 
own perspective on their behaviours, self-report measures rely on the participant providing 
honest, insightful responses (McIntire & Miller, 2000). However, the innate tendency of 
participants to provide socially desirable responses (i.e., to over-report positive behaviour, 
and under-report negative behaviour) (Hart, Ritchie, Hepper, & Gebauer, 2015) has the 
potential to influence the key outcomes of the present study, which are ultimately self-
reported. For example, participants may under-report how likely they would be to watch 
negative violent or otherwise graphic videos on the social media task. Thus, desirable 
responding was also controlled for.  
6.2.5 Aims and hypotheses 
The aim of the present study is to test whether EI promotes well-being in adolescents by 




researcher’s knowledge, no studies have examined how EI moderates ER in relation to 
actual social media posts. Thus, there was a lack of literature upon which to the base 
decision-making regarding the operationalisation of constructs. While ER strategies range 
from “explicit, conscious, effortful, and controlled regulation (e.g., explicit coping 
strategies), to implicit, unconscious, effortless, and automatic regulation” (p.2, Gross, 2013), 
the present study focussed on the former category of processes, using self-report. Because 
so little is known about how EI may operate in an online context, it would make sense to 
investigate more deliberate forms of processing first, because there is substantially more 
literature available on EI and the more deliberate forms of ER, than automatic processes 
(Fiori, 2015; Maus et al., 2007). This means that any findings identified regarding EI and ER 
processes on social media will have a broader and richer context within which to be 
interpreted. Future research can then extend study to the more automatic processes. To 
map onto the conscious deliberate processes of Gross’ model of ER (1998a), we developed 
‘proxies’ for three ER strategies: emotional response modulation (i.e., the affective response 
to posts), attentional allocation (i.e., attentional preference for posts), and situation 
selection (i.e., likelihood of engagement with posts). These scores were generated using 
participants’ self-reported responses to positively or negatively valenced posts (details of 
this process are provided in the method section). The study tests three specific hypotheses 
relating to those constructs. The first (H1), predicts that TEI, AEI (EM), and AEI (EP) should 
positively predict positive affective responses to positive posts, and negative affective 
responses to negative posts, based on the notion of context-sensitive responding (Coiffman 
& Bonanno, 2010). Second, H2 predicts that TEI will predict an attentional preference for 
positive posts, based findings from a passive viewing task (Lea et al., 2018). Finally, H3 




relationship with cognitive control and affective forecasting (Checa & Fernández-Berrocal, 
2019; Dunn et al., 2007). 
6.3 Method 
6.3.1 Design 
The study used a cross-sectional design, whereby all participants completed the same 
battery of questionnaires and social media task, producing TEI and AEI as independent 
variables, and six dependent variables (aspects of ER). Six aspects of ER were investigated: 
affective response to positive and negative posts, attentional preference for positive or 
negative posts, and likelihood of engaging with positive or negative posts. These aspects 
map onto the ‘response modulation’, ‘attentional allocation’, and ‘situation selection’ 
families of ER described by Gross (1998a). As described in the introduction, those aspects of 
ER were selected because they may not only be pertinent to situations where adolescents 
are exposed to highly emotive material online, but may also relate to EI. 
To establish ecological validity, the study was conducted online (i.e., social media is 
online, by its very nature). Moreover, online data collection is considered a valid and cost-
effective way to conduct psychological studies with nationally representative participant 
pools (Simmons & Bobo 2015; Weinberg, Freese, & McElhattan, 2014), and participants 
attend to survey items equally well whether data is collected online or in-person (e.g., 
Ramsey, Thompson, McKenzie, & Rosenbaum, 2016). Age, subjective age, sex, social media 
use (frequency of use, type of use), desirable responding tendency, personality, cognitive 
ability, and impulse control, were measured and included as covariates in analyses where 
appropriate. Ethical approval was granted by the HASSREC at the University of Worcester in 




study design choices. For clarity, details on the participants and procedure are combined 
into one initial section, which is followed by descriptions of the measures used in the 
questionnaire battery. 
6.3.2 Participants and procedure 
Preliminary a-priori power analyses conducted using G*Power (Erdfelder, Faul, & Buchner, 
1996) suggested a minimum sample of approximately 157 participants was needed to 
achieve an 80% chance of detecting true effects for the main analysis (Field, 2017). Both 
offline and online recruitment strategies were used, featuring a core advertisement ‘poster’ 
which contained a direct link to the study (Appendix B). The study was advertised on the 
researcher’s personal social media profile, and posted to relevant participant recruitment 
groups on social media platforms (Facebook, Reddit, Twitter, Instagram). The advertisement 
was also submitted for display on various non-commercial participant recruitment websites, 
such as Call for Participants (https://www.callforparticipants.com), Social Psychology 
Network (https://www.socialpsychology.org/expts.htm), and Psychological Research on the 
Net (https://psych.hanover.edu/research/exponnet.html). In terms of ‘offline’ recruitment, 
leaders of groups and clubs targeted towards young people (e.g., Girlguiding, Young Carers 
organisations, Youth Orchestras) were contacted via email (Appendix B) and asked to 
distribute flyers to young people in the target age range. Flyers were also distributed to local 
Sixth Form colleges and other venues commonly visited by young people (e.g., sports 
centres, community centres), and posters were displayed around other public areas, such as 
local coffee shops and supermarkets (Appendix B). No financial incentives were offered in 
exchange for completion of the study. A final sample of 189 participants completed the 




across the target age range: 45, 67, and 67 participants were aged 16, 17, and 18 years, 
respectively. 
The entirety of the study was hosted online on Qualtrics.com. After accessing the 
link (either by clicking on a web-link or scanning the QR code on posters/flyers) participants 
were directed to an information sheet (Appendix F). After reading the information and 
providing informed consent, participants were asked to create a unique identifier (to enable 
them to request withdrawal of their data), and to indicate their sex, age, and subjective age. 
This was followed by a questionnaire battery, containing assessment of: TEI (TEIQue-ASF; 30 
items), AEI (ERT; 36 items; STEM-B; 18 items), personality (BFI-10; 10 items), cognitive ability 
(Vocabulary Test; 18 items), social media use (PAUM; 13 items; Frequency of Social Media 
Use; 11 items); desirable responding (BIDR-16; 16 items); impulse control (SSCQ; 11 items), 
and SWB (SWLS; 5 items; SHS; 4 items). Measures were presented in a random order to 
counteract order effects (Lavrakas, 2008). The participant’s current mood was then 
ascertained using the PANAS (20 items). Finally, participants completed a Social Media Task 
designed specifically for the present study, using images from the International Affective 
Picture System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley & Cuthbert, 2008), adapted to imitate video previews on 
Facebook posts. Appendix O provides details of how that task was constructed, including 
information about the stimuli selection/modification process, and a full list of the IAPS 
stimuli used in the study. Examples of the positive and negative stimuli developed for the 
Social Media Task are shown in Figure 15. The stimuli were presented to the participants as 
one continuous page (akin to a social media newsfeed). Participants were instructed to 
imagine they were scrolling through their personal social media newsfeed from top to 
bottom, at the pace they would normally do so. The order of the ‘posts’ was randomised for 




time were asked to retrospectively rate each ‘post’ based on their initial viewing. The ratings 
took place during the second viewing to allow for uninterrupted, ‘naturalistic’, initial 
viewing. Due to the potentially distressing nature of the stimuli, participants could exit the 
social media task at any time by clicking a button, which re-directed them to the debrief 
page.  
For each post, participants answered three questions using a 7-point slider scale: 1) 
how the post made them feel (from ‘negative’ to ‘positive’), 2) how likely they would have 
been to notice the post on their newsfeed (from ‘not at all’ to ‘very much’), and 3) how 
likely they would have been to watch the video (from ‘not at all’ to ‘very much’). Based on 
the responses to the three questions, summed scores were subsequently generated for the 
positive and negative stimulus categories: affectivity (from Question 1), attentional 
preference (from Question 2), and engagement (Question 3). Justifications for this approach 
to operationalising ER on social media, and details of how outcome variables were 
calculated, are located in Appendix O. In the final part of the study, participants were shown 
a short, comedic video (the same as that used in Studies 1 and 2) to restore mood, before 
reading a debrief statement. The final screen thanked participants for their time. It took 



















    




6.3.3 Measures  
Five of the measures used for Study 3 were consistent with those used for Studies 1 and 2 
(Table 20). As with those previous studies, Study 3 yielded appropriate reliability statistics 
across all EI measures: TEIQue-ASF (.85), ERT (.83), and STEM-B (.75). Very good internal 
consistency values were also obtained for both the PA (.89) and NA (.88) scales of the 
PANAS. To avoid repetition of material presented in methods sections of earlier chapters, 
only the measures unique to the present study are described in the sections below. Full 
copies of all measures are available in Appendix C. 
Table 20 
Measures used Across Studies 1, 2 and 3 
 
Construct 
Study 1  
(Chapter 4) 
Study 2  
(Chapter 5) 
Study 3  
(Chapter 6) 
TEI TEIQue-ASF TEIQue-ASF TEIQue-ASF 
AEI (understanding) STEU-B - - 
AEI (management) STEM-B STEM-B STEM-B 
AEI (perception) - ERT ERT 
Personality Mini-IPIP Mini-IPIP BFI-10 
Cognitive ability Vocabulary Test Vocabulary Test Vocabulary Test 
Mental health and well-
being 
HADS HADS SHS; SWLS 
Mood PANAS PANAS PANAS 
Physiological stress Heart rate Heart rate; EDA - 
State coping CITS-S - - 
Post-event rumination - Thoughts Questionnaire - 
Impulse control - - SSRQ 
Desirable responding - - BIDR-16 
Social media use - - PAUM 
Note. TEI = trait emotional intelligence; TEIQue = Trait Emotional Intelligence Questionnaire – Adolescent Short 
Form (Petrides, 2009); AEI = ability emotional intelligence; STEU-B = Situational Test of Emotion 




Personality Item Pool (Donnellan et al., 2006), BFI-10 = Big Factor Inventory (Rammstedt & John, 2007); HADS 
= Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983); SHS = Subjective Happiness Scale 
(Lyubomirsky & Lepper, 1999); SWLS = Satisfaction with Life Scale (Diener et al., 1985); PANAS = Positive and 
Negative Affect Schedule (Watson et al., 1988); EDA = electrodermal activity; CITS-S = Coping Inventory for 
Task-Based Stressors (Situational Version) (Matthews & Campbell, 1998); SSRQ = Short Self-Regulation 
Questionnaire (Neal & Carey, 2005); BIDR-16 = Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (Short Form) (Hart 
et al., 2015); PAUM = Passive Active Use Measure (Gerson et al., 2017) 
 
6.3.3.1 Personality 
Due to the length of the questionnaire battery used (Table 20), a brief personality measure 
was selected: the Big Five Personality Inventory-10 (BFI-10; Rammstedt & John, 2007; 
Appendix C). However, the substitution of the personality tool from the mini-IPIP still 
permits comparability between Studies 1, 2 and 3, since the personality inventories are 
underpinned by the same theoretical framework (i.e., Big Five Factor traits; Thalmayer, 
Saucier, & Eigenhuis, 2011). In the BFI-10, participants indicate to what extent 10 brief 
statements (two of which apply to each personality component) accurately describe 
themselves using a scale of 1 ('Disagree strongly’) to 5 (‘Agree strongly’). Items are preceded 
by 'I see myself as someone who…”, with examples including “has an active imagination” 
(openness), “does a thorough job” (conscientiousness), “is outgoing, sociable” 
(extraversion), “tends to find fault with others” (agreeableness), and, “gets nervous easily” 
(neuroticism).  Internal consistencies have been acceptable-good in adolescents, with test-
retest reliabilities of between .58-.83 (e.g., Lehenbauer-Baum, Klaps, Kovacovsky, 
Witzmann, Zahlbruckner, & Stetina, 2015; Spinath, Freudenthaler, & Neubauer, 2010). BFI-
10 scores also correlate well with the full-length BFI-44, and show good convergent validity 
with longer measures that also assess the Big Five traits, such as the NEO-PI-R (Rammsted & 




scale (Pallant, 2011), it is generally not recommended to calculate Cronbach’s α values for 
scales of less than 5 items (Field, 2017; Taber, 2018). Thus, in line with recommendations for 
scales with a small number of items, the mean inter-item correlations for each Big Five trait) 
was calculated as an alternative estimate of internal consistency reliability (Pallant, 2011). 
The mean inter-item correlation was .326, with all inter-item correlations for each scale (i.e., 
between the two items for each Big Five trait) falling within the optimal range of .2 to .4 
(Briggs & Cheek, 1986). 
6.3.3.2 Socially desirable responding 
The previous two studies used a combination of subjective (e.g., self-reported mood; coping 
strategies) and objective outcome measures (e.g., HR; EDA; eye movements; reaction 
times). However, as all outcome measures in the present study are self-reported, it is 
necessary to control for the comparably higher risk of socially desirable responding (Hart et 
al., 2015; McIntire & Miller, 2000). Socially desirable responding was captured using the 
Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding - Short Form (BIDR-16) (Hart et al., 2015), a 
brief version of the Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR; Paulhus, 1991; 
Appendix C). The BIDR-16 was deemed the most suitable choice for the present study, since 
other commonly utilised measures (e.g., Marlow-Crowne Scale; Crowne & Marlowe, 1960) 
are criticised for their outdated item wordings (Beretvas, Meyers, & Leite, 2002), and lack 
multidimensionality, contradicting contemporary models of social desirability (e.g., Perinelli 
& Gremigni, 2016). The BIDR-16 incorporates two important aspects of socially desirable 
responding: impression management (IM; a conscious inclination to respond positively, to 
deceive others), and self-deceptive enhancement (SDE; an unconscious tendency to respond 




overly positive statements on a scale of 1 (Not true) to 7 (Very true), with 8 items each 
applying to IM (e.g., “I never cover up mistakes”, “When I hear people talking privately, I 
avoid listening”), and SDE (e.g., “I am a completely rational person”, “I never regret my 
decisions”). Higher scores on the respective scales represent greater tendencies to respond 
in a socially desirable manner. However, despite previous evidence suggesting that the 
reliability and validity of the BIDR-16 support its use as a substitute for the lengthier BIDR-40 
in studies where length of assessment is a concern (Hart et al., 2015), Cronbach αs in the 
present study (SDE: .57; IM: .50) were only borderline acceptable, and were subsequently 
used with caution (Field, 2017).  
6.3.3.3 Impulse control 
Hypothetically, if a relationship is identified between EI and one of the outcomes of interest 
(engagement with emotional stimuli on social media), this could be attributable to an 
individual’s tendency to control their impulses. Regardless of EI level, participants that lack 
impulse control may be more likely to ‘give in’ to engaging with problematic/harmful 
material on social media (i.e., maladaptive situation selection) before carefully considering 
its emotional impact. The 11-item Impulse Control scale of the Short Self-Regulation 
Questionnaire (SSRQ) (Appendix C) was used to estimate individual differences in perceived 
control over impulses (Neal & Carey, 2005). The other scale of the SSRQ (Goal Setting 
Behaviour) was not relevant to the present study, and was thus not included. The self-
control items ask participants to think about how they typically behave in relation to their 
impulses, using items including, “I usually think before I act”, “Often I don’t know what I’m 
doing until someone calls it to my attention”, and “It’s hard for me to notice when I’ve ‘had 
enough’ (alcohol, food etc.)”. For each item, participants respond on a 5-point Likert scale 




the scale is a reliable index of perceived cognitive control (α = .84), and shows convergent 
validity with other measures of impulsivity, such as the Self-Control Schedule (Rosenbaum, 
1980), and the Impaired Control Scale (Heather, Booth, & Luce, 1998) (Neal & Carey, 2005). 
Importantly, self-control scales tend to predict self-control behaviours (Ridder, Lensvelt-
Mulders, Finkenauer, Stok, & Baumeister, 2012; Schmeichel & Zell, 2007). However, it is 
noteworthy that the self-report nature of the Impulse Control Scale renders it susceptible to 
social desirability bias (i.e., participants often over-report how well they typically control 
their impulses), further supporting the inclusion of the BIDR-16, described earlier. A 
Cronbach’s α value of .80 indicated the scale was highly reliable in the present study’s 
adolescent sample. 
6.3.3.4 Subjective well-being 
Psychological functioning was operationalised via measures of SWB (an individual’s 
subjective evaluations of their life; Diener, 1984), a multi-faceted construct, comprised of 
both affective (i.e., feelings: positive affect; happiness) and cognitive components (thoughts: 
judgements; satisfaction) (Davern, Cummins, & Stokes, 2007; Diener & Ryan, 2009; 
Luhmann, Hawkley, Eid, & Cacioppo, 2012). For this study, SWB was chosen over mental 
health disorder assessment, such as the HADS (Studies 1 and 2). Evidence suggests that 
while moderate social media use often does not result in psychopathology, it is more likely 
to present effects on SWB (Ferguson, 2017; Przybylski & Weinstein, 2017; Seabrook et al., 
2016). Moreover, the majority of studies of social media and young people index adaptation 
through SWB (e.g., Best et al., 2014; Marino et al., 2018), which will help contextualise the 
findings of the present study. Furthermore, as the present study is conducting research in an 
applied setting, it makes sense to address mental health from a positive psychology 




learning [SEL] interventions) (Salovey, Mayer, & Caruso, 2002; Seligman, Ernst, Gillham, 
Reivich, & Linkins, 2009). Adolescents' affective and cognitive SWB well-being was estimated 
using the two most popular and validated measures: the Subjective Happiness Scale (SHS; 4 
items; Lyubomirsky & Lepper, 1999), and the Satisfaction with Life Scale (SWLS; 5 items; 
Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985). The SHS consists of four statements in which 
participants either self-rate themselves or compare themselves to others (e.g., “Compared 
to most of my peers, I consider myself: more happy/less happy”), whereas the SWLS 
contains five brief statements (for example, “In most ways my life is close to my ideal”). In 
line with recommendations for non-adult participants, the 3rd and 4th questions of the SHS 
that originally read, “To what extent does this characterization describe you?” were 
changed to, “How much does this sentence describe you?”, to improve readability (Holder & 
Klassen, 2010). In both the SHS and SWLS, participants indicated their answers using 7-point 
slider scales. Research has indicated that both the SHS (α = .90; van de Weijer-Bergsma et 
al., 2012) and the SWLS (α = .85; di Fabio & Gori, 2015) are highly reliable for use with 
adolescent participants. Furthermore, these scales have used alongside EI in a recent study 
(Szczygiel & Mikolajczak, 2017). The present study also yielded very good Cronbach α values 
(SHS; .88; SWLS; .85). Full copies are provided in Appendix C. 
6.3.3.5 Indices of social media use 
To assess frequency of social media use, participants were asked to estimate how frequently 
they use each of the 10 most popular platforms (Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, LinkedIn, 
Instagram, Pinterest, Tumblr, Snapchat, Google+, and Reddit). Responses were given using 7 
response choices ranging from “I do not use this platform” to “I use this platform 5 or more 
times a day”, akin to Lin et al. (2016), with responses coded from 0 to 6. Responses across 




daily social media use, with a potential range of 0 - 60). Sub-analyses were also conducted 
to examine platform-specific use (i.e., non-summed scores) and the variables of interest. To 
assess how participants use social media, the 13-item Passive Active Use Measure (PAUM; 
Gerson, Plagnol, & Corr, 2017) was used. Participants are asked “How frequently do you 
perform the following activities when you are on Facebook?” on a 5-point scale ranging 
from “Never (0%)” to “Very frequently (100%)”. If participants did not use Facebook (for 
which the measure is intended), they were instructed to answer in relation to their use of 
the social media platform they use the most. The PAUM produces scores for three scales: 
Active Social Use (e.g., “Commenting (on statuses, wall posts, photos etc.)”), Active Non- 
Social Use (e.g., “Creating or RSVPing to events”, and Passive Use (e.g., “Checking to see 
what someone is up to”) (see Appendix C). Internal consistencies of the scales are 
acceptable (.71-.77), show adequate test-retest reliability (.65-.76), and demonstrate 
discrimination validity against similar measures (Gerson et al., 2017). In the present study, 
the scales were also acceptable, yielding Cronbach’s α of .68 (Active Social Use), .78 (Non-
Active Social Use) and .75 (Passive Use). 
6.4 Results 
6.4.1 Analysis plan 
For the main analyses, hierarchical regressions were run to test whether EI predicted any of 
the six ER social media variables: (1) affective response to positive posts, (2) affective 
response to negative posts, (3) attentional preference to positive posts, (4) attentional 
preference for negative posts, (5) likelihood of engagement with positive posts, and (6) 
likelihood of engagement with negative posts. Big Five personality traits, cognitive ability, 




the first step of the regression. Next, EI (TEI, AEI emotion management [AEI(EM), or AEI 
emotion perception [AEI(EP)]) was entered in the second step. As with Studies 1 and 2, EI 
was operationalised as a continuous variable in all analyses, Bonferroni adjustments were 
not made, and exploratory analyses were carried out for TEI subscales. Based on the 
findings that emerged from the study, an exploratory, post-hoc mediation analysis was also 
performed, to investigate whether affective reactivity to posts mediated the relationship 
between EI and SWB. Mediation analyses provide one means of testing how EI may lead to 
positive life outcomes, and is common in the field (Matthews et al., 2006; Mikolajczak et al., 
2008). Although structural equation modelling (SEM) would have allowed for the 
simultaneous testing of the above relationships, SEM guidance suggests a minimum of 200-
300 participants to achieve a proper and reliable solution (e.g., Kline, 2011; Kyriazos, 2018; 
Tabachnick & Fidell, 2014).  
6.4.2 Data screening and preparation 
All responses (n = 518) were screened for response completeness. Although all questions 
were compulsory, a number of participants did not finish the questionnaire battery (and 
subsequently, the social media task) (n = 329), and these were subsequently removed from 
the dataset. Participants were retained if they had completed the entire questionnaire 
battery (i.e., all measures leading up to the social media task). Of the 189 participants in the 
final sample, 171 completed the study in full (i.e., the questionnaire battery and the social 
media task), of whom 130 were females, and 50, 61, and 59 participants were 16, 17 and 18 
years old. The remaining 25 participants that completed the battery but did not finish the 
social media task were included in any additional analyses unrelated to the social media 
task. Participants that completed the study did not differ significantly in sex or age from 




significantly higher mean scores for AEI (EP) (M = 70.84, SD = 15.42), than those that only 
completed the study in part (M = 63.43, SD = 18.80), t(206) = 2.52, p = .012. All other 
independent samples t-tests for completions vs. non-completions showed ps > .05.  
Assumption checking was performed for each hierarchical regression (i.e., EI and 
social media, predicting well-being, EI and social media behaviour). All eight assumptions 
(Field, 2017) were met in every case. Dependent variables (e.g., reactivity to posts, 
frequency of social media use) were continuous, and predictors were either continuous or 
categorical (assumptions 1 and 2). There were linear relationships between the independent 
and dependent variables in each case, as indicated by partial regression plots (assumption 
3). Residuals showed independence (assumption 4), visual inspection of studentised 
residuals versus unstandardised predicted values indicated homoscedasticity of residuals 
(assumption 5), and multicollinearity was not present, as tolerance values were greater than 
0.1 (assumption 6). There were also no significant outliers (assumption 7). While a small 
number of studentised deleted residuals were greater than ± 3 standard deviations from the 
mean, no leverage values exceeded 0.2, and values for Cook’s distance were less than 1, 
supporting the decision to retain these values in the dataset. All residuals (errors) were 
normally distributed, inferred through visual inspection of histograms (assumption 8).  
6.4.3 Relationships between study variables  
Whole-sample descriptive statistics and bivariate intercorrelations for all questionnaire 
variables (TEI, AEI, personality dimensions, cognitive ability, socially desirable responding, 
impulse control, and SWB) are displayed in Table 21. With the exception of cognitive ability, 
all variables were related to at least one TEI or AEI scale. This was expected, as these 




strong positive correlations between TEI and both indices of SWB: happiness (r = .70, p < 
.001), and life satisfaction (r = .63, p < .001). This also applied to all TEI subscales (ps < . 001). 
Whereas AEI (EP) scores were not related to SWB (ps > .05), higher scores on AEI (EM) were 
related to higher life satisfaction (r = .16, p = .025). Impulse control was also positively 
related to TEI (r = .71, p < .001) and AEI (EM) (r = .24, p = .001). Desirable responding 
correlated positively with most self-reported variables. However, AEI (EP) (r = -.18, p = .014) 
and openness (r = -.17, p = .021) correlated negatively with the Impression Management 
desirable responding scale. Akin to Study 2, subjective age was measured to control for age-
related differences in maturity and mind-set.  How old participants ‘felt’ (i.e., their 
subjective age score) did not vary significantly between 16, 17, and 18-year olds (ps > .05). 
Covariates were included in the first step of all regressions: personality (BFI-10), cognitive 
ability (vocabulary test), current mood (PANAS), impulse control (SSRQ), frequency and type 
of social media use (PAUM), and socially desirable responding (BIDR-16). A correlation 
matrix of whole sample descriptive statistics and bivariate intercorrelations for EI and 
outcome variables are provided in Table 22.   
Prior to testing the role of individual differences, paired t-tests were conducted to 
identify whole-sample patterns in the processing of positive and negative posts with respect 
to reactivity, attention, and situation selection. Unsurprisingly, individuals rated positive 
posts as making them feel significantly more positive (M = 4.77, SD = .83) than negative 
posts did (M = 1.71, SD = .64), t(151) = 32.89, p < .001. The attention of individuals was 
generally more drawn towards negative posts (M = 4.31, SD = 1.31) than positive posts (M = 
3.98, SD = .94), t(163) = -2.80, p = .006. However, individuals reported that they would be 
less likely to engage with negative posts (M = 2.77, SD = 1.11) than positive posts (M = 3.77, 





Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1. TEI: total - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
2. AEI: EP .03 - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
3. AEI: EM .18* .34*** - - - - - - - - - - - - 
4. O -.04 .12 .14* - - - - - - - - - - - 
5. C .45*** .02 .00 -.04 - - - - - - - - - - 
6. E .38*** -.04 .03 .10 .24** - - - - - - - - - 
7. A .29*** .14 .19* -.11 .16* .04 - - - - - - - - 
8. N -.54*** -.08 -.08 -.02 -.23** .18* -.16* - - - - - - - 
9. DR1 .38*** .06 .08 .26*** .61*** .67*** .44*** -.02 - - - - - - 
10. DR2 .21*** -.18* -.08 -.17* .29** -.05 .29*** -.11 .19* - - - - - 
11. IMP .71*** .12 .24** .03 .50*** .22** .27*** -.38*** .37*** .28*** - - - - 
12. GC .07 .09 .12 .06 .09 .13 -.11 -.03 .10 -.14 .06 - - - 
13.  WB1 .70*** -.03 .06 -.02 .39*** .41*** .27*** -.43*** .39*** .08 .49*** .02 - - 
14. WB2 .63*** .07 .16* -.12 .33*** .30*** .30*** -.32*** .31*** .03 .45*** .08 .73*** - 
M 4.32 70.32 9.73 6.82 6.41 5.57 6.92 7.03 3.12 3.90 29.49 60.06 4.15 20.24 
(SD) (0.76) (15.78) (2.73) (1.71) (1.75) (2.19) (1.74) (2.15) (.47) (.80) (6.93) (5.95) (1.36) (6.81) 
Range   2.07 – 
6.03 
  5.56 – 
94.44 
























Skew -.14 -2.02 -.94 -.11 .10 .20 -.71 -.53 .12 .23 -.16 -.01 -.09 .01 
Kurtosis -.40 4.51 .74 .23 -.28 -.70 .06 -.52 .20 .02 -.32 -.33 -.80 -.84 
 
Table 21 
Correlations and Whole-Sample Descriptive Statistics for EI, Personality, Desirable Responding, Impulse Control, Cognitive Ability and 





Notes. TEI = Trait emotional intelligence; AEI = ability emotional intelligence; EM = emotion management; EP = emotion perception; O = openness; C = 
conscientiousness; E = extraversion; A = agreeableness; N = neuroticism; DR1 = impression management; DR2 = self-deceptive enhancement; IMP = impulse 
control; GC = general cognitive ability; WB1 = happiness; WB2 = life satisfaction. * = p < .05, ** = p < .01, *** = p <.001. 





Correlations for EI, well-being, and social media variables (N = 189). 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1. TEI: total - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
2. TEI: EM .64*** - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
3. TEI: SC .66*** .17* - - - - - - - - - - - - 
4. TEI: SO .62*** .42*** .21** - - - - - - - - - - - 
5. TEI: WB .85*** .41*** .50*** .33*** - - - - - - - - - - 
6. AEI (EM) .18* .17* .14* .11 .10 - - - - - - - - - 
7. AEI (EP) .03 .06 .02 .00 .05 .34*** - - - - - - - - 
8. WB1 .70*** .37*** .39*** .31*** .77*** .06 -.03 - - - - - - - 
9. WB2 .63*** .36*** .14* .31*** .71*** .16* .07 .73*** - - - - - - 
10. AF_POS .32*** .31*** .39*** .24** .28*** .27** -.05 .37*** .35*** - - - - - 
11. AF_NEG -.15 -.28*** .05 -.15 -.12 -.22** -.31*** -.10 -.22** -.19* - - - - 
12. AT_POS .20* .22** -.02 .12 .18* -.02 -.08 .28*** .25** .66*** -.14 - - - 
13. AT_NEG -.10 .06 -.04 -.07 -.16* .19* .10 -.17* -.02 .13 -.03 .11 - - 
14. EN_POS .14 .18* -.06 .11 .12 .00 -.09 .22** .24** .62*** -.13 .86*** .04 - 
15. EN_NEG -.15 -.11 -.10 .02 -.23** -.07 -.14 -.16* -.15 -.06 .40*** -.02 .43*** .02 
Notes. TEI = Trait emotional intelligence; EM = emotionality; SC = self-control; SO = sociability; WB = well-being; AEI = ability emotional intelligence; EM = 
emotion management; EP = emotion perception; WB1 = happiness; WB2 = life satisfaction; AF_POS = affectivity to positive posts; AF_NEG = affectivity to 
negative posts; AT_POS = attentional preference for positive posts; AF_NEG = attentional preference for negative posts; ENG_POS = engagement with 





6.4.4. EI and emotion regulation on social media 
6.4.4.1 Hypothesis 1. TEI and AEI will predict stronger affective responses to social media 
posts 
Two-step hierarchical regressions were conducted to determine if EI predicted affective 
responses to positive or negative posts (Tables 23-25). Separate regressions were 
conducted for each EI ‘type’ (i.e., TEI, assessed by the TEIQue-ASF, AEI (EM), assessed by the 
STEM-B, and AEI (EP), assessed by an ERT, for each type of posts (a total of 6 regressions). 
Covariates theorised to also influence ER on social media (personality, cognitive ability, 
socially desirable responding, impulse control, and SWB), were entered into the first step of 
each regression, such that the incremental effects of EI were being examined.  
Stronger affective reactions to positive posts was only predicted by state PA (β = .21, 
p = .024), producing a statistically significant model (R2 = .28, F(16, 132) = 3.16, p < .001, 
adjusted R2 = .19). The addition of global TEI did not improve the model further (Table 23). 
Exploratory analyses were conducted, whereby the above was repeated with TEI subscales 
(emotionality, self-control, sociability, well-being), but none remained significant predictors 
at Step 2 (ps(ΔF) > .05). Turning next to AEI, the addition of AEI (EM) significantly predicted 
stronger positive responses to positive posts (ΔR2  = 060, ΔF(1,131) = 3.99, p < .001, adjusted 
R2 = .26), whereas AEI (EP) did not (p > .05) (Tables 24-25) 
For reactivity to negative posts, SWB (life satisfaction) was the only significant 
covariate that predicted a stronger negative affective reaction to negative posts, resulting in 
a significant model (R2 = .19, F(16, 143) = 2.04, p = .014, adjusted R2 = .10). The addition of 
the TEI term did not significantly improve R2 (ps > .05) (Table 23), whereas the addition of 




found for AEI (EM), whereby higher levels predicted stronger negative affective reactions to 
negative posts, its addition only marginally improved the model, ΔR2  = .02, ΔF(1,142) = 2.13, 
p = .080, adjusted R2 = .11 (Tables 24 and 25).  When analyses were repeated for captioned 
and non-captioned positive posts separately, the same pattern of findings was observed 
(data not shown). In sum, higher scores for AEI (EM) predicted stronger affective reactions 
to positive posts, whereas AEI (EP), and AEI (EM) predicted stronger affective reactions to 
negative posts (albeit the latter only approached statistical significance). 
6.4.4.2 Hypothesis 2: TEI will predict an attentional preference for positive stimuli 
Two-step hierarchical regressions were conducted to determine if EI predicted attentional 
preferences for positive or negative posts (Tables 23-25). Separate regressions were 
conducted for each EI ‘type’ (i.e., TEI, AEI (EM), AEI (EP)), for each type of posts (a total of 6 
regressions). Covariates were included in the first step. For attentional preference for 
positive posts, the only significant covariate was frequency of social media use (β = .23, p = 
.007), where greater use predicted preference for positive posts, yielding a significant 
model, R2 = .25, F(16, 143) = 2.99, p < .001, adjusted R2 = .17. The addition of TEI, AEI (EP), or 
AEI (EM) did not lead to an R2 increase (ps > .05).  
For attentional preference for negative posts, the covariates did not produce a 
statistically significant model (R2 = .15, F(16, 143) = 1.61, p = .074, adjusted R2 = .06). 
Furthermore, including the TEI term (Table 23), or the AEI (EP) term failed to improve R2 (p > 
.05), but the addition of AEI (EM) did (ΔR2  = .03, ΔF(1, 142) = 1.85, p = .026) (Tables 24 and 
25). Findings were the same for captioned and non-captioned posts (data not shown). In 






Summary Statistics for Regressions of Social Media ER Indices onto Covariates and Global TEI 
Predictors 
Notes. ER = emotion regulation; PA = positive affect; HAP = SWB (happiness); FREQ = frequency of social media 
use; IM = desirable responding (impression management). AF_POS = affectivity to positive posts (higher scores 
= more positive reactions); AF_NEG = affectivity to negative posts (lower scores = more negative reactions); 
AT_POS = attentional preference for positive posts; AF_NEG = attentional preference for negative posts; 
ENG_POS = engagement with positive posts; ENG_NEG = engagement with negative posts. ** = p < .01; *** = p 
< .001. 
 
 Step 1: 
Covariates 
 Step 2: 
TEI 
 Significant EI and 
covariate predictors 
(at Step 2) Criterion R
2 F(16,131)  R2 ΔR2 ΔF(17,130)  
AF_POS .28 3.16***  .28 .00 .53  PA (β = .22**) 
AF_NEG .19 2.04*  .19 .00 .10  HAP (β = .04*) 
AT_POS .25 2.99***  .25 .00 .01  FREQ (β = .23**) 
AT_NEG .15 1.61  .15 .00 .02  None 
EN_POS .28 3.41***  .28 .00 .21  FREQ (β = .29**) 
PA (β = .20*) 





Summary Statistics for Regressions of Social Media ER Indices onto Covariates and AEI 
(Emotion Perception) Predictors 
Notes. PA = positive affect; AEI = ability emotional intelligence; EP = emotion perception; FREQ = frequency of 
social media use; IM = desirable responding (impression management). AF_POS = affectivity to positive posts 
(higher scores = more positive reactions); AF_NEG = affectivity to negative posts (lower scores = more negative 
reactions); AT_POS = attentional preference for positive posts; AF_NEG = attentional preference for negative 
posts; ENG_POS = engagement with positive posts; ENG_NEG = engagement with negative posts. ** = p < .01; 
*** = p < .001.* = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001.  
 
 Step 1: 
Covariates 
 Step 2: 
AEI (EP) 
 
Significant EI and covariate 
predictors (at Step 2) 
Criterion R2 F(16,131)  R2 ΔR2 ΔF(17,130)  
AF_POS .28 3.16***  .28 .00 .68  PA (β = .19*) 
AF_NEG .19 2.04*  .23 .04 8.70**  AEI (EP) (β = -.24**) 
AT_POS .25 2.99***  .25 .00 .99  FREQ (β = .22*) 
AT_NEG .15 1.61  .17 .02 1.24  None 
EN_POS .28 3.41***  .28 .00 1.35  PA (β = .19*) 
FREQ  (β = .27**) 





Summary Statistics for Regressions of Social Media ER Indices onto Covariates and AEI 
(Emotion Management) Predictors 
Notes. HAP = SWB (happiness); AEI = ability emotional intelligence; EM – emotion management; FREQ = 
frequency of social media use; PA = positive affect. AF_NEG = affectivity to negative posts (lower scores = more 
negative reactions); AT_POS = attentional preference for positive posts; AF_NEG = attentional preference for 
negative posts; ENG_POS = engagement with positive posts; ENG_NEG = engagement with negative posts. * = 








 Step 1: 
Covariates 
 Step 2: 
AEI (EM) 
 
Significant EI and covariate 
predictors (at Step 2) 
Criterion R2 F(16,131)  R2 ΔR2 ΔF(17,130)  
AF_POS .28 3.16***  .34 .06 12.77***  HAP (β = .33**) 
AEI (EM) (β = .29**) 
AF_NEG .19 2.04*  .20 .01 3.11  AEI (EM) (β = -.15Δ) 
AT_POS .25 2.99***  .25 .00 .29  FREQ (β = .23**) 
AT_NEG .15 1.61  .18 .03 5.05*  AEI (EM) (β = .20*) 
EN_POS .28 3.41***  .22 .00 .00  PA (β = .21*) 
FREQ (β = .30***) 




6.4.4.3 Hypothesis 3: AEI will predict less engagement with negative stimuli 
Two-step hierarchical regressions were conducted to determine if EI predicted likelihood of 
engagement with positive or negative posts (Tables 23-25). Separate regressions were 
performed for each EI ‘type’ (i.e., TEI, AEI (EM), AEI (EP)), for each type of post (a total of 6 
regressions). Covariates were entered into the first step of that regression. For engagement 
with positive posts, the significant covariates were state PA (β = .21, p = .023), and 
frequency of social media use (β = .29, p < .001). Those variables produced a statistically 
significant model (R2 = .28, F(16, 143) = 3.41, p < .001, adjusted R2 = .19). The addition of TEI, 
AEI (EP), and AEI (EM), did not improve that model (ps > .05). Engagement with negative 
posts was only significantly predicted by desirable responding (impression management 
scale (β = -.19, p = .043), but the covariates failed to produce a statistically significant model 
(ps > .05). The subsequent addition of TEI, AEI (EP), and AEI (EM), also failed to significantly 
increase R2 (ps > .05). Findings remained the same when captioned and non-captioned posts 
were analysed separately (data not shown). In sum, neither TEI, AEI (EP), nor AEI (EM) 
predicted likelihood of engagement with either positive or negative posts. 
6.4.4.4 Exploratory analysis: Social media responding as a mediator between EI and SWB 
A potential pathway through which EI could influence SWB through social media responding 
was tested using the PROCESS macro for SPSS (Model 4). To avoid conducting mediation 
analyses for all possible combinations of EI and aspects of ER (and thus increasing the risk of 
Type I errors), mediation models were constructed to test the only aspect of processing for 
which EI was consistently associated, and which predicted SWB (i.e., reactivity to posts), and 
the aspect of EI that predicted reactivity to posts (i.e., AEI). In the models, EI was entered as 




reactivity to types of stimuli entered as a mediators (M), and the full set of covariates were 
included (with the exception of SWB, since this was the outcome) as described earlier in the 
chapter (see Figure 16 for the basic mediation model being tested). The significance of 
indirect paths was assessed using 95% percentile bootstrap confidence intervals (CIs) with 
10,000 bootstrap samples (Hayes, 2018), in line with recommendations for mediation 
analyses with small sample sizes (Creedon & Hayes, 2015). Two models were tested, with X 
representing AEI (EM), and Y representing either happiness or life satisfaction. That process 
involved calculating values for the a and b paths (Figure  16), the direct effect measures the 
extent to which X predicts Y, while M remains unaltered), and the indirect effects (the 
extent to which Y varies in relation to M, while X remains unaltered) (Hayes, 2018). The full 
mediation outputs are provided in Appendix P. 
 
Figure 16 






Models 1 and 2: AEI (emotion management) 
Regression analyses indicated that the a paths (regressing AEI [EM] onto reactivity to 
positive and negative posts) were significant a1: b = 1.37, SE = .48, p < .001; a2: b = -.78, SE = 
.38, p = .045. 
For Model 1 (Y = happiness), all paths except b2 were statistically significant. The b1 
path (regressing reactivity to positive posts, M1, onto happiness), b1: b = .38, SE = .11, p < 
.001, was significant, indicating that positive emotional responses predicted happiness, 
whereas the b2 path indicated that negative emotional responses to negative posts (M2) 
was not, b2 = -.07, SE = .14, p = .624. In addition, there were direct effects (c’: b = 2.14, SE = 
.63, 95% CI [-3.39, -.89]), and indirect effects, which were observed for M1 (b =.52, SE = .23, 
95% CI [.12 .97]), but not M2 (b =.05, SE = .11, 95% CI [-.17, .30]). Thus, the model suggests 
that AEI (EM) may predict adolescent happiness both directly and indirectly, by facilitating 
more positive emotional responses to positive posts on social media.  
For Model 2 (Y = life satisfaction), the b1 path (regressing reactivity to positive posts 
onto life satisfaction, M1) was significant (b1: b = 1.45, SE = .64, p = .025), but the b2 path 
(regression reactivity to negative posts onto life satisfaction, M2), was not, b2: b = -.13, SE = 
.80, p = .116. However, while there were no direct effects (c’: p > .05), there were indirect 
effects for both M1 (b = 1.98, SE = .98, 95% CI [.25, 4.07]) and M2 (b = .98, SE =.76, 95% CI [-
.25, 2.71]). Those findings suggest that AEI (EM) may indirectly lead to increases in life 
satisfaction, through facilitating context-sensitive emotional responses to posts on social 
media. Taken together, the above findings suggest that adaptive affective reactions could be 
one way through which AEI (EM), relates to both affective SWB (i.e., happiness) and 

























life satisfaction (i.e., significant indirect effect of X on Y, through M1 and M2, but no direct 
effects), but partial in the case of happiness (i.e., direct effect of X and Y, and indirect effect 
through M1), (Hayes, 2009; Rucker, Preacher, Tormala, & Petty, 2011). Statistical models are 
depicted in Figure 17 (top two diagrams). 
Models 3 and 4: AEI (emotion perception) 
Regression analyses indicated that the a path (regressing AEI (EP) onto reactivity to positive 
posts) was not significant (a: p > .05).  
For Model 3 (Y = happiness). As reported for Model 1, the b1 path, though not the b2 
path, was significant in regressing reactivity to posts onto happiness. Direct effects (c’: b = 
.01, SE = .01, 95% CI [-.02, .01) and indirect effects of AEI (EP) on happiness did not reach 
statistical significance for either M1 (b = .00, SE =.00, 95% CI [.00, .00]) or M2 (b = .00, SE 
=.00, 95% CI [.00, .00]) , suggesting that AEI (EP) does not predict adolescent happiness 
either directly or indirectly through via emotional responses to posts on social media.  
For Model 4 (Y = life satisfaction), as reported in the above sections for Models 1-3, 
paths a2 and b1 were significant, while a1 and b2 were not. There were no direct effects for 
AEI (EP) on life satisfaction (c’: b = .01, SE = .04, 95% CI [-.06 .08), and moreover, indirect 
effects for M1 (b = -.01, SE = .01, 95% CI [-.03, .01]) and M2 (b = .01, SE = .01, 95% CI [-.01, 
.04]) also failed to reach statistical significance. Findings suggest that AEI (EP) does not 
directly or indirectly predict adolescent life satisfaction, through emotional responding to 
posts social media. Statistical models are depicted in Figure 17 (bottom two diagrams).  
Taken together, the above findings suggest that how adolescents react to emotive 
material online may be one of many factors that could explain the relationship between AEI 




suggest that mediation was full in the case of happiness (i.e., significant indirect effect of X 
on Y, through M, but no direct effects), but partial in the case of life satisfaction (i.e., direct 
effect of X and Y, and indirect effect through M) (Hayes, 2009; Rucker, Preacher, Tormala, & 
Petty, 2011). Overall, AEI (EM) appeared to contribute towards SWB (both life satisfaction 
and happiness) through reactivity to positive posts, whereas AEI (EP) did not. 
6.5 Discussion of key findings 
The present study used novel methods to investigate how EI might relate to ER when 
exposed to emotive social media posts. By implementing a bespoke newsfeed with 
naturalistic (but validated) stimuli, findings provide a unique insight into how the effects of 
EI can differ when research is conducted in controlled versus applied settings. Three distinct 
aspects of conscious ER were measured, operationalised as affective responding (i.e., how 
posts made adolescents feel), attentional preference (i.e., how drawn adolescents were to 
posts), and behavioural response (i.e., adolescents’ likelihood of engaging with posts). H1 
(which posited that both TEI and AEI would facilitate context-sensitive emotional 
responding) was partially supported. Once confounding influences were controlled for, AEI 
was associated with amplified affectivity. Individuals that scored more highly on AEI (EM) 
reported stronger positive emotional reactions to positive content. That pattern not only 
constitutes context-sensitive responding, but exploratory mediation analyses revealed that 
AEI (EM) could potentially contribute to SWB (both life satisfaction and happiness) through 
that heightened positive affectivity. Whereas both AEI (EM) and AEI (EP) also predicted 
stronger negative emotional reactions to negative content, these effects were weaker. H2 
predicted that TEI would facilitate an attentional preference for positive posts, and was not 




greater attentional preference for negative posts, after covariates were considered. Finally, 
neither TEI, AEI (EM), or AEI (EP) predicted participants’ self-reported tendency to engage 
with either positive or negative posts, which thus does not provide support for H3 (which 
predicted that AEI [EM] would predict less engagement with negative posts). The key finding 
of the study was that AEI (EM) emerged as a facilitator of affective reactions to online 
content, and that this could be one way that AEI could protect adolescent well-being. 
Interestingly, the same finding applied whether the posts included captions or not, 
suggesting that the image-based features of social media posts were more pertinent to ER 
than text-based features.  
6.5.1 EI as a facilitator of emotion regulation on social media 
As described above, AEI (EM) emerged as a potential facilitator of adaptive ER on social 
media. As the key finding, analyses revealed that AEI (EM) related to a tendency to exhibit a 
greater positive affective reactions to positive social media posts (e.g., material designed to 
evoke happiness, amusement, joy). That pattern constitutes context-sensitive responding 
(i.e., exhibiting an emotional response relevant to the context; Coiffman & Bonanno, 2010; 
Flink et al., 2019), which is crucial for psychological adaptation (Bonanno & Burton, 2013). 
When faced with positive (i.e., non-threatening stimuli), we need to present an appropriate 
response. In neutral situations (i.e., in the absence of acute stress), individuals have an 
innate drive to upregulate positive emotions, and downregulate negative ones (Livingstone 
& Srivastava, 2012). Clearly, there are some situations where there is a need to decrease 
positive emotions or increase negative ones (Parrott, 1993). However, as a general rule, the 
majority of ER efforts in everyday life aim to maximise or maintain PA, and decrease NA 




positive emotions, in order to prolong them or magnify their effect (Tugade & Fredrickson, 
2007). Indeed, pro-hedonic ER can help buffer the short and long term physiological and 
psychological effects of stress (Folkman & Moskowitz, 2004; Fredrickson & Levenson, 1998), 
and is associated with positive mental health and well-being outcomes (Fussner, Luebbe, & 
Bell, 2015; Gómez-Baya, Mendoza, Paino, & Gillham, 2017). According to Fredrickson’s 
Broaden-and-Build theory (2004), the cultivation and amplification of positive emotions can 
initiate an “upward spiral” that enhances well-being. Thus, the findings of the presents 
study could suggest that feeling more positive when exposed to non-threatening stimuli 
may act as a ‘mood-booster’ amidst the large amount of distressing, violent, or otherwise 
threatening material on their social media newsfeeds (Best et al., 2014; NSPCC, 2017). AEI 
(EM) could therefore facilitate ER on social media, helping young people to make the most 
of the positive material (i.e., maintaining positive mood) and compensate for the negative 
material.  
Although several researchers have investigated how EI relates to the regulation of 
positive emotions, the focus has been primarily on TEI thus far (Quoidbach, Mikolajczak, & 
Gross, 2015). Multiple studies have demonstrated that TEI predicts adaptive affective 
responses, via downregulation of NA and upregulation of PA, leading to enhanced SWB 
(Gómez-Baya & Mendoza, 2018; Kong & Zhao, 2013; Sánchez-Álvarez, Extremera, & 
Fernández-Berrocal, 2015). In terms of specific strategies used, results indicate that TEI 
scores positively correlate with the use of ‘savouring’ strategies (i.e., positive emotion 
upregulation), and with dampening strategies (i.e., negative emotion downregulation); 
patterns that mediate the relationship between TEI and life satisfaction and happiness 
(Nelis, Kotsou, Quoidbach, Hansenne, Weytens, Dupuis, & Mikolajczak, 2011; Szczygieł & 




examined positive ER in relation to AEI. Extremera and Rey (2016), showed that both PA and 
NA levels mediated the relationship between AEI and life satisfaction. However, that study 
used the total score from the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT; 
Salovey et al., 2002), which does not indicate which aspects of AEI (e.g., emotion 
perception, emotion management) may be the most pertinent. The present study indicated 
that positive emotion upregulation played a key role in mediating the relationship between 
emotion management skill and SWB.  
In addition, emotion management and emotion perception AEI branches predicted 
stronger affective reactions to negative posts (though the former branch was only 
marginally significant). In other words, compared to low AEI (EM/EP) individuals, high AEI 
(EM/EP) individuals reported that negative posts (e.g., those displaying violence, cruelty, or 
otherwise distressing content) produced strong negative emotion. Whilst that pattern did 
not correspond with higher life satisfaction or happiness levels in the present study (Table 
22), it does still appear to reflect context-sensitive responding in the current paradigm 
(Coiffman & Bonanno, 2010; Flink et al., 2019), and showed indirect effects in the case of 
AEI (EM) and life satisfaction (mediation Model 2). The social media posts displayed highly 
distressing images (e.g., IAPS image 9810 shows a KKK rally; IAPS image 9187 shows a 
seriously injured dog) designed to evoke strong negative emotion (e.g., sadness, disgust, 
anger). ‘Emotional blunting’, ‘emotional numbing’, or ‘reduced affect display’ can be 
indicative of psychological disorder, or a side effect of certain psychoactive medications 
(Blair, Jones, Clark, & Smith, 1997; Fultz, Schaller, & Cialdini, 1988; Goodwin, Price, de 
Bodinat, & Laredo, 2017; Seara-Cardoso, Sebastian, Viding, & Roiser, 2015). It would 
therefore be maladaptive to not feel negative emotions in the response to material, and in 




positive and negative posts on social media. The emotion perception branch of AEI involves 
the ability to identify discrete emotions in others and oneself, requiring the individual to 
accurately attend, detect, and decipher emotional signals (Papadogiannis et al., 2009). It 
therefore seems logical that being able to perceive emotion would correspond with context-
sensitive emotion upregulation and downregulation: one needs to be able to correctly 
recognise the valence of a stimulus in order to facilitate the appropriate response. As 
proposed by emotion-as-information theory, subjective experiences are an important 
source of information (Schwartz, 2012). Displaying an appropriate emotional response (i.e., 
feeling the appropriate emotions in the appropriate situations) holds informational value for 
the individual (Storbeck & Clore, 2008). For example, correctly recognising a particular 
emotion in a stimulus (e.g., sadness from the IAPS image 2900 showing a boy who is upset) 
allows an individual to exhibit an appropriate response (i.e., feeling more NA), and may 
assist with thought processes (e.g., decision-making) and subsequent behavioural output 
(Storbeck & Clore, 2008). However, it is less clear how AEI (EM) would specifically contribute 
to that process. 
As described in the introductory chapters, emotion management involves the ability 
to regulate one’s own, and others’, emotions effectively and as required/intended for the 
specific situation (Mayer & Salovey, 1997). As AEI (EM) is thought to aid the sophisticated, 
higher-level (‘strategic’) cognitive processes (Mayer et al., 2016), it is not intuitively clear 
how this could influence affective responses. Considering the additional unexpected finding 
– that AEI (EM) also predicted an attentional preference for negative posts – might shed 
light on this. As described in Chapter 5, ‘healthy’ attentional processing theoretically 
embodies avoidance of threat (i.e., attentional bias away from threat) in non-stressful 




stressful conditions (Yiend, 2009). The current study was conducted in neutral conditions, 
whereby no specific emotional state was deliberately elicited. Therefore, in isolation, the 
finding that AEI (EM) signalled a tendency to be drawn more towards negative posts could 
suggest a maladaptive ER strategy. However, attentional preference for negative material 
may actually be normative for adolescents.  
Evidence from developmental studies suggests that younger adults show a 
significant general information processing bias toward negative information (versus positive 
information), whereas older adults show the opposite pattern (Reed, Chan, & Mikels, 2014). 
In addition, in a later study that explored attentional deployment specifically, younger 
adults were more likely to direct their attention to negative stimuli, than older adults (Wirth 
& Kunzmann, 2018). In addition, the tendency of high AEI (EM) individuals to show 
attentional preference for negative posts did not translate into a greater likelihood of 
engaging with those posts. The ‘engagement’ variable aimed to capture situation selection, 
since with each post, the participant had to report whether they would approach the 
situation (i.e., watch the video), or avoid it (i.e., scroll past it). Situation selection is an 
effective strategy for regulating emotions, especially for individuals who otherwise struggle 
to do so (Webb, Lindquist, Jones, Avishai, & Sheeran, 2018). Thus, combined with the 
finding that AEI (EM) facilitates context-sensitive affective responding, one could speculate 
that noticing the negative content to a greater extent than positive could constitute an early 
‘defence mechanism’, to enable the ‘filtering out’ of distressing material. However, an 
important caveat is that the study captured overt, deliberate attentional preferences, rather 
than preconscious, automatic attentional bias. Whilst a precise explanation for the link 
between AEI and attentional preference for negative material cannot be concluded from the 




While findings suggested a prominent role for AEI, preliminary analyses showed that 
aspects of TEI also significantly correlated with social media variables (Table 22). Global TEI 
(along with emotionality, sociability, and self-control subscales) were associated with 
positive affectivity to positive posts (akin to AEI). Furthermore, the emotionality subscale 
also correlated with negative affectivity to negative posts, attendance to positive posts, and 
greater likelihood of engagement with positive posts (reflecting the patterns shown by 
adolescents with higher levels of SWB; Table 22). Thus, emotionality - perceived abilities 
relating to recognition and expression of emotion in the self and others (Petrides, 2009) - 
showed promise in terms of reacting, attending, and engaging with social media posts in a 
beneficial manner. However, after covariates were included into the regression models, TEI 
(nor any subscales) was not a significant predictor of context-sensitive responding. 
Specifically, TEI effects may have been attributable to mood (i.e., generally higher PA). In 
other words, because high TEI individuals tend to have a higher positive mood at baseline 
(Studies 1 and 2; also see Schutte & Malouff, 2011; Schutte, Malouff, Simunek, McKenley, & 
Hollander, 2002), and the phenomenon of mood-congruent processing of emotion (Rusting, 
1998; Yiend, 2009), PA could therefore underly the relationship between TEI and context-
sensitive responding. Thus, it may not be that having high TEI is detrimental or unhelpful, 
but, rather, that AEI produces more of an incremental effect beyond allied constructs.  
6.5.2 Implications for adolescent well-being 
The findings of the present study suggested that EI’s relationship with positive ER strategies 
to maintain or amplify PA (and subsequently promote well-being) may also apply to a social 
media context. As described earlier in the chapter, exposure to distressing, irritating, and/or 




exacerbated by the presence of hallmarks that characterise adolescence, including 
heightened emotional sensitivity, and protracted development of cognitive control (Crone & 
Konijn, 2018; NSPCC, 2017; Weinstein, 2018). AEI seems helpful in that respect. 
As discussed in Chapters 1-3, the overarching hypothesis of the thesis is that EI may 
buffer the effects of adversity (acute stress) on life outcomes in adolescents by moderating 
ER processes. In the present study, ‘stress’ was conceptualised as social media stress, 
namely the exposure to distressing material on social media newsfeeds. The ‘ER processes’ 
being examined were the conscious processes related to the affective response, attentional 
preference, and situation selection, which tapped various aspects of Gross’ model of ER 
(1998a). AEI (EM) related to context-sensitive responding (an adaptive ER strategy; Coiffman 
& Bonanno, 2010), whereby adolescents that possessed knowledge about emotion 
management (as assessed by the STEM) exhibited appropriate emotional responses to social 
media posts. As indicated by a R2 change of .08, AEI (EM) explained 8% of the incremental 
variance in the emotional responses to positive social media posts, but only 1% of the 
variance in emotional response to negative posts. Thus, AEI may be more pertinent to 
positive ER strategies than negatives ones. In addition, those adolescents tended to be 
preferentially drawn to the negative stimuli. Taken together, findings could suggest one of 
multiple potential pathways to well-being via social media: adolescents with high AEI (EM) 
could utilise ER strategies that amplify the emotional experiences (e.g., by upregulating 
positive affectivity to positive posts), as well as through the strategies that initially direct 
attention to negative stimuli (perhaps to quickly ‘filter out’, since engagement with posts 
was unrelated). Furthermore, the study findings tapped both the cognitive and affective 
components of SWB, suggesting that these mechanisms benefit hedonic well-being in 




findings suggest that socio-emotional competency could be a valuable protective factor for 
adolescents’ well-being in the context of social media. However, findings cannot be 
generalised to social media platforms other than Facebook. Other platforms popular with 
young people (e.g., Instagram, Snapchat) present content in different formats, and evidence 
suggests that each platform relates to adolescent well-being differently (e.g, RSPH, 2017; 
Vannucci & Ohannessian, 2019; Utz, Muscanell, & Khalid, 2015). Therefore, it cannot be 
assumed that EI would relate to emotion processing on all social media platforms in the 
same way. 
6.5.3 Limitations 
An important caveat to the study is that the findings cannot confirm with certainty whether 
EI confers adaptivity on social media. The findings of the present study were interpreted in 
line with broad emotion theory, given the dearth of evidence around patterns of social 
media use and well-being. Nonetheless, it is difficult to identify which ways of processing 
are truly adaptive, since this is dependent on the individual and their immediate goals. The 
notion of adaptive ER is that it provides some benefit to the individual in that particular 
situation (Schramm & Wirth, 2008). With respect to online ER, a prominent theory within 
media psychology is Zillmann’s mood-management theory (MMT; Zillmann, 1988), which 
predicts that people largely turn to media for hedonistically motivated ER, via entertainment 
offerings. According to the MMT, individuals selectively expose themselves to media which 
helps them upregulate PA and downregulate NA (Reinecke, 2016). However, this is likely an 
oversimplification, since the emotion literature suggests the effectiveness of chosen ER 
strategies is tied to the social context, and the nature of the goal to be achieved, which can 




getting work done) (English, Lee, John, & Gross, 2016). Due to the uncontrolled nature of 
the data collection environment (akin to ‘natural’ social media use), there may be no ‘rule’ 
as to what entails an adaptive response to a social media post for a particular adolescent, at 
any one point in time. For example, an adolescent may be in a situation where 
downregulation of positive emotion would be helpful. Imagine a situation where a young 
person looks to social media for a calming/grounding effect before studying for an 
important test (i.e., an instrumental goal). This outcome is unlikely to be achieved by 
attending to pro-hedonic material, which could perpetuate overly positive emotions, making 
it difficult to study afterwards (Parrott, 1993). Whilst that example is quite specific, it offers 
one potential situation where the study may not have captured adaptive responding. It is 
also not possible to have direct oversight into participants mood at the time of the study in 
online settings (BPS, 2017), which is problematic given that affective state is thought to be 
an important determinant of how individuals use social media (Greenwood & Long, 2009). 
However, the study attempted to somewhat counteract this by measuring and controlling 
for current mood through administration of the PANAS (Watson et al., 1988). 
Another limitation with the present study relates to the mediation analysis. While 
affective reactions to social media posts mediated the relationship between AEI and SWB, it 
does not allow for causal relationships to be inferred. There are likely many other 
intervening variables and factors that were unaccounted for in the present study, though 
the dearth of evidence in the area means the identity of those factors is unknown. 
Furthermore, the relationship could be in the other direction; adolescents with greater SWB 
may show adaptive ER on social media (i.e., SWB may be the mediator). Further 
investigation is necessary to establish the full nature of the relationship between EI, ER, and 




Finally, the outcome variables of the present study were obtained through self-
report; participants rated how posts made them feel, how drawn they were to each post, 
and how likely they would be to engage with posts if they were encountered in a naturalistic 
setting. Thus, there was a possibility that participants may have responding in a socially 
desirable manner (i.e., to over-report positive behaviour, and under-report negative 
behaviour) (Hart et al., 2015). For example, participants may under-report how likely they 
would be to engage with negative emotional posts on the social media task. TEI scores can 
also be prone to distortion through the phenomena of socially desirable responding (e.g., 
Day & Carroll, 2007; Grubb & McDaniel, 2007; Tett et al., 2012). However, this issue was 
lessened through including a measure of socially desirable responding (the BIDR-16; Hart et 
al., 2015) that captured individual differences in impression management, and self-
deceptive enhancement. Using the current set of findings as a foundation, future research 
could extend investigation to examine the relationship between EI and objective measures 
of ER on social media. For example, attention to posts could be measured using eye-
tracking, and real-time clicks and/or viewing time could determine engagement with posts. 
In isolation, the conclusions about EI and social media cannot be drawn confidently; using 
more objective measures in future studies would help to strengthen the findings. 
In conclusion, findings suggested a prominent role for AEI when adolescents are 
faced with emotive material on social media. Adolescents skilled at managing their 
emotions (i.e., high AEI) tended to show adaptive (context-sensitive) emotional responses to 
social media posts, which may contribute to a greater sense of well-being and life 
satisfaction. However, adolescents with high AEI (EM) reported feeling drawn more towards 
negative posts, an attentional preference that could be viewed as maladaptive. The 




did not translate into a greater tendency to engage with negative material, and could 
therefore perhaps indicate a potential early ‘defence’ mechanism. In sum, AEI seems to 
moderate the conscious emotional processing of emotive stimuli on social media. This 
contrasts starkly to the findings found for the experimental Studies 1 and 2, which 
highlighted the role of TEI. Thus, it would appear that in applied settings, actual emotional 
skills (i.e., AEI) may be more pertinent to ER than emotional personality (i.e., TEI). Future 
research should build on those findings to investigate whether they also apply to content 

















7.1 Chapter overview 
The research set out to explore potential affective, cognitive, and physiological mechanisms 
through which EI may lead to adaptive acute stress regulation in older adolescents. Findings 
were mixed, but suggested that EI may be advantageous in certain contexts, with effects 
contingent on EI conceptualisation, type of stressor, and outcome measure. Furthermore, 
findings demonstrated that EI makes clear contributions towards the prediction of stress 
regulation beyond the Big Five personality traits and cognitive ability, demonstrating its 
incremental validity. This chapter presents a detailed analysis of the research findings as 
they pertain to three key themes: 1) the nature of EI in adolescence, 2) EI as a protective 
resource in adolescence, and 3) the measurement of EI in adolescence. Contributions to 
knowledge are then considered, followed by a review of the limitations of the research. 
Discussion closes by suggesting future directions of the field. 
7.2 Summary of key findings 
As a time of ‘storm and stress’, adolescence can produce substantial emotion regulation 
(ER) challenges for some young people (Ahmed et al., 2015; Riediger & Klipker, 2014). 
However, the ability to navigate normative everyday stressors differs markedly between 
individuals (Luthar et al., 2006; Wright et al., 2013), with some ‘resilient’ adolescents 
demonstrating positive adaptation in the face of adversity (e.g., Masten et al.,1999). 
Contextualised within a resilience framework, research has begun to investigate EI as a 
protective marker that operates within stress regulation pathways to lead to positive life 




Mikolajczak, et al., 2006). However, to rigorously investigate how and when EI contributes to 
stress regulation, there was a pressing need to conduct more process-oriented EI research 
(Peña-Sarrionandia et al., 2015). The present programme of research tested the possibility 
that EI may lead to resilience in adolescence by facilitating adaptive stress regulation 
processes (Davis, 2018a; 2018b).  
Several key findings emerged from the research, each of which were contingent on 
how EI was measured, the ER process being examined, and the context. Figure 18 shows the 
significant findings of the research, mapped onto Gross’ ER model (1998a). When 
conceptualised as a trait, EI was pertinent to stress regulation in some circumstances, but 
significant findings were usually restricted to certain TEI subscales. Analysis of the pooled 
sample from Studies 1 and 2 revealed that the sociability subscale of the Trait Emotional 
Intelligence Questionnaire - Adolescent Short Form (TEIQue-ASF; Petrides, 2009) was 
important in helping adolescents modulate their emotional and physiological response to 
psychosocial stress. When exposed to an acute stressor with a strong sense of social 
evaluation (the Sing-a-Song Stress Test; Brouwer & Högervorst, 2014), higher levels of trait 
sociability were associated with smaller increases in negative affect (NA) and heart rate 
(HR). However, the self-control subscale was the strongest predictor of attentional 
allocation, whereby higher levels corresponded with a general avoidance of sad faces, and 
less rumination post-stressor (Study 2). Turning to ability EI (AEI), adolescents that scored 
higher on the Situational Test of Emotional Management - Brief (STEM-B; Allen et al., 2015) 
demonstrated adaptive coping in controlled settings (Study 1), and more context-sensitive 
emotional responding in an applied setting (on social media; Study 3). Notable themes and 




adolescence, will now be explored. A discussion of the key contributions to knowledge, 
limitations, and future directions, follows. 
 
Figure 18 
Significant Findings Mapped onto Gross’ (1998a) Model of ER 
Note. TEI = trait emotional intelligence; AEI (EM) = ability emotional intelligence (emotion 
management); AEI (EP) = ability emotional intelligence (emotion perception). 
 
7.3 The nature of EI in adolescence 
Findings from the present research lend credence to the construct differentiation of EI, 
extended to late adolescence. As expected, whole-sample trait EI scores were unrelated to 
AEI (EP) scores, and weakly correlated with AEI (EM) scores (rs. .12-.26, ps < .05). Whilst AEI 
branch scores were obtained through separate measures (i.e., STEM; emotion recognition 
test; ERT), rather than from a single measure (i.e., Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional 
Intelligence Test [MSCEIT]; Salovey et al., 2002), that pattern still replicates that found in 




(Brackett & Mayer, 2003; Davis & Humphrey, 2012a; O’Connor & Little, 2003; Warwick & 
Nettlebeck, 2004). The consistently low correlations between TEI and AEI reported in the 
literature (and indeed the present research) indicates that the constructs appear to be 
relatively independent of one another. The present findings reinforce the notion that 
conceptual differences between the AEI and TEI exist in adolescence, and that this extends 
to late adolescence. Importantly, findings indicated that each construct operates differently 
with respect to stress regulation, as will be discussed in a later section. First, an examination 
of relationships between EI and allied constructs is necessary, to consider whether the 
conceptual frameworks suggested for TEI and AEI, with respect to their parent constructs, 
hold true for the current data. 
The AEI approach conceives EI as a form of intelligence, where the content domain is 
emotions, similar to how numbers or words represent the content domains of numerical 
and verbal abilities, respectively (Mayer et al., 2016). In line with theoretical predictions, EM 
and EP abilities converged with each other (r = .31, p < .001), suggesting that these are 
distinct yet related skills (Elfenbein & MacCann, 2017). Because AEI represents cognitive 
abilities specialised for reasoning about emotion, AEI should only weakly relate to 
personality, but share moderately positive associations with general cognitive ability (Mayer 
et al., 2008). In the present research, cognitive ability (specifically, crystallised intelligence; 
Gc) was measured using one of the 18-item Vocabulary tests from the Kit of Factor-
Referenced Cognitive Tests (Ekstrom et al., 1976), an objective, standardised measure of g. 
Unexpectedly, however, whole-sample analysis revealed that Gc scores only weakly 
correlated with emotion management (r = .13, p = > .05), and emotion perception scores (r = 




encompassed all types of AEI and IQ-type Gc instrumentation found similarly sized effects 
(AEI [EP]; r = .10; AEI [EM], r = .16) (Joseph & Newman, 2010). Moreover, individual studies 
that shared methodological similarity with the present research replicated current findings. 
In one study that used the same vocabulary test as the present research alongside the 
MSCEIT (Farrelly & Austin, 2007), relationships between Gc and those AEI branches were 
often small (i.e., all rs < .22). In addition, Austin (2010) found that correlations between 
vocabulary test scores were only .12 (STEM), and -.08 (perception branch of MSCEIT). Thus, 
although the current findings did not meet theoretical expectations with respect to AEI and 
cognitive ability, they appeared they aligned with empirical findings of other researchers 
that have utilised similar measures.  
By contrast, the current data found that AEI negligibly related to the Big Five 
personality traits, in line with theoretical principles (Austin, 2010). Specifically, neither of 
the AEI branches significantly corresponded with extraversion, conscientiousness, or 
neuroticism. However, relatively small associations were detected for agreeableness 
(emotion management, r = .23; emotion perception, r = .13) and openness (emotion 
perception, r =.14). These patterns markedly correspond with those documented in 
previous research (e.g., Austin, Farrelly, Black, and Moore, 2007; Brackett & Mayer, 2003; 
Davis & Humphrey, 2012b; Fiori & Antonakis, 2011; van der Linden et al., 2017; Zeidner & 
Olnick-Shemesh, 2010), and generally support the notion that the AEI model exists outside 
of a personality framework, in contrast to TEI (Caruso, Mayer, & Salovey, 2002).   
Across all three studies, TEI was measured using the TEIQue-ASF, an age-
appropriate, short measure of TEI from the TEIQue family of measures; Petrides, 2009), and 




control, sociability, emotionality, and well-being (Petrides, 2009). As anticipated, TEI (and all 
subscales) were unrelated to Gc (all r values were under .10). Since TEI represents a 
constellation of emotional self-perceptions assessed through self-report questionnaires, 
rather than maximal performance, findings reinforce the viewpoint that TEI is not a form of 
intelligence (Austin, 2010), and correspond with findings reported elsewhere (e.g., Farrelly 
& Austin, 2007; Ferrando et al., 2010; Mavroveli et al., 2008; Mikolajczak et al., 2007; 
Qualter et al., 2012). Rather, the consensus is that TEI is located at the lower levels of 
personality hierarchies (De Raad, 2005; Petrides & Furnham, 2001; Petrides et al., 2007 
Petrides et al., 2016), and that global scores should correlate substantially with several of 
the Big Five personality traits. Indeed, the current research identified that TEI (and 
subscales) showed medium-large correlations with conscientiousness (r = .44, p < .001), 
extraversion (r = .35, p < .001), agreeableness (r = .30, p < .001), and neuroticism (r = -.58, p 
< .001). The relationship with openness was much weaker (r = .06, p > .05). Those patterns 
reflect those present in the literature (e.g., Austin et al., 2007; Davis & Humphrey, 2012b). 
Furthermore, the magnitude of coefficients obtained (medium to large) match those 
returned by meta-analyses examining TEI and personality (Joseph & Newman, 2010; van der 
Linden et al., 2017; van Rooy & Viswesvaran, 2004). Thus, present findings compare 
favourably with that of others, and suggest that in late adolescence, TEI shares much the 
same conceptual framework with that of adulthood, with respect to its parent constructs 
(i.e., Big Five traits). In addition to relationship with allied constructs, it is important to check 
that the current data show the expected patterns concerning sex differences. 
Sex differences were controlled for in study-specific analyses, rather than analysed in 
their own right, due to the sex imbalance in participant samples (across programme of 




consider sex differences observed for whole-sample EI data obtained across the three 
studies, since there is very little ‘norm’ data available for older adolescents. In line with 
previous research, sex differences were detected for AEI, whereby females demonstrated 
higher levels of objective emotional skill. As determined by t-test, females (M = 10.16, SD = 
2.47) outperformed males (M = 9.38, SD = 2.75) on emotion management, t = -2.23, p = 
.027. Similarly, females were better able to perceive emotions (M = 73.04, SD = .97) than 
males (M = 67.94, SD = 16.97), t = -2.32, p = .021. Findings corroborate previous evidence 
suggests that females typically score higher on all branches of AEI in adults (e.g., Cabello et 
al., 2016; Farelly & Austin, 2007; Fernández-Berrocal, Cabello, Castillo, & Extremera, 2012), 
and in children and young adolescents (Barlow, Qualter, & Stylianou, 2010; Qualter et al., 
2012). That trend for females to be more emotionally proficient is also supported by meta-
analytic research (Joseph & Newman, 2010; Sánchez-Núñez, Fernández-Berrocal, Montañés, 
& Latorre, 2008). By contrast, no discernible sex differences were detected for TEI at the 
global level. That finding is well-supported by previous adult (e.g., Brackett & Mayer, 2003), 
adolescent (e.g., Mavroveli et al., 2007; Mavroveli et al., 2008; Williams, Daley, Burnside, & 
Hammond-Rowley, 2009), and meta-analytic research (Joseph & Newman, 2010; Sánchez-
Núñez et al., 2008). However, when the data were probed for sex-differences at the 
subscale level, factor level differences were found for ‘self-control’. Males consistently 
perceived themselves as more competent in regulating their emotions and impulses (M = 
4.52, SD = 9.48), than females did (M = 3.85, SD = .97), t = 5.05, p < .001). The trend of 
higher trait self-control scores in males has been identified previously (Siegling, Saklofske, 
Vesely, & Nordstokke, 2012). In sum, the sex differences in EI observed for the present 
research fully match those identified in the literature to date: females score more highly on 




self-control subscale). Future studies should ensure a more balanced sample with respect to 
sex, so that the above sex-differences can be explored in the context of ER processes. 
The above section highlights that in late adolescence (specifically in young people 
aged 16-18 years), assumptions regarding the conceptual frameworks of TEI (and to some 
extent, AEI) hold true. Thus, the research emphasises the need to control for the effects of 
allied variables, and sex differences, when judging the value of EI as a protective factor in 
adolescence. The next section considers whether EI predicts meaningful, incremental 
contributions to stress regulation processes in adolescents, beyond the effects of allied 
constructs, and what findings suggest about EI as a protective factor.  
7.4 EI as a protective resource in adolescence 
The research took a process-oriented approach, which aimed to broaden our understanding 
of how EI may moderate stress regulation processes in context (Davis, 2018b; Fiori, 2009). 
However, the rationale for the research emerged from the wealth of cross-sectional 
research identifying associations between EI and adaptive health outcomes (e.g., for review, 
see Martin et al., 2010). It is important to briefly consider whether the current set of 
findings validated those underlying assumptions. Broadly speaking, the research converged 
with prior literature and theory that suggests EI relates to better mental health and well-
being, as measured through aspects of affect (Studies 1-3), clinical symptomology (Studies 
1-2), and subjective well-being (SWB) (Study 3).  
Based on correlation data across all studies, individuals with higher TEI consistently 
showed higher levels of baseline PA (r = .37, p < .001), and lower levels of NA (r = -.29, p = 
.001), indicative of the pattern shown for adult participants (Schutte et al., 2002; Sevdalis et 




management r = -.25, p < .001; emotion perception r = -.31, p < .001) echoing findings found 
by others (e.g., Extremera & Rey, 2016). TEI (and all four subscales) also correlated strongly 
and significantly with indices of positive psychological well-being, in the case of happiness (r 
= .70, p < .001), and life satisfaction (r = .63, p < .001), supporting adult data (Austin et al., 
2005; Chamorro-Premuzic et al., 2007; Petrides & Furnham, 2003; Livingstone & Day, 2005; 
Palmer et al., 2002). In addition, emotion management was associated with greater life 
satisfaction (r = .16, p = .026). However, findings are generally mixed with regards to AEI and 
SWB, with some studies returning either positive associations (e.g., Fernández-Berrocal & 
Extremera, 2016), or no relationship (e.g., Zeidner & Olnick-Shemesh, 2010). Nevertheless, 
the finding is still in line with the available evidence, which suggests a greater effect of EI 
abilities on cognitive well-being than on affective well-being (Fernández-Berrocal & 
Extremera, 2016). Turning to mental health symptomology, the literature consistently 
identified links between TEI and a lower risk of internalising problems in non-clinical 
adolescent populations (Fernandez-Berrocal et al., 2006; Schutte et al., 2007). That long-
standing finding was corroborated by the present research, since whole-sample data 
showed that adolescents with higher TEI reported less anxiety (r = -.57, p < .001), and 
depression (r = -.50, p < .001). While AEI did not relate to anxiety or depression variables, 
this is not unusual (e.g., Martins et al., 2010), since the relationship between EI and health is 
generally much stronger when EI is measured as a trait. In sum, the findings observed for EI 
and mental health outcomes support those found for adults: emotionally intelligent 
adolescents tend to exhibit a more positive mood at baseline, and better mental health and 
well-being. This supports the argument for examining the processes underlying EI - the main 




7.4.1 The incremental validity of EI 
Throughout EI’s history, there have been concerns that the associations between EI and 
adaptive outcomes simply reflect the overlap with personality traits (TEI: Zeidner et al., 
2012b), or cognitive ability (AEI: MacCann et al., 2014). Indeed, the present research 
showed that empirically, those constructs are important to control for (especially the Big 
Five, which showed correlations with both TEI and AEI). Thus, to achieve rigour, and address 
those issues, all constructs that were deemed theoretically pertinent to the study outcomes 
(including personality and cognitive ability) were controlled for across the programme of 
research. Such analyses allow for a ‘clean’ assessment of EI’s contributions to outcomes. 
Findings indicate that, depending on the context, both forms of EI can make a significant, 
incremental contribution to the prediction of acute stress regulation in adolescence (Figure 
18). However, the extent to which EI predicted outcomes beyond personality, cognitive 
ability, and other emotion-related constructs, varied considerably between, and within, 
studies.  
To illustrate the incremental validity of EI, it is necessary to consider analyses for 
which the role of EI reached statistical significance, especially for the finding that replicated: 
the TEI sociability subscale related to less stress reactivity across Studies 1 and 2. As 
expected, however, the factors that explained the most variance in both NA and HR 
reactivity were the experimental condition and pre-task state, which, together, explained 
36-75% and 24-50% of the variance in NA reactivity and HR reactivity, respectively. In other 
words, how stressed a participant became during the experiment was mostly determined by 
how stressed they were at the beginning of the experimental session, and the type of task 




ability, anxiety, depression) tended to explain a further 3-6% (NA), and 8-18% (HR). 
However, on top of that explained variance, the TEI subfactors, together with their 
conditional effects, explained between 2-6% of additional variance in NA reactivity, and 4-
19% of HR reactivity. In line with reviews on the incremental validity of TEI, those results 
appear in line with other TEIQue analyses that have accounted for other construct-relevant 
criteria (e.g., 1-18% in adults, using the TEIQue-SF; Siegling et al., 2015b; 1.7-6.3% in 
adolescents, using the TEIQue-ASF; Siegling et al., 2017). However, findings challenge the 
concern that TEI’s incremental effects are mainly attributed to predictor-criterion overlap in 
item content and method bias (Zeidner et al., 2012b), since TEI sociability related to HR (i.e., 
a criterion that does not overlap with TEI) in addition to NA reactivity. In contrast, the AEI 
abilities of emotion management and emotion perception did not significantly predict 
reactivity; additional explained variance in NA or HR reactivity was typically around 1%.  
Notably, there were a number of analyses performed where neither TEI nor AEI 
predicted the study outcomes beyond confounds. For example, in the context of recovering 
from acute stress, only trait agreeableness (β = -1.22), and its interaction term (β = .83) 
remained significant at the final step of the analysis, indicating a link between agreeableness 
and NA recovery (i.e., adolescents’ level of NA recovered more quickly after the stressor if 
they scored highly on agreeableness). However, another Big Five trait, neuroticism, 
predicted an attentional bias for orienting away from happy faces (β = -.57), whereas TEI 
and AEI failed to show significance. Out of the covariates examined for Study 3, it was affect 
that appeared pertinent for ER on social media. For instance, neither the Big Five traits, 
cognitive ability, nor EI, significantly predicted the likelihood of engagement with either 
positive or negative social media posts. However, with all other variables held constant, 




stimuli, indicating that an individual’s decision of whether to engage with emotive social 
media posts might be influenced to a greater degree by state factors (i.e., their current 
mood), than by individual differences such as EI, personality, or cognitive ability. 
Furthermore, there were circumstances where EI would have likely been highlighted as a 
statistically significant predictor, had confounding influences not been accounted for. For 
example, both TEI and AEI initially correlated with affective responding in Study 3 (Chapter 
6), but, unlike AEI, the significance of TEI was lost once confounding variables were entered 
into the hierarchical regression. In particular, the effects seem to have been largely 
attributable to baseline PA instead. In other words, because high TEI individuals tend to 
show greater levels of PA (Studies 1 and 2; also see Schutte, et al., 2002; Schutte & Malouff, 
2011), and the phenomenon of mood-congruent processing of emotion (Rusting, 1998; 
Yiend, 2009), PA could therefore underly the relationship between TEI and affective 
reactivity to emotive stimuli. As discussed in Chapter 6, it may not be that having high TEI is 
detrimental or unhelpful on social media, but, rather, that AEI produces more of an 
incremental effect beyond allied constructs. The findings discussed above demonstrate the 
importance of controlling for relevant constructs, since not doing so may have yielded a 
number of false positive results, and, thus, ‘overestimated’ EI’s contributions to study 
outcomes. In sum, when EI is ‘stripped down’ (i.e., isolated from the overlapping constructs 
within its nomological network), it still explains unique variance with respect to some, but 
not all, adolescent stress regulation processes.  
7.4.2 EI and stress regulation: The role of context 
As a whole, the programme of research explores the extent to which EI acts as a stress 




one way EI could lead to positive outcomes (e.g., Lea et al., 2019; Mikolajczak et al., 2009a). 
The findings obtained suggest that this view may be an oversimplification. Although there 
were no instances whereby EI strictly corresponded with maladaptive processing, there 
were cases where the effects of EI appeared to generalise across stressful and non-stressful 
contexts, but also ER processes for which EI showed specificity.  
7.4.2.1 Specificity of EI’s effects: generalised or stress-specific? 
In stark contrast to the generalised effects of EI shown for the processes of attentional 
deployment and cognitive change, the effects of EI discriminated quite clearly between 
stressful and non-stressful situations with regard to stress reactivity. Specifically, TEI 
sociability was associated with less reactivity in the stress condition, but not the control 
condition. Furthermore, that effect replicated across two studies. Of all the findings, this 
one is most supportive of EI as a stress buffer in adolescence, and corroborates the pattern 
observed in adult samples (Mikolajczak et al., 2007; 2009). Furthermore, while EI showed 
situation-specific effects, the effect generalised across both physiological and psychological 
aspects of reactivity, suggesting that sociability may contribute to multiple aspects of the 
fight or flight response in social settings. As an amalgamation of several constructs, 
sociability comprises self-perceived traits relating to assertiveness, social competence, 
agreeableness, and self-efficacy (Petrides, 2009). With respect to that nomological network, 
assertiveness in social settings could be the key distinguishing aspect of sociability (p.187). 
Assertive individuals are self-efficacious, and have high self-esteem, meaning they can face 
stressful demands with confidence (Hughes, 2007; Krieger et al., 2015; Murphey et al., 
2013), and perceive stressors as challenging rather than threatening (e.g., Trotman et al., 




handle psychosocial stressors better due to their assertiveness and confidence in social 
contexts. 
EI did not unequivocally confer stress-dependent ER processing, however. For 
example, with respect to deliberate, controlled cognitive processes, AEI (EM) and TEI (self-
control) predicted task-focussed coping, and post-event rumination, respectively. However, 
in both cases, effects were generalised across both stressful and control conditions, making 
it difficult to identify whether EI’s relationship with those processes is especially helpful in 
challenging circumstances. With respect to coping specifically, AEI (EM) related to less 
reported use of task-focussed coping. Although identifying universal ‘adaptive’ strategies is 
not realistic, since the effectiveness of any one strategy is context-dependent (Baker & 
Berenbaum, 2007; Carver & Connor-Smith, 2010), Folkman & Moskowitz, 2004), active 
coping strategies (i.e., task-focussing coping) are more effective in controllable situations 
(e.g., Bowman & Stern, 1995). In the Sing-a-Song Stress Test (SSST) paradigm, the stress is 
instead largely uncontrollable, and the emphasis is on social evaluation, rather than 
evaluation of performance. Thus, rather than focussing on performance, keeping calm (e.g., 
by engaging with emotion-focussed coping strategies), is probably more helpful (Folkman & 
Moskowitz, 2004). However, the relationship between AEI (EM) and less task-focussed 
coping was also demonstrated for the control (reading) task, though the effect was weaker. 
As a non-stressful task, reading a magazine article (with no measure of performance or 
social evaluation), does not theoretically require high levels of task-focussed (i.e., there is no 
‘problem’ to solve), emotion-focussed (i.e., the task is not designed to elicit an emotional 
response), or avoidant coping (i.e., the task is not unpleasant, reducing the need to 




both experimental conditions), there appeared be a ‘graded’ effect, whereby emotionally 
intelligent adolescents used comparably less task-focussed coping for the most resource-
intensive task, where other forms of coping were likely necessary. However, since AEI (EM) 
did not relate to levels of other coping strategies, that explanation is only speculative at 
present. If that prediction holds true, EI would theoretically relate to higher levels task-
focussed coping if the stressor featured an element of performance evaluation (e.g., a 
grading of their singing skill), rather than solely social evaluation. Future research is 
necessary to test that hypothesis. 
EI also showed a generalised effect with regards to post-event rumination, another 
cognitive ER strategy. Generally perceived as a maladaptive ER strategy, ruminating (which 
features intrusive, repetitive, unwanted thoughts that interrupt ongoing activities; 
Rachman, 1981) is typically detrimental to mental health and well-being (for meta-analysis, 
see Rood et al., 2009; Young & Dietrich, 2015). Evidence strongly suggests that there are not 
many circumstances where excessively ruminating after an event presents benefits for 
adolescents, and thus ruminating can result in both short-term (e.g., problem-solving; Ward, 
Lyubomirsky, Sousa, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003), and long-term issues (e.g., depressive 
symptoms; van Beveren, Kuppens, Hankin, & Braet, 2019). In the present research, TEI (self-
control subscale) predicted lower levels of post-event rumination across both conditions, 
but with a slightly weaker effect for the reading task than the singing task. In other words, 
individuals that rated themselves as being able to control their emotions and impulses 
(Petrides, 2009), were less likely to brood after completing a task (whether the task was 
stressful or not). Having high TEI may help adolescents show less intrusive negative thoughts 
after any event, but the dampening of these is intensified further if that event was 




with respect to problem-focussed coping, may also apply here. TEI may exert a slightly 
stronger effect on post-event rumination when the event was distressing, compared to a 
neutral event, because there are relatively more negative thoughts to suppress. Post-event 
rumination could therefore be a universal, adaptive ER strategy associated with TEI self-
control. That subscale also demonstrated another generalised effect: attentional bias. 
The effect of TEI (self-control) on attentional bias (where adolescents with high 
scores showed avoidance of sad faces) was not contingent on experimental group. 
Immediately following both the SSST and the reading task, adolescents with high self-control 
scores tended to orient away from sad faces. Theoretically, patterns of visual processing of 
high EI scorers should comprise of attentional bias away from threat in non-stressful 
conditions, but for threat in stressful conditions (Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Yiend, 2009). 
However, while angry faces were the primary focus (as anger is the most threatening 
emotion used in the study), it is unexpected that a significant outcome was only detected 
for sad faces, since sadness-inducing stimuli do not represent threat per se. However, as 
discussed in Chapter 5, evidence generally points to an avoidance of sadness-evoking stimuli 
is adaptive in everyday circumstances, and serves a protective function against depression 
(Mennen et al., 2019; Peckham et al., 2010). Because anxiety and depression were 
controlled for in the present study, one could speculate that findings indicate a way in which 
TEI could safeguard against future depression. Conflict exists in the growing number of 
studies assessing EI and attentional processing, providing little with which to contextualise 
the current findings. For example, Davis (2018b) identified roles for emotionality, well-
being, and sociability TEI subscales, with effects not restricted to stressful conditions, 




(2009b). Nonetheless, because the effect of EI was not stress-specific in the present 
research, it is not clear whether the generalised bias for orienting away from sad faces is 
helpful for adolescents in times of acute stress.  
In summary, findings from the research challenge the previously held assumption 
that EI always provides benefit under stress, as there were cases where EI showed a 
generalised effect, but also cases where EI showed stress-specific effects. Generally, 
generalised effects of EI were present for coping and rumination (cognitive aspects of ER), 
and attentional processing, but evidence indicated clear-cut discriminatory effects with 
respect to EI and stress response modulation. In addition, as discussed under ‘Incremental 
Validity of EI’, there were also situations where EI explained no additional variance at all, 
despite theoretical predictions that it should (e.g., recovery from stress; attentional 
processing of happy faces), contradicting evidence that suggests EI (especially TEI) explains 
incremental variance in socioemotional outcomes in 81% of cases (Andrei et al., 2016). 
Overall, the effects of EI appeared very specific, and context-dependent.  
7.4.2.2 The role of EI in controlled versus applied settings 
In addition to the stress regulation process being examined, the paradigm used appears a 
key driver of whether EI shows significant effects. Specifically, the paradigm was an 
important in factor in determining whether TEI or AEI was the ‘dominant’ predictor of study 
outcomes. Broadly speaking, the research was conducted across two settings. The first was 
a tightly controlled experimental setting (Studies 1 and 2), and the second was an applied 
setting (Study 3), where ecologically valid stimuli were designed to represent social media 
content. At this point, it is important to emphasise that the way in which stress was 




psychosocial stress (using the SSST), and the latter, which exposed participants to highly 
emotive material (some of which was highly distressing). One way to conceptualise that 
distinction between the paradigms is that the former is classified as an active stressor (i.e., it 
requires active participation in a task), whereas exposure to emotive material is an example 
of a passive stressor (Hamilton & Alloy, 2016). While social media is often classified as an 
everyday ‘stressor’ in adolescence (Beyens et al., 2016; O’Reilly et al., 2018; van der Schuur 
et al., 2019; Weinstein & Selman, 2016), the paradigm employed in Study 3 did not 
technically induce acute stress (unlike the first two studies), since passively viewing emotive 
material is not necessarily stressful. Moreover, because Study 3 did not measure stress per 
se, it would not be valid to make direct comparisons between the paradigms. However, 
findings across both paradigms do provide indications of how EI contributes to ER processes 
‘in action’, rather than relying on retrospective recollections of ER, or asking participants to 
self-report their typical patterns of responding.  
A crucial finding with respect to response modulation was that TEI was most relevant 
in the controlled experimental setting, whereas AEI was most relevant in the more applied 
setting. Findings suggest that when in a socially evaluative situation, how confident 
adolescents feel about their emotional abilities matters more for stress regulation than their 
actual emotion-cognitive skill. In other words, socially charged, face-to-face situations 
require emotional self-efficacy to optimise stress outcomes. However, when confronted 
with stressful posts on social media (a poorly understood stressor), it is emotional cognition 
that enables an appropriate emotional response. Importantly, there were no findings that 
were common across both TEI and AEI conceptualisations of EI, not only corroborating the 




trajectories with respect to adaptation (O’Connor & Little, 2003; Petrides & Furnham, 2000; 
Warwick & Nettelbeck, 2004). The following section discusses potential explanations for the 
context-dependent patterns observed with respect to each of the paradigms.  
Present findings highlighted a key role for TEI sociability in the modulation of 
affective and physiological responses when acute psychosocial stress was induced under 
controlled conditions. The SSST has a strong social evaluation component, whereby 
participants are exposed to a potentially negative judgment by others (Campbell & Ehlert, 
2012), achieved by having the participant sing in front of an experimenter, further 
exacerbated by the belief that the performance was being video-recorded. As a social 
stressor, the finding that sociability (i.e., self-perceptions related to emotional competence) 
is helpful, makes theoretical sense. Adolescents scoring highly on sociability view 
themselves as more assertive, and confident in their abilities to influence others’ emotions 
(i.e., trait sociability) (Petrides, 2009), traits of which the broader stress literature highlights 
as strong predictors of adaptive functioning for young people in social contexts (Murphey et 
al., 2013). The precise mechanism of action that connects sociability to reactivity is still 
unknown, but there a likely a number of interconnecting processes involved, including, for 
example, cognitive appraisal, and locus of control (e.g., Mikolajczak et al., 2006; Mikolajczak 
& Luminet, 2008; Salovey et al., 2002). As suggested in the discussion sections of Chapter 4 
and 5, it is possible that high sociability individuals perceive socially charged acute stressors 
as less threatening, and their prosocial nature and self-efficacy (i.e., trait sociability) enables 
them to instead focus on managing their emotional response (Meier et al., 2006; 
Mikolajczak et al., 2008). Or, perhaps, they felt more in control of the situation, since locus 
of control is a known protective factor in stressful situations (Jerusalem & Schwarzer, 1992; 




perceptions seem the most useful emotion-related traits for becoming less stressed in 
situations where there is a seemingly high potential for negative judgement from others. 
Ultimately, in interpersonal contexts, actual abilities did not seem to be as useful as how 
adolescents perceived those abilities. However, while the study has yielded a role for EI as a 
stress buffer under controlled conditions, it is important to note that the current finding 
may not generalise to other types of stressor, even if those stressors are also ‘active’ and 
induced through experimentation. The precise emotions and physiological outcomes that 
emerge in a challenging situation are highly idiosyncratic, and hinge on many stressor 
characteristics (i.e., levels of social evaluative threat, cognitive effort required; Denson et 
al., 2009). It seems doubtful that sociability would be as valuable in non-social contexts (e.g., 
cognitive stressors), for example, or in the case of a passive stressor. The findings of Study 3 
illustrate that point; in the case of a passive stressor, findings were markedly different to 
those where an active stressor was used.  
Whilst several studies have tested whether EI relates to affective responses to 
exposure to emotive material (e.g., highly emotive videos, images, sounds, written 
statements) in experimental paradigms (Lea et al., 2019), no studies had yet examined 
whether findings differed when the material was presented using ecologically valid stimuli 
(i.e., social media). The previous ‘offline’ research typically demonstrates that TEI shows the 
capacity to exacerbate (e.g., Fernández-Berrocal & Extremera, 2006; Petrides & Furnham, 
2003), but also decrease, the intensity of emotional reactions to emotive stimuli in adults 
(e.g., Ramos et al., 2007; Schutte et al., 2002; Zysberg, 2012). In two studies examining links 
between AEI and affective reactivity to emotional images, AEI had no effect on responses 




observed for ‘traditional’ passive mood induction studies; results signalled that, instead, AEI 
held the chief role in predicting affective responses to emotive stimuli. Adolescents skilled in 
emotion management and perception were more likely to report more intense emotional 
reactions to emotive material. Moreover, those effects were dependent on the valence of 
the post. Compared to less emotionally intelligent adolescents, they reported feeling 
stronger positive affect to the positive posts (e.g., smiling baby; cute puppy), and stronger 
negative affect to negative posts (e.g., KKK rally; injured dog). That pattern appears to 
represent context-sensitive responding (Blair et al., 1997; Goodwin et al., 2017; Livingstone 
& Srivastava, 2012; Seara-Cardoso et al., 2015; Tugade & Fredrickson, 2007). As proposed by 
emotion-as-information theory (sometimes also referred to as feelings-as-information 
theory, or affect-as-information theory), subjective experiences are an important source of 
information (Schwartz, 2012). According to that theory, exhibiting the appropriate 
emotional response (i.e., feeling the appropriate emotions in the appropriate situations) 
holds informational value for the task at hand, and assists with thought processes, such as 
decision-making (Storbeck & Clore, 2008). In other words, how we are feeling in a given 
situation helps us decide what actions we should take. Thus, showing appropriate reactions 
to material posted on social media could provide adolescents with useful information, which 
they could consequently use to navigate the emotionally complex material present online. 
Findings suggest that AEI could promote more efficient processing of salient emotional 
information, in line with contemporary frameworks regarding EI and emotion processing 
(Fiori & Veseley-Maillefer, 2018). Tentatively, one could suggest that this could comprise a 
way that AEI could help to safeguard well-being. However, it is worth noting that there still 




the other variables measured, indicating that much work remains to be done in 
understanding individual differences in ER within social media contexts.  
7.7.3 Implications of findings for adolescent resilience 
Stress is a normal part of adolescent life, yet young people vary substantially in their 
vulnerability or resilience in the face of everyday adversity (Luthar et al., 2006; Wright et al., 
2013). Given the considerable quantity of empirical evidence suggesting that emotionally 
intelligent individuals tend to be happier, healthier and more productive (Brackett et al., 
2011; Petrides et al., 2016), and studies indicating that EI may hold a pivotal role in 
mediating or moderating the stress-illness relationship (e.g., Ciarrochi et al., 2002; Davis & 
Humphrey, 2014), the present research aimed to investigate the possible involvement of the 
construct in various stress regulation mechanisms, which could potentially underpin 
resilience processes in young people. Earlier discussion emphasised that resilience is not a 
static quality, trait, skill, or ability, but rather a dynamic interaction between risk factors and 
protective markers, that can buffer the effects of adversity (Luthar & Cushing, 2002). Within 
such a resilience framework, EI could be considered a protective marker if it helps 
individuals to moderate the impact of stressors (i.e., by acting as a stress buffer) (Masten et 
al., 1999; McMahon et al., 2003; Olsson et al., 2003). Findings from the programme of 
research are mixed, but tentatively hint at some implications for EI and resilience in older 
adolescents. For young people in the crucial developmental ‘transition’ period between 
adolescence and adulthood of 16-18 years, EI does appear advantageous, but only in certain 
circumstances. Whether EI buffers the effects of acute stress is dependent on several 
factors, including the specific ER process being examined (i.e., which ‘family’ of processes), 




separately), and the nature of the stress setting (i.e., acute psychosocial stress; exposure to 
emotive material).  
Psychosocial stress is particularly potent in adolescent daily life, since adolescents 
are particularly sensitive to the effects of social evaluation (Gunnar et al., 2009; Somerville, 
2013). The psychosocial task was selected to mimic everyday sources of social stress for 
young people (e.g., presentations; peer pressure; uncomfortable interactions with others; 
e.g., Rüppel et al., 2015; Zeidner & Matthews, 2005), through fear of failure, social 
evaluative threat, and a lack of control (Buck, 2016). When confronted with a stressor, 
individuals need to find a way to regulate their emotions, whilst also avoiding an 
exaggerated physiological response, to avoid placing an unnecessary ‘wear and tear’ on 
stress response systems of the body (e.g., Arora et al., 2010; Rano et al., 2018). Since TEI 
sociability corresponded with a dampened stress response, in terms of both affective and 
ANS reactivity, findings indicate that emotional self-efficacy might be a protective individual-
level resource for adolescents in social settings. This could help explain why TEI is often 
associated with more positive stress-related outcomes in young people, such as better 
mental health and well-being (e.g., Austin et al., 2005; Chamorro-Premuzic et al., 2007; 
Fernandez-Berrocal et al., 2006; Schutte et al., 2007), and educational attainment (MacCann 
et al., 2020). In addition, AEI was associated with a reduced likelihood of using unhelpful 
coping strategies, but because this effect was generalised across stressful and non-stressful 
conditions (and thus did not moderate the impact of the stressor), the extent to which AEI 
exerts a protective effect with respect to adolescent resilience is unknown. However, AEI 
could bestow resilience in less acutely stressful situations where inter-personal social 




The propagation of social media use over the last decade is widely acknowledged, 
and the amount of time young people spend online has doubled in the past decade (Ofcom, 
2017). In Great Britain, 96% of 16-24 year olds use social media (Office for National 
Statistics, 2017). For older adolescents, social media can present a pertinent, yet poorly 
understood, form of everyday stress that calls for further investigation (O’Reilly et al., 2018). 
Using social media posts as salient, ecologically valid emotive stimuli, the present research 
demonstrated that objective emotional skill may have a protective effect. Earlier discussion 
highlighted that adolescents adept at emotion management and perception showed 
emotional responses that aligned with those appropriate for the context (i.e., positive posts 
elicited strong positive emotions; negative posts elicited strong negative emotions, though 
the latter effect was not as strong). Mediation analyses suggest that this pattern of 
responding mediated the relationship between AEI and both the cognitive and affective 
components of SWB: life satisfaction (Diener et al., 1985), and happiness (Lyubomirsky & 
Lepper, 1999), demonstrating value of AEI for promoting hedonic well-being in adolescents 
(McMahan & Estes, 2011). Given that the effects were much stronger for positive social 
media posts, AEI may help emotionally intelligent adolescents to ‘upregulate’ positive 
emotions (joy, interest, contentment) (Frederickson, 1998), with positive posts acting as a 
‘mood-booster’ amidst the large amount of distressing, violent, or otherwise threatening 
material on their social media newsfeeds (Best et al., 2014; Crone & Konijn, 2018; 
Weinstein, 2018). In addition, because AEI was associated with initially directing attention 
towards negative stimuli without impacting engagement with said stimuli, AEI might be 
helping to ‘filter’ out threatening material. Based on the current set of findings, AEI seems 




responding on social media (potentially conferring resilience), though this area of research is 
in its embryonic stages. 
With respect to EI in general, no single profile seems adaptive in isolation. Rather, 
the different skills and abilities required for successful stress regulation are dependent upon 
the environment, a sentiment echoed by other studies that have compared stress 
responding across different contexts (e.g., Shirtcliff, Peres, Dismukes, Lee, & Phan, 2014). In 
sum, findings provide mixed support for the notion of EI as a stress buffer in late 
adolescence. Furthermore, theoretically, the significant effects observed from the research 
as a whole could convey long-term benefits for both TEI (e.g., if sociability buffers acute 
stressful situations, this could prevent chronic stress and allostatic overload) and AEI (e.g., 
emotional skills could help adolescents form ‘healthy’ online behaviours and habits), but 
further investigation is required. While EI may help promote adaptive ER strategies in some 
stressful situations, the effect is neither consistent nor universal. The present research has 
demonstrated the presence of some context-dependent relationships between EI and key 
stress regulation processes, but exactly how those mechanisms are implicated within, and 
contribute towards, underlying risk-modifying mechanisms has yet to be elucidated, and 
should form a priority for future researchers.   
7. 5 Measurement of EI in adolescence 
7.5.1 Issues with adolescent EI measures 
While the findings of the current research indicate that EI makes an important and 
incremental (albeit context-dependent) contribution to ER processes, they also hold 
implications for the measurement of both TEI and AEI in adolescence. The measurement of 




al., 2019; Petrides, 2011). The historic issue of whether TEI or AEI was ‘better’ is largely 
obsolete, since most EI researchers now agree that both are needed, and that each explains 
unique aspects of emotionally intelligent behaviour (Boyatzis, 2019). However, the more 
contemporary issue concerns how we can measure those constructs in a valid, reliable, and 
practical way. Moreover, few EI measures are designed for the later years of adolescence 
(16-18 years). Often described as a ‘forgotten group’ with respect to empirical research into 
emotional functioning (Kennedy, 2010; Zeman et al., 2007), that group would benefit greatly 
from the further development of age appropriate EI measures. Whilst the development of 
such measures is awaited, further testing of existing measures (especially AEI) is required to 
establish their psychometric properties with adolescent samples. Thus, although not a 
primary aim, the present research served to validate several EI measures within the 16-18-
year-old population.  
To support the efforts in addressing MSCEIT construct validity issues, a piecemeal 
approach is generally taken to AEI assessment (i.e., using different instruments to capture 
key aspects of AEI) (Elfenbein & MacCann, 2017; Fiori & Veseley-Maillefer, 2018). Choice of 
instrumentation was primarily based on the psychometric properties of existing adult 
measures (using reviews such as O’Connor et al., 2019), due to the dearth of readily 
available adolescent AEI measures suitable for the participant group in question. AEI 
measures used in the present research included the Situational Test of Emotional 
Management- Brief (STEM-B; Allen et al., 2015), and the Situational Test of Emotional 
Understanding- Brief (STEU-B; Allen et al., 2014), and a bespoke ERT. Reliability analyses 
conducted for the first empirical study (Chapter 4) highlighted the STEU-B (Allen et al., 2014) 
as a highly unreliable measure of emotional understanding for older adolescents. The study 




any single item (Field, 2017). Others have encountered similar issues regarding the low 
internal reliability of the STEU in adult samples, though with values still higher than in the 
present study (α = .48; Austin et al., 2010; α = .40; Libbrecht, Lievens, Carette, & Cote, 2014; 
= .54; Martin-Raugh, Kell, & Motowidlo, 2016). It would seem that the STEU-B instrument 
does not adequately capture the construct of emotion understanding in late adolescence. In 
contrast, the instrument used to measure emotion management – the STEM-B (Allen et al., 
2015) – appeared a more reliable measure than the STEU-B. In Studies 1, 2 and 3, α values 
calculated for the STEM-B were 67, .64, and .75, respectively. Moreover, those values 
concur with those found by studies using adult samples (e.g., α =.73; Austin, 2010; α = .84; 
Allen et al. 2015; α = .63: de Motta et al., 2018). The reasons for the disparity between the 
reliabilities of the STEU-B and STEM-B are unclear. Potentially, differences could have arisen 
though the two use different scoring methods (i.e., theory-based for the STEU; expert 
consensus for the STEM), but it is not obvious why theory-based scoring would negatively 
impact the reliability of a measure. One potential explanation for the discrepancy could be 
related to the developmental appropriateness of the STEU. A considerable portion of the 
scenarios contained within the STEU relate to workplace behaviour. While this makes the 
STEU highly applicable for professional contexts (O’Connor et al., 2019), only 20% of 
students aged 16-18 years work alongside their studies (UK Commission for Employment 
and Skills, 2015), which could impact adolescents’ capacity to relate to the scenarios (and, 
consequently, underestimate their emotion understanding). Whilst such an explanation is 
only speculative, future researchers examining emotion understanding in older adolescents 
may wish to use the STEU-B with caution.  
 The STEM and STEU were included to capture the strategic branch of AEI, but there 




latter branch, the present research did not measure the skill of ‘using emotion to facilitate 
thought’, which is frequently highlighted as conceptually redundant (e.g., Gardner & 
Qualter, 2011; Gignac, 2005; Joseph & Newman, 2010; Maul, 2011; Maul, 2012; Palmer et 
al., 2005; Rossen et al., 2008). However, while Studies 2 and 3 measured emotion 
perception, using a video-based emotion recognition test (ERT), as suggested by the 
literature (Elfenbein & MacCann, 2017), no suitable ERT could be sourced (as described in 
Chapter 4). For example, some ERTs only used static images, rather than multisensory 
integration (i.e., sight and sound), or posed technical issues upon uploading to an online 
platform (see Appendix J). Because a suitable test that satisfied all criteria could not be 
identified, a new ERT was developed for the purposes of the present study, using stimuli 
from the Ryerson Audio-Visual Database of Emotional Speech and Song (RAVDESS; 
Livingstone & Russo, 2018). It is fairly commonplace for EI researchers to develop bespoke 
scales and tasks to fit the purposes of the study (e.g., see Zysberg et al., 2010). For the 255 
participants in the research that completed the ERT, the mean accuracy rate was 71.97% (SD 
= 14.28), very similar to that reported for other ERTs (e.g., Multimodal Emotion Recognition 
Test [MERT]; Banziger et al., 2009; Geneva Emotion Recognition Test [GERT]; Schlegel & 
Scherer, 2015). Data also did not indicate any ceiling effects. Moreover, the pattern of 
accuracy across different emotion types was markedly similar to that recorded by others, 
whereby anger (75.26%) and happiness (73.63%) were the most accurately identified 
emotions, followed by sadness (70.64%), disgust (69.08%), surprise (67.77%), ending with 
fear as the least well-recognised emotion (66.41%) (Lydon & Nixon, 2014; Mancini, Biolcati, 
Agnoli, Andrei, & Trombini, 2018; Wells, Gillespie, & Rotshtein, 2016). Those whole-sample 




emotion perception in adolescents, and that the subsequent findings regarding the role of 
emotion perception are not simply the artefact of a poorly designed measure.  
Turning next to TEI, there are several well-validated measures of TEI available, but 
the TEIQue-ASF (Petrides, 2009) was selected for all studies due to its promising 
psychometric properties, and common usage (e.g., Davis & Humphrey, 2014; Ferrando et 
al., 2010; Mavroveli, et al., 2007; Siegling et al., 2015a; 2015b). When using global scores, 
the TEIQue-ASF (Petrides, 2009) appeared a reliable measure of TEI in older adolescents. 
Studies yielded Cronbach α values of .85- .91, all of which fall into the ‘good’ or ‘excellent’ 
range, suggesting that the TEIQue-ASF measured TEI consistently, and that all items 
sufficiently contributed to the global score (Tavakol & Dennick, 2011). However, exploratory 
analyses were also carried out, whereby the effects of the four subscale scores of the 
TEIQue were examined. Such analyses help to maximise the explanatory power of EI  - and 
help to distinguish TEI from “a grab-bag of desirable personal characteristics” (Zeidner et al., 
2006, p.102) – and to enable the differentiation of predictive and nonpredictive elements in 
different contexts (Downey et al., 2010; Zeidner et al., 2012b). As described earlier in the 
discussion, the programme of research identified a crucial role for TEI sociability with 
regards to modulating the stress response, whereby higher levels dampened psychological 
and physiological stress reactivity in the case of psychosocial stress. However, it was instead 
self-control that appeared more pertinent for attentional ER processes. Findings therefore 
support the notion that as an amalgamation of various emotional traits and dispositions 
that underlie emotionally intelligent behaviour (Petrides et al., 2007), global TEI is not 
helping us understand how adolescents navigate stressors. In other words, it is necessary to 




Concerningly, the reliability of the subscales was lower than ideal in the case of 
emotionality (α = .66), sociability (α. = .59), and self-control (α = .62), though well-being 
sustained a ‘good’ level of internal consistency (α =.85). Whilst the present research 
returned slightly lower Cronbach alpha values than expected, the ‘pattern’ of reliability 
values across factors broadly corroborated that typically obtained from the TEIQue-SF, with 
sociability being one of the least reliable, and well-being one of the most reliable (e.g., 
Siegling et al., 2015b: emotionality: .72-.73, sociability: .72-.73, self-control: .67-.77, well-
being: .86; Laborde, Allen, & Guillén, 2016: emotionality: .83, sociability: .70, self-control: 
.72, well-being: .78). Studies using the adolescent form of the TEIQue-SF tend not to provide 
reliability data for subscales (e.g., Davis & Humphrey, 2014; Ferrando et al., 2010; 
Mavroveli, et al., 2007), so it is difficult to judge whether the current reliability data is 
‘typical’ for adolescent samples. Nonetheless, all four subscales were included in analyses, 
irrespective of reliability, since all items are necessary to construct the global score 
(Petrides, 2009). It is important to note, however, that the authors of the TEIQue suggest 
that results obtained from subscale analyses using its brief forms, should be interpreted 
with caution, since scales comprise only 6-8 items (Petrides, 2009). Reliability analyses 
conducted with subscales supports that notion. Often, the subscale responsible for 
significantly predicting a study outcome was the one of the most unreliable out of the four 
subscales for that study. For example, in study 2, global TEI did not predict any form of 
attentional bias, but self-control (α = .53) predicted bias away from sad faces. Whilst such 
findings hint that only parts of the TEI sampling domain (Table 1) may be pertinent to acute 
stress regulation in older adolescents, drawing firm conclusions regarding the role of the 
component subscales of TEI should be viewed as preliminary until similar findings are 




An important caveat to the findings from the first two studies relates to a common 
critique of TEI measures: their susceptibility to faking and socially desirable responding (Day 
& Carroll, 2007), and their reliance on individuals being good judges of their emotion-
related abilities (which they are largely not, e.g., Boyatzis, 2019; Brackett et al., 2006). Such 
behaviour can thus ‘inflate’ TEI’s effects. The decision to try and mitigate the risk of socially 
desirable responding was made for Study 3, due to the study’s reliance on self-reported 
measures. Indeed, that precaution appeared warranted, since TEI scores correlated 
significantly with socially desirable responding, in terms of both impression management 
(i.e., a conscious inclination to respond positively, to deceive others; r =.38, p < .001), and 
self-deceptive enhancement (i.e., an unconscious tendency to respond overly positively; r = 
.21, p < .001) (Paulhus, 1991). One could speculate that controlling for those variables may 
have somewhat dampened TEI’s effects for that study. However, additional analyses (data 
not shown) indicated that the absence of TEI effects (at least in Study 3), was not due to 
accounting for socially desirable responding (i.e., when IM and SDE were not included as 
covariates, results were similar). In other words, response tendencies did not explain why 
TEI was unrelated to the indices representing emotion processing on social media. In sum, 
findings indicate that controlling for whereas socially desirable responding is still 
recommended in the case of EI studies where outcomes are primarily self-reported, it is not 
likely to have impacted the key findings from the programme of research. 
Whilst not an EI instrument, the present research also provides empirical support for 
the SSST (Brouwer & Högervorst, 2014) as a practical and effective means of inducing acute 
stress in older adolescents. Few stressors are designed specifically for adolescent 
populations, but the SSST was selected based on a theoretical and pragmatic rationale (see 




the control condition) exhibited a significant increase in HR, EDA, and NA from baseline, 
signalling that the SSST appears a reliable and potent stress inducer for adolescent 
participants. Data also helped validate other measures with participants aged 16-18 years, 
including instrumentation assessing transient mood (Positive and Negative Affect Schedule; 
Watson et al., 1988), personality (Mini International Personality Item Pool; Donnellan et al., 
2006), mental health (Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale; Zigmond & Snaith, 1983), and 
SWB (Subjective Happiness Scale; Lyubomirsky & Lepper, 1999; Satisfaction with Life Scale; 
Diener et al., 1985). 
Overall, data discussed in this section suggest that viewing EI as a global construct 
does not tell us much about how it works. To understand the mechanisms underpinning EI, 
and how it leads to positive outcomes, coverage should be comprehensive (i.e., examine 
both TEI and AEI), and fine-grained (i.e., examine subscales of TEI, and branches of AEI). 
Further contributions towards the field of EI, present findings suggest that, for adolescents 
aged 16-18 years, the TEIQue-ASF, STEM-B (though not the STEU), and a video-based 
emotion recognition test, are appropriate for the respective measurement of TEI, emotion 
management, and emotion perception. Discussion now turns to another aspect of 
methodology pertinent to the current findings: effect sizes and replication.  
7.5.1 Effect sizes and replication 
Effect sizes across the present research were generally small, according to guidance for 
individual differences researchers suggesting r values of.10, .20, and .30 as relatively small, 
typical, and relatively large (Gignac & Szodorai, 2016). For statistically significant findings, 
the proportion of incremental variance explained by EI (i.e., change in R2) ranged between 1 




explained 4 - 5% of the variance in stress reactivity (Studies 1 and 2), and AEI emotion 
management explained 6% of the variance in affectivity to positive posts on social media 
(Study 3). The largest effect size emerged from study 2, whereby TEI self-control explained 
15% of the variance in individuals’ orientation away from sad faces. While small, the effect 
sizes yielded by the present research are not dissimilar to ‘typical’ effect sizes for EI. Recent 
meta-analyses often demonstrate small pooled effect sizes, with EI explaining 6% (TEI and 
affect, behaviour and cognition criteria; Andrei et al., 2016), 2 - 27% (TEI and biological 
variables; Sarrionandia & Mikolajczak, 2019), and 0.7 - 2.3% (EI and academic achievement; 
MacCann et al., 2020) of variance in criteria. Thus, small effect sizes for EI are not 
uncommon. Indeed, one recent perspective is that effect sizes in the EI field may be 
decreasing over time. A recent meta-meta-analysis (i.e., a meta-analysis of meta-analyses, 
covering 484 unique primary studies) observed a decline in effect sizes for TEI, but not AEI 
(Gong & Jiao, 2019). The authors suggest that their observed decline in TEI effect sizes could 
indicate that the TEI field may be experiencing a “replicability crisis” (Gong & Jiao, 2019), 
akin to the concerns applying to the field of psychology as a whole (Makel et al., 2012; 
Nelson et al., 2017). However, it seems plausible that the decline in effect sizes instead 
relates to changes in methodology.  
The EI field has seen (slightly) greater uptake in more robust approaches, which has 
included, for example, accounting for confounding influences, a growing use of 
experimental paradigms, and increasing interest in examining EI’s relationship with 
objective outcomes; (e.g., neurophysiological; physiological). With respect to the former, TEI 
studies are increasingly controlling for well-established confounds, namely personality and 
cognitive ability (e.g., di Fabio & Kenny, 2016; MacCann et al., 2020; Siegling et al., 2017), 




concept (Ferrando et al., 2010). After accounting for confounding influences, it would 
indeed follow that EI would explain less variance in outcomes, since the ‘overlap’ between 
EI and allied constructs would have previously been attributed to EI alone. For example, 
Study 1 demonstrated that TEI sociability and the Big Five trait agreeableness correlated 
significantly with each other, and both predicted less stress reactivity. Had agreeableness 
not been statistically controlled for, the effect size for TEI would have been falsely inflated. 
Another explanation for declining effect sizes in the EI field could relate to a change in the 
outcome measures being investigated. Whilst the quantity of ‘behavioural’ EI studies (often 
questionnaire-based) far outweighs those of a biological nature, neuropsychological and 
neurophysiological correlates of EI are of increasing interest in the attempt to link EI to 
health outcomes (for recent meta-analyses and reviews, see Sarrionandia & Mikolajczak, 
2019; Raz & Zysberg, 2015). As alluded to in the earlier chapters, the issues of circularity, 
contamination, and socially desirable responding may be exaggerating the relationship 
between TEI and questionnaire-based outputs (Day & Carroll, 2007; Keefer et al., 2018).  
For that reason, EI often relates more strongly to behavioural measures, than 
biological indices (Sarrionandia & Mikolajczak, 2019), including in the domain of stress 
reactivity (Lea et al., 2019). However, the present studies do not entirely support that 
observation, since significant findings were identified for both subjective and objective 
outcome measures, with approximately similar effect sizes across types of measure. It is not 
clear why this is the case, but could be a phenomena that features in adolescent sampling, 
for which little process-oriented research has been conducted with respect to EI. Although 
effect sizes are small in the present research, findings indicate that EI makes incremental 
contributions to aspects of affective, physiological, and cognitive stress regulation 




optimistic standpoint, small effect sizes could be an artefact of rigorous methodology, 
whereas earlier studies may have inadvertently overestimated the power of EI to uniquely 
predict important criteria (Gong & Jiao, 2019). Thus, a decline in effect sizes should not be 
viewed as a ‘failure’ or a ‘crisis’, but could perhaps signal that advances are leading us 
towards better quality research, and a clearer picture of how EI contributes to life 
outcomes. Interestingly, the present research only partially supported the notion that TEI 
relates more strongly to outcomes than AEI does (Martins et al., 2010). In their recent meta-
meta-analysis, Gong and Jiao (2019) found that average effect size of TEI (r = 0.27) was 
significantly higher than that of AEI (r = 0.16). The present study revealed that whether 
stronger effects were shown for TEI or AEI was dependent on the context (i.e., controlled or 
applied), and the outcome measure (i.e., objective or subjective; nature of the ER strategy).  
A broader criticism of psychological research as a whole is that effects often fail to 
replicate (Maxwell, Lau, & Howard, 2015). Replications are markedly rare in the EI field, with 
the exception of authors that replicate studies within their own laboratory group, often 
released as multi-study papers (e.g., Cooper & Petrides, 2010; Gohm, 2003; Mikolajczak & 
Luminet, 2007; Mikolajczak et al., 2009a; 2009b). Nonetheless, replications are sorely 
needed to strengthen the credibility of the field. In response to this, the present research 
included elements of replication. For example, study 2 mirrored a high-quality experimental 
study that examined EI and attentional allocation in adults (Davis, 2019), to investigate 
whether findings extended to adolescents. Findings differed considerably between the 
studies, demonstrating the need for replication to highlight those nuances. Furthermore, 
study 2 constituted a replication of the stress induction paradigm employed in Study 1. 
Importantly, the key role of TEI sociability was consistent across the two studies, 




7.6 Contributions to knowledge 
The programme of research makes significant contributions toward the existing body of 
knowledge within the EI field. The research is the first to examine how EI contributes to 
stress regulation processes in adolescents aged 16-18 years, an empirically neglected 
population. Whilst previous research has begun to explore such processes in young people 
(Ciarrochi et al., 2002; Davis & Humphrey, 2012a; 2014; Mikolajczak, et al., 2006), it was not 
known whether findings would also apply to older adolescents. Using Gross’ (1998a; 1998b) 
model of ER as a framework, the research considered the influence of EI on several ER 
processes, including situation selection, attentional allocation, cognitive change. and 
response modulation. The overriding finding was that different aspects of EI contribute 
differentially to those processes. For example, only the sociability TEI subscale influenced 
stress response modulation. Since most findings were only applicable to either specific 
subscales of TEI, or specific branches of AEI, investigating EI exclusively as a global construct 
may not be useful.  
Second, the research highlighted that in the quest to understand how EI works 
within stress trajectories, context matters. To reflect recommendations that the role of EI 
needs to be explored in different contexts, stress regulation processes were examined in 
both a controlled context (i.e., in a stress induction paradigm), and an applied context (i.e., 
on social media). Both approaches utilised different stressors (i.e., psychosocial stressor; 
exposure to emotive social media posts), and data collection environments (i.e., laboratory 
setting; online). Findings were strikingly different for those different contexts. When 
confronted with psychosocial stress under tightly controlled experimental conditions, 




social media, AEI showed greater relevance. To date, the vast majority of EI studies have 
focussed on TEI, rather than AEI (for reviews, see Gutiérrez-Cobo et al., 2016; Lea et al., 
2019; Resurrección et al., 2014). Findings from the programme of research suggest that 
both emotional self-efficacy (i.e., TEI) and emotion-cognitive skills (i.e., AEI) are beneficial 
for adolescents to some extent, but that different stress contexts ‘activate’ different aspects 
of each. Findings therefore indicate that the capacity of EI to buffer acute stress differs as a 
function of methodological and situational factors. As a result, future research should 
continue to measure the contributions of both constructs to ER processes. 
Third, while findings should be considered preliminary, and should not be used to 
directly inform the content of SEL or EI training programmes, they challenge some of the 
assumptions upon which such programmes are based. As discussed in detail in Chapter 1, 
the current zeitgeist of cultivating protective factors to produce resilient young people 
through emotional education has resulted in a plethora of EI training programmes. 
However, as there is heterogeneity in school ethos, practices, and extent to which 
interventions incorporate EI content explicitly, the evidence base concerning their 
effectiveness is mixed. The core issue is that, while well-meaning, policies and school 
curricula have been keen to embrace EI training interventions, before knowledge of EI is 
underpinned by rigorous scientific investigation (“the cart before the horse”) (Qualter et al., 
2007). Furthermore, there is a potential risk that current programmes are not age-
appropriate, as they are typically informed by data obtained from adult samples. The 
present programme of research has put forward evidence which indicates that, in older 
adolescents, the mechanisms underpinning EI are complex. Only certain aspects of EI seem 




dependent. Most SEL and EI training programmes rely on intuitive, idiosyncratic, or 
overinclusive accounts of EI (Zeidner et al., 2012a), but the current data suggest that 
approach may not be effective in developing ER strategies, at least from a stress-buffering 
perspective. Findings suggest potential pathways through which EI might lead to well-being. 
For example, perceived social competence may assist with handling psychosocial stress, 
while emotion management skill could help facilitate context-sensitive emotional responses 
on social media. Moreover, in addition to understanding more about how EI might be 
beneficial, findings also emphasise the importance of boosting emotional knowledge and 
skills in addition to emotional self-efficacy. However, to date, SEL interventions are primarily 
evaluated using self-reported (i.e., questionnaire-based) changes, akin to TEI (e.g., 
psychosocial adjustment; Ruiz-Aranda et al., 2012b; reductions in aggression; Castillo-
Gualda et al., 2017) rather than assessing changes in emotional skills explicitly (e.g., Durlak 
et al., 2011). This is something that should be addressed going forward. 
7.7 Limitations 
Whilst the research offers important contributions to knowledge, there are limitations that 
warrant consideration. Study-specific limitations were discussed in the respective chapters. 
For example, the STEU-B showed unacceptably low levels of reliability (Study 1), and the 
dot-probe paradigm may not have validly captured early attentional selection (Study 2). 
However, some limitations spanned multiple studies, including the ways in which ‘adaptive’ 
responding was ascertained, that causation cannot be inferred from the current set of 





The first limitation refers to the confidence with which the current findings imply 
adaptive behaviour. As noted by Matthews and colleagues (2002), “not only must we show 
that EI is associated with individual differences in processing, but those processing 
differences must have significant consequences for real-world functioning” (p. 233). 
Generally, findings were interpreted with respect to emotion theory to decipher whether 
the patterns observed for EI had implications for adolescent psychological adaptation. 
However, for all studies, it cannot be said with certainty whether EI corresponded with 
adaptive responding, since notable conflict exists within most aspects of the ER literature. 
The key study outcome for which such conflict exists relate to stress reactivity – a construct 
that describes the extent or capacity to which an individual responds to an acute stressor 
(Schlotz, 2013). While there is agreement that the network of systems that constitute the 
‘fight or flight’ response is a core structure shared by all humans, there are large and 
enduring differences between people in terms of the magnitude of their stress response 
(Shirtcliff et al., 2014). Indeed, some individuals experience powerful affective and biological 
responses, whereas others experience show little change from baseline. There are 
persistent, heated debates about what constitutes optimal reactivity to stress, and whether 
heightened (i.e., hyperarousal) or blunted reactivity (i.e., hypoarousal) poses more of a 
threat to adaptation (see Hu et al., 2016; Phillips et al., 2013). The conventional view (and 
the approach taken by this thesis) proposes that repeatedly exaggerated elevations of stress 
markers (e.g., cortisol, cardiac activity), can, over time, lead to a number of physiological 
and psychological illnesses (e.g., Brown, Gallagher, & Creaven, 2017; Chida & Steptoe, 2010; 
Lovallo, 2011), due to “chronic wear and tear” on the stress systems of the body (McEwen, 
2003; McEwen, 2004; McEwen, 2008). There is also evidence that suggests stress 




Arora et al., 2010; sport performance; van der Does et al., 2017; Rano et al., 2018; short-
term memory; Kuhlmann et al., 2005; Shields et al., 2017). Hyperreactivity can also act as a 
hallmark of clinical conditions (e.g., depression; O’Hara, Armeli, Boynton, & Tennen, 2014), 
though some dispute this (Hamilton & Alloy, 2016). Studies that have examined stress 
responding developmentally, usually show that compared to adults, adolescents tend to 
show heightened reactivity to acute stressors, both physiologically and behaviourally 
(Romeo, 2013; Stroud et al., 2009). Combined, the protracted maturation of emotional 
neuroanatomy in adolescence, that hyperreactivity can create a “perfect storm” for some, 
resulting in an increased risk for internalising and externalising problems (Ortiz & Raine, 
2004; Owens et al., 2018; Romeo, 2013). 
Taking the above evidence base into account, the findings of the present research 
would indicate that EI (specifically the TEI sociability subscale) corresponds with adaptive 
stress modulation, since higher sociability predicted smaller HR and NA increases under 
stress. However, there is a (somewhat smaller, but growing) body of evidence indicating 
that blunted stress reactivity can also be harmful, whereby diminished responses to 
stressors may signal poor long-term health outcomes (for reviews, see Carroll et al., 2009; 
Lovallo, 2011; Phillips et al., 2013). For example, blunted relationships between loneliness 
and cortisol reactivity are sometimes observed (Brown et al., 2017), and experiencing early 
childhood adversity has been associated with blunted reactivity, leading to impulsive 
behaviour in young adulthood (Lovallo, 2013). Diminished reactivity has also been shown to 
predict negative health behaviours, such as disordered eating, and a greater likelihood of 
smoking (Ginty, Whittaker, Higgs, Heaney, & Carroll, 2011; Ginty, Jones, Caroll, Roseboom, 
Phillips, Painter, & de Rooij, 2014). In light of those (albeit, cross-sectional) findings, TEI 




of such evidence is conducted within clinical or subclinical groups (e.g., lonely individuals), in 
contrast to the participants that took part in the present research (i.e., a non-clinical group). 
In addition, mental health was controlled for (using the HADS) in the present research, 
meaning that smaller stress responses were unlikely to be attributable to mental health 
conditions. Furthermore, individuals still showed some reactivity (i.e., their responses were 
not completely blunted/diminished). Another perspective suggests that whether an 
individuals’ stress response dynamics are beneficial (i.e., whether they should show hyper- 
or hyporeactivity) is dependent on the contexts, such as the stressor, the goals of the 
particular situation, and even the genetic profile of the individual (Ellis, Jackson, & Boyce, 
2006; Lovallo, 2011; Turner et al., 2020). Until theory and evidence unequivocally elucidates 
the nature of ‘healthy’ stress responding for individuals, and upon which contextual factors 
this is contingent, the extent to which the findings from Studies 1 and 2 can be interpreted 
is limited. The ‘threshold’ for adaptive stress reactivity in late adolescence certainly 
warrants further investigation.  
 That limitation regarding the challenges in determining ‘adaptive’ responses also 
extends to Study 3. As considered in the discussion section for that study, it is difficult to 
judge whether the findings regarding AEI and responding to social media posts confers 
adaptivity. This is because the effectiveness of chosen ER strategies is tied to the social 
context, and the nature of the goal to be achieved, which can be interpersonal (e.g., to 
avoid conflict), hedonic (e.g., to feel better), or instrumental (e.g., getting work done) 
(English et al., 2016). Due to the uncontrolled nature of the data collection environment 
(akin to ‘natural’ social media use), there may be no ‘rule’ as to what entails an adaptive 
response to a social media post for a particular adolescent, at any one point in time, and the 




within. Thus, while findings reinforce the context-dependent nature of EI’s workings, it 
would be premature to suggest that EI promotes adaptive ways of processing and regulating 
emotional information.  
A second shortcoming of the present programme of research is that causal 
relationships cannot be inferred, since the use of cross-sectional data restricts the scope of 
interpretations (Rutter, 2000). For example, high TEI (sociability) was associated with less 
stress reactivity in Studies 1 and 2. However, we cannot assume that sociability was solely 
responsible for that response pattern, in spite of the many variables that were controlled for 
in the regression analyses. There could still be an ability or disposition related to both 
reactivity and TEI that underlies that effect. For example, an adolescent’s family context 
(e.g., trauma history, exposure to violence, conflict in the home), can influence both stress 
reactivity (Hamilton & Alloy, 2016), and emotional response styles (e.g., Heleniak, King, 
Monahan, & McLaughlin, 2017). Future work could take a more longitudinal approach, 
which is markedly absent for studies examining EI and stress, particularly in adolescence. 
One way to achieve this would be to measure adolescents’ acute stress regulation both 
before and after an EI training intervention, whereby level of EI is manipulated. For 
example, subjective and physiological reactivity to the SSST (Study 1, Chapter 4) could be 
examined at baseline, and then again following an EI intervention. Changes in responding as 
a function of EI could then indicate a possible causal effect, and offer greater credence to 
the present set of findings. However, conducting such studies is hindered by the scope and 
effectiveness of currently implemented EI training interventions. As outlined in the 
introductory chapters, many SEL programmes (and subsequent evaluations) are not 
specifically designed to address EI, and the level of EI content in them is often insufficient 




measures at baseline or during post-study evaluations; most opt for outcomes considered to 
be influenced by increased EI, such as lower levels of depression and anxiety (Ruiz-Aranda et 
al., 2012), reductions in physical or verbal aggression (Castillo-Gualda et al., 2017), or 
teacher-ratings of prosocial behaviour (Humphrey et al., 2018). We therefore cannot be 
sure that such interventions successfully increase EI levels. Thus, it is not yet feasible to test 
whether stress regulation processes differ as a function of a change in EI levels. 
Comprehensive longitudinal studies charting the relationships between stress competencies 
and EI over time will be necessary to better understand the complexities of the stress-
buffering relationship.  
Third, it is not clear whether the participants recruited adequately represent the 
target population. Participants were all within the target age range (16-18 years), and were 
relatively equally distributed within that bracket, with 39.0 %, 32.7 %, and 28.3 % of 
participants aged 16, 17 and 18 years, respectively. However, of the 307 participants that 
took part in the current research, 77.2 % were female. While biological sex was controlled 
for in all analyses, such that sex would not have influenced the study outcomes, future 
studies could aim for a more equal split of males and females, and examine whether the 
effect of EI on acute stress responding is dependent on sex. Furthermore, the sample may 
not represent young people from all socioeconomic backgrounds. For Studies 1 and 2 
(Chapters 4 and 5), participants were recruited primarily from sixth form colleges, in the 
West Midlands of the UK. However, it is important to note that not all young people aged 
16-18 years are in full-time education. At the end of 2018, it was calculated that at least 
24.6 % of young people aged 16-18 years in the UK were not in full or part-time education 
(Department for Education, 2019). This is pertinent because young people classified as 




mental health issues (Rodwell, Romaniuk, Nilsen, Carlin, Lee, & Patton, 2018). Additionally, 
young people whom are NEET have a higher probability of experiencing further adversities, 
such as living in residential care, becoming incarcerated, and engaging with substance or 
alcohol misuse, which together result in a cumulative risk for psychological dysfunction 
(Murphy & Fonagy, 2013; Powell, 2019). Importantly, it is precisely for those vulnerable 
groups that EI has been highlighted as being an especially important protective marker for 
mental health and well-being (Moreno-Manso, García-Baamonde, Guerrero-Barona, Godoy-
Merino, Bázquez-Alonso, & González-Rico, 2015). EI may buffer the effects of stress 
differently, or work via different trajectories, in those vulnerable young people, whom may 
not be represented by the data acquired from the current research. In sum, the participant 
sample may not be representative of all adolescents aged 16-18, primarily due to issues 
concerning cultural and socioeconomic diversity. A worthwhile direction for future research 
could be to investigate whether adolescents from diverse backgrounds present different 
patterns of acute stress processing as a function of EI.  
7.8 Future directions 
There are several ways that the current research could be taken forward. There are ways in 
which the methods used could be adapted and refined, to help elucidate nuances in EI and 
ER and replicate current findings. However, future directions could also utilise alternative 
paradigms, to provide new perspectives on the notion of EI as a stress buffer in adolescence. 
Both ‘streams’ of potential future research will now be considered. 
A clear way that the present research could be expanded is by exploring whether the 
current set of findings generalise. The research focussed on two different stressors: 




multitude of different stressors have been explored in relation to EI (Lea et al., 2019). These 
include exposure to stressful material (e.g., watching an excerpt from a holocaust 
documentary; Petrides & Furnham, 2003), cognitive stress (e.g., a mathematical puzzle; 
O'Connor et al., 2017), competitive sports events (e.g., running marathon; Lane & Wilson, 
2011), or naturalistic stressors (e.g., a dental procedure; Aminabadi et al., 2013). The 
current research could be replicated in different stress contexts, to confirm external validity 
– or, alternatively (and more likely) – find that adolescents rely on different emotional traits 
and abilities in different situations. The importance of context in understanding emotional 
information processing has been noted by EI researchers previously; EI may relate to EIP and 
ER differently under different conditions (Veseley-Maillefer et al., 2018). In the case of the 
current research, for example, it could be that while sociability offers benefits in 
psychosocial contexts (as indicated by Studies 1 and 2), it may be redundant in situations 
where the stressor lacks an interpersonal element. One way to build on the foundation of 
Studies 1 and 2 could be to harness virtual reality (VR) technology, which has increasingly 
made its way into mainstream psychological research over the last two decades (Diemer, 
Alpers, Peperkorn, Shiban, & Mühlberger, 2015). VR presents a number of advantages 
afforded over traditional psychological experimentation, such as tighter control of the 
environment, and seemingly limitless possibilities for the creation of ecologically valid, 
salient stimuli. Evidence suggests that virtual environments are typically very effective in 
inducing social stress (Hartanto, Kampmann, Morina, Emmelkamp, Neerincx, & Brinkman, 
2014; Zimmer, Buttlar, Halbeisen, Walther, & Domes, 2019). With the exception of one 
study, which explored how EI related to acute stress in medical students, using a VR surgery 
simulator (Arora et al., 2011), the EI field has yet to utilise VR in stress or emotion-inducing 




be otherwise difficult to replicate in experimental settings, such as completing examinations 
with a large number of other people (which is a prominent cause of test anxiety in 
adolescents; Rüppel et al., 2015). This will be a valuable extension to the current findings. 
An alternative means of capturing EI and stress regulation ‘in action’ would be a daily diary 
approach, which could capture everyday stressors and the ER strategies (e.g., attention 
allocation; cognitive change; response modulation) used to tackle them. Such work is 
already underway in adults (e.g., Pekaar, Bakker, van der Linden, Born, & Sirén, 2018). 
However, to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, this approach has not yet been 
implemented with reference to EI and everyday stress in adolescents. Using a daily diary 
approach could illuminate whether current findings generalise to actual, real-life stressors in 
adolescents’ everyday lives. 
As the first of its kind, Study 3 (Chapter 6), along with its findings, should be 
regarded as a preliminary, with the potential to stimulate further research in EI and ER on 
social media. Whilst socially desirable responding was controlled for via inclusion of the 
BIDR-16, it cannot be assumed that self-reported social media responding represents 
everyday social media behaviour. Often, individuals’ self-reported social media activity does 
not reflect their actual activity. For example, one study demonstrated that social media 
users underestimate their smartphone usage by up to 40% (Lee, Ahn, Nguyen, Choi, & Kim, 
2017). This is particularly relevant, considering all outcomes in the social media study were 
measured through self-report. Whilst not necessary a limitation of the research, a logical 
extension of the work would be to test whether results replicate when objective measures 
are deployed. For example, rather than asking participants how drawn they were towards a 
particular social media post, dwell time on different types of posts could be calculated 




selection; situation modification) with differently valenced posts could be quantified using 
behavioural data, such as whether the participant ‘likes’ a post, and calculating the duration 
of time a participant spends watching different video posts. Such approaches to measuring 
social media behaviour (e.g., gaze tracking, scrolling time, clicks) has traditionally been 
applied within the field of consumer psychology (e.g., Kim, Hassan, White, & Zitouni, 2014), 
but would be a promising means of taking the current research forward, and of providing 
credence to the current findings. In addition to replicating and extending the methods 
utilised in the present research, as outlined above, there are alternative paradigms that 
could form important empirical developments. 
There would be much value in pursuing the role of emotional forecasting in the 
stress-buffering process with reference to EI. Emotional or affective forecasting represents 
the ability of an individual to predict their future feelings (Wilson & Gilbert, 2003). 
Preliminary work has begun to explore how EI feeds into those abilities. For example, Dunn 
et al. (2007) examined whether AEI (MSCEIT) or TEI (Self-Rated Emotional Intelligence Scale; 
SREIS) would be useful in helping participants predict how happy or sad they would feel in 
specific real-life situations (e.g., when they received their grades for coursework, 3 weeks 
later), with forecasting accuracy calculated as the absolute value of the difference between 
each participant’s affective forecast, and their actual affective experience for each event. 
Out of the four AEI branches, emotion management emerged as the sole predictor of 
forecasting accuracy. A later study (Hoerger, Chapman, Epstein, & Duberstein, 2012) 
comprehensively examined affective forecasting with respect to exposure to emotionally 
evocative pictures, using measures of both TEI (SREIS, TEIQue-SF, Survey of Emotional 
Intelligence), and AEI (Judgement of Emotions Test; Interpersonal Judgement Inventory; 




which they were provided a written description (e.g., “Police officers with nightsticks raised 
getting ready to beat a homeless man on the ground”). They were then exposed to the 
pictures one week later, and indicated their emotional responses. After controlling for 
cognitive functioning, three measures (TEIQue-SF well-being subscale, SREIS (Perceiving 
Emotions), and JET (global score) were associated with forecasting accuracy. Taken 
together, those studies indicate that EI helps with predicting one’s future emotional 
reactions.  
The present research could provide a foundation for future investigations to build on 
that work in an adolescent sample. For example, the ability to forecast future affective 
reactions could be one way through which EI relates to EIP on social media. In one potential 
study, adolescents could predict their affective reactions to emotive videos on social media, 
given only still previews (combining methodologies of Study 3 and Hoerger et al., 2012), and 
then provide their true affective reactions upon watching the video some time later. Given 
the crucial role that AEI played in Study 3, it could be that such effects relate to the ability to 
forecast future emotional responses to emotive material. In other words, adolescents with 
high EI may be able to regulate emotions effectively on social media because they are better 
placed to predict the emotional impact of content, and modify their behaviour accordingly. 
Similarly, the principle of affective forecasting could be applied to acute stress induction 
(akin to Studies 1 and 2). Individuals with high EI may be better able to predict how acutely 
stressful they would find a socially evaluative situation.   
7.9 Conclusion 
The present research makes significant contributions toward the existing body of knowledge 




effects of acute stress for young people, and thus represents a protective marker within 
resilience frameworks (e.g., Ciarrochi et al., 2002; Davis & Humphrey, 2012a; 2012b; 2014; 
Mikolajczak, et al., 2006), but there remains a pressing need to conduct more process-
oriented EI research (Peña-Sarrionandia et al., 2015). To address this, the present 
programme of work comprehensively investigated how and when EI contributes to stress 
regulation in late adolescence. While findings are mixed, EI makes unique contributions 
towards the prediction of stress regulation beyond the Big Five personality traits and 
cognitive ability. It would appear that whilst emotional self-efficacy (i.e., TEI) and emotional 
processing skills (i.e., AEI) do sometimes bestow protection for adolescents when faced with 
stressors, the mechanisms by which these operate differ substantially, with effects 
contingent on stressor context, and outcome measure. With respect to how EI moderates 
stress regulation, the research highlighted that EI emerged as a key predictor of ER 
processes within response trajectories (i.e., attentional deployment, cognitive change, 
response modulation; Gross, 1998a). However, EI’s effects are often very specific, and hinge 
on methodological factors. In terms of when EI contributes to stress responding, aspects of 
TEI prove pertinent when adolescents are confronted with psychosocial stress under tightly 
controlled experimental conditions (i.e., an active stressor) whereas AEI shows greater 
relevance upon exposure to highly emotive material on social media (i.e., a passive 
stressor). While the vast majority of EI studies to date have focussed on TEI, rather than AEI 
(Gutiérrez-Cobo et al., 2016; Lea et al., 2019; Resurrección et al., 2014), this work provides 
clear support for the construct differentiation of trait and ability approaches to the study of 
EI, and suggests both have the potential to offer valuable insight into adaptational 
behaviours. Although causation cannot be inferred from the current set of findings, the 




and represents a positive step forward in our pursuit to understand how EI might lead to 
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Justification for Study 1 Design 
The sections below provide theory and evidence-based justifications for the specific design 
choices made in relation to the stress induction procedure, and the analysis of related 
outcomes. 
Stress induction procedure 
In a controlled experimental setting, stress can be induced in a multitude of ways (for 
reviews, see Gunnar et al., 2009; Zhang, Yu, & Barrett, 2014). The specific emotions and 
physiological outcomes that emerge in a challenging situation are highly idiosyncratic, and 
depend on many stressor characteristics (i.e., levels of social evaluative threat, cognitive 
effort required; Denson et al., 2009). However, to meet traditional theoretical definitions of 
‘stress’ (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984), experimental stressors should be appraised as negative, 
unpredictable, and threatening, by the individual (Liu & Vickers, 2015).  
As identified by systematic review (Lea et al., 2019), studies that have examined the 
relationship between EI and stress reactivity vary considerably in the protocols used to 
induce stress. While 34% opted for passive methods, whereby participants viewed, read, or 
listened to emotional stimuli (e.g., video clips, Ciarrochi et al., 2001), most studies (66%) 
used more active/participatory methods of stress induction. In those, participants 
performed tasks that were deemed stressful due to their difficulty, unfamiliarity, time 
pressure, and/or the presence of an audience participants (e.g., completing a timed Tower 
of Hanoi task; O’Connor et al., 2017; giving an impromptu speech; Ling et al., 2018). 




performance tasks’ are generally deemed to be more ecologically valid methods of inducing 
stress (Fakhrhosseini & Jeon, 2017). In particular, psychosocial stressors – that induce stress 
through social evaluation – often demonstrate the largest effect sizes (Dickerson & Kemmy, 
2004), especially in adolescent populations (Gunnar et al., 2009). Part of this could be 
because public speaking tasks are thought to successfully mimic examinations (a source of 
stress for many young people, e.g., Rüppel et al., 2015; Zeidner & Matthews, 2005), due to 
the similar feelings as those associated with testing process; including the fear of failure, 
social evaluative threat, and a lack of control (Buck, 2016). 
The most widely used psychosocial stress protocol is the Trier Social Stress Test, 
which consists of a 10-minute waiting period, a 3-minute anticipatory period, a 5-minute 
public speaking task, and a 5-minute arithmetic test (TSST; Kirschbaum et al., 1993). The 
TSST is considered to be as the ‘gold standard’ for the induction of psychosocial stress 
protocols (Dickerson & Kemeny, 2004). However, the procedure is relatively complicated, 
and geared towards examining neuroendocrine responses, notably cortisol (Brouwer & 
Högervorst, 2014). In addition to its relatively long length, the TSST also requires a panel of 
judges dressed in white lab-coats, and a ‘business-like, equipped test room’, making it 
difficult to conduct in school-based settings. Furthermore, the TSST requires the participant 
to take on the role of a job applicant, which may not be the most relevant stressor for older 
adolescents (Buck, 2016).  
The Sing-a-Song Stress Test (SSST; Brouwer & Högervorst, 2014) is a relatively new, 
novel, but effective, psychosocial stressor where participants are instructed to sing a song 
(for protocol details, see Chapter 4, p.110). Akin to the TSST, the SSST is also performed in 




enhanced by the performance being video-recorded (purportedly for further analysis). 
While most adolescents may be seldom asked to sing in everyday life, evidence suggests 
that, in accordance to the stress-inducing potency of social evaluative threat, singing with an 
audience elicits considerable psychological stress (Harris, 2001; Hofmann, Moscovitch, & 
Kim, 2006). Importantly, while the magnitude of physiological stress achieved is comparable 
to that achieved by the TSST (Brouwer & Högervorst, 2014), the SSST is considerably 
shorter, and is much less resource-intensive. For example, recent evidence suggests that the 
SSST works equally well with a single experimenter (van der Mee, Duivestein, Gevonden, 
Westerink, & Geus, 2020). Furthermore, in contrast to the TSST and a number of other 
stress-inducing paradigms, body movements and sensory input are kept constant (i.e., the 
participant remains sitting down throughout), allowing physiological changes to be 
attributed exclusively to mental stress.  
In sum, the SSST was selected as the stressor for the present study, as it significantly 
induces both physiological and perceived stress (Brouwer & Högervorst, 2014), and presents 
practical utility, and a greater suitability for the target participants, over other tests such as 
the TSST (Kirschbaum et al., 1993). 
Measurement of stress reactivity and recovery 
Since no ‘gold standard’ measure of response to stressful stimuli exists (Mauss & Robinson, 
2009), the measurement of individuals’ responses to the SSST was given careful 
consideration. Because the stress pathway is complex, acute stress can be measured in a 
multitude of different ways. The full ‘fight or flight' response to stress involves arousal of 
both arousal the autonomic nervous system (ANS), and the somewhat faster HPA axis (e.g., 




include cardiac measures (including heart rate [HR], heart rate variability [HRV], blood 
pressure), cortisol secretion, electro-dermal activity (EDA), electroencephalography (EEG), 
and pupil dilation (Lea et al., 2019). HR was selected as an index for ANS reactivity in Study 
1, due to its capacity to represent general ANS reactivity to acute psychosocial stress 
(Cohen, et al., 1995), and its rapid response to stress in comparison to other indices (e.g., 
cortisol), which can often can demonstrate a large time-delay before levels increase (Tarullo 
& Gunnar, 2006). HR can also be captured easily and non-invasively, making it an ideal 
choice for school-based studies.  
While objective measurements are free from self-report biases, biomarkers are often 
not a reliable indicator of stress on their own, and should be applied together with self-
report questionnaires to contextualize the measurements (Campbell & Ehlert, 2012). 
Though many studies focus only one aspect of the stress response (i.e., objective or 
subjective stress), the present study also captured psychological stress reactivity, as 
indicated by change in self-reported affect. In the majority of EI and stress reactivity studies 
identified by the systematic review (Lea et al., 2019), participants' acute psychological stress 
was conceptualized as the change in negative affect (NA) from baseline, for which the most 
popular tool was the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson et al., 1988). To 
help with comparability between Study 1 and other published work, the NA scale of the 
PANAS was also used as a measure of psychological stress reactivity. 
Analysis of stress reactivity and recovery 
The study aimed to examine whether higher levels of EI predicted less stress reactivity 
under stressful conditions, when compared to a control group. To do this, hierarchical 




criterion. For this, EI was operationalised as a continuous variable, rather than being 
dichotomised through a median split approach. While others have used the latter approach 
(e.g., Davis, 2018b), avoiding artificial categorisation of psychological variables presents 
many benefits and often provides more meaningful interpretations of data (DeCoster, 
Gallucci, & Iselin, 2011). Treating EI as dichotomous could result in a loss of power, and 
increases in Type I errors (McClelland, Lynch, Irwin, Spiller, & Fitzsimons, 2015). Thus, the 
analytic strategy for the reactivity analyses was based upon that described by Matthews et 
al. (2006), where variables were added to the reactivity model in successive steps, including 
1) baseline state, (2) task condition, (3) covariates, along with their product vectors 
representing conditional effects, (4) EI, as a continuous variable, and (5) product vectors 
representing EI x task condition. The use of a hierarchical approach also allows incremental 
effects of EI to be tested, which addresses a core limitation often observed in previous 




















Dear [TITLE, LAST NAME] 
 
I am a PhD student from the Institute of Health and Society at the University of Worcester with a passion 
and research interest in adolescent mental health. I am writing to offer your school the opportunity to 
take part in a doctoral research project entitled ‘Emotions’ which is due to take place in the 
Worcestershire area. The aim of the project is to explore how young people (aged 16-18) use their 
emotional skills and abilities in different situations. Of particular interest is whether some of the ways 
young people recognise, understand, and use information about emotions (their own and others) are 
more effective than others. Knowing this could help us determine how best to help improve well-being 
and reduce the risk of developing mental health problems.  
  
My aim is to recruit up to 50 young people from your school. The initial study is in two parts. The first part 
(an anonymous tick-box survey about emotions, personality, and mental health) can be completed online 
at the students’ convenience. In the second part (which will take around 20 minutes), I will meet with 
students 1:1 and ask them to perform an unanticipated, mildly stressful task. Afterwards, I will ask 
students some questions about their coping strategies during the task. Delivery of all research would be 
entirely dependent on the convenience of the staff, young people and school timetable.  
  
All of my research has been approved by the University of Worcester Humanities, Arts and Social 
Sciences Research Ethics Committee (HASSREC), and I have undergone an enhanced DBS check 
(copy available on request). I hope to start the research at the beginning of the 2017 academic year. 
  
Taking part would reflect positively on your institution given the alignment of the research with the current 
educational agenda on building resilience, and social and emotional learning. This opportunity could also 
help students develop an understanding of the role and importance of research. Should your school 
participate in the study, I will be also be able to provide bespoke, aggregated feedback following collation 
of data from your students. This could be very useful in illuminating general mental health/well-being 
issues in the school, and identifying areas for potential intervention. Information on how school data 
compares with other participating schools could also be provided on request.  
  
Thank you for taking the time to consider taking part in my research. I will follow this letter up with 
telephone call in around 10 days. In the meantime, if you are interested in discussing the project further, 
please do get in touch via email (r.lea@worc.ac.uk). I am happy to come into the school personally if you 




BSc (Hons) Biology, MSc Psychology 
Appendix B: Study Recruitment Materials 










Dear [TITLE, LAST NAME] 
 
I am a psychology PhD student and Associate Lecturer from the University of Worcester, with a 
passion and research interest in adolescent mental health. I am writing to offer your school the 
opportunity to take part in a doctoral research project entitled ‘Looking at Emotions which is due 
to take place in the Worcestershire area. 
 
The aim of the project is to explore how young people (aged 16-18) use their emotional skills and abilities 
(emotional intelligence) in different situations. Of particular interest is whether emotionally intelligent 
young people are more adept at handling stress, and, more specifically, whether they process visual 
emotional information (e.g. faces) in a healthier way under pressure. As you are likely well aware, mental 
health problems are becoming more prevalent in this age group. Improved understanding of the link 
between emotional intelligence and stress will help with development of more evidence-based 
preventative strategies, with the purpose of reducing the prevalence of mental health issues in 
adolescents. 
 
My aim is to recruit up to 50 young people from your school. If possible, I would like to visit the school to 
introduce myself and speak directly with classes (this should take no longer than 10 minutes) to tell them 
about the study and invite them to take part. I feel this would be beneficial for Psychology students in 
particular as they would be able to learn about an example of psychology ‘in action’. The study itself is 
in two parts. The first part (an anonymous tick-box survey that assesses emotional intelligence, 
personality, mental health, and includes a video-based emotion recognition task) can be completed 
online at the students’ convenience, and will take around 25 minutes. In the second part (which will take 
around 45 minutes), I will meet with students 1:1 and ask them to perform an unanticipated (mildly 
stressful) task. Following the task, I will use a portable eye-tracker to monitor attention patterns (i.e., what 
the participant pays attention to). Delivery of all research would be entirely dependent on the convenience 
of the staff, young people, and school timetable.  
 
All of my research has been approved by the University of Worcester Humanities, Arts and Social 
Sciences Research Ethics Committee (HASSREC), and I have undergone an enhanced DBS check 
(copy available on request). I hope to start the research at the beginning of the 2018 academic year. 
 
Taking part would reflect positively on your institution given the alignment of the research with the current 
educational agenda on building resilience, and social and emotional learning. This opportunity could also 
help students develop an understanding of the role and importance of research. Feedback from my most 
recent research project at a local sixth form college was very positive - 100% of participants stated they 
would take part in research again. Should your school participate in the study, I will be also be able to 
provide a summary of the research findings following collation of data from your students.  
Appendix B: Study Recruitment Materials 








Thank you for taking the time to consider taking part in my research. I will follow this letter up with 
telephone call in around 10 days. In the meantime, if you are interested in discussing the project further, 
please do get in touch via email (r.lea@worc.ac.uk). I am happy to come into the school personally if you 





BSc (Hons) Biology, MSc Psychology 
Institute of Health and Society 




































Title of the Study: Emotional intelligence and social media 
Researchers (without academic titles): Rose Lea 
Institution: University of Worcester 
Web Address of Study:  -weblink to study- 
Brief Description of the Study:  
This study is part of my PhD research. It is investigating how we use emotional intelligence 
on social media. It will take approximately 35-45 minutes to complete. There are 3 parts: 
• In Part 1 - a video-based emotion recognition task. 
• In Part 2 - 6 brief questionnaires about your personality, emotions and well-being.  
• In Part 3 - an image-viewing task. This will involve viewing a newsfeed of posts, 
similar to a social media newsfeed. After this, you will be asked some short questions 
about how you felt about the posts that you have seen. Please note: for this part of 
the study, some of the content you will view can be considered offensive, such as 
violent pictures. If at any point you wish to stop the study, please close the browser 
window.  
To take part in the study, you must be between the ages of 16 and 18 years old, and use a 
browser capable of playing videos with sound. 
Ethics Review Information: Approved by the University of Worcester Ethics Committee, 
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Recruitment Email Template for Study 3 
 
 
 Appendix B: Study Recruitment Materials 
Recruitment Poster for Study 3 
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Appendix C: Measures 
Trait Emotional Intelligence Questionnaire – Adolescent Short Form (Petrides, 2009)  
Instructions: Please answer by ticking the number that best shows how much you agree or disagree 
with each sentence below. If you strongly disagree with a sentence, tick a number close to 1. If you 
strongly agree with a sentence, tick a number close to 7. If you're not too sure if you agree or 
disagree, tick a number close to 4. Work quickly, but carefully. There are no right or wrong answers. 
 
 Disagree        Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 It’s easy for me to talk about my feelings to other people        
2 I often find it hard to see things from someone else’s point of view        
3 I’m a very motivated person        
4 I find it hard to control my feelings        
5 My life is not enjoyable        
6 I’m good at getting along with my classmates        
7 I change my mind often        
8 I find it hard to know exactly what emotion I’m feeling        
9 I’m comfortable with the way I look        
10 I find it hard to stand up for my rights        
11 I can make other people feel better when I want to        
12 Sometimes, I think my whole life is going to be miserable        
13 Sometimes, others complain I treat them badly        
14 I find it hard to cope when things change in my life        
15 I’m able to deal with stress        
16 I don’t know how to show the people close to me that I care about them        
17 I’m able to “get into someone’s shoes” and feel their emotions        
18 I find it hard to keep myself motivated        
19 I can control my anger when I want to        
20 I’m happy with my life        
21 I would describe myself as a good negotiator        
22 Sometimes, I get involved in things I later wish I could get out of        
23 I pay a lot of attention to my feelings        
24 I feel good about myself        
25 I tend to “back down” even if I know I’m right        
26 I’m unable to change the way other people feel        




28 Sometimes, I wish I had a better relationship with my parents        
29 I’m able to cope well in new environments        









































Appendix C: Measures 
Situational Test of Emotional Management – Brief (Allen et al., 2015) 
Instructions: The following questions each describe an emotional situation, and ask you to choose 
the most effective course of action (from a possible 4) to manage the emotions the person is feeling 
and the problems they face in that situation. Although more than one course of action may be 
acceptable, you are choosing what you think is the most effective response. Remember, you are not 
necessarily choosing what you would do, or the nicest thing to do, but the most effective response 
for that situation. 
 
 
1. Wai-Hin and Connie have shared an office for years but Wai-Hin gets a new job and Connie loses contact 
with her. What action would be the most effective for Connie? 
(a) Just accept that she is gone and the friendship is over.  
(b) Ring Wai-Hin an ask her out for lunch or coffee to catch up.  
(c) Contact Wai-Hin and arrange to catch up but also make friends with her replacement.  
(d) Spend time getting to know the other people in the office, and strike up new friendships.  
 
2. Manuel is only a few years from retirement when he finds out his position will no longer exist, although he 
will still have a job with a less prestigious role. What action would be the most effective for Manual? 
(a) Carefully consider his options and discuss it with his family.  
(b) Talk to his boss or the management about it.  
(c) Accept the situation, but still feel bitter about it.  
(d) Walk out of that job.  
 
3. Surbhi starts a new job where he doesn’t know anyone and finds that no one is particularly friendly. What 
action would be the most effective for Surbhi? 
 (a) Have fun with his friends outside of work hours.  
(b) Concentrate on doing his work well at the new job.  
(c) Make an effort to talk to people and be friendly himself.  
(d) Leave the job and find one with a better environment.  
 
4. Andre moves away from the city his friends and family are in. He finds his friends make less effort to keep in 
contact than he thought they would. What action would be the most effective for Andre? 
(a) Try to adjust to life in the new city by joining clubs and activities there.  
(b) He should make the effort to contact them, but also try to meet people in his new city.  
(c) Let go of his old friends, who have shown themselves to be unreliable.  
(d) Tell his friends he is disappointed in them for not contacting him.  
 
5. Clayton has been overseas for a long time and returns to visit his family. So much has changed that Clayton 
feels left out. What action would be the most effective for Clayton? 
(a) Nothing – it will sort itself out soon enough.  
(b) Tell his family he feels left out.  
(c) Spend time listening and getting involved again.  
(d) Reflect that relationships can change with time.  
 




He and his wife decide it is worth relocating. What action would be the most effective for Daniel? 
(a) Realize he shouldn’t have applied for the job if he didn’t want to leave.  
(b) Set up a system for staying in touch, like weekly phone calls or emails.  
(c) Think about the great opportunities this change offers.  
(d) Don’t take the position.  
 
7. Mei Ling answers the phone and hears that close relatives are in hospital critically ill. What action would be 
the most effective for Mei Ling? 
(a) Let herself cry and express emotion for as long as she feels like.  
(b) Speak to other family to calm herself and find out what is happening, then visit the hospital.  
(c) There is nothing she can do.  
(d) Visit the hospital and ask staff about their condition.  
 
8. Shona has not spoken to her nephew for months, whereas when he was younger they were very close. She 
rings him but he can only talk for five minutes. What action would be the most effective for Shona? 
(a) Realize that he is growing up and might not want to spend so much time with his family any more.  
(b) Make plans to drop by and visit him in person and have a good chat.  
(c) Understand that relationships change, but keep calling him from time to time.  
(d) Be upset about it, but realize there is nothing she can do.  
 
9. Mina and her sister-in-law normally get along quite well, and the sister-in-law regularly baby-sits for her for 
a small fee. Lately she has also been cleaning away cobwebs, commenting on the mess, which Mina finds 
insulting. What action would be the most effective for Mina? 
(a) Tell her sister-in-law these comments upset her.  
(b) Get a new babysitter. 
(c) Be grateful her house is being cleaned for free.  
(d) Tell her only to baby-sit, not to clean.  
 
10. Juno is fairly sure his company is going down and his job is under threat. It is a large company and nothing 
official has been said. What action would be the most effective for Juno? 
(a) Find out what is happening and discuss his concerns with his family.  
(b) Try to keep the company afloat by working harder.  
(c) Start applying for other jobs.  
 (d) Think of these events as an opportunity for a new start.  
 
11. Mallory moves from a small company to a very large one, where there is little personal contact, which she 
misses. What action would be the most effective for Mallory? 
(a) Talk to her workmates, try to create social contacts and make friends.  
(b) Start looking for a new job so she can leave that environment.  
(c) Just give it time, and things will be okay.  
(d) Concentrate on her outside-work friends and colleagues from previous jobs.  
 
 
12. A demanding client takes up a lot of Jill’s time and then asks to speak to Jill’s boss about her performance. 
Although Jill’s boss assures her that her performance is fine, Jill feels upset. What action would be the most 
effective for Jill? 
 (a) Talk to her friends or workmates about it.  
(b) Ignore the incident and move on to her next task.  




(d) Think that she has been successful in the past and this client being difficult is not her fault.  
 
13. Blair and Flynn usually go to a cafe after the working week and chat about what’s going on in the company. 
After Blair’s job is moved to a different section in the company, he stops coming to the cafe. Flynn misses 
these Friday talks. What action would be the most effective for Flynn? 
 (a) Go to the cafe or socialize with other workers.  
(b) Don’t worry about it, ignore the changes and let Blair be.  
(c) Not talk to Blair again.  
(d) Invite Blair again, maybe rescheduling for another time.  
 
14. Michelle’s friend Dara is moving overseas to live with her partner. They have been good friends for many 
years and Dara is unlikely to come back. What action would be the most effective for Michelle? 
(a) Forget about Dara.  
(b) Spend time with other friends, keeping herself busy.  
(c) Think that Dara and her partner will return soon.  
(d) Make sure she keeps in contact through email, phone or letter writing.  
 
15. Hannah’s access to essential resources has been delayed and her work is way behind schedule. Her 
progress report makes no mention of the lack of resources. What action would be the most effective for 
Hannah? 
(a) Explain the lack of resources to her boss or to management.  
(b) Learn that she should plan ahead for next time.  
(c) Document the lack of resources in her progress report.  
(d) Don’t worry about it.  
 
16. Reece’s friend points out that her young children seem to be developing more quickly than Reece's. Reece 
sees that this is true. What action would be the most effective for Reece? 
(a) Talk the issue over with another friend.  
(b) Angrily confront her friend about making such statements.  
(c) Realize that children develop at different rates.  
(d) Talk to a doctor about what the normal rates of development are.  
 
17. Jumah has been working at a new job part-time while he studies. His shift times for the week are changed 
at the last minute, without consulting him. What action would be the most effective for Jumah? 
(a) Refuse to work the new shifts.  
(b) Find out if there is some reasonable explanation for the shift changes.  
(c) Tell the manager in charge of shifts that he is not happy about it.  
(d) Grumpily accept the changes and do the shifts.  
 
18. Julie hasn’t seen Ka for ages and looks forward to their weekend trip away. However, Ka has changed a lot 
and Julie finds that she is no longer an interesting companion. What action would be the most effective for 
Julie? 
(a) Cancel the trip and go home.  
(b) Realize that it is time to give up the friendship and move on.  
(c) Understand that people change, so move on, but remember the good times.  






Appendix C: Measures 
Situational Test of Emotional Understanding – Brief (Allen et al., 2014) 
Instructions: The following questions each describe a situation, and ask you to choose which of five 
emotions is most likely to result from that situation. 
Example: Clara receives a gift. Clara is most likely to feel? (a) Happy (b) Angry (c) Frightened (d) 
Bored (e) Hungry. If you think Clara would feel happy, you would tick the box for 'Happy' and then 
move onto the next question. 
 
1. Xavier completes a difficult task on time and under budget. Xavier is most likely to feel? 
(a) Surprise   
(b) Pride   
(c) Relief   
(d) Hope   
(e) Joy 
 
2. If the current situation continues, Denise's employer will probably be able to move her job to a location 
much closer to her home, which she really wants. Denise is most likely to feel? 
(a) Distress   
(b) Joy   
(c) Surprise   
(d) Hope   
(e) Fear 
 
3. Song finds out that a friend of hers has borrowed money from others to pay urgent bills, but has in fact used 
the money for less serious purposes. Song is most likely to feel? 
(a) Anger   
(b) Excitement   
(c) Contempt   
(d) Shame   
(e) Horror 
 
4. Charles is meeting a friend to see a movie. The friend is very late and they are not in time to make it to the 
movie. Charles is most likely to feel? 
(a) Depressed   
(b) Frustrated  
(c) Angry  
 (d) Contemptuous   
(e) Distressed 
 
5. Someone believes that another person harmed them on purpose. There is not a lot that can be done to 
make things better. The person involved is most likely to feel? 
(a) Dislike   




(c) Jealousy   
(d) Surprise   
(e) Anxiety 
 
6. Jim enjoys spending Saturdays playing with his children in the park. This year they have sporting activities on 
Saturdays and cannot go to the park with him any more. Jim is most likely to feel? 
(a) Angry   
(b) Sad   
(c) Frustrated   
(d) Distressed   
(e) Ashamed 
 
7. Megan is looking to buy a house. Something happened and she felt regret. What is most likely to have 
happened? 
(a) She didn't make an offer on a house she wanted, and now she is trying to find out if it is too late. 
(b) She found a house she liked that she didn't think she would find. 
(c) She couldn't make an offer on a house she liked because the bank didn't get her the money in 
time. 
(d) She didn't make an offer on a house she liked and now someone else has bought it. 
(e) She made an offer on a house and is waiting to see if it is accepted. 
 
8. Mary was working at her desk. Something happened that caused her to feel surprised. What is most likely to 
have happened? 
(a) Her work-mate told a silly joke. 
(b) She was working on a new task she hadn't dealt with before. 
(c) She found some results that were different from what she thought they would be. 
(d) She realized she would not be able to complete her work. 
(e) She had to do a task she didn't normally do at work. 
 
9. Someone thinks that another person has deliberately caused something good to happen to them. They are 
most likely to feel? 
(a) Hope   
(b) Pride   
(c) Gratitude   
(d) Surprise  
(e) Relief 
 
10. By their own actions, a person reaches a goal they wanted to reach. The person is most likely to feel? 
(a) Joy   
(b) Hope   
(c) Relief   
(d) Pride   
(e) Surprise 
 
11. An unwanted situation becomes less likely or stops altogether. The person involved is most likely to feel? 
(a) Regret   
(b) Hope   
(c) Joy   






12. Hasad tries to use his new mobile phone. He has always been able to work out how to use different 
appliances, but he cannot get the phone to function. Hasad is most likely to feel? 
(a) Distressed   
(b) Confused  
(c) Surprised   
(d) Relieved   
(e) Frustrated 
 
13. Dorian's friend is ill and coughs all over him without bothering to turn away or cover his mouth. Dorian is 
most likely to feel? 
(a) Anxiety   
(b) Dislike   
(c) Surprise   
(d) Jealousy   
(e) Rage 
 
14. Quan and his wife are talking about what happened to them that day. Something happened that caused 
Quan to feel surprised. What is most likely to have happened? 
(a) His wife talked a lot, which did not usually happen. 
(b) His wife talked about things that were different to what they usually discussed. 
(c) His wife told him that she might have some bad news. 
(d) His wife told Quan some news that was not what he thought it would be. 
(e) His wife told a funny story. 
 
15. A supervisor who is unpleasant to work for leaves Alfonso's work. Alfonso is most likely to feel? 
(a) Joy   
(b) Hope   
(c) Regret   
(d) Relief   
(e) Sadness  
16. The nature of Sara's job changes due to unpredictable factors and she no longer gets to do the portions of 
her work that she most enjoyed. Sara is most likely to feel? 
(a) Ashamed   
(b) Sad   
(c) Angry   
(d) Distressed   
(e) Frustrated 
 
17. Leila has been unable to sleep well lately and there are no changes in her life that might indicate why. Leila 
is most likely to feel? 
(a) Angry   
(b) Scared   
(c) Sad   






18. Someone believes another person has deliberately caused something good to stop happening to them. 
However, they feel they can do something about it. They are most likely to feel? 
(a) Angry   
(b) Contemptuous   
(c) Distress   




19. Matthew has been at his current job for six months. Something happened that caused him to feel regret. 
What is most likely to have happened? 
(a) He did not apply for a position he wanted, and has found out that someone else less qualified got 
the job. 
(b) He did not apply for a position he wanted, and has started looking for a similar position. 
(c) He found out that opportunities for promotion have dried up. 
(d) He found out that he didn't get a position he thought he would get. 






























Appendix C: Measures 
Mini International Personality Item Pool (Donnallan et al., 2006) 
Instructions: This section contains 20 phrases that describe various behaviours. Please use the rating 
scale to show how accurately each statement describes you. Be honest, and describe yourself as you 
generally are now, not as you wish to be in the future. Work quickly, but carefully. There are no right 












Am the life of the party      
Rarely feel blue      
Make a mess of things      
Have a vivid imagination      
Don’t talk a lot      
Have difficulty understanding 
abstract ideas 
     
Am not interested in abstract 
ideas 
     
Talk to a lot of different people at 
parties 
     
Feel others’ emotions      
Do not have a good imagination      
Get chores done right away      
Am relaxed most of the time      
Sympathise with others’ feelings      
Have frequent mood swings      
Get upset easily      
Am not interested in other 
people’s problems 
     
Keep in the background      
Often forget to put things back in 
their proper pace 
     
Like order      





Appendix C: Measures 
Vocabulary test from the Kit of Factor-Referenced Cognitive Tests (Ekstrom et al., 1976) 
Instructions: This is a test of your knowledge of word meanings. One of the four words in 
the drop-down list has the same, or nearly the same, meaning as the word above. Indicate 
which word you think is closest in meaning. 




Airtight Firm Light Sealed Plane sick 
Peddle Tattle Cheat Misrepresent Sell 
Raider Frontiersman Plunderer Murderer Cynic 
Energetically Inspiringly Skillfully Delightfully Vigorously 
Implicate Involve Remove Retaliate Exaggerate 
Gloaming Autumn Midnight Twilight Daybreak 
Legibleness Crookedness Amity Plainness Carelessness 
Laceration Cut Oration Tumour Flogging 
Jollification Capitulation Merrymaking Emancipation Teasing 
Willowy Lithe Windy Quiet Fickle 
Feline Guileness Fabulous Equine Catlike 
Dispiritedly Neglectfully Conspicuously Dishonourably Dejectedly 
Intricacy Delicacy Complexity Invisibility Hostility 
Excerpt Accept Extract Curtail Deprive 
Arrogance Contrariness Insubordination Haughtiness Vivacity 
Gallivant Serenade Gad about Plunder Espouse 
Sheik Priest Casque Shepherd Chief 










Appendix C: Measures 
Hospital and Anxiety Depression Scale (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983) 
Instructions: For each question, select the option that is closest to how you have been feeling in the 
past week. Don't take too long over your replies: your immediate is best.  
 D A  D A 
I feel tense or ‘wound up’:   I feel as if I am slowed down   
Most of the time  3 Nearly all the time 3  
A lot of the time  2 Very often 2  
From time to time, occasionally  1 Sometimes 1  
Not at all  0 Not at all 0  
      
I still enjoy the things I used to enjoy:   I get a sort of frightened feeling like 
‘butterflies’ in the stomach: 
  
Definitely as much 0  Not at all  0 
Not quite so much 1  Occasionally  1 
Only a little 2  Quite often  2 
Hardly at all 3  Very often  3 
      
I get a sort of frightened feeling as if 
something awful is about to happen: 
  I have lost interest in my appearance:   
Very definitely and quite badly  3 Definitely 3  
Yes, but not too badly  2 I don’t take quite as much care 2  
A little, but it doesn’t worry me  1 I take just as much care as ever 1  
Not at all  0  0  
      
I can laugh and see the funny side of things:   I feel restless, as if I have to be on the 
move: 
 3 
As much as I always could 0  Very much indeed  2 
Not quite as much now 1  Quite a lot  1 
Definitely not so much now 2  Not very much  0 
Not at all 3  Not at all   
      
Worrying thoughts go through my mind:   I look forward with enjoyment to 
things: 
  
A great deal of the time  3 As much as I ever did 0  
A lot of the time  2 Rather less than I used to 1  
From time to time, but not too often  1 Definitely less than I used to 2  
Only occasionally  0 Hardly at all 3  
      
I feel cheerful:   I get sudden feelings of panic:   
Not at all 3   
Very often indeed 
  
Not often 2  Quite often  3 
Sometimes 1  Not very often  2 
Most of the time 0  Not at all  1 
     0 
I can sit at ease and feel relaxed:   I can enjoy a good book or radio or TV 
programme: 
  
Definitely  0 Often 0  




Not often  2 Not often 2  



























Appendix C: Measures 
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (Watson et al., 1988) 
 
Instructions: This questionnaire lists a number of words that describe different feelings and 
emotions. Indicate to what extent you feel this way right now, at the present moment. 
Read each word and then list the number from the scale below next to each word.  
 
1       2   3          4               5 
          Very Slightly             A Little             Moderately             Quite a Bit             Extremely 
                      or Not at All  
 
_________ 1. Interested  
_________ 2. Distressed 
_________ 3. Excited 
_________ 4. Upset  
_________ 5. Strong 
_________ 6. Guilty  
_________ 7. Scared 
_________ 8. Hostile 
_________ 9. Enthusiastic 
_________ 10. Proud 
 
_________ 11. Irritable  
_________ 12. Alert 
_________ 13. Ashamed  
_________ 14. Inspired 
_________ 15. Nervous 
_________ 16. Determined 
_________ 17. Attentive 
_________ 18. Jittery 
_________ 19. Active 















Appendix C: Measures 
Coping Inventory for Task Stressors (Situational Version) (Matthews & Campbell, 1998) 
 
Instructions:  Think about how you dealt with any difficulties or problems that arose while you were 
performing the task. Below are some options for dealing with problems during the task (such as poor 
performance or negative reactions). Please indicate how much you used each option as a way of 
dealing with task you have just performed. To answer, circle one of the following answers: 
 
0       1    2          3               4 
           Not at all               A little bit                   Somewhat                  Very much              Extremely 
1. Worked out a strategy for successful performance 0 1 2 3 4 
2. Worried about what I would do next 0 1 2 3 4 
3. Stayed detached or distanced from the situation 0 1 2 3 4 
4. Decided to save my efforts for something worthwhile 0 1 2 3 4 
5. Blamed myself for not doing better 0 1 2 3 4 
6. Became preoccupied with my problems 0 1 2 3 4 
7. Concentrated hard on doing well 0 1 2 3 4 
8. Focussed my attention on the task 0 1 2 3 4 
9. Acted as though the task wasn’t important 0 1 2 3 4 
10. Didn’t take the task too seriously 0 1 2 3 4 
11. Wished that I could change what was happening 0 1 2 3 4 
12. Blamed myself for not knowing what to do 0 1 2 3 4 
13. Worried about my inadequacies  0 1 2 3 4 
14. Made every effort to achieve my goals 0 1 2 3 4 
15. Blamed myself for becoming too emotional 0 1 2 3 4 
16. Was single-minded and determined to overcome problems 0 1 2 3 4 
17. Gave up any attempt to do well 0 1 2 3 4 
18. Told myself it wasn’t worth getting upset 0 1 2 3 4 
19. Was careful to avoid mistakes 0 1 2 3 4 
20. Did my best to follow the instructions for the task 0 1 2 3 4 






Appendix C: Measures 
Thoughts Questionnaire (Negative Subscale) (Edwards, Rapee, & Franklin, 2003) 
Instructions: How often have you experienced the following thoughts about the task since it 
finished? Please circle a number for each statement using the key below:  
0                         1                   2             3             4 
             Never                      Not often                 Sometimes                  Often                  Very often 
 
1. I could have done much better 0 1 2 3 4 
2. How anxious I felt 0 1 2 3 4 
3. I should have chosen a different song 0 1 2 3 4 
4. If my blushing/sweating/dry mouth/shaking was obvious 0 1 2 3 4 
5. How bad my singing was 0 1 2 3 4 
6. I made a fool of myself 0 1 2 3 4 
7. How I always do badly in that type of situation 0 1 2 3 4 
8. I must have looked stupid 0 1 2 3 4 
9. How self-conscious I felt 0 1 2 3 4 
10. What a failure I was 0 1 2 3 4 
11. How many mistakes I made 0 1 2 3 4 
12. How awkward I felt 0 1 2 3 4 
13. How fast my heart was pounding  0 1 2 3 4 
14. I didn’t make a good impression 0 1 2 3 4 










Appendix C: Measures 
Big Five Personality Inventory-10 (Rammstedt & John, 2007) 
Instructions: How well do the following statements describe your personality? 
 












… is reserved      
… is generally trusting      
… tends to be lazy      
… is relaxed, handles stress well      
… has few artistic interests      
… is outgoing, sociable      
… tends to find fault with others      
… does a thorough job      
… gets nervous easily      












Appendix C: Measures 
Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding Short Form (Hart et al., 2015) 
 
Instructions: Please read the following statements and rate how true they are when thinking about 
your own thoughts and behaviours. There are no right or wrong answers. 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Not true                                   Somewhat true                                                Very true 
 
I have not always been honest with myself. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I always know why I like things. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
It’s hard for me to shut off a disturbing thought. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I never regret my decisions. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I sometimes lose out on things because I can’t make up my mind soon 
enough. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I am a completely rational person. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I am very confident in judgements. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I have sometimes doubted my ability as a lover. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I sometimes tell lies if I have to. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I never cover up mistakes. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
There have been occasions when I have taken advantage of someone. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I have said something bad about a friend behind his or her back. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
When I hear people talking privately, I avoid listening. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I never take things that don’t belong to me. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 







Appendix C: Measures 
Impulse Control Scale from the Short Self-Regulation Questionnaire (Neal & Carey, 2005) 
 
Instructions:  Please rate how well each statement describes you. Work quickly and don’t think too 














I don’t notice the effects of my 
actions until it’s too late. 
     
I put off making decisions.      
It’s hard for me to notice when I’ve 
‘had enough’ (alcohol, food, sweets) 
     
I have trouble following through 
with things once I’ve made up my 
mind to do something. 
     
I don’t seem to learn from my 
mistakes. 
     
I usually only have to make a 
mistake once in order to learn from 
it. 
     
I can usually find several different 
possibilities when I want to change 
something. 
     
Often, I don’t notice what I’m doing 
until someone calls it to my 
attention. 
     
I usually think before I act.      
I learn from my mistakes.      






Appendix C: Measures 
Subjective Happiness Scale (Lyubomirsky & Lepper, 1999) 
 
Instructions:  For each of the following statements and/or questions, please indicate on the scale 
how appropriate it is in describing you. 
 
1. In general, I consider myself: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not a very 
happy 
person 






2. Compared to most of my peers, I consider myself: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 





3. Some people are generally very happy. They enjoy life regardless of what is going on, getting 
the most out of everything. To what extent does this describe you? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 





4. Some people are generally not very happy. Although they are not depressed, they never 
seem as happy as they might be. To what extent does this describe you? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not a very 
happy 
person 














Appendix C: Measures 
Satisfaction with Life Scale (Diener et al., 1985) 
 
Instructions:  Below are five statements that you may agree or disagree with. Using the 7-item scale, 
indicate your agreement with each statement. Please be open and honest in your responding. 
7 – Strongly agree 
6 – Agree 
5 – Slightly agree 
4 – Neither agree nor disagree 
3 – Slightly disagree 
2 – Disagree 
1 – Strongly disagree 
 
 
_________ In most ways my life is close to ideal. 
_________ The conditions of my life are excellent. 
_________ I am satisfied with my life. 
_________ So far, I have gotten the most important things I want in life. 


















Appendix C: Measures 
Passive Active Use Measure (Gerson et al., 2013) 
 
Instructions:  How frequently do you perform the following activities when you are on Facebook? 
(Note: Choosing “Very Frequently” means that about 100% of the time that you log on to Facebook, 














Posting updates      
Commenting (on statuses, 
posts, photos etc.) 
     
Private messaging      
Checking to see what 
someone is up to 
     
Creating or RSVPing to 
events 
     
Posting photos      
Tagging photos      
Viewing photos      
Posting videos      
Tagging videos      
Browsing newsfeed passively 
(without liking or 
commenting on anything) 
     
Browsing newsfeed actively 
(liking and commenting) 
     
Looking through friends’ 
profiles/updates 









Sing-a-Song Stress Test (PowerPoint Slides) (Brouwer & Hogervorst, 2014) 
 
Slide 1.  
Breathing exercise 
Slide 2.  
Mood questionnaire 1 (PANAS) 
Slide 3.  
Instructions 
   
Slide 4.  
Neutral statement 1 
Slide 5.  
Neutral statement 2 
Slide 6.  
Neutral statement 3 




Slide 7.  
Neutral statement 4 
Slide 8.  
Stress-inducing statement 1 
Slide 9.  
Stress-inducing statement 2 
 
  
Slide 10.  











Control Task (from Davis, 2018) 
 
Participants read a magazine article (Deary & Maltby, 2013), and were then presented with the 
following questionnaire. 
 
Instructions: Below are some questions about the presentation style of the article you have just 
read.  Please indicate your response to each item by circling the appropriate phrase. There are no 
right or wrong answers. 
 
1. How interesting did you find the subject of this article? 
5 4 3 2 1 
Very interesting Fairly interesting So-so Fairly boring Very boring 
 
2. Was this article clearly presented (i.e., text size, formatting, images?) 










3. Do you feel you have learnt anything new from reading this article? 
5 4 3 2 1 
Very much so A little Don’t know Not really Definitely not 
 
4. Overall, how easy was this article to read? 
5 4 3 2 1 
Very easy to read Fairly easy to 
read 
So-so Fairly difficult to 
read 
Very difficult to 
read 
 





Appendix F: Participant Information Packs 
Study 1: Participant Information Sheet 
 
Participant Information Sheet 
     Title of Project: Emotions 
Researcher: Rose Lea 
Invitation 
I would like to invite you to take part in a research project. Before you decide 
whether to take part it is important that you understand why the research is 
being done and what it will involve. Please take time to read this carefully and 
ask Rose if you have any questions about the study. You can also speak your 
teachers about the study if you feel this would be helpful. 
What is this study for? 
This study will try and improve understanding of how we use our emotions in 
different situations, and how this differs between young people. 
Why have I been asked to take part? 
You have received this invitation because you are a student aged 16-18 years 
old. I am hoping to recruit 75 students from your school to take part. 
Do I have to take part? 
No. If you are interested in psychology or research, you may find the experience 
useful, but it is up to you to decide if you want to take part. You can withdraw 
from the study at any time, and you can request for your data to be withdrawn 
up to 2 weeks after data collection. If you would like to have your data 
withdrawn please contact Rose with your participation code and your data will 
then not be used. To take part, you and a parent/guardian will be need to sign 
the consent form.  
What will happen to me if I agree to take part? 
There are two parts to the study (both are required). If you agree to take part: 
Part 1 (online):  
• You will be sent an online link via email 
• You will complete 6 online tick-box questionnaires about your personality, 




• You can stop and resume this part of the study as long as all is completed 
within 1 week (select ‘finish later’ and follow the instructions). This part should 
take no longer than 30 minutes in total 
Part 2 (face-to-face): 
• You will be invited to meet with Rose at a time that suits you (you will be given 
a choice of time slots to choose from) 
• When you arrive, you will be asked to put on a wristband that measures your 
physical state (it will feel like wearing a wristwatch) 
• First, you will in a short questionnaire about how you are feeling 
• You will then be asked to read some material, and at some point you may be 
asked to take part in a task 
• Afterwards, you will fill in questionnaires about how you felt during the task 
• You will then watch a short (3 minute) video and fill in the last questionnaire 
• At the end, I will give you more information on what the study was about 
 
Are there any disadvantages risks to taking part? 
If you get upset or anxious easily, we suggest you do not take part in this study. 
There is a possibility you may find the task stressful, but it is unlikely this will be 
extreme or last very long. The stress you feel should not be beyond that 
encountered in everyday life. However, if you don’t want to continue, you can 
stop at any time and do not have to give a reason. If you feel you need to talk to 
someone after taking part, you can contact the Samaritans by phone (116 123) 
or via email (jo@samaritans.org). If you would prefer to talk in person, your 
school offers a counselling service. All of these services are free of charge. 
 
Will the information I give stay confidential? 
Everything you say as part of the research is confidential unless you tell me 
something that suggests that you or someone else is at risk of harm. I would 
discuss this with you before telling anyone else. The responses you give may be 
used for a research report, but it will not be possible to identify you from the 
research report or anything else. Information that personally identifies you (e.g. 
name and contact details) will not be collected, and you will instead be given a 
research participation number. The research data will be stored securely on the 
researcher’s password-protected device and may be kept for up to 10 years. 
 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
 This research is being carried out as part of my PhD at the University of 
Worcester. The findings of this study will be reported as part of my research 





Who is in charge of the research?   
Rose is the primary researcher. This research has been approved according to the 
University of Worcester Ethics Policy. 
 
What happens next? 
If you would like to take up this opportunity, please fill in and return the consent form 
to your teacher. Your parent/legal guardian will also need to sign the form. Please 
keep this information sheet. If you have any questions or concerns, please contact the 




If you would like to speak to someone who is not a member of the research team, 
please contact Dr John-Paul Wilson (Deputy Pro-Vice Chancellor Research) or 
Louise Heath (Research Support Officer) at the University of Worcester, using the 





Graduate Research School 
University of Worcester  
Henwick Grove 


















Jenny Lind Building 1013 
Henwick Grove 





Appendix F: Participant Information Packs 






Your son/daughter has been offered the opportunity to take part in an exciting psychology 
research project, entitled ‘Emotions’. This letter should provide some information about the 
study to help you decide whether or not you consent to your son/daughter taking part. 
 
About the Emotions project 
 
As you may be well aware, mental health problems affect at least 1 in 10 young people, 
and this figure is likely to increase. The aim of the project is to explore how young people 
(aged 16-18) use their emotional skills and abilities in different situations. Knowing this 
could help us determine how best to help improve well-being and reduce the risk of 
developing mental health problems in the future. The research is in two parts (Part 1: online 
questionnaires; Part 2: a face-to-face task) – please read the attached Information Sheet 
for more details.  
 
What are the benefits/risks of taking part? 
 
Students will get to see what it is like to take part in a real life experiment! Many students 
cover research methods in their A levels, and this is a chance to see research ‘in action’. It 
may also be a useful experience for students to talk about in UCAS personal statements 
and interviews when applying for University - many courses will involve carrying out 
research projects in the final year. The opportunity will be especially beneficial for students 
studying Psychology or any health-related subjects at AS and A Level.  
There is a possibility that students may find the task in Part 2 mildly stressful, but it is 
unlikely this will be extreme or last very long. Therefore, it is not recommended that students 












given guidance on where to get support if they need it. The researcher has undergone an 
enhanced DBS check and the research has been given full ethical approval.  
 
Thank you for taking the time to read this information. Please email me, Rose 
(r.lea@worc.ac.uk), or [Staff Details Here], if you have any questions. If you consent to your 
son/daughter taking part, please ensure the attached consent form is signed and returned 





BSc (Hons) Biology, MSc Psychology 
Institute of Health and Society 
University of Worcester 
























Appendix F: Participant Information Packs 



































Appendix F: Participant Information Packs 
Study 2: Participant Information Sheet 
 
Participant Information Sheet 
     Title of Project: Looking at Emotions 
Researcher: Rose Lea 
Invitation 
I would like to invite you to take part in a research project. Before you decide 
whether to take part it is important that you understand why the research is 
being done and what it will involve. Please take time to read this carefully and 
ask Rose if you have any questions about the study (r.lea@worc.ac.uk). You 
can also speak to any of your teachers about the study if you feel this would be 
helpful. 
What is this study for? 
This study will try and improve understanding of how we use our emotions in 
different situations, and how this differs between young people. 
Why have I been asked to take part? 
You have received this invitation because you are a student aged 16-18 years 
old. I am hoping to recruit 50 students from your college to take part. 
Do I have to take part? 
No. It is up to you to decide whether or not you want to take part in this study. 
You can decide not to take part or to withdraw from the study at any time, and 
you can request for your data to be withdrawn up to 2 weeks after data 
collection. If you would like to have your data withdrawn please contact Rose 
with your participant ID and your data will then not be used. If you do decide to 
take part you will be asked to sign a consent form.  
What will happen to me if I agree to take part? 
There are two parts to the study. If you agree to take part: 
 
 
Part 1 (online):  




• You will be asked to complete a consent form 
• You will complete a video-based emotion recognition task, 4 online tick-box 
questionnaires about your personality, emotions and mental health, and a 
short word task 
• You can stop and resume this part of the study as long as all is completed 
within 1 week (just keep your login number given to you by the website).  
 
Part 2 (face-to-face experiment): 
• After completing Part 1, you will be invited to meet with Rose at a time that 
suits you (you will be given a choice of time slots to choose from) 
• You will then take part in 2 tasks 
• During the experiment, your physical responses will be measured using a 
wristband (it will feel like wearing a wristwatch). For task 2, an eye-tracker will 
monitor what you are looking at on a screen 
• You may find the first task stressful, but is it important that you remember you 
can stop at any time, without giving a reason 
• After both tasks you will fill in a short questionnaire about your thoughts 
throughout the task 
• You will then watch a short (2 minute) video 
• At the end, I will give you more information on what the study was about 
 
Part 1 will take approximately 25 minutes, and Part 2 will take approximately 45 
minutes. 
Are there any risks to taking part? 
If you get upset or anxious easily, we suggest you do not take part in this study. 
You may find one of the tasks stressful, but it is unlikely this will be extreme or 
last very long. However, if you don’t want to continue, you can stop at any time 
and do not have to give a reason. If you feel uncomfortable after taking part, 
you may find it useful to read some information on coping with stress using the 






If you feel you need to talk to someone after taking part, you can contact the 
Samaritans by phone (116 123) or via email (jo@samaritans.org). If you would 
prefer to talk in person, your school offers a counselling service (*insert 





Will the information I give stay confidential? 
Everything you say as part of the research is confidential unless you tell me 
something that suggests that you or someone else is at risk of harm. I would 
discuss this with you before telling anyone else. The responses you give may be 
used for a research report, but it will not be possible to identify you from the 
research report or anything else. Information that personally identifies you (e.g. 
name and contact details) will not be collected, and you will instead be given a 
research participation number. The research data will be stored securely on the 
researcher’s password-protected device and may be kept for up to 10 years. 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
This research is being carried out as part of my PhD at the University of 
Worcester. The findings of this study will be reported in my PhD write-up and 
may also be published in academic journals or at conferences. I may revisit the 
college to present my research findings to students that have taken part. 
Who is in charge of the research?   
This research has been approved according to the University of Worcester Ethics Policy. 
What happens next? 
If you do decide to take part, or have any questions or concerns, please contact the 




If you would like to speak to an independent person who is not a member of the 
research team, please contact Karen Dobson (Research Knowledge and 
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Your son/daughter has been offered the opportunity to take part in an exciting psychology 
research project, entitled ‘Looking at Emotions’. This letter should provide some information 
about the study to help you decide whether or not you consent to your son/daughter taking 
part. 
 
About the Looking at Emotions project 
 
As you may be well aware, mental health problems affect at least 1 in 10 young people, 
and this figure is likely to increase. The aim of the project is to explore how young people 
(aged 16-18) use their emotional skills and abilities in different situations. Knowing this 
could help us determine how best to help improve well-being and reduce the risk of 
developing mental health problems in the future. The research is in two parts (Part 1: online 
questionnaires; Part 2: two face-to-face tasks) – please read the attached Information 
Sheet for more details.  
 
What are the benefits/risks of taking part? 
 
Students will get to see what it is like to take part in a real life experiment! Many students 
cover research methods in their A levels, and this is a chance to see research ‘in action’ 
using cutting edge eye-tracking technology. It may also be a useful experience for students 
to talk about in UCAS personal statements and interviews when applying for University - 
many courses will involve carrying out research projects. The opportunity will be especially 
beneficial for students studying psychology or health-related subjects.  
 
There is a possibility that students may find Part 2 stressful, but it is unlikely this will be 












get upset or anxious easily. Students can stop at any point, and will be given guidance on 
where to get support if they need it. The researcher (Rose) has undergone an enhanced 
DBS check and the research has been given full ethical approval from the University.  
 
Thank you for taking the time to read this information. Please email me, Rose 
(r.lea@worc.ac.uk), or the head of sixth form, [Details Here), if you have any questions. If 
you consent to your son/daughter taking part, please ensure the attached consent form is 
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Appendix F: Participant Information Packs 
Study 3: Participant Information Sheet and Consent Form (Embedded in Online Survey) 
 
Participant Information Sheet 
     Title of Project: Emotional Intelligence and Social Media 
Researcher: Rose Lea 
Invitation 
I would like to invite you to take part in a research project. Before you decide 
whether to take part it is important that you understand why the research is 
being done and what it will involve. Please take time to read this carefully and 
ask Rose if you have any questions about the study. You can also speak to any 
of your teachers about the study if you feel this would be helpful. 
What is this study for? 
This study will try and improve understanding of how we use our emotions on social 
media, and how that differs between young people. 
Why have I been asked to take part? 
You have received this invitation because you are a student aged 16-18 years. I 
am hoping to recruit at least 100 participants for this study. 
Do I have to take part? 
No. It is up to you to decide whether or not you want to take part in this study. 
You can decide not to take part or to withdraw from the study at any time, and 
you can request for your data to be withdrawn up to 2 weeks after data 
collection. If you would like to have your data withdrawn please contact Rose 
with your participant ID and your data will then not be used. If you do decide to 
take part you will be asked to sign a consent form.  
What will happen to me if I agree to take part? 
All parts of the study are online, and can be completed on a computer, laptop, tablet, 




• Part 1: You will complete a video-based emotion recognition task. Please 
note, for this part of the study, you will need access to sound either through 
the device speaker or headphones. 
• Part 2: You will complete 6 brief questionnaires about your personality, 
emotions, and wellbeing, and a short word task. 
• Part 3: You will take part in an image-viewing task. This will involve viewing a 
newsfeed of posts, similar to a social media newsfeed. After that, you will be 
asked some short questions about how you felt about the posts that you have 
seen. Please note: for this part of the study, some of the content you will view 
can be considered offensive, such as violent pictures. If at any point you wish 
to stop the study, please close the browser window, or press the “exit survey” 
button, which will take you straight to the end. 
• At the end, you will be given the option of watching a short video. I will give 
you more information on what the study was about. 
 
You can stop and resume the study as many times as you like before the study 
closes on the 31st July 2018. To resume the study, just keep your login number given 
to you by the website. The study should take approximately 35-45 minutes in total. 
 
Are there any disadvantages risks to taking part? 
There is a possibility you may find the viewing of the images in the study 
distressing. But, it is unlikely this will be extreme or last very long. However, if 
you don’t want to continue, you can stop at any time by exiting the browser 
window without having to give a reason. If you still feel some discomfort after 
taking part, you may find it useful to read some information on coping with 







Will the information I give stay confidential? 
Everything you say as part of the research is confidential unless you tell me 
something that suggests that you or someone else is at risk of harm. I would 
discuss this with you before telling anyone else. The responses you give may be 




research report or anything else. Information that personally identifies you (e.g. 
name and contact details) will not be collected. Any contact you have with me 
(the researcher) will use your participant ID generated at the start of the study. 
The research data will be stored securely on the researcher’s password-
protected device and may be kept for up to 10 years. 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
 This research is being carried out as part of my PhD at the University of 
Worcester. The findings of this study will be reported as part of my research 
reports and may also be published in academic journals or at conferences.  
Who is in charge of the research?   
This research has been approved according to the University of Worcester Ethics Policy. 
What happens next? 
Please keep a copy this information sheet. If you would like to take part in the study, please 
continue onto the next page. If you have any questions or concerns, please contact the 




If you would like to speak to an independent person who is not a member of the 
research team, please contact Dr John-Paul Wilson (Deputy Pro-Vice Chancellor 
Research) or Louise Heath (Research Support Officer) at the University of 





Graduate Research School 
University of Worcester  
Henwick Grove 











Jenny Lind Building 1013 
Henwick Grove 





Participant Consent Form 
 
Title of Project: Emotional Intelligence and Social Media 
 
Name of Researcher:   Rose Lea  
   
     




I confirm that I have read and understood the information 
sheet for the above study and have had the opportunity to ask 
questions. 
  
    
2
.  
I confirm that I have had enough time to consider whether  






I understand that I do not have to take part and I can change 
my mind at any time by exiting the browser.  
 
I understand that I can withdraw my data by contacting the 




   
 
 I am aware that I will see potentially distressing images as 
part of the study. 
 
I agree to my answers to the questions being used in 







I have been made aware of support services that are available 
if I need them. 
 
I know who to contact if I have any concerns about this 
research. 
 





























Appendix H: Study 1 Descriptive Statistics by Experimental Condition 
Table H1: Stress Condition 
Correlations and Whole-Sample Descriptive Statistics for EI, HR, Stress Reactivity and Stress Recovery under Stressful Conditions (N = 30) 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1. TEI: total - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
2. TEI: EM .81*** - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
3. TEI: SC .81*** .51** - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
4. TEI: SO .80*** .57** .51** - - - - - - - - - - - - 
5. TEI: WB .90*** .57** .73*** .67*** - - - - - - - - - - - 
7. AEI: EM .55** .61*** .37* .28 .40* - - - - - - - - - - 
8. HR1 .13 .03 .07 .23 .05 .20 - - - - - - - - - 
9. HR: REACT -.03 -.00 .27 -.47* -.01 .09 -.24 - - - - - - - - 
10. HR: REC -.07 -.11 -.24 .35 -.06 -.34 -.09 -.83*** - - - - - - - 
11. PA1 .48** .37* .24 .38* .50** .35 .13 -.01 -.15 - - - - - - 
12. PA: REACT -.16 -.12 .03 -.18 -.23 -.18 .01 -.02 .13 -.62*** - - - - - 
13. PA: REC -.03 .02 -.17 .05 .00 -.05 -.01 -.06 -.03 .26 -.75*** - - - - 
14. NA1 -.59*** -.47** -.61* -.42* -.47** -.53** -.26 .12 -.01 -.26 .16 .00 - - - 
15. NA; REACT -.23 -.07 .24 -.21 .20 -.03 -.07 .08 -.17 .06 -.49** .69*** .02 - - 
16. NA: REC .33 .08 .36 .34 .29 .13 .12 -.10 .13 .06 .34 -.60*** -.19 -.83*** - 
M 4.38 4.72 3.91 4.85 4.25 10.19 72.52 14.74 -13.34 27.50 -.10.03 5.90 15.27 9.40 -12.27 
(SD) (1.01) (1.07) (1.15) (.96) (1.63) (2.29) (10.10) (10.58) (10.72) (5.53) (6.98) (6.46) (5.09) (5.79) (7.04) 






























Skew -.24 -.04 -.32 -.97 -.29 -1.31 .04 .33 -.23 -.24 .52 -.36 1.74 -.49 -.30 
Kurtosis .43 .48 -.08 2.32 -.81 1.84 -.44 -1.19 -1.14 -.84 -.49 .69 4.01 -.03 .96 
Notes. TEI = Trait emotional intelligence; EM = Emotionality; SC = Self-control; SO = Sociability; WB = Wellbeing; AEI: EM = Ability emotional intelligence (emotional management) REACT = Reactivity; HR = Heart rate, 




Appendix H: Correlation and Whole-Sample Statistics by Experimental Condition 
Table H2: Control Condition 
Correlations and Whole-Sample Descriptive Statistics for EI, HR, Stress Reactivity and Stress Recovery under Control Conditions (N = 28) 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1. TEI: total - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
2. TEI: EM .81** - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
3. TEI: SC .82*** .57** - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
4. TEI: SO .68*** .47* .42* - - - - - - - - - - - - 
5. TEI: WB .89*** .61** .64*** .54** - - - - - - - - - - - 
6. AEI: MAN .11 .27 .22 -.09 .06 - - - - - - - - - - 
7. HR1 .03 .02 -.06 -.01 .13 .17 - - - - - - - - - 
8. HR: REACT -.11 -.10 -.24 .19 -.02 -.32 -.38* - - - - - - - - 
9. HR: REC .14 .27 .19 -.02 .07 .29 -.35 .10 - - - - - - - 
10. PA1 .39* .41* .14 .45* .31 .23 -.17 .09 .36 - - - - - - 
11. PA: REACT .16 .04 .33 .12 -.05 .03 -.24 -.08 .10 -.04 - - - - - 
12. PA: REC -.07 -.02 -.07 -.07 .-03 .20 .08 -.02 .15 .16 -.59*** - - - - 
13. NA1 -.12 .26 -.15 .02 -.28 .26 .07 .23 -.05 .01 .15 -.18 - - - 
14. NA; REACT -.04 -.20 .05 .11 .01 -.28 .11 .02 .06 -.09 -.09 .28 -.41* - - 
15. NA: REC .07 -.07 .15 -.16 .03 .12 -.37 -.21 .02 .04 .11 -.14 -.29 -.59*** - 
M 4.43 4.81 3.83 4.86 4.43 10.11 82.86 1.70 -3.13 27.18 -6.43 2.71 13.46 -1.32 -1.64 
(SD) (.86) (.82) (1.02) (.82) (1.47) (2.56) (17.21) (2.69) (5.91) (5.65) (4.98) (5.45) (2.25) (3.02) (2.31) 






























Skew -.45 -.19 .56 -.92 -.80 -.40 .21 .61 -1.13 .12 .37 .89 .77 .96 -1.67 
Kurtosis -.09 -1.09 -.65 .46 -.19 -.63 -.84 -.48 2.44 -1.55 -.15 .34 1.16 .86 2.12 
Notes. TEI = Trait emotional intelligence; EM = Emotionality; SC = Self-control; SO = Sociability; WB = Wellbeing; AEI: EM = Ability emotional intelligence (emotional management) REACT = Reactivity; HR = Heart rate, 




Appendix I: Moderated Mediation Analyses 
TEI Sociability 
Moderated Mediation Results for Trait Sociability and Physiological Reactivity with 95% 
Confidence Intervals (n = 55) 
 
Moderated mediation results  Coefficient  LLCI  ULCI 
Outcome: Task-focussed coping       
R = .69, F (13,41) = 2.82, p = .0057       
TEI sociability  .97  -3.30  5.24 
Sex  .38  -2.62  3.38 
Openness  -.13  -.59  .32 
Conscientiousness  .19  -.19  .68 
Extraversion  -.37  -.77  .03 
Agreeableness  .10  -.32  .53 
Neuroticism  .39  -.10  .88 
Cognitive ability  .06  -.02  .13 
Depression  .18  -.23  .59 
Anxiety  -.46  -.92  .01 
HR1  -.01  -.11  .09 
Outcome: Emotion-focussed coping       
R = .64, F (13,41) = 2.16, p = .0307       
TEI sociability  -3.26  -10.38  3.85 
Sex  4.12  -.88  9.12 
Openness  .23  -.53  .99 
Conscientiousness  -.38  -1.02  .26 
Extraversion  .21  -.45  .87 
Agreeableness  -.07  -.77  .64 
Neuroticism  .82  .01  1.64 
Cognitive ability  .02  -.11  .14 
Depression  -.02  -.70  .67 
Anxiety  -.25  -1.03  .52 
HR1  -.02  -.19  .15 
Outcome: Avoidant coping       
R = .63, F (13,41) = 2.05, p = .0402       
TEI sociability  -6.27  -11.91  -.63 
Sex  .91  -3.06  4.87 
Openness  -.01  -.61  .60 
Conscientiousness  -.05  -.56  .45 
Extraversion  .60  .07  1.12 
Agreeableness  .40  -.16  .96 




Cognitive ability  -.10  -.20  .00 
Depression  .45  -.09  1.00 
Anxiety  -.09  -.62  .61 
HR1  .07  -.06  .20 
Outcome: HR2       
R = .87, F (16,38) = 7.71, p < .001       
TEI sociability  -19.37  -31.04  -7.70 
TEI sociability x group  10.76  3.82  17.70 
Task-focussed coping  -.27  -1.17  .63 
Emotion-focussed coping  -.04  -.57  .49 
Avoidant coping  .04  -.69  .77 
Sex  9.13  1.13  17.14 
Openness  -1.42  -2.61  -.23 
Conscientiousness  -.02  -1.04  1.00 
Extraversion  -.06  -1.15  1.03 
Agreeableness  -.94  -2.09  .20 
Neuroticism  -.59  -2.05  .87 
Cognitive ability  .19  -.02  .40 
Depression  .09  -1.04  1.23 
Anxiety  .08  -1.20  1.35 
HR1  .75  .49  1.02 
Conditional indirect effects:  Effect  BootLLCI  BootULCI 
Task-focussed coping       
Stress group  -.26  -2.06  1.43 
Control group  -.25  -2.42  1.82 
Conditional indirect effects:  Effect  BootLLCI  BootULCI 
Emotion-focussed coping       
Stress group  .09  -1.73  2.26 
Control group  .05  -1.54  1.83 
Condition indirect effects:  Effect  BootLLCI  BootULCI 
Avoidant coping       
Stress group  -.16  -5.43  4.70 
Control group  -.09  -2.72  2.14 
Direct effect  -19.37  -31.04  -7.70 
Note. LLCI = Low Limit Confidence Interval; ULCI = Upper Limit Confidence Interval; BootLLCI 
= bootstrapped LLCI; bootULCI = bootstrapped ULCL. 










Appendix I: Moderated Mediation Analyses 
TEI Self-Control 
Moderated Mediation Results for Trait Self-Control and Physiological Reactivity with 95% 
Confidence Intervals (N = 55) 
 
Moderated mediation results  Coefficient  LLCI  ULCI 
Outcome: Task-focussed coping       
R = .69, F (13,41) = 2.86, p = .0052       
TEI self-control  -2.09  -6.39  2.22 
Sex  .48  -2.54  3.50 
Openness  -.13  -.57  .32 
Conscientiousness  .27  -.11  .65 
Extraversion  -.31  -.69  .06 
Agreeableness  .16  -.26  .57 
Neuroticism  .12  -.49  .73 
Cognitive ability  .06  -.01  .14 
Depression  .17  -.23  .58 
Anxiety  -.48  -.94  .02 
HR1  .00  -.09  1.00 
Outcome: Emotion-focussed coping       
R = .63, F (13,41) = 2.08, p = .037       
TEI self-control  -2.25  -9.49  5.00 
Sex  4.85  -.24  9.94 
Openness  .07  -.69  .81 
Conscientiousness  -.58  -1.22  .06 
Extraversion  .12  -.50  .75 
Agreeableness  -.16  -.86  .54 
Neuroticism  .86  -.17  1.89 
Cognitive ability  .04  -.09  .17 
Depression  -.10  -.78  .58 
Anxiety  -.02  -.80  .76 
HR1  -.06  -.22  .10 
Outcome: Avoidant coping       
R = .52, F (13,41) = 1.17, p = .333       
TEI self-control  -.93  -5.33  7.17 
Sex  1.47  -2.93  5.86 
Openness  -.17  -.81  .48 
Conscientiousness  -.29  -.84  .26 
Extraversion  .36  -.18  .91 
Agreeableness  .23  -.37  .83 




Cognitive ability  -.09  -.20  .02 
Depression  .32  -.26  .91 
Anxiety  .17  -.50  .84 
HR1  .01  -.13  .15 
Outcome: HR2       
R = .86, F (16,38) = 6.45, p < .001       
TEI self-control  8.49  -3.63  20.61 
TEI self-control x group  -2.08  -8.99  4.83 
Task-focussed coping  .04  -.94  1.01 
Emotion-focussed coping  -.03  -.61  .55 
Avoidant coping  .42  -.31  1.15 
Sex  9.53  .77  18.30 
Openness  -1.05  -2.30  -.19 
Conscientiousness  -.53  -1.63  .57 
Extraversion  -.19  -1.26  .88 
Agreeableness  -1.38  -2.56  -.19 
Neuroticism  1.28  -.51  3.07 
Cognitive ability  .14  -.09  .37 
Depression  -.30  -1.47  .87 
Anxiety  .04  -1.31  1.39 
HR1  .65  .39  .92 
Conditional indirect effects:  Effect  BootLLCI  BootULCI 
Task-focussed coping       
Stress group  -.05  -3.10  1.53 
Control group  -.01  -1.39  1.24 
Conditional indirect effects:  Effect  BootLLCI  BootULCI 
Emotion-focussed coping       
Stress group  .02  -1.89  1.60 
Control group  -.04  -1.35  1.31 
Condition indirect effects:  Effect  BootLLCI  BootULCI 
Avoidant coping       
Stress group  .19  -2.01  3.50 
Control group  -.01  -1.31  1.96 
Direct effect  8.49  -3.63  20.61 
Note. LLCI = Low Limit Confidence Interval; ULCI = Upper Limit Confidence Interval; BootLLCI 














Supplementary Information on the Construction of the Emotion Recognition Test (ERT) 
Used in Studies 2 and 3 
To assess the perception branch of AEI, an emotion recognition test (ERT) that fulfilled three 
criteria was sought. Because a suitable test that satisfied all criteria could not be identified, 
a new ERT was developed for the purposes of the present study.  
The bespoke test contained stimuli from the Ryerson Audio-Visual Database of 
Emotional Speech and Song (RAVDESS; Livingstone & Russo, 2018). The RAVDESS is a 
relatively new, multimodal database of 7,356 validated, emotional stimuli, where 24 actors 
(12 female, 12 male) vocalise two neutral, lexically-matched statements (“Kids are talking by 
the door”, “Dogs are sitting by the door”), with a variety of emotional expressions (neutral, 
calm, happy, sad, angry, fearful, surprise, and disgust), at two levels of intensity (normal, 
strong), each with two repetitions. Recordings are available in both speech and song, in 
audiovisual, audio only, and visual only, formats. For the audiovisual stimuli, the authors 
report high levels of emotional validity (80%), inter-rater reliability (kappa = .53 - .61), and 
test-retest reliability (kappa = .73) (Livingstone & Russo, 2018). All RAVDESS files are freely 
available to use under a Creative Commons Non-Commercial license. While new, the 
RAVDESS has been successfully used in various emotion studies in recent years (e.g., 
Cunningham, Weinel, & Picking, 2018; Kurbesov, Ryabkin, Miroshnichenko, Aruchidi, & 
Kalugyan, 2019; Venkataramanan & Rajamohan, 2019; Zamil, Hasan, Baki, Adam, & Zaman, 
2019). 
The ERT comprised 36 items, plus two practice items, a task length deemed 




of RAVDESS stimuli for the ERT took a systematic approach, with several ‘filters’ applied to 
reduce the 1,440 speech-based, audiovisual files down to 36. First, the number of included 
actors was restricted to 10 (e.g., Multimodal Emotion Recognition Test [MERT]; Banziger et 
al., 2009; Geneva Emotion Recognition Test [GERT]; Schlegel & Scherer, 2015), whereby a 
random number generator was used to select 5 male and 5 female actors from the pool of 
24. The randomisation process was repeated until the mean accuracy of the 10 actors was 
equivalent to the accuracy rate of other published tests (~70%). This was made possible by 
actor-specific emotional accuracy information made available by the RAVDESS authors. 
Second, of the 8 emotions depicted in the RAVDESS, only 6 (happiness, sadness, anger, fear, 
disgust, surprise) were represented in the ERT, to correspond with Ekman’s theory of six basic 
universal emotions (e.g., Ekman & Oster, 1979). Third, only the ‘normal’ (not ‘high’) intensity 
stimuli were selected, in order to attain a marker of skilled emotion recognition, and avoid 
ceiling effects. Fourth, equal representations of each of the two statements (i.e., “kids…”, 
“dogs…”), and of each repetition (i.e., 1st, 2nd), were included. In the final ERT, participants 
view each of the 36 videos video in a random order, and choose the emotion they think is 
being expressed from a choice of six. Responses are scored as either correct (1) or incorrect 
(0). Total scores (% correct) are computed for each participant by dividing the number of 









Presented below are the file numbers of the stimuli used from the RAVDESS 



















































Study 2 Preliminary Analyses: Bias for Emotions by Experimental Condition 
 
Bias for Emotion as a Function of Emotion Type and Experimental Condition, Calculated by 
Manual Reaction Time 
 




 Stress  Control   
 M SD n  M SD n t df 
Angry 2.16 21.89 31  4.02 16.93 29 -12.01, 8.31 -.37 58 
Sad 6.78 21.27   -4.90 23.67  .07, 23.29 2.01* 58 
Happy 6.17 28.47   -.37 17.47  -5.78, 18.84 1.06 58 
Note. M = mean; SD = standard deviation. Positive values denote bias towards emotion, negative values 
denote bias away from emotion. *= p < 05. 
 
Bias for Emotion as a Function of Emotion Type and Experimental Condition, Calculated by 
First Fixation 
 




 Stress  Control   
 M SD n  M SD n t df 
Angry .49 .10 29  .52 .11 28 -.09, .03 -1.08 55 
Sad .49 .10   .49 .06  -.04, .05 .32 55 
Happy .46 .11   .48 .06  -.08, .02 -1.14 55 
Note. M = mean; SD = standard deviation. Values > .50 denote bias towards emotion, values < .50 denote bias 






Appendix L: Study 2 Descriptive Statistics by Experimental Condition 
Table L1: Stress Condition 
Correlations and Whole-Sample Descriptive Statistics for EI, Reactivity, and Rumination under Stressful Conditions (N = 31) 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. TEI: total - - - - - - - - - - - 
2. TEI: EM .77*** - - - - - - - - - - 
3. TEI: SC .58** .46** - - - - - - - - - 
4. TEI: SO .57** .23 .23 - - - - - - - - 
5. TEI: WB .87*** .50** .38* .48** - - - - - - - 
6. AEI: EM .11 .34 .27 -.23 .00 - - - - - - 
7. AEI: EP -.06 .14 -.05 -.17 -.10 .04 - - - - - 
8. NA: REACT -.17 -.04 -.03 -.32 -.14 .20 -.22 - - - - 
9. HR: REACT -.04 -.16 -.01 .00 .05 .13 -.14 -.02 - - - 
10. EDA: REACT -.22 -.31 -.26 .05 -.14 -.47* .15 -.17 .11 - - 
11. RUM -.48** -.20 -.44* -.23 -.47** .04 -.14 .29 -.09 -.12 - 
M 4.23 4.39 3.67 4.88 3.98 10.40 76.23 8.06 18.68 252.36 23.81 
(SD) (.80) (1.06) (.73) (.78) (.73) (2.26) (8.00) (4.89) (21.16) (409.10) (15.18) 
Notes. TEI = Trait emotional intelligence; TEI: EM = Emotionality; SC = Self-control; SO = Sociability; WB = Wellbeing; AEI (EM)= Ability emotional intelligence (emotional 
management; AEI (PER) = Ability emotional intelligence (Emotion perception); REACT = Reactivity; HR = Heart rate, EDA = electrodermal activity; NA = negative affect; M = 




Appendix L: Study 2 Descriptive Statistics by Experimental Condition 
Table L2: Control Condition 
 
Correlations and Whole-Sample Descriptive Statistics for EI, Reactivity, and Rumination under Stressful Conditions (N = 29) 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. TEI: total - - - - - - - - - - - 
2. TEI: EM .81*** - - - - - - - - - - 
3. TEI: SC .72*** .38* - - - - - - - - - 
4. TEI: SO .62*** .67*** .09 - - - - - - - - 
5. TEI: WB .88*** .65** .56** .37* - - - - - - - 
6. AEI: MAN .27 .30 .05 .35 .21 - - - - - - 
7. AEI: PER -.33 -.37 -.27 -.44* -.16 -.09 - - - - - 
8. NA: REACT .37 .20 .22 .29 .42* -.03 .03 - - - - 
9. HR: REACT .11 .12 -.02 .13 .19 -.03 .09 .29 - - - 
10. EDA: REACT .05 .06 .12 .05 -.07 .03 -.44* -.49** -.37* - - 
11. RUM -.48** -.43** -.33 -.25 -.50** -.50** -.03 -.24 -.17 -.12 - 
M 4.44 4.67 3.93 4.98 4.33 10.78 77.18 -1.14 1.51 56.86 .80 
(SD) (.81) (.92) (1.12) (.77) (1.42) (2.29) (6.78) (2.72) (11.57) (145.70) 9.87 
Notes. TEI = Trait emotional intelligence; TEI: EM = Emotionality; SC = Self-control; SO = Sociability; WB = Wellbeing; AEI (EM)= Ability emotional intelligence (emotional 
management; AEI (PER) = Ability emotional intelligence (Emotion perception); REACT = Reactivity; HR = Heart rate, EDA = electrodermal activity; NA = negative affect; M = 




Appendix M: Pooled Sample Analyses 
Preliminary Analyses 
Relationships between study variables 
Table M1 displays whole-sample descriptive statistics and bivariate intercorrelations for the 
questionnaire battery variables from the pooled sample (TEI, AEI, personality dimensions, 
cognitive ability, depression, anxiety). Expectedly, findings broadly embodied those of Study 
1 and 2.  
Stress manipulation check 
The manipulation had a powerful impact on all stress indices for participants in the stress 
condition, demonstrated by significant increases in NA and HR from baseline. NA and HR did 
not significantly change for the control group. There was a significant time X condition 
interaction for NA (F(1,110) = 90.33, p < .001, n2partial = .45). Post-hoc testing confirmed that 
the stressful task significantly increased NA levels (Mchange = 8.64, SD = 5.54, t(1, 55) = 11.56, 
p < .001), whereas those in the control group showed no significant change (p > .05). A 
significant time x condition interaction also emerged for HR (F(1,107) = 28.96, p < .001, 
n2partial = .21). The stressful task, but not the control task (p > .05), also induced a significant 









Appendix M: Pooled Sample Analyses 
Table M1 
Correlations and Whole-Sample Descriptive Statistics for EI, Personality, Cognitive Ability and Mental Health (Pooled Sample from Studies 1 and 2 ([N = 138]) 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1. TEI: total - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
2. TEI: EM .78*** - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
3. TEI: SC .76*** .45*** - - - - - - - - - - - - 
4. TEI: SO .64*** .44*** .27** - - - - - - - - - - - 
5. TEI: WB .88*** .56*** .61*** .48*** - - - - - - - - - - 
6. AEI: EM .26** .36*** .22** .07 .17 - - - - - - - - - 
7. O -.10 -.05 -.04 -.05 -.13 -.02 - - - - - - - - 
8. C .44 -.19 .35*** .24** .34*** .07 -.14 - - - - - - - 
9. E .31*** .36*** .06 .47*** .25** .00 -.03 .07 - - - - - - 
10. A .33*** .56*** .16 .24** .11 .23 .03 .20 .11 - - - - - 
11. N -.65*** -.31*** -.68*** -.37*** -.62 -.04 .12 -.21* -.17* .02 - - - - 
12. GC .01 -.01 .05 .03 -.01 .13 .24** .01 -.12 .04 -.04 - - - 
13. ANX -.57*** -.39*** -.50*** -.32*** -.52*** -.02 .10 -.18* -.19* -.18* .60*** -.04 - - 
14. DEP -.50*** -.41*** -.41*** -.23** -.50*** -.06 .08 -.18* -.15 -.30*** .37*** .00 .76*** - 
M 4.38 4.64 3.82 4.94 4.27 10.33 14.63 12.83 12.05 16.00 13.95 60.95 13.45 8.33 




Range   2.27 – 
6.67 
  2.13 – 
6.75 
  1.67 – 
6.33 
  2.17 – 
7.00 
  1.00 – 
7.00 
  3.33 – 
14.42 
  7.00 – 
20.00 
  5.00 – 
20.00 
  4.00 – 
20.00 
  4.00 – 
20.00 
  4.00 – 
20.00 
  11.11 
– 100 
  0.00 – 
27.00 
  0.00 – 
23.00 
Skew -.20 -.19 .14 -.82 -.30 -.75 -.35 .17 -.18 -1.15 -.45 .14 .03 .25 
Kurtosis -.15 -.20 -.27 1.21 -.86 .43 .26 -.43 -.80 -1.44 -.25 -.41 -.19 -.69 
α .90 .67 .61 .57 .91 .64 .71 .64 .81 .80 .78 .70 .84 .73 
Notes. TEI = Trait emotional intelligence; EM = Emotionality; SC = Self-control; SO = Sociability; WB = Wellbeing; AEI (EM)= Ability emotional intelligence (emotional 
management); O = Openness; C = Conscientiousness; E = Extraversion; A = Agreeableness; N = Neuroticism; GC = Crystallised intelligence; ANX = Trait anxiety; DEP = Trait 






Appendix M: Pooled Sample Analyses 
Main Analyses: EI and Stress Reactivity (Hypothesis 1) 
TEI and stress reactivity 
For the prediction of NA from global TEI, different findings emerged for the pooled sample 
than those obtained from the individual samples for Studies 1 and 2. While covariates (ΔR2 = 
.04, p = .220), and the subsequent addition of global TEI (ΔR2 = .00, p = .854) did not 
significantly improve the model, adding in the TEI x condition significantly increased R2 (ΔR2 
= .02, F(1, 98) = 15.61, p = .010, adjusted R2 = .63). Simple slopes analyses were conducted 
to probe this finding further. There was a statistically significant negative relationship (b = -
.81, SE = .80) between TEI and NA reactivity in the stress condition (p = .03). In contrast, the 
relationship (b = 1.35, SE = .76) between TEI and NA reactivity in the control condition was 
not significant (p = .081). However, consistent with data from Study 2 (but not data from 
Study 1), global TEI did not predict HR reactivity. The addition of covariates did not improve 
the model fit (R2 change = .14, p = .08), TEI (ΔR2 = .00, p = .727), nor the TEI x condition (ΔR2 
= .00, p = .657) resulted in a significant increase to R2.  
While the addition of all four TEI subfactor scores did not significantly improve the 
model for predicting NA reactivity (ΔR2 = .00, p = .223), the model was improved when the 
subfactor product vectors were included (ΔR2 = .04, F(4,92) = 10.85, p = .025, adjusted R2 = 
.63). However, only the trait sociability subfactor (β = -.59, p = .010) and its condition 
interaction (β = .58, p = .012) were significant at the final step, in contrast to Study 1. Simple 
slopes analyses revealed a negative relationship between TEI and NA reactivity in the stress 
condition (b = -2.34, SE = .79, p = .004), but no relationship in the control condition (b = 1.37, 




not improve the HR reactivity model, whereas entering the interaction terms for the 
subfactors significantly improved R2 (ΔR2 = .07, F(4,86) = 2.99, p = .049, adjusted R2 = .29). 
However, as with the NA analyses above, only sociability was a significant predictor of HR 
reactivity (β = -.86, p = .011), with the sociability interaction term approaching significance 
(β = .62, p = .058). Simple slopes analyses revealed a non-significant relationship between 
sociability and NA reactivity in the control condition (b = 1.16, SE = 2.26, p = .615), but a 
negative relationship between sociability and HR reactivity that trended towards 
significance in the stress condition (b = -3.55, SE = 2.14, p = .092). To investigate this further, 
a GLM was constructed to assess differences between the regression lines. For the mean 
sociability score (M = 4.88), the difference between HR change for the control group (M = 
2.20%) and the stress group (M = 15.69%) is 13.49%, 95% CI [8.46, 18.49], p < .001. Thus, 
results indicate that sociability had a significant negative relationship with HR change in the 
stress group (Field, 2017). In sum, global TEI predicted less mood deterioration, but had no 
effect on physiological reactivity. The TEI sociability subfactor played a significant role under 
stressful conditions, whereby higher scores predicted less NA and less HR reactivity. 
Reactivity analyses for TEI are summarised in Tables M2 and M3. 
AEI and stress reactivity 
Consistent with Study 1, entering AEI (EM) into the NA reactivity model (ΔR2 = .00, p = .869) 
and subsequent conditional effects (ΔR2  = .00, p = .572) did not produce a significant R2 
increase. Similarly, AEI (EM) failed to improve the HR reactivity model (ΔR2 = .00, p = .432; 
conditional effects ΔR2 = .01, p = .323).  
In general, pooled-sample findings were a combination of those obtained from the 




(it did not in Study 1 or 2 separately). A more detailed investigation into TEI’s component 
factors revealed that, under stress, the TEI sociability subfactor predicted less NA reactivity 
(supporting Study 2) and less HR reactivity (supporting Study 1). AEI did not predict either 









































Appendix M: Pooled Sample Analyses 
Table M2 
Summary Statistics for Regressions of Stress Reactivity onto Pretask State, Condition, Personality, Cognitive Ability, Mental Health, and Global 
TEI Predictors (Pooled Sample from Studies 1 and 2) (N = 118) 
Note. NA = negative affect; HR = heart rate; FFM = Five Factor Model personality traits; TEI = trait emotional intelligence; Gc = vocabulary test score; ANX = trait anxiety. * = 






 Step 1: 
Pretask state 
 Step 2: 
Condition 
 Step 3: 
FFM, cognitive ability, 
mental health 
 Step 4: 
TEI 
 Step 5: 





Significant EI and covariate 
predictors (at Step 5) 
Criterion R2 F(1,110)  R2 ΔR2 ΔF(1,109)  R2 ΔR2 ΔF(9,100)  R2 ΔR2 ΔF(1,99)  R2 ΔR2 ΔF(1,98)  
NA .29 45.25***  .61 .32 88.85***  .65 .04 1.34  .65 .00 .04  .67 .02 6.76*  TEI (β = -.50*) 
TEI x Condition (β = .51*) 
 
HR .02 2.46  .20 .18 23.34***  .34 .14 1.70  .34 .00 .13  .34 .00 .21  Gc (β = .83**) 
Gc x Condition (β = -.66*) 
ANX (β = 1.00*) 




Appendix M: Pooled Sample Analyses 
Table M2 
Summary Statistics for Regressions of Stress Reactivity onto Pretask State, Condition, Personality, Cognitive Ability, Mental Health, and TEI 
Subfactor Predictors (Pooled Sample from Studies 1 and 2) (N = 118) 
 Note. NA = negative affect at Time 2; HR = heart rate at Time 2; FFM = Five Factor Model personality traits; TEI = trait emotional intelligence; SOC = TEI (sociability factor); 
Gc = vocabulary test score; trait anxiety. * = p < .05, ** = p < .01, *** = p < .001.. * = p < .05, ** = p < .01, *** = p < .00
 Step 1: 
Pretask state 
 Step 2: 
Condition 
 Step 3: 
FFM, cognitive ability, 
mental health 




 Step 5: 





Significant EI and covariate 
predictors (at Step 5) 
Criterion R2 F(1,110)  R2 ΔR2 ΔF(1,109)  R2 ΔR2 ΔF(9,100)  R2 ΔR2 ΔF(4,96)  R2 ΔR2 ΔF(4,92)  
NA .29 45.25***  .61 .32 88.85***  .65 .04 1.34  .65 .00 .08  .69 .04 2.87*  SOC (β = -.59) 
SOC x Condition (β = .58*) 
 
HR .02 2.46  .20 .18 23.34***  .34 .14 1.70  .37 .03 .92  .43 .06 2.49*  SOC (β = -.86*) 
SOC x Condition (β = .62) 
Gc (β = .92**) 
Gc x Condition (β = -.76**) 




Appendix N: EI and First Fixation Analyses 
Global TEI and First Fixations 
 
Summary Statistics for Regressions of Bias (First Fixations) for Different Emotions onto Condition, Personality, Cognitive Ability, Mental Health, 






Note. ANG = bias for angry faces; SAD = bias for sad faces; HAP = bias for happy faces; FFM = Five Factor Model personality traits; TEI = trait emotional intelligence; C = 
conscientiousness; ANX = trait anxiety; SAGE = subjective age. * = p < .05; ** = p < .01. 
 
 Step 1: 
Condition 
 Step 2: 
FFM, cognitive ability, 
mental health 
 Step 3: 
TEI 
 Step 4: 




Significant EI and covariate 
predictors (at Step 4) 
Criterion R2 F(1,55)  R2 ΔR2 ΔF(10,45)  R2 ΔR2 ΔF(1,44)  R2 ΔR2 ΔF(1,43)   
ANG .02 1.17  .14 .12 .68  .15 .01 .63  .17 .02 .70   None 
SAD .00 .10  .31 .31 1.82*  .32 .01 1.75  .40 .08 2,17   C (β = .38**) 
ANX (β = -.12*) 
SAGE (β = .46**) 




Appendix N: EI and First Fixation Analyses 
TEI Subfactors and First Fixations 
 
Summary Statistics for Regressions of Bias (First Fixations) for Different Emotions onto Condition, Personality, Cognitive Ability, Mental Health, 







Note. ANG = bias for angry faces; SAD = bias for sad faces; HAP = bias for happy faces; FFM = Five Factor Model personality traits; TEI = trait emotional intelligence; SOC = 




 Step 1: 
Condition 
 Step 2: 
FFM, cognitive ability, 
mental health 
 Step 3: 
Emotionality, Self-Control, 
Sociability, Wellbeing 
 Step 4: 





Significant EI and covariate 
predictors (at Step 4) 
Criterion R2 F(1,58)  R2 ΔR2 ΔF(10,48)  R2 ΔR2 ΔF(4,44)  R2 ΔR2 ΔF(4,40)   
ANG .02 1.17  .14 .12 .68  .30 .16 1.15  .43 .13 1.48   None 
SAD .00 .10  .31 .31 1.82*  .45 .14 2.07  .55 .10 2.24   SOC (β = 1.27*) 
SOC x Condition (β = -1.49*)C (β = 
.42**) 
ANX (β = - 1.57*) 
ANX x Condition (β = 1.34*) 
SAGE (β = .65***) 




Appendix N: EI and First Fixation Analyses 
AEI (Emotion Management) and First Fixations 
Summary Statistics for Regressions of Bias (First Fixations) for Different Emotions onto Condition, Personality, Cognitive Ability, Mental Health, 







Note. ANG = bias for angry faces; SAD = bias for sad faces; HAP = bias for happy faces; FFM = Five Factor Model personality traits; AEI (EM) = emotional intelligence 








 Step 1: 
Condition 
 Step 2: 
FFM, cognitive ability, 
mental health 
 Step 3: 
AEI (EM) 
 Step 4: 




Significant EI and covariate 
predictors (at Step 4) 
Criterion R2 F(1,55)  R2 ΔR2 ΔF(10,45)  R2 ΔR2 ΔF(1,44)  R2 ΔR2 ΔF(1,43)   
ANG .02 1.17  .14 .12 .63  .19 .05 2.59  .19 .00 .08   None 
SAD .00 .10  .31 .31 1.99  .32 .01 .88  .32 .00 .09   None 




Appendix N: EI and First Fixation Analyses 
AEI (Emotion Perception) and First Fixations 
Summary Statistics for Regressions of Bias (First Fixations) for Different Emotions onto Condition, Personality, Cognitive Ability, Mental Health, 









Note. ANG = bias for angry faces; SAD = bias for sad faces; HAP = bias for happy faces; FFM = Five Factor Model personality traits; AEI (EM) = emotional intelligence 
(emotion perception); C = conscientiousness; SAGE = subjective age. * = p < .05, ** = p < .01. 
 
4 While the addition of the AEI (EP) x condition variable significantly improved the happiness bias model at step 4, the final model was not statistically significant (F(1, 46) = 
1.49, p = .143, adjusted R2 = .16). 
 Step 1: 
Condition 
 Step 2: 
FFM, cognitive ability, 
mental health 
 Step 3: 
AEI (EP) 
 Step 4: 




Significant EI and covariate 
predictors (at Step 4) 
Criterion R2 F(1,58)  R2 ΔR2 ΔF(10,48)  R2 ΔR2 ΔF(1,47)  R2 ΔR2 ΔF(1,46)   
ANG .00 .21  .28 .28 .171  .30 .02 1.04  .30 .00 .18   None 
SAD .00 .10  .31 .31 1.99  .31 .00 .07  .34 .00 .91   SAGE (β = .36*) 
C (β = .37*) 
HAP .02 1.30  .34 .32 .99  .38 .04 2.18  .47 .09 6.28*4   AEI (EP) (β = 1.37**) 




Appendix O: Design and Construction of the Social Media Task for Study 3 
To assess how individuals might regulate their emotions upon exposure to emotive material 
on social media, a task was developed for the purposes of the present study. That process is 
outlined below. 
The first stage of developing the social media task involved selecting the emotional 
material to use as a base for the social media posts. Typically, emotion research laboratories 
employ their own (often unvalidated) idiosyncratic emotion stimuli, which is not often 
available to others, resulting in replicability, interpretability, and generalisability issues 
(Bradley & Lang, 2007). The International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang et al., 2008) 
was developed to address the problem of emotional stimulus standardisation in emotion 
research, comprising a large database of 1,182 normatively rated, emotional colour images 
for use in studies of emotion and attention. The social media task was thus developed using 
images from the IAPS. IAPS images vary in their elicitation of a range of human emotion 
(e.g., joy, disgust, fear, sadness, anger; Mikels, Fredrickson, Larkin, Lindberg, Maglio, & 
Reuter-Lorenz, 2005), and portray a vast array of categories, for example: people, 
landscapes, bodies, insects, photojournalism from wars and disasters, medical treatments, 
baby animals, household objects. Importantly, IAPS images are freely available for academic 
researchers to use, which enables study replication. Furthermore, each image is 
accompanied by normative ratings on three dimensions, based on how pleasant/unpleasant 
(valence), how calm/excited (arousal), and how controlled/in-control (dominance), a sample 
of over 100 participants felt when viewing the picture (Lang et al., 2008). The IAPS has been 
extensively validated cross-culturally (e.g., Aluja, Rossier, Blanch, Blanco, Martí-Guiu, & 




Based on other IAPS studies of emotion (e.g., Cuthbert, Schupp, Bradley, Birbaumer, 
& Lang, 2000; McManis, Bradley, Berg, Cuthbert, & Lang, 2001), and attention (e.g., 
Grossman, Ellsworth, & Hong, 2011; Papies, Barsalou, & Custers, 2012) a total of 48 ‘posts’ 
(images) was deemed sufficient for the present study, with 24 images each for the positive 
and negative categories. Ensuring the negative images in the social media task were 
appropriate for the age range in question (16-18 years) was a high priority for the 
researcher. Therefore, empirical work that examined adolescents’ responses to the IAPS 
was consulted for information on valence and arousal ratings of images typically used 
(Hernández et al., 2013, Vasa et al., 2011). Images with similar ratings were subsequently 
selected for the present study, whilst also ensuring that the (equal) ratio of image types (i.e., 
animals, objects, people, scenes) was balanced across positive and negative categories. As a 
further precaution, the British Board of Film Classification website was also consulted for 
reference on visual material deemed legally suitable for viewing by adolescents aged 15 and 
over (http://www.bbfc.co.uk/what-classification/15), which states material may include: 
discriminatory language or behaviour, drug taking (though no instructional detail), 
dangerous behaviour, nudity and sexual content (though no strong detail), and strong threat 
and horror (without focus on sadistic or sexual threat), strong violence (without dwelling on 
infliction of pain or injury). Some images included in the study met the criteria above (age 
15+), but none met criteria for material only suitable for viewing by ages 18+ years 
(http://www.bbfc.co.uk/what-classification/18). Although the IAPS images are emotionally 
provocative by design, the types of images are comparable to those easily found on 
television, in magazines and newspapers, and there have been no reported effects on 
mental health attributable to viewing IAPS images (Bradley & Lang, 2007). However, several 




fully informed about the types of images they would see, and reminded that they could 
withdraw at any time, in the information sheet, and throughout the study (“Some of the 
pictures you will see in this study may include content that can be considered offensive, 
such as violent pictures. If at any point you wish to stop the study, please click here to be 
taken to the end”). To restore participants to their normative mood, a mood relief video 
was shown at the end of the study (confirmed as mood-enhancing by study 1). Participants 
were not identifiable from their responses in the study, thus maintaining anonymity. 
Assignment of images to positive or negative categories was determined by IAPS valence 
and arousal ratings used for adolescent samples in comparable studies (Hernández et al., 
2013; Vasa et al., 2011; Table O1). The IAPS arousal and valence ratings for the 48 images 
used in the present study can be found in Table O2. 
 
Table O1 
Mean Valence and Arousal Ratings of Images in the Present Study and Two Other Studies 
with Adolescent Samples, According to Image Type 
 
  Positive  Negative 
Sample  Valence Arousal  Valence Arousal 
Hernandez et al. (2013) 
(M age = 13.79 years) 
 6.97 4.89  2.86 5.76 
Vasa et al. (2011)  
(M age = 14.95 years) 
 7.45 5.11  3.22 5.95 
Present study  
(age range = 16-18 years) 
 7.32 5.14  2.62 5.92 
Note. M = mean; Valence = how positive image makes participants feel (higher score = more pleasant); Arousal 





The second stage of the design process contributed to the task’s ecological validity, 
by adapting and modifying the IAPS images to align with real-life Facebook newsfeed 
content as closely as possible. First, all stimuli were situated on a white background and 
resized square column. Because many social media platforms (e.g., Facebook), posts contain 
a logo in the upper left corner to represent the source of the material, the second 
adaptation included the addition of a black circular ‘logo’, akin to that of many popular 
Facebook content publishers (e.g., 9GAG, UniLad, Ladbible). Third, non-functional ‘play’ and 
‘audio’ buttons, response buttons (like, comment, share), view count, and time since 
posting (133K; 6 hours), were superimposed over the stimuli to simulate playable videos. 
Lastly, captions were added to 50% of the stimuli. Since no database of such material was 
available at the time of designing the study, such material was collected by analysing 
caption content from five of the most popular Facebook video publishers (as identified by 
digital news websites: 9GAG, Ladbible, UNILAD, VT and Buzzfeed). The 30 most recent 
generic captions (i.e., not specific to a particular person, topic etc.) were manually captured 
for each publisher. By identifying common themes across these 150 captions, 24 captions 
(12 positive, 12 negative) were generated and balanced for sentence length and structure 
(i.e., punctuation). Examples included: “A heart-warming video”; “So adorable…”, “Inspiring” 
(for positive posts), and “A heart-wrenching video”, “So sad..”, “Horrific” (for negative 
posts). Captions contained a mixture of language devices (e.g., question marks, all in 
capitals, captions consisting of a single word). Posts could be classified as one of four 
categories depending on valence (positive or negative) and format (captioned or non-
captioned). A small pilot study (N = 11) showed that 100% of participants correctly allocated 




The stimuli described above were presented to the participants as one continuous 
page (akin to a social media newsfeed). Participants were instructed to imagine they were 
scrolling through their personal social media newsfeed from top to bottom, at the pace they 
would normally use. The order of the ‘posts’ was randomised for each participant. On the 
next page, participants viewed the same ‘newsfeed’ again, but this time were asked to 
retrospectively rate each ‘post’ based on their initial viewing. The ratings took place during 
the second viewing to allow for uninterrupted, ‘naturalistic’, initial viewing. Due to the 
potentially distressing nature of the stimuli, participants could exit the social media task at 
any time by clicking a button, which re-directed them to the debrief page. For each post, 
participants answered three questions using a 7-point slider scale: 1) how the image made 
them feel (from ‘negative’ to ‘positive’), 2) how likely they would have been to notice the 
post on their newsfeed (from ‘not at all’ to ‘very much’), and 3) how likely they would have 
been to watch the video (from ‘not at all’ to ‘very much’). Based on the responses to the 
three questions, summed scores were subsequently generated for the positive and negative 
stimulus categories: affectivity (from Question 1), attentional preference (from Question 2), 
and situation selection (Question 3). The term attentional preference was selected over 
attentional bias, as the variable was constructed from subjective (i.e., self-report) rather 
than objective means (i.e., eye-tracking). Scores from those three questions were used to 
calculate six indices (Table O3). These operationalisations map onto the conscious 
deliberate processes of Gross’ model of ER (1998a), whereby affectivity and engagement are 
proxies for ‘response modulation’ strategies, and ‘attentional preference’ is a proxy for 






Valence, Arousal, and Dominance Information for the IAPS Images Used to Develop Social Media Posts 
    Valence  Arousal  Dominance 
Image Description Category Assigned Caption M SD  M SD  M SD 
1050 Snake Negative None 3.46  2.15  6.87  1.68  3.08 1.93 
1201 Spider Negative None 3.55 1.88  6.36 2.11  3.87 2.30 
2900 CryingBoy Negative So sad… 2.45 1.42  5.09 2.15  3.64 1.79 
3100 BurnVictim Negative None 1.60 1.07  6.49 2.23  3.00 2.16 
3170 BabyTumor Negative None 1.46 1.01  7.21 1.99  2.70 1.89 
3181 BatteredFem Negative Is this the worst thing you’ve ever seen? 2.30 1.43  5.06 2.11  4.31 2.32 
3550.1 PlaneCrash Negative None 2.35 1.39  6.29 1.96  3.47 2.10 
4574 AttractiveMan Negative None 6.62 1.62  4.25 2.29  5.70 1.68 
5970 Tornado Negative Bad news! 4.14  1.77  4.88 2.59  3.73 2.34 
6020 ElectricChair Negative Guaranteed to make you feel terrible 3.41 1.98  5.58 2.01  4.07 2.43 
6260 AimedGun Negative None 2.44 1.54  6.93 1.93  2.87 2.16 
6415 DeadTiger Negative WARNING: Graphic content. 2.21 1.51  6.20 2.31  3.79 2.47 




7520 Hospital Negative None 3.83  1.56  4.57 1.85  4.42 1.82 
9008 Needle Negative THIS LOOKS DISGUSTING! 3.47 1.85  4.45 2.10  5.30 2.21 
9181 DeadCows Negative RIP. 2.26 1.85  5.39 2.41  4.04 2.27 
9187 InjuredDog Negative A heart-wrenching video. 1.81 1.36  6.45 2.30  3.17 2.11 
9301 Toilet Negative OMG! You won’t be able to look away… 2.26 1.56  5.28 2.46  4.11 2.32 
9413 Hanging Negative Truly horrific. 1.76 1.08  6.81 2.09  2.75 2.21 
9480 Skull Negative Wow, this place is just shocking! 3.51 2.08  5.57 1.87  4.56 2.12 
9592 Injection Negative None 3.34 1.75  5.23 2.09  4.14 2.28 
9800 SkinHead Negative None 2.04 1.57  6.05 2.71  4.92 2.52 
9810 KKKRally Negative None 2.09 1.78  6.62 2.26  3.95 2.50 
9832 Cigarettes Negative None 2.94 1.58  4.46 2.06  5.53 2.51 
9940 Explosion Negative None 1.62 1.20  7.15 2.24  2.45 2.22 
1595 Pony Positive A heart-warming video. 6.22 1.64  4.79 2.09  5.54 1.96 
1710 Puppies Positive None 8.34 1.12  5.41 2.34  6.55 1.98 
1750 Bunnies Positive None 8.28 1.07  4.10 2.31  6.15 2.01 
1920 Porpoise Positive LOL 7.90 1.48  4.27 2.53  6.50 2.18 
2070 Baby Positive None 8.17 1.46  4.51 2.74  7.14 2.10 




2332 Family Positive WARNING: Cuteness overload. 7.64 1.60  4.30 2.29  6.37 1.91 
2347 Children Positive So adorable… 7.83 1.36  5.56 2.34  6.54 1.86 
4619 Romance Positive This video is the most incredible thing you will ever see. 6.46 1.61  5.09 1.97  5.62 1.84 
5301 Galaxy Positive Good news! 6.54 1.68  5.21  2.42  4.06 2.42 
5621 SkyDivers Positive None 7.57 1.42  6.99 1.95  5.81 2.38 
5825 Sea Positive Wow, this place is just beautiful! 8.03 1.18  5.46 2.72  6.61 2.11 
7330 IceCream Positive THIS LOOKS AMAZING! 7.69  1.84  5.14 2.58  6.58 2.51 
7410 Candy Positive None 6.91 1.56  4.55 2.24  5.92 2.10 
7460 FrenchFries Positive None 6.81 2.08  5.12 2.49  5.78 2.26 
7499 Concert Positive None 6.47 1.57  5.58 2.16  5.37 2.03 
7502 Castle Positive None 7.75 1.40  5.91 2.31  6.64 2.19 
7530 House Positive None 6.71 1.36  4.00 2.14  6.09 1.69 
8162 HotAirBalloon Positive OMG! You’ll want to watch this all day… 6.97 1.55  4.98 2.25  6.37 1.89 
8461 HappyTeens Positive None 7.22 1.53  4.69 2.20  6.36 1.67 
8470 Gymnast Positive Is this the best thing you’ve ever seen? 7.74 1.53  6.14  2.19  6.17 2.09 
8501 Money Positive Guaranteed to make your day 7.91 1.66  6.44 2.29  6.05 2.52 





Indices Calculated from the Social Media Task 
 
Variable Index Description Calculation 




The extent to which 
participants reported 
positive posts as making 
them feel positive.  
A higher score represents 
experiencing a more 
positive response 
[Sum (reactivity scores 
for positive posts)]  / 
(Total number of 
positive posts rated) 




The extent to which 
participants reported 
negative posts as making 
them feel negative.  
A lower score represents 
experiencing a more 
negative response. 
[Sum (reactivity scores 
for negative posts)]  / 
(Total number of 






The extent to which 
participants reported that 
they would notice positive 
posts on their social media 
newsfeed. 
A higher score represents 
greater preference. 
[Sum (attentional 
preference scores for 
positive posts)]  / 
(Total number of 












The extent to which 
participants reported that 
they would notice negative 
posts on their social media 
newsfeed. 
[Sum (attentional 
preference scores for 
negative posts)]  / 
(Total number of 




A higher score represents 
greater preference. 




The extent to which 
participants reported they 
would engage with positive 
posts.  
A higher score represents 
more engagement 
[Sum (engagement 
scores for positive 
posts)]  / (Total 
number of positive 
posts rated) 




The extent to which 
participants reported they 
would engage with negative 
posts.  
A higher score represents 
more engagement. 
[Sum (engagement 
scores for negative 
posts)]  / (Total 
















Appendix P: Mediation Analyses 
Model 1 
Mediation Results for AEI Emotion Management and Happiness with 95% Confidence 
Intervals (N = 149) 
Mediation results  Coefficient  LLCI  ULCI 
Outcome: Reactivity to positive posts       
R = .53, F (15,149) = 3.42, p = .0001       
AEI (EM)  1.37  1.83  2.32 
Sex  -.21  .42  .09 
Openness  -.02  -.12  .08 
Conscientiousness  -.08  -.23  .08 
Extraversion  .07  -.06  .19 
Agreeableness  .01  .-.12  .14 
Neuroticism  .00  -.09  .09 
Cognitive ability  .01  -.02  .03 
Impulse control  .00  -.02  .02 
Self-deceptive enhancement  .14  -.81  1.09 
Impression management  -.06  -.24  .11 
Baseline positive affect  .03  .01  .04 
Baseline negative affect  -.02  -.04  .00 
Social media use  .01  .00  .03 
Outcome: Reactivity to negative posts       
R = .50, F (13,41) = 2.93, p = .0005       
AEI (EM)  -.78  2.24  4.92 
Sex  .27  .03  .50 
Openness  .01  -.07  .09 
Conscientiousness  .03  -.09  .15 
Extraversion  -.02  -.12  .09 
Agreeableness  -.04  -.15  .07 
Neuroticism  -.01  -.08  .06 
Cognitive ability  -.01  -.03  .01 
Impulse control  .00  -.01  .02 
Self-deceptive enhancement  -.35  -1.11  .341 
Impression management  -.01  -.15  .13 
Baseline positive affect  .00  -.02  .02 
Baseline negative affect  .00  -.02  .01 
Social media use  .00  -.02  .01 
Outcome: Happiness       
R = .76, F (13,41) = 10.51, p = .0000       
AEI (EM)  -2.14  -.36  4.49 




Reactivity to negative posts  -.02  -.30  .27 
Sex  .16  -.22  .54 
Openness  -.06  -.18  .07 
Conscientiousness  .15  -.05  .034 
Extraversion  .13  -.03  .29 
Agreeableness  .18  .01  .36 
Neuroticism  -.05  -.26  .06 
Cognitive ability  .00  -.03  .03 
Impulse control  .05  .02  .08 
Self-deceptive enhancement  -.44  -1.64  .76 
Impression management  -.13  -.34  .09 
Baseline positive affect  .03  .01  .06 
Baseline negative affect  -.03  -.05  -.01 
Social media use  -.02  -.04  .01 
Indirect effects:  Effect  BootLLCI  BootULCI 
Reactivity to positive posts  .52  .13  1.06 
Reactivity to negative posts  .05  -.16  .30 
Direct effect  -2.14  -3.39  -.89 
Note. AEI (EM) = Ability EI (emotion management); LLCI = Low Limit Confidence Interval; ULCI = 

















Appendix P: Mediation Analyses 
Model 2 
Mediation Results for AEI Emotion Management and Happiness with 95% Confidence 
Intervals (N = 149) 
Mediation results  Coefficient  LLCI  ULCI 
Outcome: Reactivity to positive posts       
R = .53, F (15,149) = 3.42, p = .0001       
AEI (EM)  1.37  1.83  2.32 
Sex  -.21  .42  .09 
Openness  -.02  -.12  .08 
Conscientiousness  -.08  -.23  .08 
Extraversion  .07  -.06  .19 
Agreeableness  .01  .-.12  .14 
Neuroticism  .00  -.09  .09 
Cognitive ability  .01  -.02  .03 
Impulse control  .00  -.02  .02 
Self-deceptive enhancement  .14  -.81  1.09 
Impression management  -.06  -.24  .11 
Baseline positive affect  .03  .01  .04 
Baseline negative affect  -.02  -.04  .00 
Social media use  .01  .00  .03 
Outcome: Reactivity to negative posts       
R =N .50, F (13,41) = 2.93, p = .005       
AEI (EM)  -.78  2.24  4.92 
Sex  .27  .03  .50 
Openness  .01  -.07  .09 
Conscientiousness  .03  -.09  .15 
Extraversion  -.02  -.12  .09 
Agreeableness  -.04  -.15  .07 
Neuroticism  -.01  -.08  .06 
Cognitive ability  -.01  -.03  .01 
Impulse control  .00  -.01  .02 
Self-deceptive enhancement  -.35  -1.11  .341 
Impression management  -.01  -.15  .13 
Baseline positive affect  .00  -.02  .02 
Baseline negative affect  .00  -.02  .01 
Social media use  .00  -.02  .01 
Outcome: Life satisfaction       
R = .65, F (13,41) = 5.65, p = .0000       
AEI (EM)  -4.82  -12.16  2.50 




Reactivity to negative posts       
Sex  .32  -1.93  2.57 
Openness  -.87  -1.64  -.11 
Conscientiousness  .41  -.73  1.55 
Extraversion  .36  -.59  1.31 
Agreeableness  .56  -.43  1.55 
Neuroticism  -.22  -.87  .43 
Cognitive ability  .05  -.14  .25 
Impulse control  .21  .04  .39 
Self-deceptive enhancement  -.89  -7.94  6.16 
Impression management  -1.17  -2.47  .13 
Baseline positive affect  .15  .03  .28 
Baseline negative affect  -.19  -.34  -.03 
Social media use  -.01  -.15  .14 
Indirect effects:  Effect  BootLLCI  BootULCI 
Reactivity to positive posts  1.98  2.51  5.50 
Reactivity to negative posts  .98  .25  4.07 
Direct effect  4.83  -12.17  2.50 
Note. AEI (EM) = Ability EI (emotion management); LLCI = Low Limit Confidence Interval; ULCI = 

















Appendix P: Mediation Analyses 
Model 3 
Mediation Results for AEI Emotion Perception and Happiness with 95% Confidence Intervals 
(N = 149) 
Mediation results  Coefficient  LLCI  ULCI 
Outcome: Reactivity to positive posts       
R = .48, F (15,149) = 2.64, p = .0016       
AEI (EP)  .00  -.01  .00 
Sex  -.31  -.61  .00 
Openness  -.02  -.12  .09 
Conscientiousness  -.08  -.24  .08 
Extraversion  .06  -.07  .19 
Agreeableness  .04  -.10  .17 
Neuroticism  .01  -.08  .10 
Cognitive ability  .01  -.02  .04 
Impulse control  .-1  -.01  .04 
Self-deceptive enhancement  .08  -.90  1.05 
Impression management  -.09  -.27  .09 
Baseline positive affect  .03  .05  .00 
Baseline negative affect  -.03  -.05  -.01 
Social media use  .00  -.02  .02 
Outcome: Reactivity to negative posts       
R = .53, F (13,41) = 3.39, p = .0001       
AEI (EP)  -.01  -.02  -.01 
Sex  .27  .03  .50 
Openness  .02  -.06  .11 
Conscientiousness  .05  -.07  .17 
Extraversion  -.01  -.11  .09 
Agreeableness  -.03  -.13  .08 
Neuroticism  -.01  -.07  .06 
Cognitive ability  -.02  -.04  .00 
Impulse control  .00  -.02  .01 
Self-deceptive enhancement  -.41  =1.16  .34 
Impression management  -.04  -.18  .10 
Baseline positive affect  .00  -.02  .01 
Baseline negative affect  .00  -.02  .01 
Social media use  -.01  -.02  .01 
Outcome: Happiness       
R = .74, F (13,41) = 9.30, p = .0000       
AEI (EP)  -.01  -.02  .01 




Reactivity to negative posts  -.02  -.30  .27 
Sex  .16  -.22  .54 
Openness  -.06  -.18  .07 
Conscientiousness  .15  -.05  .034 
Extraversion  .13  -.03  .29 
Agreeableness  .18  .01  .36 
Neuroticism  -.05  -.26  .06 
Cognitive ability  .00  -.03  .03 
Impulse control  .05  .02  .08 
Self-deceptive enhancement  -.44  -1.64  .76 
Impression management  -.13  -.34  .09 
Baseline positive affect  .03  .01  .06 
Baseline negative affect  -.03  -.05  -.01 
Social media use  -.02  -.04  .01 
Indirect effects:  Effect  BootLLCI  BootULCI 
Reactivity to positive posts  .00  .00  .00 
Reactivity to negative posts  .00  .00  .00 
Direct effect  -.01  -.02  .01 
Note. AEI (EM) = Ability EI (emotion management); LLCI = Low Limit Confidence Interval; ULCI = Upper 

















Appendix P: Mediation Analyses 
Model 4 
Mediation Results for AEI Emotion Perception and Life Satisfaction with 95% Confidence 
Intervals (N = 149) 
Mediation results  Coefficient  LLCI  ULCI 
Outcome: Reactivity to positive posts       
R = .48, F (15,149) = 2.64, p = .0016       
AEI (EP)  .00  -.01  .00 
Sex  -.31  -.61  .00 
Openness  -.02  -.12  .09 
Conscientiousness  -.08  -.24  .08 
Extraversion  .06  -.07  .19 
Agreeableness  .04  -.10  .17 
Neuroticism  .01  -.08  .10 
Cognitive ability  .01  -.02  .04 
Impulse control  .-.01  -.01  .04 
Self-deceptive enhancement  .08  -.90  1.05 
Impression management  -.09  -.27  .09 
Baseline positive affect  .03  .05  .00 
Baseline negative affect  -.03  -.05  -.01 
Social media use  .00  -.02  .02 
Outcome: Reactivity to negative posts       
R = .52, F (13,41) = 3.39, p = .0001       
AEI (EP)  -.01  -.02  -.01 
Sex  .27  .03  .50 
Openness  .02  -.06  .11 
Conscientiousness  .05  -.07  .17 
Extraversion  -.01  -.11  .09 
Agreeableness  -.03  -.13  .08 
Neuroticism  -.01  -.07  .06 
Cognitive ability  -.02  -.04  .00 
Impulse control  .00  -.02  .01 
Self-deceptive enhancement  -.41  =1.16  .34 
Impression management  -.04  -.18  .10 
Baseline positive affect  .00  -.02  .01 
Baseline negative affect  .00  -.02  .01 
Social media use  -.01  -.02  .01 
Outcome: Life satisfaction       
R = .65, F (13,41) = 5.49, p = .0000       
AEI (EP)  .01  -.06  .08 




Reactivity to negative posts  -.97  -2.60  .65 
Sex  .32  -1.93  2.57 
Openness  -.87  -1.64  -.11 
Conscientiousness  .41  -.73  1.55 
Extraversion  .36  -.59  1.31 
Agreeableness  .56  -.43  1.55 
Neuroticism  -.22  -.87  .43 
Cognitive ability  .05  -.14  .25 
Impulse control  .21  .04  .39 
Self-deceptive enhancement  -.89  -7.94  6.16 
Impression management  -1.17  -2.47  .13 
Baseline positive affect  .15  .03  .28 
Baseline negative affect  -.19  -.34  -.03 
Social media use  -.01  -.15  .14 
Indirect effects:  Effect  BootLLCI  BootULCI 
Reactivity to positive posts  -.01  -.03  .01 
Reactivity to negative posts  .01  -.01  .04 
Direct effect  .01  -.01  .04 
Note. AEI (EM) = Ability EI (emotion management); LLCI = Low Limit Confidence Interval; ULCI = 
Upper Limit Confidence Interval; BootLLCI = bootstrapped LLCI; bootULCI = bootstrapped ULCL. 
 
 
 
 
 
